Laszlo Matiscsak - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Address: Bristol, Bristol, City of, United Kingdom
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Contractarianism is not a moral theory that is usually thought of in connection with non-rational... more Contractarianism is not a moral theory that is usually thought of in connection with non-rational creatures. It is almost commonplace that the whole idea behind the establishment of moral rules through a social contract is that such rules will then protect the contractors themselves. Because the framers of the contract are considered to be rational agents, a contractarian theory simply cannot generate moral principles that would apply to non-rational agents. It has been argued by some however, that this widely accepted view is false and that contractarianism, if properly understood offers moral protection to non-rational individuals. In this article, after considering both sides of this debate, I shall argue that contractarianism has strong resources to justify normative claims regarding our duties towards non-rational agents such as non-human animals and non-rational humans. The paper focuses on one particular version of contractarianism developed by John Rawls. I will claim that there are certain inconsistencies in Rawls’ theory which need to be corrected. Once this is done, the contractarian position on the moral protection of animals and humans with severe mental disabilities will change significantly. However, I will argue that under a social contract, contractors would still distinguish between animals and humans in situations where there is a serious clash of interests. Such a distinction is a psychological necessity which explains why rational agents might come to the conclusion that their duties towards non-rational humans are greater than their duties towards animals.
Contractarianism is not a moral theory that is usually thought of in connection with non-rational... more Contractarianism is not a moral theory that is usually thought of in connection with non-rational creatures. It is almost commonplace that the whole idea behind the establishment of moral rules through a social contract is that such rules will then protect the contractors themselves. Because the framers of the contract are considered to be rational agents, a contractarian theory simply cannot generate moral principles that would apply to non-rational agents. It has been argued by some however, that this widely accepted view is false and that contractarianism, if properly understood offers moral protection to non-rational individuals. In this article, after considering both sides of this debate, I shall argue that contractarianism has strong resources to justify normative claims regarding our duties towards non-rational agents such as non-human animals and non-rational humans. The paper focuses on one particular version of contractarianism developed by John Rawls. I will claim that there are certain inconsistencies in Rawls’ theory which need to be corrected. Once this is done, the contractarian position on the moral protection of animals and humans with severe mental disabilities will change significantly. However, I will argue that under a social contract, contractors would still distinguish between animals and humans in situations where there is a serious clash of interests. Such a distinction is a psychological necessity which explains why rational agents might come to the conclusion that their duties towards non-rational humans are greater than their duties towards animals.