Lönngren Prinsloo - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
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North-Eastern Hill University, Hill Univ. Shillong-793022 (India)
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Papers by Lönngren Prinsloo
These days, it is common for people to buy goods that only exist in cyberspace. These items have ... more These days, it is common for people to buy goods that only exist in cyberspace. These items have been dubbed “virtual property” by many academics, although the notion of virtual property has not been expressly accepted or denounced by the legislator. Currently, the status quo is that people who purchase virtual goods within virtual worlds are granted a right to use these goods through various licensing agreements with the developers of the virtual worlds within which these goods are located. This means that the individual is not afforded the full scope of rights that would accrue to him/her would these virtual goods be classified as a manifestation of personal property. In a vacuum these considerations do not seem to warrant much concern, however, they become more than a mere triviality when one comes to the realisation that some manifestations of virtual goods often accrue values of thousands of dollars on the secondary market. In instances where creditors are probing the virtual contents of an insolvent estate, this question becomes even more interesting. This dissertation will consider the way the term “property” is defined in the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 and, more specifically, whether the notion of virtual property could be recognised within the definition’s broad scope. Furthermore, it posits that the recognition of virtual property rights in the context of insolvency is not only possible, but that it would be in the interest of the creditors of the insolvent estate to do so.
Thesis Chapters by Lönngren Prinsloo
NWU Master of Laws Dissertation, 2017
These days, it is common for people to buy goods that only exist in cyberspace. These items have ... more These days, it is common for people to buy goods that only exist in cyberspace. These items have been dubbed “virtual property” by many academics, although the notion of virtual property has not been expressly accepted or denounced by the legislator.
Currently, the status quo is that people who purchase virtual goods within virtual worlds are granted a right to use these goods through various licensing agreements with the developers of the virtual worlds within which these goods are located. This means that the individual is not afforded the full scope of rights that would accrue to him/her would these virtual goods be classified as a manifestation of personal property.
In a vacuum these considerations do not seem to warrant much concern, however, they become more than a mere triviality when one comes to the realisation that some manifestations of virtual goods often accrue values of thousands of dollars on the secondary market. In instances where creditors are probing the virtual contents of an insolvent estate, this question becomes even more interesting.
This dissertation will consider the way the term “property” is defined in the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 and, more specifically, whether the notion of virtual property could be recognised within the definition’s broad scope. Furthermore, it posits that the recognition of virtual property rights in the context of insolvency is not only possible, but that it would be in the interest of the creditors of the insolvent estate to do so.
These days, it is common for people to buy goods that only exist in cyberspace. These items have ... more These days, it is common for people to buy goods that only exist in cyberspace. These items have been dubbed “virtual property” by many academics, although the notion of virtual property has not been expressly accepted or denounced by the legislator. Currently, the status quo is that people who purchase virtual goods within virtual worlds are granted a right to use these goods through various licensing agreements with the developers of the virtual worlds within which these goods are located. This means that the individual is not afforded the full scope of rights that would accrue to him/her would these virtual goods be classified as a manifestation of personal property. In a vacuum these considerations do not seem to warrant much concern, however, they become more than a mere triviality when one comes to the realisation that some manifestations of virtual goods often accrue values of thousands of dollars on the secondary market. In instances where creditors are probing the virtual contents of an insolvent estate, this question becomes even more interesting. This dissertation will consider the way the term “property” is defined in the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 and, more specifically, whether the notion of virtual property could be recognised within the definition’s broad scope. Furthermore, it posits that the recognition of virtual property rights in the context of insolvency is not only possible, but that it would be in the interest of the creditors of the insolvent estate to do so.
NWU Master of Laws Dissertation, 2017
These days, it is common for people to buy goods that only exist in cyberspace. These items have ... more These days, it is common for people to buy goods that only exist in cyberspace. These items have been dubbed “virtual property” by many academics, although the notion of virtual property has not been expressly accepted or denounced by the legislator.
Currently, the status quo is that people who purchase virtual goods within virtual worlds are granted a right to use these goods through various licensing agreements with the developers of the virtual worlds within which these goods are located. This means that the individual is not afforded the full scope of rights that would accrue to him/her would these virtual goods be classified as a manifestation of personal property.
In a vacuum these considerations do not seem to warrant much concern, however, they become more than a mere triviality when one comes to the realisation that some manifestations of virtual goods often accrue values of thousands of dollars on the secondary market. In instances where creditors are probing the virtual contents of an insolvent estate, this question becomes even more interesting.
This dissertation will consider the way the term “property” is defined in the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 and, more specifically, whether the notion of virtual property could be recognised within the definition’s broad scope. Furthermore, it posits that the recognition of virtual property rights in the context of insolvency is not only possible, but that it would be in the interest of the creditors of the insolvent estate to do so.