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Papers by Johan Moyersoen
Symposium on Enhanced …, 2010
In 2006, the Flemish government (Belgium) and the Flemish Public Waste Agency (OVAM) decided to s... more In 2006, the Flemish government (Belgium) and the Flemish Public Waste Agency (OVAM) decided to start a transition process in Sustainable Materials Management, called 'Plan C'. Together with a diverse group of stakeholders Plan C developed a vision or 'Leitbild' ...
Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 2004
This paper proposes a new approach to identify robust joint actions for groups in conflict. It pu... more This paper proposes a new approach to identify robust joint actions for groups in conflict. It puts forward the concept of stable neighborhood positions or positions of local satiation. Positions of local satiation are positions of joint action where a small deviation of either of the belligerent groups from that arrangement does not increase one's benefit. The paper seeks to support its argument in two ways. First, it gives a descriptive foundation extracted from prospect theory for the concept of positions of local satiation. Especially the concept of myopic loss aversion that embraces narrow framing and local loss aversion is employed. Second, it tries to apply the concept of stable neighborhood positions in a case study. The case study unravels an investment conflict in the city of Brussels, Belgium.
Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 2003
Substantial evidence suggests that group diversity can generate a multiplier effect that signific... more Substantial evidence suggests that group diversity can generate a multiplier effect that significantly affects the public good produced in collective action. In this paper, we examine how such a multiplier effect impacts group formation or the matching of diverse agents. Our model shows that when group diversity or financial rewards to group diversity are low, increasing rewards to diversity can crowd-out individual incentives to cooperate and choose a socially superior investment strategy. The higher diversity rewards essentially create a higher implicit tax or requisite implicit compensations to sustain the cooperative voluntary production of the public good. For very diverse groups, by contrast, we find that greater diversity rewards can both increase individual contributions to the public good initiative (ie. exerts a direct effect on individual contribution behavior), and lower individual incentives to deviate from their cooperative strategies (ie. exerts an indirect effect on ...
Symposium on Enhanced …, 2010
In 2006, the Flemish government (Belgium) and the Flemish Public Waste Agency (OVAM) decided to s... more In 2006, the Flemish government (Belgium) and the Flemish Public Waste Agency (OVAM) decided to start a transition process in Sustainable Materials Management, called 'Plan C'. Together with a diverse group of stakeholders Plan C developed a vision or 'Leitbild' ...
Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 2004
This paper proposes a new approach to identify robust joint actions for groups in conflict. It pu... more This paper proposes a new approach to identify robust joint actions for groups in conflict. It puts forward the concept of stable neighborhood positions or positions of local satiation. Positions of local satiation are positions of joint action where a small deviation of either of the belligerent groups from that arrangement does not increase one's benefit. The paper seeks to support its argument in two ways. First, it gives a descriptive foundation extracted from prospect theory for the concept of positions of local satiation. Especially the concept of myopic loss aversion that embraces narrow framing and local loss aversion is employed. Second, it tries to apply the concept of stable neighborhood positions in a case study. The case study unravels an investment conflict in the city of Brussels, Belgium.
Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 2003
Substantial evidence suggests that group diversity can generate a multiplier effect that signific... more Substantial evidence suggests that group diversity can generate a multiplier effect that significantly affects the public good produced in collective action. In this paper, we examine how such a multiplier effect impacts group formation or the matching of diverse agents. Our model shows that when group diversity or financial rewards to group diversity are low, increasing rewards to diversity can crowd-out individual incentives to cooperate and choose a socially superior investment strategy. The higher diversity rewards essentially create a higher implicit tax or requisite implicit compensations to sustain the cooperative voluntary production of the public good. For very diverse groups, by contrast, we find that greater diversity rewards can both increase individual contributions to the public good initiative (ie. exerts a direct effect on individual contribution behavior), and lower individual incentives to deviate from their cooperative strategies (ie. exerts an indirect effect on ...