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Papers by Jonathan Dancy
Oxford Scholarship Online, 2018
This chapter considers how to locate moral reasoning in terms of the structures that have emerged... more This chapter considers how to locate moral reasoning in terms of the structures that have emerged so far. It does not attempt to write a complete theory of moral thought. Its main purpose is rather to reassure us that moral reasoning—which might seem to be somehow both practical and theoretical at once—can be perfectly well handled using the tools developed in previous chapters. It also considers the question how we are to explain practical reasoning—and practical reasons more generally—by contrast with the explanation of theoretical reasons and reasoning offered in Chapter 4. This leads us to the first appearance of the Primacy of the Practical. The second appearance concerns reasons to intend.
Journal of the History of Philosophy, 1989
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 1986
In this paper I distinguish two conceptions of moral realism, strong and weak, and argue the meri... more In this paper I distinguish two conceptions of moral realism, strong and weak, and argue the merits of the former. In fact, I argue that the weak conception is not a form of moral realism at all. I take moral realism to be a view about the nature of moral properties; the realist holds that ...
Ragion pratica, 2003
... Jonathan Dancy Contro le ragioni basate su desideri Ragion pratica 20/giugno 2003 1. Ragioni ... more ... Jonathan Dancy Contro le ragioni basate su desideri Ragion pratica 20/giugno 2003 1. Ragioni motivanti e ragioni normative ... Questo tipo di ragione sarà da me chiamata ragione normativa. Le ragioni motivanti (motivating reasons) sono le ragioni in virtù delle quali noi agiamo. ...
Philosophical Books, 1995
CAN WE TRUST ANNETTE BAIER? This collection of fourteen essays (Moral Prgudices: Essays on Ethics... more CAN WE TRUST ANNETTE BAIER? This collection of fourteen essays (Moral Prgudices: Essays on Ethics. By Annette C. Baier. Harvard University Press, 1993. xiii + 353 pp. $42.50), some of which will already be familiar, is largely concerned with three broad topics, which are brought together in an attempt to write a moral theory which is acceptable to 'reflective women'. Those three topics are the post-Gilligan tradition, the contrast between Hume and Kant (in which Hume always emerges triumphant) and the notion of trust. This review will concentrate on the last of these, as being the most constructive and forward-looking. Baier suggests that a morality whose central concept is that of obligation needs to be supplemented by a morality of love, and that these two concepts can be given their proper place within an overall morality of trust. So we have a THE UNIVERSITY OF KEELE JONATHAN DANCY
A companion to ethics, 1991
The Philosophical Quarterly, 1983
Oxford University Press eBooks, Jul 29, 2021
Oxford University Press eBooks, Jul 19, 2018
This chapter shows how the various forms of theoretical reasoning—in particular, formal and proba... more This chapter shows how the various forms of theoretical reasoning—in particular, formal and probabilistic—can perfectly well be understood in the sort of way in which we are now understanding practical reasoning. There will be differences between practical and theoretical reasoning, but those differences are to be found in the ways in which we explain the various normative relations that play the driving role in the making of a case for doing, or believing, this or that. The structures are the same, but the explanations are not. This is true whether one thinks in terms of credences or more simply in terms of probability.
Oxford University Press eBooks, Jul 19, 2018
This chapter lays out various considerations that have persuaded people, or that might have influ... more This chapter lays out various considerations that have persuaded people, or that might have influenced people to believe, that reasoning cannot ‘conclude in’ action in the way that it can ‘conclude in’ belief. These include a sense that action is so unlike belief that it cannot figure anywhere in a process of inference; one cannot infer an action. Such suggestions are to be rejected in favour of the Aristotelian view that action can be the conclusion of reasoning, just as can belief. The chapter also makes some suggestions about how to conceive of action.
Oxford University Press eBooks, Jul 29, 2021
This Introduction is a short intellectual biography. In addition to telling how it was that the a... more This Introduction is a short intellectual biography. In addition to telling how it was that the author ended up in philosophy, it tracks the development of his views in the theory of reasons and the way in which combining those views with views he later developed in the theory of motivation reveal the possibility of a new form of Aristotelianism in the theory of practical reasoning. It ends by discussing the relevance of the distinction between knowledge and true belief to the theory of motivation.
Oxford University Press eBooks, Nov 6, 2014
Oxford University Press eBooks, Jul 29, 2021
This paper discusses two conceptions of organic unities. Moore, who first brought the notion of a... more This paper discusses two conceptions of organic unities. Moore, who first brought the notion of an organic unity to prominence, argues for an intrinsicalist conception of the organic: items do not have different non-instrumental value in different contexts, but the value they contribute to a whole of which they are a part may vary according to other parts of that whole. In this sense, they can contribute value that they have not got. This paper contrasts that conception with a different, variabilist conception which is more friendly to a general holism in the theory of value. It argues that intrinsicalism gives an incoherent account of what Moore calls vindictive punishment.
Oxford University Press eBooks, Jul 29, 2021
This paper starts by considering an interesting argument of H. A. Prichard’s against the view tha... more This paper starts by considering an interesting argument of H. A. Prichard’s against the view that to act is to cause a change; the argument is that causing is not an activity. The argument is important because of the recent emergence of an ‘agent-causation’ view according to which actions are the causing of changes by agents. The author suggests a way of responding to Prichard’s argument, and then, profiting from one of his own conclusions, turns to consider the relation between neurophysiological changes and the causation of bodily movement by the agent. The paper makes a suggestion about the proper way to understand the relation between the neurophysiological changes, the bodily movements and the action.
Oxford University Press eBooks, Jul 29, 2021
This paper is a successor to the author’s ‘In Defence of Thick Concepts’. It asks first whether a... more This paper is a successor to the author’s ‘In Defence of Thick Concepts’. It asks first whether all thick concepts have a default valence. It then considers how to account for the combination of the descriptive and the evaluative (which is sometimes called ‘interpenetration’) in a thick concept, and suggests that the so-called ‘no-priority’ view fails to do this. We might also wonder why the descriptive element is not always capable of separate instantiation. Various alternative moves are considered. The paper offers a considerably more varied list of supposedly thick concepts than is normal. It ends by suggesting that thick concepts are evaluative because competence with them involves grasp of their evaluative point.
Oxford Scholarship Online, 2018
This chapter considers how to locate moral reasoning in terms of the structures that have emerged... more This chapter considers how to locate moral reasoning in terms of the structures that have emerged so far. It does not attempt to write a complete theory of moral thought. Its main purpose is rather to reassure us that moral reasoning—which might seem to be somehow both practical and theoretical at once—can be perfectly well handled using the tools developed in previous chapters. It also considers the question how we are to explain practical reasoning—and practical reasons more generally—by contrast with the explanation of theoretical reasons and reasoning offered in Chapter 4. This leads us to the first appearance of the Primacy of the Practical. The second appearance concerns reasons to intend.
Journal of the History of Philosophy, 1989
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 1986
In this paper I distinguish two conceptions of moral realism, strong and weak, and argue the meri... more In this paper I distinguish two conceptions of moral realism, strong and weak, and argue the merits of the former. In fact, I argue that the weak conception is not a form of moral realism at all. I take moral realism to be a view about the nature of moral properties; the realist holds that ...
Ragion pratica, 2003
... Jonathan Dancy Contro le ragioni basate su desideri Ragion pratica 20/giugno 2003 1. Ragioni ... more ... Jonathan Dancy Contro le ragioni basate su desideri Ragion pratica 20/giugno 2003 1. Ragioni motivanti e ragioni normative ... Questo tipo di ragione sarà da me chiamata ragione normativa. Le ragioni motivanti (motivating reasons) sono le ragioni in virtù delle quali noi agiamo. ...
Philosophical Books, 1995
CAN WE TRUST ANNETTE BAIER? This collection of fourteen essays (Moral Prgudices: Essays on Ethics... more CAN WE TRUST ANNETTE BAIER? This collection of fourteen essays (Moral Prgudices: Essays on Ethics. By Annette C. Baier. Harvard University Press, 1993. xiii + 353 pp. $42.50), some of which will already be familiar, is largely concerned with three broad topics, which are brought together in an attempt to write a moral theory which is acceptable to 'reflective women'. Those three topics are the post-Gilligan tradition, the contrast between Hume and Kant (in which Hume always emerges triumphant) and the notion of trust. This review will concentrate on the last of these, as being the most constructive and forward-looking. Baier suggests that a morality whose central concept is that of obligation needs to be supplemented by a morality of love, and that these two concepts can be given their proper place within an overall morality of trust. So we have a THE UNIVERSITY OF KEELE JONATHAN DANCY
A companion to ethics, 1991
The Philosophical Quarterly, 1983
Oxford University Press eBooks, Jul 29, 2021
Oxford University Press eBooks, Jul 19, 2018
This chapter shows how the various forms of theoretical reasoning—in particular, formal and proba... more This chapter shows how the various forms of theoretical reasoning—in particular, formal and probabilistic—can perfectly well be understood in the sort of way in which we are now understanding practical reasoning. There will be differences between practical and theoretical reasoning, but those differences are to be found in the ways in which we explain the various normative relations that play the driving role in the making of a case for doing, or believing, this or that. The structures are the same, but the explanations are not. This is true whether one thinks in terms of credences or more simply in terms of probability.
Oxford University Press eBooks, Jul 19, 2018
This chapter lays out various considerations that have persuaded people, or that might have influ... more This chapter lays out various considerations that have persuaded people, or that might have influenced people to believe, that reasoning cannot ‘conclude in’ action in the way that it can ‘conclude in’ belief. These include a sense that action is so unlike belief that it cannot figure anywhere in a process of inference; one cannot infer an action. Such suggestions are to be rejected in favour of the Aristotelian view that action can be the conclusion of reasoning, just as can belief. The chapter also makes some suggestions about how to conceive of action.
Oxford University Press eBooks, Jul 29, 2021
This Introduction is a short intellectual biography. In addition to telling how it was that the a... more This Introduction is a short intellectual biography. In addition to telling how it was that the author ended up in philosophy, it tracks the development of his views in the theory of reasons and the way in which combining those views with views he later developed in the theory of motivation reveal the possibility of a new form of Aristotelianism in the theory of practical reasoning. It ends by discussing the relevance of the distinction between knowledge and true belief to the theory of motivation.
Oxford University Press eBooks, Nov 6, 2014
Oxford University Press eBooks, Jul 29, 2021
This paper discusses two conceptions of organic unities. Moore, who first brought the notion of a... more This paper discusses two conceptions of organic unities. Moore, who first brought the notion of an organic unity to prominence, argues for an intrinsicalist conception of the organic: items do not have different non-instrumental value in different contexts, but the value they contribute to a whole of which they are a part may vary according to other parts of that whole. In this sense, they can contribute value that they have not got. This paper contrasts that conception with a different, variabilist conception which is more friendly to a general holism in the theory of value. It argues that intrinsicalism gives an incoherent account of what Moore calls vindictive punishment.
Oxford University Press eBooks, Jul 29, 2021
This paper starts by considering an interesting argument of H. A. Prichard’s against the view tha... more This paper starts by considering an interesting argument of H. A. Prichard’s against the view that to act is to cause a change; the argument is that causing is not an activity. The argument is important because of the recent emergence of an ‘agent-causation’ view according to which actions are the causing of changes by agents. The author suggests a way of responding to Prichard’s argument, and then, profiting from one of his own conclusions, turns to consider the relation between neurophysiological changes and the causation of bodily movement by the agent. The paper makes a suggestion about the proper way to understand the relation between the neurophysiological changes, the bodily movements and the action.
Oxford University Press eBooks, Jul 29, 2021
This paper is a successor to the author’s ‘In Defence of Thick Concepts’. It asks first whether a... more This paper is a successor to the author’s ‘In Defence of Thick Concepts’. It asks first whether all thick concepts have a default valence. It then considers how to account for the combination of the descriptive and the evaluative (which is sometimes called ‘interpenetration’) in a thick concept, and suggests that the so-called ‘no-priority’ view fails to do this. We might also wonder why the descriptive element is not always capable of separate instantiation. Various alternative moves are considered. The paper offers a considerably more varied list of supposedly thick concepts than is normal. It ends by suggesting that thick concepts are evaluative because competence with them involves grasp of their evaluative point.