Juergen Huber - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Papers by Juergen Huber
We investigate the effects of differences in social group membership and opportunities in a real ... more We investigate the effects of differences in social group membership and opportunities in a real effort task on preferences for redistribution in Germany.
Supplemental material, McCarthySupplementalTables for Registered Replication Report on Srull and ... more Supplemental material, McCarthySupplementalTables for Registered Replication Report on Srull and Wyer (1979) by Randy J. McCarthy, John J. Skowronski, Bruno Verschuere, Ewout H. Meijer, Ariane Jim, Katherine Hoogesteyn, Robin Orthey, Oguz A. Acar, Balazs Aczel, Bence E. Bakos, Fernando Barbosa, Ernest Baskin, Laurent Bègue, Gershon Ben-Shakhar, Angie R. Birt, Lisa Blatz, Steve D. Charman, Aline Claesen, Samuel L. Clay, Sean P. Coary, Jan Crusius, Jacqueline R. Evans, Noa Feldman, Fernando Ferreira-Santos, Matthias Gamer, Coby Gerlsma, Sara Gomes, Marta González-Iraizoz, Felix Holzmeister, Juergen Huber, Rafaele J. C. Huntjens, Andrea Isoni, Ryan K. Jessup, Michael Kirchler, Nathalie klein Selle, Lina Koppel, Marton Kovacs, Tei Laine, Frank Lentz, David D. Loschelder, Elliot A. Ludvig, Monty L. Lynn, Scott D. Martin, Neil M. McLatchie, Mario Mechtel, Galit Nahari, Asil Ali Özdoğru, Rita Pasion, Charlotte R. Pennington, Arne Roets, Nir Rozmann, Irene Scopelliti, Eli Spiegelman, Kristi...
Worries about unethical behavior are a recurring issue in the finance industry, which has inspire... more Worries about unethical behavior are a recurring issue in the finance industry, which has inspired a number of recent studies. We contribute to this ongoing discussion by investigating preferences for truthfulness within the finance industry in a controlled experiment with 415 financial professionals (and 270 students as a control group). Participants have to report one of two numbers, of which one is true, the other false, and where truth-telling is costly. In three main treatments we vary the situational context of subjects' decisions (abstract, neutral, finance context) by applying differently framed instructions. We find that contexts matter for financial professionals: they act more honestly in a financial context, while for a control group we find no such differences. Further variations on the financial decision situation do not worsen financial professionals' honesty. As driver of the observed behavior we find reputational concerns to play a major role in financial professionals' decisions.
In this experiment we examine the performance of three minimal strategic market games relative to... more In this experiment we examine the performance of three minimal strategic market games relative to theoretical predictions. These models of a closed exchange economy with monetary and financial structures have limited amounts of cash to facilitate transactions. Subsequent experiments will deal with credit limitations, banking and credit, the role of clearinghouses and the possibility for the universal issue of credit by individuals. In theory, with enough money the non-cooperative equilibria should converge to the respective competitive equilibria as the number of players increases. Since general equilibrium theory abstracts away from the market mechanism, it makes no predictions about how the paths of convergence to the CE may differ across market mechanisms. GE allows no role for money or credit. In contrast to most market experiments conducted in open or partial equilibrium settings, we report on closed settings that include feedbacks. Laboratory examination of the three market me...
If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the ti... more If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the working paper or other series, the year, and the publisher.
Closed exchange and production-and-exchange economies may have multiple equilibria, a fact that i... more Closed exchange and production-and-exchange economies may have multiple equilibria, a fact that is usually ignored in macroeconomic models. Our basic argument is that default and bankruptcy laws are required to prevent strategic default, and these laws can also serve to provide the conditions for uniqueness. In this paper we report experimental evidence on the effectiveness of this approach to resolving multiplicity: society can assign default penalties on fiat money so the economy selects one of the equilibria. Our data show that the choice of default penalty takes the economy close to the chosen equilibrium. The theory and evidence together reinforce the idea that accounting, bankruptcy and possibly other aspects of social mechanisms play an important role in resolving the otherwise mathematically intractable challenges associated with multiplicity of equilibria in closed economies. Additionally we discuss the politico-economic meaning and experimental implications of default pena...
Is personal credit issued by participants sufficient to operate an economy efficiently, with no o... more Is personal credit issued by participants sufficient to operate an economy efficiently, with no outside or government money? Sorin (1995) constructed a strategic market game to prove that this is possible. We conduct an experimental game in which each agent issues her own IOUs and a costless efficient clearinghouse adjusts the exchange rates among them so the markets always clear. The results suggest that if the information system and clearing are so good as to preclude moral hazard, any form of information asymmetry, or need for trust, the economy operates efficiently at any price level without government money. Conversely, perhaps explanations for prevalence of government money should be sought in either the above mentioned frictions or our unwillingness to experiment with innovation.
Corporate campaign contributions and abnormal stock returns after presidential elections
This chapter reviews the recent literature on nudges and its applications in the area of finance.... more This chapter reviews the recent literature on nudges and its applications in the area of finance. We restrict our attention to randomized controlled trials (RCTs) to shed light on the influence of nudges in form of defaults, active choice and simplification; social norms and comparisons; and implementation intentions prompts and reminders on financial decision making. The emphasis of our review on the one hand reflects on changes to the choice architecture and on the other hand on simple and low-cost informational interventions. Our key finding is that the frequency of RCTs in finance is so far low and the results are mixed, thus leaving scope for further research.
Sws-rundschau, 2003
Wahlbörsen sind ein Instrument der Meinungsforschung, um Wahlergebnisse vorherzusagen, leisten ab... more Wahlbörsen sind ein Instrument der Meinungsforschung, um Wahlergebnisse vorherzusagen, leisten aber aufgrund der ihnen zuteil werdenden öffentlichen Aufmerksamkeit auch Funktionen der politischen Bildungsarbeit. Struktur und Methodik von Wahlbörsen, aber auch ihre Möglichkeiten und Grenzen werden ausführlich dargestellt. Detailanalysen beschäftigen sich insbesondere mit dem Kursverlauf und der Dateninterpretation einer von den AutorInnen betreuten Wahlbörse vor der österreichischen Nationalratswahl 2002 sowie mit neuen Erkenntnissen über Handelsentscheidungen und das politische Informationsverhalten der HändlerInnen. Die Schlussfolgerung ist, dass Wahlbörsen in Zukunft regelmäßig stattfinden werden, aber mit steigender Öffentlichkeit vermehrt Konflikte zwischen wissenschaftlichen Interessen und den Anliegen von medialen Veranstaltern entstehen, die den spielerischen Charakter in den Mittelpunkt stellen. Dementsprechend werden konkrete Empfehlungen für die zukünftige Gestaltung von Wahlbörsen gegeben.
Today information is generally considered the most valuable good in modern economies. Especially ... more Today information is generally considered the most valuable good in modern economies. Especially in financial markets information is often viewed as the only ingredient necessary to achieve above-average returns. However, empirical, theoretical and experimental work shows that the matter is not that simple. We develop an experimental setting to analyse how valuable forecasting ability is in financial markets. We find that knowledge about the future development of the profits of a company does no necessarily improve the performance of an agent in the market. Our experimental markets show similar behaviour to real markets in several very important aspects, namely volatility clustering, excess kurtosis, and the autocorrelation behaviour. This increases our confidence, that the one feature not observable in real markets – the relation between information level and return – looks similar to our results as well.
For the past two decades a market model introduced by Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988, hencef... more For the past two decades a market model introduced by Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988, henceforth SSW) has dominated experimental research on financial markets. In SSW the fundamental value of the traded asset is determined by the expected value of a finite stream of dividend payments. This setup implies a deterministically falling fundamental value with a predetermined end of the life-span of the asset and extremely high dividend-payouts. We present a new market model in which we implement the fundamental value by adopting a random walk process. Compared to SSW-markets, prices in the new markets (SAVE) are more efficient and end-of-experiment imbalances common in SSW-markets are not observed. Our results demonstrate, that implicit features of the SSW market model contribute to bubble formation. JEL classification: C92, D83, D84, G12
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
To explore how speculative trading influences prices in financial markets, we conduct a laborator... more To explore how speculative trading influences prices in financial markets, we conduct a laboratory market experiment with speculating investors (who do not collect dividends and trade only for capital gains) and dividend-collecting investors. Moreover, we operate markets at two different levels of money supply. We find that in phases with only speculating investors present (i) price deviations from fundamentals are larger; (ii) prices are more volatile; (iii) mispricing increases with the number of transfers until maturity; and (iv) speculative trading pushes prices upward (downward) when the supply of money is high (low). These results suggest that controlling the money supply can help to stabilize asset prices.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Worries about unethical behavior are a recurring issue in the finance industry, which has inspire... more Worries about unethical behavior are a recurring issue in the finance industry, which has inspired a number of recent studies. We contribute to this ongoing discussion by investigating preferences for truthfulness within the finance industry in a controlled experiment with 415 financial professionals (and 270 students as a control group). Participants have to report one of two numbers, of which one is true, the other false, and where truth-telling is costly. In three main treatments we vary the situational context of subjects' decisions (abstract, neutral, finance context) by applying differently framed instructions. We find that contexts matter for financial professionals: they act more honestly in a financial context, while for a control group we find no such differences. Further variations on the financial decision situation do not worsen financial professionals' honesty. As driver of the observed behavior we find reputational concerns to play a major role in financial professionals' decisions.
We investigate the effects of differences in social group membership and opportunities in a real ... more We investigate the effects of differences in social group membership and opportunities in a real effort task on preferences for redistribution in Germany.
Supplemental material, McCarthySupplementalTables for Registered Replication Report on Srull and ... more Supplemental material, McCarthySupplementalTables for Registered Replication Report on Srull and Wyer (1979) by Randy J. McCarthy, John J. Skowronski, Bruno Verschuere, Ewout H. Meijer, Ariane Jim, Katherine Hoogesteyn, Robin Orthey, Oguz A. Acar, Balazs Aczel, Bence E. Bakos, Fernando Barbosa, Ernest Baskin, Laurent Bègue, Gershon Ben-Shakhar, Angie R. Birt, Lisa Blatz, Steve D. Charman, Aline Claesen, Samuel L. Clay, Sean P. Coary, Jan Crusius, Jacqueline R. Evans, Noa Feldman, Fernando Ferreira-Santos, Matthias Gamer, Coby Gerlsma, Sara Gomes, Marta González-Iraizoz, Felix Holzmeister, Juergen Huber, Rafaele J. C. Huntjens, Andrea Isoni, Ryan K. Jessup, Michael Kirchler, Nathalie klein Selle, Lina Koppel, Marton Kovacs, Tei Laine, Frank Lentz, David D. Loschelder, Elliot A. Ludvig, Monty L. Lynn, Scott D. Martin, Neil M. McLatchie, Mario Mechtel, Galit Nahari, Asil Ali Özdoğru, Rita Pasion, Charlotte R. Pennington, Arne Roets, Nir Rozmann, Irene Scopelliti, Eli Spiegelman, Kristi...
Worries about unethical behavior are a recurring issue in the finance industry, which has inspire... more Worries about unethical behavior are a recurring issue in the finance industry, which has inspired a number of recent studies. We contribute to this ongoing discussion by investigating preferences for truthfulness within the finance industry in a controlled experiment with 415 financial professionals (and 270 students as a control group). Participants have to report one of two numbers, of which one is true, the other false, and where truth-telling is costly. In three main treatments we vary the situational context of subjects' decisions (abstract, neutral, finance context) by applying differently framed instructions. We find that contexts matter for financial professionals: they act more honestly in a financial context, while for a control group we find no such differences. Further variations on the financial decision situation do not worsen financial professionals' honesty. As driver of the observed behavior we find reputational concerns to play a major role in financial professionals' decisions.
In this experiment we examine the performance of three minimal strategic market games relative to... more In this experiment we examine the performance of three minimal strategic market games relative to theoretical predictions. These models of a closed exchange economy with monetary and financial structures have limited amounts of cash to facilitate transactions. Subsequent experiments will deal with credit limitations, banking and credit, the role of clearinghouses and the possibility for the universal issue of credit by individuals. In theory, with enough money the non-cooperative equilibria should converge to the respective competitive equilibria as the number of players increases. Since general equilibrium theory abstracts away from the market mechanism, it makes no predictions about how the paths of convergence to the CE may differ across market mechanisms. GE allows no role for money or credit. In contrast to most market experiments conducted in open or partial equilibrium settings, we report on closed settings that include feedbacks. Laboratory examination of the three market me...
If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the ti... more If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the working paper or other series, the year, and the publisher.
Closed exchange and production-and-exchange economies may have multiple equilibria, a fact that i... more Closed exchange and production-and-exchange economies may have multiple equilibria, a fact that is usually ignored in macroeconomic models. Our basic argument is that default and bankruptcy laws are required to prevent strategic default, and these laws can also serve to provide the conditions for uniqueness. In this paper we report experimental evidence on the effectiveness of this approach to resolving multiplicity: society can assign default penalties on fiat money so the economy selects one of the equilibria. Our data show that the choice of default penalty takes the economy close to the chosen equilibrium. The theory and evidence together reinforce the idea that accounting, bankruptcy and possibly other aspects of social mechanisms play an important role in resolving the otherwise mathematically intractable challenges associated with multiplicity of equilibria in closed economies. Additionally we discuss the politico-economic meaning and experimental implications of default pena...
Is personal credit issued by participants sufficient to operate an economy efficiently, with no o... more Is personal credit issued by participants sufficient to operate an economy efficiently, with no outside or government money? Sorin (1995) constructed a strategic market game to prove that this is possible. We conduct an experimental game in which each agent issues her own IOUs and a costless efficient clearinghouse adjusts the exchange rates among them so the markets always clear. The results suggest that if the information system and clearing are so good as to preclude moral hazard, any form of information asymmetry, or need for trust, the economy operates efficiently at any price level without government money. Conversely, perhaps explanations for prevalence of government money should be sought in either the above mentioned frictions or our unwillingness to experiment with innovation.
Corporate campaign contributions and abnormal stock returns after presidential elections
This chapter reviews the recent literature on nudges and its applications in the area of finance.... more This chapter reviews the recent literature on nudges and its applications in the area of finance. We restrict our attention to randomized controlled trials (RCTs) to shed light on the influence of nudges in form of defaults, active choice and simplification; social norms and comparisons; and implementation intentions prompts and reminders on financial decision making. The emphasis of our review on the one hand reflects on changes to the choice architecture and on the other hand on simple and low-cost informational interventions. Our key finding is that the frequency of RCTs in finance is so far low and the results are mixed, thus leaving scope for further research.
Sws-rundschau, 2003
Wahlbörsen sind ein Instrument der Meinungsforschung, um Wahlergebnisse vorherzusagen, leisten ab... more Wahlbörsen sind ein Instrument der Meinungsforschung, um Wahlergebnisse vorherzusagen, leisten aber aufgrund der ihnen zuteil werdenden öffentlichen Aufmerksamkeit auch Funktionen der politischen Bildungsarbeit. Struktur und Methodik von Wahlbörsen, aber auch ihre Möglichkeiten und Grenzen werden ausführlich dargestellt. Detailanalysen beschäftigen sich insbesondere mit dem Kursverlauf und der Dateninterpretation einer von den AutorInnen betreuten Wahlbörse vor der österreichischen Nationalratswahl 2002 sowie mit neuen Erkenntnissen über Handelsentscheidungen und das politische Informationsverhalten der HändlerInnen. Die Schlussfolgerung ist, dass Wahlbörsen in Zukunft regelmäßig stattfinden werden, aber mit steigender Öffentlichkeit vermehrt Konflikte zwischen wissenschaftlichen Interessen und den Anliegen von medialen Veranstaltern entstehen, die den spielerischen Charakter in den Mittelpunkt stellen. Dementsprechend werden konkrete Empfehlungen für die zukünftige Gestaltung von Wahlbörsen gegeben.
Today information is generally considered the most valuable good in modern economies. Especially ... more Today information is generally considered the most valuable good in modern economies. Especially in financial markets information is often viewed as the only ingredient necessary to achieve above-average returns. However, empirical, theoretical and experimental work shows that the matter is not that simple. We develop an experimental setting to analyse how valuable forecasting ability is in financial markets. We find that knowledge about the future development of the profits of a company does no necessarily improve the performance of an agent in the market. Our experimental markets show similar behaviour to real markets in several very important aspects, namely volatility clustering, excess kurtosis, and the autocorrelation behaviour. This increases our confidence, that the one feature not observable in real markets – the relation between information level and return – looks similar to our results as well.
For the past two decades a market model introduced by Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988, hencef... more For the past two decades a market model introduced by Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988, henceforth SSW) has dominated experimental research on financial markets. In SSW the fundamental value of the traded asset is determined by the expected value of a finite stream of dividend payments. This setup implies a deterministically falling fundamental value with a predetermined end of the life-span of the asset and extremely high dividend-payouts. We present a new market model in which we implement the fundamental value by adopting a random walk process. Compared to SSW-markets, prices in the new markets (SAVE) are more efficient and end-of-experiment imbalances common in SSW-markets are not observed. Our results demonstrate, that implicit features of the SSW market model contribute to bubble formation. JEL classification: C92, D83, D84, G12
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
To explore how speculative trading influences prices in financial markets, we conduct a laborator... more To explore how speculative trading influences prices in financial markets, we conduct a laboratory market experiment with speculating investors (who do not collect dividends and trade only for capital gains) and dividend-collecting investors. Moreover, we operate markets at two different levels of money supply. We find that in phases with only speculating investors present (i) price deviations from fundamentals are larger; (ii) prices are more volatile; (iii) mispricing increases with the number of transfers until maturity; and (iv) speculative trading pushes prices upward (downward) when the supply of money is high (low). These results suggest that controlling the money supply can help to stabilize asset prices.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Worries about unethical behavior are a recurring issue in the finance industry, which has inspire... more Worries about unethical behavior are a recurring issue in the finance industry, which has inspired a number of recent studies. We contribute to this ongoing discussion by investigating preferences for truthfulness within the finance industry in a controlled experiment with 415 financial professionals (and 270 students as a control group). Participants have to report one of two numbers, of which one is true, the other false, and where truth-telling is costly. In three main treatments we vary the situational context of subjects' decisions (abstract, neutral, finance context) by applying differently framed instructions. We find that contexts matter for financial professionals: they act more honestly in a financial context, while for a control group we find no such differences. Further variations on the financial decision situation do not worsen financial professionals' honesty. As driver of the observed behavior we find reputational concerns to play a major role in financial professionals' decisions.