Nicole Koenig - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Papers by Nicole Koenig
SUMMARY The appointment of new leaders at the top of the European institutions in 2014 and the am... more SUMMARY The appointment of new leaders at the top of the European institutions in 2014 and the ambitious review calendar for 2015 have raised expectations that the European Union (EU) will finally ‘get real’ about its common foreign policy. This policy paper puts these expectations into perspective and formulates recommendations for more coherent, efficient, and strategic external action. 1. The comprehensive approach and implementation gaps One of the key principles of EU external action is the comprehensive approach, referring to the strategic and coherent use of civilian and military instruments towards collective, overarching objectives. European decision-makers generally recognise its strategic, political, and financial advantages and tend to present comprehensiveness as the EU’s key added value. However, the Union still suffers from important implementation gaps. 2. Five years after Lisbon: the good, the bad, and the ugly A review of the five past years of EU external action o...
Decision-makers and policy analysts from leading European think tanks and academics met in rome t... more Decision-makers and policy analysts from leading European think tanks and academics met in rome to discuss the priorities and challenges of the upcoming Italian Presidency of the Council of the European Union (July-December 2014). this report offers an overview of the key themes discussed at the conference: the prospects for a more effective European economic governance and for new measures to stimulate a jobcreating growth; the response to the Ukrainian crisis and its implications for the EU’s neighbourhood policy; the future of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP); the reform of the EU immigration policy; the effectiveness and legitimacy of the EU leadership. For each of these priority themes, the report provides a list of recommendations about the initiatives that the Italian government can undertake during its presidency term to promote the European integration process.
This is to certify that the work contained within has been composed by me and is entirely my own ... more This is to certify that the work contained within has been composed by me and is entirely my own work. No part of this thesis has been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification.
German Politics, 2018
In 2014, Germany's foreign policy elite promoted a new international role. It promised more leade... more In 2014, Germany's foreign policy elite promoted a new international role. It promised more leadership in foreign and security policy, in line with the country's international responsibility and firmly embedded in the European Union. This article applies sociological role theory and foreign policy analysis to review the origins and implications of this role re-conception. The empirical focus is on Germany's role in crisis management vis-à-vis Libya and Syria. The analysis shows that the 2011 Libyan crisis fuelled existing intra-role tensions between multilateralism and military restraint. Role re-conception was an attempt to overcome tensions while satisfying international and domestic audiences. In practice, there has been a gradual adaptation based on a more flexible interpretation of military restraint. However, Germany's ability to project leadership beyond the confines of the civilian power role remains limited and depends on the situation-specific balance between domestic and external expectations.
integration, 2011
Als Muammar al-Gaddafi im Frühjahr 2011 die Waffen gegen seine eigene Bevölkerung richtete, wandt... more Als Muammar al-Gaddafi im Frühjahr 2011 die Waffen gegen seine eigene Bevölkerung richtete, wandten sich alle Blicke nach Libyen. Die internationale Gemeinschaft reagierte schnell und entschlossen. Die Vereinten Nationen wurden für die beispiellose Geschwindigkeit und Einstimmigkeit ihrer Krisenreaktion gelobt. 1 Laut NATO-Generalsekretär 2 Anders Fogh Rasmussen war der Einsatz in Libyen "einer der erfolgreichsten in der Geschichte der NATO". 3 Demgegenüber gab es nur wenige schmeichelhafte Worte zur Reaktion der Europäischen Union auf die Libyen-Krise. "In der Stunde größter Herausforderung versagt dieses Europa [...]. Es ist trostlos: keine Idee, kein Plan, keine Initiative", wetterte der ehemalige Außenminister Joschka Fischer im März 2011. 4 In den darauffolgenden Wochen und Monaten häuften sich Presseberichte, die das Bild einer zögerlichen, zerstrittenen und gänzlich inkohärenten Europäischen Union in der Libyen-Krise zeichneten. Dieser Artikel untersucht die (In-)Kohärenz der Reaktion der Europäischen Union auf die Libyen-Krise und geht dabei auf folgende drei Fragen ein: 5 Inwieweit war die Reaktion der Europäischen Union auf die Libyen-Krise (in-)kohärent? Worauf ist der kritisierte Mangel an Kohärenz zurückzuführen? Und was lässt sich aus der Libyen-Krise für die Zukunft des europäischen Krisenmanagements ableiten? Der Schwerpunkt liegt hier auf der ‚vertikalen' Kohärenz, also der Kohärenz zwischen den Krisenreaktionen auf supranationaler und nationaler Ebene. Das Zusammenspiel der beiden Ebenen wird an den Beispielen Frankreichs, Deutschlands und Italiens veranschaulicht. Zeitlich konzentriert sich die Analyse auf das kurz-bis mittelfristige Krisenmanagement, genauer gesagt, auf den Zeitraum vom Beginn der Libyen-Krise (15. Februar 2011) bis zur Einnahme von Tripolis durch die libyschen Rebellen (22. August 2011). Der Artikel stützt sich auf die einschlägige wissenschaftliche Literatur, Analysen von Think Tanks, Presseberichte, offizielle Dokumente sowie auf zwölf qualitative Experteninterviews. 6 Die Libyen-Krise oder das Ende der Realpolitik Vor nicht allzu langer Zeit wurde Gaddafi mit offenen Armen in westlichen Hauptstädten empfangen. 2004 kündigte der damalige deutsche Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder den
The International Spectator, 2011
EU Diplomacy Papers, 2010
The EU and NATO are two major actors in post-Cold War crisis management. With dissimilar strength... more The EU and NATO are two major actors in post-Cold War crisis management. With dissimilar strengths and weaknesses and a somewhat different focus, the two organizations tackle conflicts and crises around the world. In recent years, the cooperation between these two ...
European Security, 2014
This paper assesses the role of the European Union in the Libyan crisis (2011) and critically con... more This paper assesses the role of the European Union in the Libyan crisis (2011) and critically considers the implications for its evolution as an international security actor. Employing role theory, the paper reviews the historical development of the Union's security actorness and sheds specific light on the balance between self-conception and external expectations in the case of the Libyan crisis. Its central argument is that, despite external expectations and European narratives of a ‘comprehensive power role’, the Libyan crisis showed that the Union still acts in line with its traditional role as a civilian power. The inability to go beyond civilian power stemmed from internal dissonance on a potential hard power role and a corresponding lack of material capabilities. The growing gap between expectations about comprehensive actorness on the one hand and performance on the other is likely to damage the Union's future credibility as an international security actor.
The International Spectator, 2012
Polit Vierteljahresschr, 2010
Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 2010
SUMMARY The appointment of new leaders at the top of the European institutions in 2014 and the am... more SUMMARY The appointment of new leaders at the top of the European institutions in 2014 and the ambitious review calendar for 2015 have raised expectations that the European Union (EU) will finally ‘get real’ about its common foreign policy. This policy paper puts these expectations into perspective and formulates recommendations for more coherent, efficient, and strategic external action. 1. The comprehensive approach and implementation gaps One of the key principles of EU external action is the comprehensive approach, referring to the strategic and coherent use of civilian and military instruments towards collective, overarching objectives. European decision-makers generally recognise its strategic, political, and financial advantages and tend to present comprehensiveness as the EU’s key added value. However, the Union still suffers from important implementation gaps. 2. Five years after Lisbon: the good, the bad, and the ugly A review of the five past years of EU external action o...
Decision-makers and policy analysts from leading European think tanks and academics met in rome t... more Decision-makers and policy analysts from leading European think tanks and academics met in rome to discuss the priorities and challenges of the upcoming Italian Presidency of the Council of the European Union (July-December 2014). this report offers an overview of the key themes discussed at the conference: the prospects for a more effective European economic governance and for new measures to stimulate a jobcreating growth; the response to the Ukrainian crisis and its implications for the EU’s neighbourhood policy; the future of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP); the reform of the EU immigration policy; the effectiveness and legitimacy of the EU leadership. For each of these priority themes, the report provides a list of recommendations about the initiatives that the Italian government can undertake during its presidency term to promote the European integration process.
This is to certify that the work contained within has been composed by me and is entirely my own ... more This is to certify that the work contained within has been composed by me and is entirely my own work. No part of this thesis has been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification.
German Politics, 2018
In 2014, Germany's foreign policy elite promoted a new international role. It promised more leade... more In 2014, Germany's foreign policy elite promoted a new international role. It promised more leadership in foreign and security policy, in line with the country's international responsibility and firmly embedded in the European Union. This article applies sociological role theory and foreign policy analysis to review the origins and implications of this role re-conception. The empirical focus is on Germany's role in crisis management vis-à-vis Libya and Syria. The analysis shows that the 2011 Libyan crisis fuelled existing intra-role tensions between multilateralism and military restraint. Role re-conception was an attempt to overcome tensions while satisfying international and domestic audiences. In practice, there has been a gradual adaptation based on a more flexible interpretation of military restraint. However, Germany's ability to project leadership beyond the confines of the civilian power role remains limited and depends on the situation-specific balance between domestic and external expectations.
integration, 2011
Als Muammar al-Gaddafi im Frühjahr 2011 die Waffen gegen seine eigene Bevölkerung richtete, wandt... more Als Muammar al-Gaddafi im Frühjahr 2011 die Waffen gegen seine eigene Bevölkerung richtete, wandten sich alle Blicke nach Libyen. Die internationale Gemeinschaft reagierte schnell und entschlossen. Die Vereinten Nationen wurden für die beispiellose Geschwindigkeit und Einstimmigkeit ihrer Krisenreaktion gelobt. 1 Laut NATO-Generalsekretär 2 Anders Fogh Rasmussen war der Einsatz in Libyen "einer der erfolgreichsten in der Geschichte der NATO". 3 Demgegenüber gab es nur wenige schmeichelhafte Worte zur Reaktion der Europäischen Union auf die Libyen-Krise. "In der Stunde größter Herausforderung versagt dieses Europa [...]. Es ist trostlos: keine Idee, kein Plan, keine Initiative", wetterte der ehemalige Außenminister Joschka Fischer im März 2011. 4 In den darauffolgenden Wochen und Monaten häuften sich Presseberichte, die das Bild einer zögerlichen, zerstrittenen und gänzlich inkohärenten Europäischen Union in der Libyen-Krise zeichneten. Dieser Artikel untersucht die (In-)Kohärenz der Reaktion der Europäischen Union auf die Libyen-Krise und geht dabei auf folgende drei Fragen ein: 5 Inwieweit war die Reaktion der Europäischen Union auf die Libyen-Krise (in-)kohärent? Worauf ist der kritisierte Mangel an Kohärenz zurückzuführen? Und was lässt sich aus der Libyen-Krise für die Zukunft des europäischen Krisenmanagements ableiten? Der Schwerpunkt liegt hier auf der ‚vertikalen' Kohärenz, also der Kohärenz zwischen den Krisenreaktionen auf supranationaler und nationaler Ebene. Das Zusammenspiel der beiden Ebenen wird an den Beispielen Frankreichs, Deutschlands und Italiens veranschaulicht. Zeitlich konzentriert sich die Analyse auf das kurz-bis mittelfristige Krisenmanagement, genauer gesagt, auf den Zeitraum vom Beginn der Libyen-Krise (15. Februar 2011) bis zur Einnahme von Tripolis durch die libyschen Rebellen (22. August 2011). Der Artikel stützt sich auf die einschlägige wissenschaftliche Literatur, Analysen von Think Tanks, Presseberichte, offizielle Dokumente sowie auf zwölf qualitative Experteninterviews. 6 Die Libyen-Krise oder das Ende der Realpolitik Vor nicht allzu langer Zeit wurde Gaddafi mit offenen Armen in westlichen Hauptstädten empfangen. 2004 kündigte der damalige deutsche Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder den
The International Spectator, 2011
EU Diplomacy Papers, 2010
The EU and NATO are two major actors in post-Cold War crisis management. With dissimilar strength... more The EU and NATO are two major actors in post-Cold War crisis management. With dissimilar strengths and weaknesses and a somewhat different focus, the two organizations tackle conflicts and crises around the world. In recent years, the cooperation between these two ...
European Security, 2014
This paper assesses the role of the European Union in the Libyan crisis (2011) and critically con... more This paper assesses the role of the European Union in the Libyan crisis (2011) and critically considers the implications for its evolution as an international security actor. Employing role theory, the paper reviews the historical development of the Union's security actorness and sheds specific light on the balance between self-conception and external expectations in the case of the Libyan crisis. Its central argument is that, despite external expectations and European narratives of a ‘comprehensive power role’, the Libyan crisis showed that the Union still acts in line with its traditional role as a civilian power. The inability to go beyond civilian power stemmed from internal dissonance on a potential hard power role and a corresponding lack of material capabilities. The growing gap between expectations about comprehensive actorness on the one hand and performance on the other is likely to damage the Union's future credibility as an international security actor.
The International Spectator, 2012
Polit Vierteljahresschr, 2010
Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 2010