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Papers by Julius Sensat

The Western political quarterly, Dec 1, 1980

The Philosophical Review, Oct 1, 1980

In volume 1 of Capital Marx assumes that equilibrium prices are proportional to values (in his se... more In volume 1 of Capital Marx assumes that equilibrium prices are proportional to values (in his sense of ‘value’, according to which the value of a commodity is the labor socially necessary to produce it). Not all of the claims about estrangement and ideology surveyed in the last chapter rest on this assumption. Among those that don’t is the claim that commodity production is a system of estrangement because in it, economic agents’ ‘own social movement has for them the form of a movement of things controlling them instead of being controlled by them’ [90, pp. 167–168 (my translation); 95, part 2, 6:105]. Even the related doctrine of commodity fetishism is easily stated as the claim that the power of exchangeability that commodities possess takes on the guise of a power they have as natural objects rather than one they possess in virtue of certain specific relations of production.

C re at iv e C om m on s A ttr ib ut io nN on C om m er ci al -N oD er iv at iv es / ht tp :// w ... more C re at iv e C om m on s A ttr ib ut io nN on C om m er ci al -N oD er iv at iv es / ht tp :// w w w .h at hi tr us t.o rg /a cc es s_ us e# cc -b ync -n d Der Anti-Samuelson : Kritik e. repräsentativen Lehrbuchs d. bürgerl. Ökonomie / Marc Linder, unter Mitarb. von Julius Sensat u. George Caffentzis ; [Übers. aus d. amerikan. Ms. durch Ulrike Besuch ... et al.] -1.-3. v.1-2 Linder, M arc. T s d . -E r la n g e n : V e r la g P olit laden , 1 9 7 4 .

Synthese, Dec 1, 1996

Marx criticized political economy for propounding an inverted, mystical view of economic reality.... more Marx criticized political economy for propounding an inverted, mystical view of economic reality. But he went beyond asserting the falsity and apologetic character of the doctrine to characterize it as reflecting a social practice of inversion or mystification — an inverted social world — in which individuals incorporate their own actions into a process whose dynamic lies beyond their control. Caught up in this process, individuals confront aspects of their own agency in the alien or “reified” form of a given, determining reality. Marx leaves unclear exactly how the process exerts and maintains its hold on agents, the nature of the reasons they might have for wanting to free themselves of it, and under what conditions they could do so. However, it is possible to abstract somewhat from Marx's specific concerns and to model a self-reproducing practice of reification that works through the informational environment of decision. Though of wider interest, this more general conception can shed light on the nature and critique of Marx's inverted world. It draws on conceptual resources from decision theory, game theory and general equilibrium theory.

The Philosophical Review, Oct 1, 1983

theory. Insofar as inflation is a differentiated and "class-conscious" process, it is i... more theory. Insofar as inflation is a differentiated and "class-conscious" process, it is in large measure determined by concrete and, viewed from the level of abstraction, say, in C apital, historically accidental phenom ena. U nless the term inflation is to become a formal classification bereft of all meaning, it appears necessary to deny that inflation has anything to do with (1) a decrease in the value of gold, (2) an increase in the value of commodities, or (3) a deviation of market prices from value as determined by supply and demand; for as a concept existing on a level much closer to concrete reality than, say, value, inflation m ust be ex plained in terms of concrete phenom ena, and it " ju st so happens" that today none of these three factors has any thing to do with rising prices: (1) productivity in the gold industry has not advanced faster than that in other indus tries; (2) productivity in the bulk of commodity-producing industries has not decreased absolutely; and (3) the gap be tw een supply and effective dem and that characterized World War II and the postwar periods has been closed by the usual overproduction . N ow we know som e of the things inflation is not. The distinguishing characteristic of inflation is not so much the flooding of the conduits with paper money as the depreciation of that paper vis-a-vis gold. This is not to say that flooding does not also take place; in w artim e, for example, "civilian production" drops: "th e excess purchas ing power can be used to bid up the prices of goods and not to obtain additional goods. Under these conditions, consumers can only pay more for goods; they cannot get more g oo d s."5 But wars can also be financed without in creasing the supply of paper money; the state can tax away the "e x ce ss" effective demand; this is in fact what hap pened during World War II in the U .S .: taxes increased fas ter than money depreciated. If all this is true, then our attention should be fixed on the

European Journal of Philosophy, Dec 1, 2003

Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks, 2016

I begin this chapter with general remarks about the potential relevance of conceptions of estrang... more I begin this chapter with general remarks about the potential relevance of conceptions of estrangement for the critical interpretation and assessment of John Rawls’s political philosophy. Then I consider several specific issues within this area.

For Hegel, the world is thoroughly intelligible, and as such it must realize a rational system of... more For Hegel, the world is thoroughly intelligible, and as such it must realize a rational system of categories. Hegel’s logic lays out what he takes to be this system. His philosophies of nature and spirit aim at explaining how the system is realized in natural and cultural phenomena. His term for the realized system is ‘Idea’ (Idee). The term is appropriate, because Hegel takes something from Plato. The Idea is the inner reason that makes the external reality, the reality of spatiotemporal objects, events, and actions, what it is. Hegel differs from Plato in not understanding the Idea as an intelligible world of forms separate from the sensible world and more real than the latter. He believes that forms are in things, as their immanent soul and essence. In this respect he draws a page from Aristotle. But in another respect he differs from both of these ancient philosophers and is distinctly modern: the realization of the Idea is for Hegel the self-realization of free reason—thought freely structuring itself, giving itself content, and actualizing itself. This process is one in which human beings can be participants; in fact it is only understandable in terms of responsible thinking in inquiry and action. For Hegel, a philosophically adequate account of this process both (1) carries out and completes Kant’s attempted self-vindication of human reason and (2) articulates the actualization of human freedom.

Kant is an incipient philosopher of estrangement. Though he does not use the vocabulary of estran... more Kant is an incipient philosopher of estrangement. Though he does not use the vocabulary of estrangement that became prominent in the nineteenth century, he offers an account of moral evil that accords it the marks of the concept, and he understands his moral philosophy as aimed at dispelling the semblance of morality as an alien imposition, a semblance that in his view helps to sustain socially systemic moral evil. I want to discuss his moral philosophy as an attempt to foster such a self-clarification.

1. Introduction 2. Kantian Morality and Estrangement 3. Hegel: Actualization of the Free Will 4. ... more 1. Introduction 2. Kantian Morality and Estrangement 3. Hegel: Actualization of the Free Will 4. Marx: Economic Estrangement 5. Marx: Prices and the Rate of Profit 6. Strategic Estrangement 7. Rawls: Toward a Well-Ordered Society

point of view accessible to each individual. Hegel rejects the idea that these conceptions can pl... more point of view accessible to each individual. Hegel rejects the idea that these conceptions can play the foundational role claimed for them. They do, he thinks, have an important role, but it can only be determined through a more concrete specification of a system of institutions necessary for the social realization of freedom. Hegel offers us such a specification under his heading of "Ethical Life." Abstract right and morality cannot be foundational in the way that received views claim, Hegel thinks, because they lack determinacy and self-sufficiency. For example, it is a mistake to think that one can start with a conception of private right, one say that includes rights of private property and free contract, and use it to ground the specification a private-property, free-market economy as a complete and sufficient institutional embodiment of these rights. In fact, to be sufficiently determinate and stable it requires integration with morality or moral subjectivity. The latter, however, cannot by itself provide enough content to perform this function. Nor can the moral point of view serve by itself to identify a political structure that adequately respects the status of each citizen as a person and a moral subject. Both abstract right and morality must be grounded in a suitably specified comprehensive and self-sustaining scheme of institutions (a system of ethical life) for the full realization of autonomy (or as Hegel puts it, for the fullright and morality cannot be foundational in the way that received views claim, Hegel thinks, because they lack determinacy and self-sufficiency. For example, it is a mistake to think that one can start with a conception of private right, one say that includes rights of private property and free contract, and use it to ground the specification a private-property, free-market economy as a complete and sufficient institutional embodiment of these rights. In fact, to be sufficiently determinate and stable it requires integration with morality or moral subjectivity. The latter, however, cannot by itself provide enough content to perform this function. Nor can the moral point of view serve by itself to identify a political structure that adequately respects the status of each citizen as a person and a moral subject. Both abstract right and morality must be grounded in a suitably specified comprehensive and self-sustaining scheme of institutions (a system of ethical life) for the full realization of autonomy (or as Hegel puts it, for the full realization of the concept of the free will). Thus he says: The course we follow is that whereby the abstract forms reveal themselves not as existing for themselves, but as untrue. . . . The sphere of right and that of morality cannot exist independently; they must have the ethical as their support and foundation [Hegel 1991, §§32A, 141A; Hegel 1969, 7: §§32A, 141A]. Hegel implies here that his genuinely philosophical approach to the conceptions of abstract right and morality allows them to display their own insufficiency, which does not present itself readily to the everyday perspective usually occupied by agents in societyright and morality allows them to display their own insufficiency, which does not present itself readily to the everyday perspective usually occupied by agents in society

University Microfilms International eBooks, 1976

In Section 3.6 we examined Marx’s critique of Hegel’s integrationist conception of the relation b... more In Section 3.6 we examined Marx’s critique of Hegel’s integrationist conception of the relation between civil society and the state. We noted the implication of that critique that Hegel’s proposals are incapable of overcoming the estrangement he finds in abstract right and the moral will. To appreciate how Marx develops the concept of economic estrangement, we need to note a second criticism of Hegel’s political philosophy that one finds in Marx’s early work, namely that Hegel’s doctrine contains an ‘inversion’ that amounts to a mysticism of reason. My concern in this section is not to defend this criticism but to explain its role in the genesis of Marx’s conception of economic estrangement.

Topoi-an International Review of Philosophy, Sep 1, 1996

Many people know that Marx criticized political economy for mixing up social and natural phenomen... more Many people know that Marx criticized political economy for mixing up social and natural phenomena and thereby propounding an inverted, apologetic view of economic reality. But often they do not realize that he viewed this doctrinal inversion as an expression of an underlying social inversion, in which economic agents actually transform social aspects of their own agency into a hostile, given reality, a "second nature" in whose grip they are caught. Both forms of inversion-the doctrinal and the social-are referred to in the following early passage: This state and this society produce religion, which is an inverted consciousness of the world, because they are an inverted worm