Joaquin Millon - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Papers by Joaquin Millon

Tomando las consecuencias en serio. Ensayos en homenaje a Martín Diego Farrell, Joaquín Millón Quintana y Florencia Saulino (coords.), (Bs. As.: La Ley - Universidad de Palermo, 2022), 2022

This work revisits both Ronald Dworkin’s original critique to legal positivism, exposed in “The M... more This work revisits both Ronald Dworkin’s original critique to legal positivism, exposed in “The Model of Rules”, and his most articulated reformulation, displayed in Law's Empire. Contrary to what current dominant readings suggest, I emphasize that there is an obvious identity relation in Dworkin’s objections. Dworkin’s challenges go beyond his generic purpose at pointing out legal positivism limitations, regarding the role that morality takes at the process of legal adjudication. Rather, over the years, his criticism has always been aimed at questioning what ended up being, for many commentators, the most basic thesis of the type of positivism championed by H.L.A. Hart. That is, that law, as a human artifice, involves a conventional reality. The paper argues that once we identify this core feature of Dworkin's criticism, we are able to realize to what extent Hart’s and Genaro Carrió’s seminal replies were inadequate, even considering “The Model of Rules” arguments. This paper tries to show that both Dworkin’s early and mature arguments against positivism challenged superficial reconstructions of the legal phenomenon. Throughout the course of the debate, Dworkin highlighted, once and again, there is no such a thing as a uniform social practice that might allow the individualization of the content of law, in the relatively simple way implied in Hart’s most basic ideas. What has always been under discussion is the possibility that the conventional features of Hart’s theory may have some explanatory value of legal reasoning. Therefore, Hart’s and Carrió’s efforts to open a conceptual space in the idea of the rule of recognition in order to admit the incorporation of moral standards into law, was doomed from the start. If those replies intended to confront Dworkin’s original attack, they left unanswered a more basic question: how such conception of law, so attached to that relatively straightforward possibility to identify agreements between legal officials, could do justice to the complexity of the legal arguments?

Resumen
Este trabajo pretende revisitar tanto la originaria crítica de Ronald Dworkin al positivismo, expuesta en “The Model of Rules”, como su más articulada reformulación, desarrollada en Law’s Empire. Contrariamente a lo que sugieren las lecturas hoy dominantes, me interesa destacar que hay una evidente relación de identidad en las objeciones de Dworkin. Sus desafíos trascienden el propósito genérico de señalar las limitaciones del positivismo en cuanto al rol que la moral tiene en la identificación y aplicación del derecho. Antes bien, a lo largo de los años, la crítica siempre ha estado dirigida a cuestionar lo que acabó por revelarse, para muchos, como la tesis más básica del tipo de positivismo jurídico defendido por H.L.A. Hart. Esto es, que el derecho, en tanto artificio humano, involucra una realidad convencional. Una vez que identificamos este aspecto medular de los cuestionamientos de Dworkin, es posible advertir en qué medida las réplicas aportadas en su momento por Hart y Genaro Carrió, resultan inadecuadas, incluso considerando los seminales argumentos de “The Model of Rules”. Para ello se intentará demostrar que tanto los iniciales como los maduros argumentos de Dworkin contra el positivismo pretendían resistir cualquier reconstrucción superficial del fenómeno jurídico. A lo largo del debate, Dworkin puso en evidencia, una y otra vez, la ausencia de una práctica social uniforme que permita identificar el contenido del derecho, del modo relativamente simple que viene implicado en las principales ideas de Hart. De este modo, lo que siempre estuvo en discusión es la posibilidad de que los rasgos convencionales de la teoría de Hart puedan tener algún valor explicativo del razonamiento de jueces y abogados. De allí que la insistencia de Hart y Carrió por abrir un espacio conceptual en la regla de reconocimiento a fin de admitir la incorporación de estándares morales haya estado condenada desde el comienzo. Si mediante esa respuesta se pretendía enfrentar a los inaugurales argumentos de Dworkin, quedaba sin responder cómo una concepción del derecho aferrada a la posibilidad de que pueda verificarse una convención entre los operadores jurídicos oficiales puede hacer justicia a la complejidad de la argumentación jurídica.

Desafios constitucionales de los procesos migratorios en el siglo XXI., 2020

The place on earth where we are born impacts heavily on our life prospects, our possibilities of... more The place on earth where we are born impacts heavily on our life prospects, our possibilities of development and personal flourishment. This factual premise has led many to conceive political borders between nation states as a profound source of socio-economic injustice. Certainly, in addition to favoring wealth redistribution structures among nation states, some scholars have also advocate for the implementation of open borders regimes, which would allow individuals to move freely across the planet. All these institutional arrangements, it is thought, would expand the conditions of equal opportunities worldwide. These proposals could be contested from both a theoretical and a practical perspective. However, the immediate need for the adoption of such international mechanisms of social justice seems to be the normative conclusion of the recognition of the universal nature of human rights. If every individual has equal value, their socio-economic requirements transcend borders, given that such contingencies cannot justify any distinction on this matter. Considering the implications of the above are particularly pressing in countries like Argentina, where a large number of international human rights treaties are granted constitutional rank, this paper outlines the serious problems of reconstructing our Constitution under this interpretation of human rights, conceived as mechanisms of redistributive justice at a global level. This work will begin by pointing out that in a context where those who have economic resources to emigrate are usually not the most disadvantaged individuals on the planet and, in any case, where immigrants will represent a tiny fraction of those in need, open borders' theories fail to articulate how such an ideal of free mobility would improve the conditions of equal opportunities on a global scale. More importantly, reconstructing our constitutional practice as inexorably devoted to the fulfillment of general duties in terms of redistributive justice is not consistent with relevant aspects of that same practice. Indeed, a pivotal feature of our constitutional life consists in considering citizens as mediate authors in the institutional procedures that define the domestic structures of distribution of burdens and benefits, for which they are also held responsible. In this sense, the paper highlights that those who are part of this associative dynamics are only obliged to attend to the claims of distributive justice of others with whom they are politically linked and held co-responsible. Nevertheless, the work also argues that this reconstruction of our constitutional practice should leave enough normative place to identify humanitarian duties in circumstances were non-citizens are under pressing need, emphasizing that such cases should not be understood as instances of distributive justice. Yet, the paper warns us that advocating for readings of our Constitution triggering exorbitant recognitions of those general humanitarian duties, might undermine our capacity to hold us together as a political community, hampering the fundamental role that document has—and must have—for this purpose.

Tomando las consecuencias en serio. Ensayos en homenaje a Martín Diego Farrell, Joaquín Millón Quintana y Florencia Saulino (coords.), (Bs. As.: La Ley - Universidad de Palermo, 2022), 2022

This work revisits both Ronald Dworkin’s original critique to legal positivism, exposed in “The M... more This work revisits both Ronald Dworkin’s original critique to legal positivism, exposed in “The Model of Rules”, and his most articulated reformulation, displayed in Law's Empire. Contrary to what current dominant readings suggest, I emphasize that there is an obvious identity relation in Dworkin’s objections. Dworkin’s challenges go beyond his generic purpose at pointing out legal positivism limitations, regarding the role that morality takes at the process of legal adjudication. Rather, over the years, his criticism has always been aimed at questioning what ended up being, for many commentators, the most basic thesis of the type of positivism championed by H.L.A. Hart. That is, that law, as a human artifice, involves a conventional reality. The paper argues that once we identify this core feature of Dworkin's criticism, we are able to realize to what extent Hart’s and Genaro Carrió’s seminal replies were inadequate, even considering “The Model of Rules” arguments. This paper tries to show that both Dworkin’s early and mature arguments against positivism challenged superficial reconstructions of the legal phenomenon. Throughout the course of the debate, Dworkin highlighted, once and again, there is no such a thing as a uniform social practice that might allow the individualization of the content of law, in the relatively simple way implied in Hart’s most basic ideas. What has always been under discussion is the possibility that the conventional features of Hart’s theory may have some explanatory value of legal reasoning. Therefore, Hart’s and Carrió’s efforts to open a conceptual space in the idea of the rule of recognition in order to admit the incorporation of moral standards into law, was doomed from the start. If those replies intended to confront Dworkin’s original attack, they left unanswered a more basic question: how such conception of law, so attached to that relatively straightforward possibility to identify agreements between legal officials, could do justice to the complexity of the legal arguments?

Resumen
Este trabajo pretende revisitar tanto la originaria crítica de Ronald Dworkin al positivismo, expuesta en “The Model of Rules”, como su más articulada reformulación, desarrollada en Law’s Empire. Contrariamente a lo que sugieren las lecturas hoy dominantes, me interesa destacar que hay una evidente relación de identidad en las objeciones de Dworkin. Sus desafíos trascienden el propósito genérico de señalar las limitaciones del positivismo en cuanto al rol que la moral tiene en la identificación y aplicación del derecho. Antes bien, a lo largo de los años, la crítica siempre ha estado dirigida a cuestionar lo que acabó por revelarse, para muchos, como la tesis más básica del tipo de positivismo jurídico defendido por H.L.A. Hart. Esto es, que el derecho, en tanto artificio humano, involucra una realidad convencional. Una vez que identificamos este aspecto medular de los cuestionamientos de Dworkin, es posible advertir en qué medida las réplicas aportadas en su momento por Hart y Genaro Carrió, resultan inadecuadas, incluso considerando los seminales argumentos de “The Model of Rules”. Para ello se intentará demostrar que tanto los iniciales como los maduros argumentos de Dworkin contra el positivismo pretendían resistir cualquier reconstrucción superficial del fenómeno jurídico. A lo largo del debate, Dworkin puso en evidencia, una y otra vez, la ausencia de una práctica social uniforme que permita identificar el contenido del derecho, del modo relativamente simple que viene implicado en las principales ideas de Hart. De este modo, lo que siempre estuvo en discusión es la posibilidad de que los rasgos convencionales de la teoría de Hart puedan tener algún valor explicativo del razonamiento de jueces y abogados. De allí que la insistencia de Hart y Carrió por abrir un espacio conceptual en la regla de reconocimiento a fin de admitir la incorporación de estándares morales haya estado condenada desde el comienzo. Si mediante esa respuesta se pretendía enfrentar a los inaugurales argumentos de Dworkin, quedaba sin responder cómo una concepción del derecho aferrada a la posibilidad de que pueda verificarse una convención entre los operadores jurídicos oficiales puede hacer justicia a la complejidad de la argumentación jurídica.

Desafios constitucionales de los procesos migratorios en el siglo XXI., 2020

The place on earth where we are born impacts heavily on our life prospects, our possibilities of... more The place on earth where we are born impacts heavily on our life prospects, our possibilities of development and personal flourishment. This factual premise has led many to conceive political borders between nation states as a profound source of socio-economic injustice. Certainly, in addition to favoring wealth redistribution structures among nation states, some scholars have also advocate for the implementation of open borders regimes, which would allow individuals to move freely across the planet. All these institutional arrangements, it is thought, would expand the conditions of equal opportunities worldwide. These proposals could be contested from both a theoretical and a practical perspective. However, the immediate need for the adoption of such international mechanisms of social justice seems to be the normative conclusion of the recognition of the universal nature of human rights. If every individual has equal value, their socio-economic requirements transcend borders, given that such contingencies cannot justify any distinction on this matter. Considering the implications of the above are particularly pressing in countries like Argentina, where a large number of international human rights treaties are granted constitutional rank, this paper outlines the serious problems of reconstructing our Constitution under this interpretation of human rights, conceived as mechanisms of redistributive justice at a global level. This work will begin by pointing out that in a context where those who have economic resources to emigrate are usually not the most disadvantaged individuals on the planet and, in any case, where immigrants will represent a tiny fraction of those in need, open borders' theories fail to articulate how such an ideal of free mobility would improve the conditions of equal opportunities on a global scale. More importantly, reconstructing our constitutional practice as inexorably devoted to the fulfillment of general duties in terms of redistributive justice is not consistent with relevant aspects of that same practice. Indeed, a pivotal feature of our constitutional life consists in considering citizens as mediate authors in the institutional procedures that define the domestic structures of distribution of burdens and benefits, for which they are also held responsible. In this sense, the paper highlights that those who are part of this associative dynamics are only obliged to attend to the claims of distributive justice of others with whom they are politically linked and held co-responsible. Nevertheless, the work also argues that this reconstruction of our constitutional practice should leave enough normative place to identify humanitarian duties in circumstances were non-citizens are under pressing need, emphasizing that such cases should not be understood as instances of distributive justice. Yet, the paper warns us that advocating for readings of our Constitution triggering exorbitant recognitions of those general humanitarian duties, might undermine our capacity to hold us together as a political community, hampering the fundamental role that document has—and must have—for this purpose.