John Sorensen - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Papers by John Sorensen
Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment, 2020
Abstract Household evacuation preparation time distributions are essential when computing evacuat... more Abstract Household evacuation preparation time distributions are essential when computing evacuation time estimates (ETEs) for hurricanes with late intensification or late changing tracks. Although evacuation preparation times have been assessed by expected task completion times, actual task completion times, and departure delays, it is unknown if these methods produce similar results. Consequently, this study compares data from one survey assessing expected task completion times, three surveys assessing actual task completion times, and three surveys assessing departure delays after receiving a warning. In addition, this study seeks to identify variables that predict household evacuation preparation times. These analyses show that the three methods of assessing evacuation preparation times produce results that are somewhat different, but the differences have plausible explanations. Household evacuation preparation times are poorly predicted by demographic variables, but are better predicted by variables that predict evacuation decisions—perceived storm characteristics, expected personal impacts, and evacuation facilitators.
a study on warning systems, some of which was translated into the standards included here as Appe... more a study on warning systems, some of which was translated into the standards included here as Appendix F. Lee L. Williams of the University of Tennessee was heavily involved in the preparation of Appendices B, G, and K. Finally, the U.S. Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency provided much of the text regarding training and exercises included in sections 8.19 and 8.20. We also wish to express appreciation to the people and agencies who have provided insightful comments on this report during its long period of evolution. The U.S. Army, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Installations, Logistics, and Environment, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Office of Technological Hazards, have provided extensive review and guidance of this effort. In addition, the report has been shaped by comments received from the affected FEMA Regional offices, the state and county governments involved in the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Finally, we gratefully acknowledge the notable contributions made by Cynthia J. Coomer, Lori A Warnecke, and Beverly J. Norton in organizing and producing the document. TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF FIGURES vi LIST OF TABLES vi ACRONYMS vii 1.
Because the goal of emergency preparedness for both chemical and nuclear hazards is to reduce hum... more Because the goal of emergency preparedness for both chemical and nuclear hazards is to reduce human exposure to hazardous materials, this paper examines the interchange of lessons learned from emergency planning and accident experience in both industries. While the concerns are slightly different, sufficient similarity is found for each to draw implications from the others experience. Principally the chemical industry can learn from the dominant planning experience associated with nuclear power plants, while the nuclear industry can chiefly learn from the chemical industry's accident experience. 23 refs.
The importance of social and institutional issues in the siting of nuclear waste facilities has b... more The importance of social and institutional issues in the siting of nuclear waste facilities has been recognized in recent years. Limited evidence from a survey of rural Wisconsin residents in 1980 indicates that incentives may help achieve the twin goals of increasing local support and decreasing local opposition to nosting nuclear waste facilities. Incentives are classified according to functional categories (i.e., mitigation, compensation, and reward) and the conditions which may be prerequisites to the use of incentives are outlined (i,e., guarantee of public health and safety, some measure of local control, and a legiti mation of negotiations during siting). Criteria for evaluating the utility of incentives in nuclear waste repository siting are developed. Incentive packages may be more useful than single incentives, and non monetary incentives, such as independent monitoring and access to credi ble information, may be as important in eliciting support as monetary incentives. Without careful attention to prerequisites in the siting process it is not likely that incentives will facilitate the siting process. vi LIST OF TABLES Fa"orability to siting a nuclear waste facility in the respondent's community after exposure to incentives ... 9 Distribution of. persons who changed their position to accept a waste repository in their community by type of incentive package Distribution of the acceptance of incentives to site a nuclear waste repository among Wisconsin residents .... Distribution of persons who changed their position to accept a waste repository in their community by type of incentive package Favorability to siting a nuclear waste facility in the respondent's community after exposure to incentives by selected demographic and social characteristics Favorability to siting a nuclear waste facility in the respondent's community after exposure to incentives by community setting v11
Dimensions of hazardous events 21 Hypothetical values for a Jane Doe and Jack Smith 54 Behavioral... more Dimensions of hazardous events 21 Hypothetical values for a Jane Doe and Jack Smith 54 Behavioral adjustments to risks of a future disaster .... 65 Cognitive adjustments to restart and associated impacts 66 Risk perceptions of the TMI-2 iccident 95 Attitudes towards coping ability 97 Coping by evacuation 98 Evaluation of information sources 100 Disruption of households 100 1C Economic impacts of the accident 102 11 Summary of changes in obtrusive measures of stress following TMI-2 accident 103 Reasons for relocation of professionals 107 Summary of analogous elements in three somewhat unique situations lit Conflict and harmony concerning ha7*rdous events 125 Bruce Petersen, who reviewed the real estate studies. George Marheit, University of Florida, assisted in defining future research needs. Tom Drabek, University or Denver, provided input for defining the conceptual framework and reviewed a draft manuscript. Social Impacts Research collected the data for the profiling section. The authors of the report deserve recognition for their major contributions. Sam Carries was mainly responsible for mitigation. Emily Copenhaver contributed to mitigation and developed the profiling summary. Robert BpHn contributed a large part .ofJtheJjJterature.j=ev4«w,-_Jc»4od6r*tr«ii-had-€hfefresponsibility for summarizing the methodological considerations and defining the TMI restart issues. John Sorensen served as the project leader and had responsibility for developing the conceptual framework and putting the report together. The report, however, is truly a team 1x/X aaggfe^vs. 1 £23$,?* •^3 .vS-'-"^^"-^WP^igr'-fH^pr:: and assi5t#npe frpp R, Br^ii^ j. Honea, H. «$tiel.
Journal of Hazardous Materials, 1991
Emergency preparedness for chemical hazards is a relatively recent phenomenon. The earliest plans... more Emergency preparedness for chemical hazards is a relatively recent phenomenon. The earliest plans were adopted in the late 1960's but more than half of the existing chemical plans were enacted after 1987. The central purpose of this paper is to examine factors underlying variations in levels of community preparedness for chemical hazards. Ideally, the implementation process would be observed directly in a number of communities to determine the events and factors that stimulate the adoption of various planning practices; However, such a study is probably unrealistic, expensive and unlikely to be able to observe enough of the process to be usefui. This paper examines survey data collected in late-1987 and mid-1988, in support of the SARA Title III Section 305b Report to Congress. Five factors related to the adoption of state-of-the-art planning practices among local community emergency management organizations are examined: innovation, available resources, necessity, vicarious experience, and professionalism. While each of these factors exhibit relationships with the adoption of state-of-the-art planning practices, none is sufficient to explain the trends in the adoption of planning practices. Supporting evidence is presented that links the adoption of state-of-the-art planning practices to the evaluation of risk in the community and innovation in other related areas.
Journal of Hazardous Materials, 1992
The selection of an emergency planning zone {EPZ) for hazardous materials is often a difficult te... more The selection of an emergency planning zone {EPZ) for hazardous materials is often a difficult technical as well as a political task. This paper describes a method used in the United States to establish EPZs in the Army's Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program. A rationale for a zoned based approach to emergency planning for hazardous materials is developed. The method presented integrates risk analysis data with meteorological, topographical, demographic, and political concerns. The method is then applied at the Tooele Army Depot in Tooele, Utah. Although the analysis concerns chemical weapons, the process is relevant to other hazardous material problems.
LIST OF FIGURES Figure 2.1. The general components of an integrated warning system 2-4 3.1. Examp... more LIST OF FIGURES Figure 2.1. The general components of an integrated warning system 2-4 3.1. Examples of detection management linkages 3-5 3.2. The style and content of a warning message 3-10 3.3. A guide for selecting warning channels 3-16 5.1. Typology of sender characteristics 5-4 5.2. Typology of receiver characteristics 5-5 5.3. A model for the determinants and consequences of public warning response 5-14 6.1. Classification of warning systems 6-8 7.1. A proposed cross-hazard tiered warning system scheme 7-12 x xi LIST OF TABLES Table 2.1. Reported rates of informal notification. 2-12 6.1. A typology of hazard types. 6-9 7.1. Status of monitoring and detection technology and application coverage for warning systems 7-2 xii xiii ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS AND INITIALISMS
This report has been reproduced directly from the best available copy. Available to DOE and DOE c... more This report has been reproduced directly from the best available copy. Available to DOE and DOE contractors from the Office of Scientific and Technical Information, P.O. Box 62, Oak Ridge, TN 37831; prices available fiom (615) 576-8401, FTS 626-8401.
This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of United States Government... more This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of United States Government. Neither die United States Governnient nor any agency diereof. nor any of l e i r employees. makes any warranty, express or implied. or assunies any legal 1i;ihility or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness. or usefulness of any information, apparatus. product. or process disclosed. or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned righls. Reference lierein to any specific commercial product, process. or service by tradc name, trademark. nianufxturer, or odierwise. docs not iiecessarily constitute or imply its endorsement. recommendation. or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof. Tlic views and opinions of audiors expressed herein do not necessarily state o r retlect those of die United States Government or any agency thcrcof.
This report describes a U.S. Department of Energy, (DOE) Chemical and Biological National Securit... more This report describes a U.S. Department of Energy, (DOE) Chemical and Biological National Security Program project that sought to establish what is known about decontamination of structures, objects, and people following an exposure to chemical or biological materials. Specifically we sought to identify the procedures and protocols used to determine when and how people or buildings are considered "clean" following decontamination. To fulfill this objective, the study systematically examined reported decontamination experiences to determine what procedures and protocols are currently employed for decontamination, the timeframe involved to initiate and complete the decontamination process, how the contaminants were identified, the factors determining when people were (or were not) decontaminated, the problems encountered during the decontamination process, how response efforts of agencies were coordinated, and the perceived social psychological effects on people who were decontaminated or who participated in the decontamination process. Findings and recommendations from the study are intended to aid decision-making and to improve the basis for determining appropriate decontamination protocols for recovery planners and policy makers for responding to chemical and biological events.
Natural Hazards Review, 2000
Abstract. In 1995, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39 introduced the nation to the term Con... more Abstract. In 1995, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39 introduced the nation to the term Consequence Management which meant to establish how the effects of a terrorist attack employing weapons of mass destruction and/or other means would be managed. The importance of Consequence Management became more apparent after 9/11 as we realized that is impossible to harden the infrastructure to avoid losses in a range of damage scenarios. If damage occurs, the goal is to minimize those loses by an effective response and to achieve a rapid recovery. With this goal in mind, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), which over the years has conducted applied research and assisted in the development of emergency planning capabilities for a variety of agencies including the
Journal of Hazardous Materials, 1989
Warning system effectiveness is critically important in selecting an appropriate emergency warnin... more Warning system effectiveness is critically important in selecting an appropriate emergency warning system to alert to public to potential danger. This paper examines warning system effectiveness in terms of the timing of warning receipt and response. Warning receipt involves the analysis of when warning system information is received, which includes alerting the public and delivering a warning massage. Response involves what people decide to do on the basis of the information provided in the warning message. Data from post-event surveys conducted in communities affected by two U.S. train derailments in western Pennsylvania, one in Pittsburgh and the other in Confluence, in the spring of 1987 are analyzed The general logistic model of the diffusion of emergency warning specified in earlier works [ 11 is examined and found to fit the data from these events quite well. Warning penetration in these two events can be estimated as a function of the simulated models. While response can lag behind warning as much as 6 hours, the response occurs within an hour after warning receipt on average. Response time is found to be a function of when the warning is received, the warning message, and the source of the information.
Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment, 2020
Abstract Household evacuation preparation time distributions are essential when computing evacuat... more Abstract Household evacuation preparation time distributions are essential when computing evacuation time estimates (ETEs) for hurricanes with late intensification or late changing tracks. Although evacuation preparation times have been assessed by expected task completion times, actual task completion times, and departure delays, it is unknown if these methods produce similar results. Consequently, this study compares data from one survey assessing expected task completion times, three surveys assessing actual task completion times, and three surveys assessing departure delays after receiving a warning. In addition, this study seeks to identify variables that predict household evacuation preparation times. These analyses show that the three methods of assessing evacuation preparation times produce results that are somewhat different, but the differences have plausible explanations. Household evacuation preparation times are poorly predicted by demographic variables, but are better predicted by variables that predict evacuation decisions—perceived storm characteristics, expected personal impacts, and evacuation facilitators.
a study on warning systems, some of which was translated into the standards included here as Appe... more a study on warning systems, some of which was translated into the standards included here as Appendix F. Lee L. Williams of the University of Tennessee was heavily involved in the preparation of Appendices B, G, and K. Finally, the U.S. Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency provided much of the text regarding training and exercises included in sections 8.19 and 8.20. We also wish to express appreciation to the people and agencies who have provided insightful comments on this report during its long period of evolution. The U.S. Army, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Installations, Logistics, and Environment, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Office of Technological Hazards, have provided extensive review and guidance of this effort. In addition, the report has been shaped by comments received from the affected FEMA Regional offices, the state and county governments involved in the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Finally, we gratefully acknowledge the notable contributions made by Cynthia J. Coomer, Lori A Warnecke, and Beverly J. Norton in organizing and producing the document. TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF FIGURES vi LIST OF TABLES vi ACRONYMS vii 1.
Because the goal of emergency preparedness for both chemical and nuclear hazards is to reduce hum... more Because the goal of emergency preparedness for both chemical and nuclear hazards is to reduce human exposure to hazardous materials, this paper examines the interchange of lessons learned from emergency planning and accident experience in both industries. While the concerns are slightly different, sufficient similarity is found for each to draw implications from the others experience. Principally the chemical industry can learn from the dominant planning experience associated with nuclear power plants, while the nuclear industry can chiefly learn from the chemical industry's accident experience. 23 refs.
The importance of social and institutional issues in the siting of nuclear waste facilities has b... more The importance of social and institutional issues in the siting of nuclear waste facilities has been recognized in recent years. Limited evidence from a survey of rural Wisconsin residents in 1980 indicates that incentives may help achieve the twin goals of increasing local support and decreasing local opposition to nosting nuclear waste facilities. Incentives are classified according to functional categories (i.e., mitigation, compensation, and reward) and the conditions which may be prerequisites to the use of incentives are outlined (i,e., guarantee of public health and safety, some measure of local control, and a legiti mation of negotiations during siting). Criteria for evaluating the utility of incentives in nuclear waste repository siting are developed. Incentive packages may be more useful than single incentives, and non monetary incentives, such as independent monitoring and access to credi ble information, may be as important in eliciting support as monetary incentives. Without careful attention to prerequisites in the siting process it is not likely that incentives will facilitate the siting process. vi LIST OF TABLES Fa"orability to siting a nuclear waste facility in the respondent's community after exposure to incentives ... 9 Distribution of. persons who changed their position to accept a waste repository in their community by type of incentive package Distribution of the acceptance of incentives to site a nuclear waste repository among Wisconsin residents .... Distribution of persons who changed their position to accept a waste repository in their community by type of incentive package Favorability to siting a nuclear waste facility in the respondent's community after exposure to incentives by selected demographic and social characteristics Favorability to siting a nuclear waste facility in the respondent's community after exposure to incentives by community setting v11
Dimensions of hazardous events 21 Hypothetical values for a Jane Doe and Jack Smith 54 Behavioral... more Dimensions of hazardous events 21 Hypothetical values for a Jane Doe and Jack Smith 54 Behavioral adjustments to risks of a future disaster .... 65 Cognitive adjustments to restart and associated impacts 66 Risk perceptions of the TMI-2 iccident 95 Attitudes towards coping ability 97 Coping by evacuation 98 Evaluation of information sources 100 Disruption of households 100 1C Economic impacts of the accident 102 11 Summary of changes in obtrusive measures of stress following TMI-2 accident 103 Reasons for relocation of professionals 107 Summary of analogous elements in three somewhat unique situations lit Conflict and harmony concerning ha7*rdous events 125 Bruce Petersen, who reviewed the real estate studies. George Marheit, University of Florida, assisted in defining future research needs. Tom Drabek, University or Denver, provided input for defining the conceptual framework and reviewed a draft manuscript. Social Impacts Research collected the data for the profiling section. The authors of the report deserve recognition for their major contributions. Sam Carries was mainly responsible for mitigation. Emily Copenhaver contributed to mitigation and developed the profiling summary. Robert BpHn contributed a large part .ofJtheJjJterature.j=ev4«w,-_Jc»4od6r*tr«ii-had-€hfefresponsibility for summarizing the methodological considerations and defining the TMI restart issues. John Sorensen served as the project leader and had responsibility for developing the conceptual framework and putting the report together. The report, however, is truly a team 1x/X aaggfe^vs. 1 £23$,?* •^3 .vS-'-"^^"-^WP^igr'-fH^pr:: and assi5t#npe frpp R, Br^ii^ j. Honea, H. «$tiel.
Journal of Hazardous Materials, 1991
Emergency preparedness for chemical hazards is a relatively recent phenomenon. The earliest plans... more Emergency preparedness for chemical hazards is a relatively recent phenomenon. The earliest plans were adopted in the late 1960's but more than half of the existing chemical plans were enacted after 1987. The central purpose of this paper is to examine factors underlying variations in levels of community preparedness for chemical hazards. Ideally, the implementation process would be observed directly in a number of communities to determine the events and factors that stimulate the adoption of various planning practices; However, such a study is probably unrealistic, expensive and unlikely to be able to observe enough of the process to be usefui. This paper examines survey data collected in late-1987 and mid-1988, in support of the SARA Title III Section 305b Report to Congress. Five factors related to the adoption of state-of-the-art planning practices among local community emergency management organizations are examined: innovation, available resources, necessity, vicarious experience, and professionalism. While each of these factors exhibit relationships with the adoption of state-of-the-art planning practices, none is sufficient to explain the trends in the adoption of planning practices. Supporting evidence is presented that links the adoption of state-of-the-art planning practices to the evaluation of risk in the community and innovation in other related areas.
Journal of Hazardous Materials, 1992
The selection of an emergency planning zone {EPZ) for hazardous materials is often a difficult te... more The selection of an emergency planning zone {EPZ) for hazardous materials is often a difficult technical as well as a political task. This paper describes a method used in the United States to establish EPZs in the Army's Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program. A rationale for a zoned based approach to emergency planning for hazardous materials is developed. The method presented integrates risk analysis data with meteorological, topographical, demographic, and political concerns. The method is then applied at the Tooele Army Depot in Tooele, Utah. Although the analysis concerns chemical weapons, the process is relevant to other hazardous material problems.
LIST OF FIGURES Figure 2.1. The general components of an integrated warning system 2-4 3.1. Examp... more LIST OF FIGURES Figure 2.1. The general components of an integrated warning system 2-4 3.1. Examples of detection management linkages 3-5 3.2. The style and content of a warning message 3-10 3.3. A guide for selecting warning channels 3-16 5.1. Typology of sender characteristics 5-4 5.2. Typology of receiver characteristics 5-5 5.3. A model for the determinants and consequences of public warning response 5-14 6.1. Classification of warning systems 6-8 7.1. A proposed cross-hazard tiered warning system scheme 7-12 x xi LIST OF TABLES Table 2.1. Reported rates of informal notification. 2-12 6.1. A typology of hazard types. 6-9 7.1. Status of monitoring and detection technology and application coverage for warning systems 7-2 xii xiii ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS AND INITIALISMS
This report has been reproduced directly from the best available copy. Available to DOE and DOE c... more This report has been reproduced directly from the best available copy. Available to DOE and DOE contractors from the Office of Scientific and Technical Information, P.O. Box 62, Oak Ridge, TN 37831; prices available fiom (615) 576-8401, FTS 626-8401.
This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of United States Government... more This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of United States Government. Neither die United States Governnient nor any agency diereof. nor any of l e i r employees. makes any warranty, express or implied. or assunies any legal 1i;ihility or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness. or usefulness of any information, apparatus. product. or process disclosed. or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned righls. Reference lierein to any specific commercial product, process. or service by tradc name, trademark. nianufxturer, or odierwise. docs not iiecessarily constitute or imply its endorsement. recommendation. or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof. Tlic views and opinions of audiors expressed herein do not necessarily state o r retlect those of die United States Government or any agency thcrcof.
This report describes a U.S. Department of Energy, (DOE) Chemical and Biological National Securit... more This report describes a U.S. Department of Energy, (DOE) Chemical and Biological National Security Program project that sought to establish what is known about decontamination of structures, objects, and people following an exposure to chemical or biological materials. Specifically we sought to identify the procedures and protocols used to determine when and how people or buildings are considered "clean" following decontamination. To fulfill this objective, the study systematically examined reported decontamination experiences to determine what procedures and protocols are currently employed for decontamination, the timeframe involved to initiate and complete the decontamination process, how the contaminants were identified, the factors determining when people were (or were not) decontaminated, the problems encountered during the decontamination process, how response efforts of agencies were coordinated, and the perceived social psychological effects on people who were decontaminated or who participated in the decontamination process. Findings and recommendations from the study are intended to aid decision-making and to improve the basis for determining appropriate decontamination protocols for recovery planners and policy makers for responding to chemical and biological events.
Natural Hazards Review, 2000
Abstract. In 1995, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39 introduced the nation to the term Con... more Abstract. In 1995, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39 introduced the nation to the term Consequence Management which meant to establish how the effects of a terrorist attack employing weapons of mass destruction and/or other means would be managed. The importance of Consequence Management became more apparent after 9/11 as we realized that is impossible to harden the infrastructure to avoid losses in a range of damage scenarios. If damage occurs, the goal is to minimize those loses by an effective response and to achieve a rapid recovery. With this goal in mind, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), which over the years has conducted applied research and assisted in the development of emergency planning capabilities for a variety of agencies including the
Journal of Hazardous Materials, 1989
Warning system effectiveness is critically important in selecting an appropriate emergency warnin... more Warning system effectiveness is critically important in selecting an appropriate emergency warning system to alert to public to potential danger. This paper examines warning system effectiveness in terms of the timing of warning receipt and response. Warning receipt involves the analysis of when warning system information is received, which includes alerting the public and delivering a warning massage. Response involves what people decide to do on the basis of the information provided in the warning message. Data from post-event surveys conducted in communities affected by two U.S. train derailments in western Pennsylvania, one in Pittsburgh and the other in Confluence, in the spring of 1987 are analyzed The general logistic model of the diffusion of emergency warning specified in earlier works [ 11 is examined and found to fit the data from these events quite well. Warning penetration in these two events can be estimated as a function of the simulated models. While response can lag behind warning as much as 6 hours, the response occurs within an hour after warning receipt on average. Response time is found to be a function of when the warning is received, the warning message, and the source of the information.