Lizzie Fricker - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Drafts by Lizzie Fricker

Linguistic Luck, 2023

Speakers convey messages in a variety of ways, including assertion, presupposition, and conversat... more Speakers convey messages in a variety of ways, including assertion, presupposition, and conversational implicature. Assertion is the paradigm vehicle for acts of testifying. The speaker gives her word to her audience that the presented content is true, allowing them to gain knowledge via a distinctive mechanism: believing on the speaker's say-so. This is made possible by the conventions and norms that govern the social practise of making assertions, encapsulated in assertion's being governed by the norm that one must: assert that P only if one knows that P. Do other means of conveying a message also amount to testifying to it? I first examine presupposition, which we see can be used as a sneaky way to inculcate belief in an audience without it being subject to attention and scrutiny. I then turn to conversational implicature, which I show is an epistemically fragile means of conveying a message, resulting in implicatures often being deniable by the speaker. As such implicature is not apt to be, and is not, governed by a social norm, as the robust communicative means assertion is. We see that only explicit assertion of a conveyed message amounts to testifying to it. The paper revisits and expands upon arguments first broached in my earlier paper, Stating and Insinuating (PAS SV 2012).

Contemporary Debates in Epistemology 3rd Edn, 2023

When should one believe what one is told? We humans are social beings, and it is a ubiquitous fea... more When should one believe what one is told? We humans are social beings, and it is a ubiquitous feature of human life that we constantly interact with each other through the medium of a shared language. 1 One central part of this communicative activity is the sharing of information: conveying of facts, judgments and opinions to each other in spoken acts of face-to-face telling. These are the core case of what, with the rise of modern technologies, is now a broader kind of communicative act. The broader kind includes purportedly factual one-to-one communicative acts mediated via telephone conversations and Zoom calls, emails and text messages and posted letters; as well as various types of purportedly information-supplying communicative acts with a multiple and sometimes indeterminate intended audience. These occur via radio broadcasts and television programmes, podcasts, websites, twitter and other social media, newspapers and magazines, all kinds of books, and other written sources. At the extreme we may consider historical records such as birth, death and marriage registers and other official records of events to instance the kind we are interested in.

Linguistic Luck (edited book), 2022

Philosophical Topics, 2021

I develop a thin account of trust as trust-based reliance on an occasion. I argue that this thin ... more I develop a thin account of trust as trust-based reliance on an occasion. I argue that this thin notion describes the trust a recipient of testimony has in a speaker when she forms belief on his say-so. This basis for trusting belief in what one is told is also available to those who overhear and correctly understand the teller’s speech act. I contrast my account of trusting testimonial uptake with an alternative account that invokes a thicker notion: reciprocal trust. This involves mutual awareness of their trusting relation between truster and trustee, and so is not available to mere overhearers of an utterance. Reciprocal trust involves norms to be trusting, and to be trustworthy. I explore how these second-personal norms make visible the possibility of an epistemology of testimony that includes second-personal reasons to trust a speaker's testimony, ones that hold only for the addressee. Crucially, if the account of trust is a non-doxastic one – that is to say, trust does not analytically entail belief in trustworthiness – then this possibility arises without prior rejection of a core canon of mainstream epistemology: that only evidence can serve as grounds for belief. We find that non-doxastic testimonial trust has the potential to work epistemic magic: to enable one to reach justified beliefs that are not reachable except via second-personal trust in what one is told. But this result obtains only if trust is not only analytically possible without belief in trustworthiness, but can be justified by norms of trust when the latter would not be. My own account rejects this thesis, at least in the case of trusting a speaker as regards her utterance. But my analysis makes sense of the idea of second-personal reasons for testimonial belief, as posited by so-called ‘assurance theorists’ of testimony, and allows that debate to proceed further.

Epistemic Autonomy, 2021

There is a prima facie tension between maintaining one's epistemic autonomy and trusting the word... more There is a prima facie tension between maintaining one's epistemic autonomy and trusting the word of others. But I argue that one can maintain self-governance regarding one's beliefs - which I argue amounts to believing in accordance with one's evidence - while trusting the word of others, if one does so only when one has evidence of their trustworthiness. I give an analytic account of trust that fits what it is to trust another with respect to what she tells, which allows that one may give such trust only when one has evidence of the speaker's trustworthiness; when so, it is consistent with maintaining epistemic self-governance.

Royal Institute of Philosophy Proceedings, 2021

It is argued that many means-end skills are mere drudgery, and there is no case from well-being t... more It is argued that many means-end skills are mere drudgery, and there is no case from well-being to regret that the advance of technology has replaced them with machines. But a case is made that for humans possessing some skills is important for well-being, and that certain core skills are important for it. It is argued that these include navigational skills. While the march of technology has tended to promote human well-being, there is now some cause for concern that silicone chip technology is de-skilling us to an extent that impacts negatively on well-being.

Epistemic Autonomy (Routledge Studies in Epistemology series), 2021

forthcoming in Jon Matheson and Kirk Lougheed (eds.) Epistemic Autonomy (Routledge Studies in Epi... more forthcoming in Jon Matheson and Kirk Lougheed (eds.) Epistemic Autonomy (Routledge Studies in Epistemology series) 1. Practical and Epistemic Self-Governance and Trust Self-governance, being oneself in control of one's self and one's life, seems like a good thing, even an ideal to be aspired to. But the ability to enter into trusting relationships is also an important good of human life. We are social and emotional creatures, and a good human life involves cooperative and caring relationships with others. An indispensable part of these is allowing oneself to be dependent on others for various needs, and vulnerable to being harmed if others betray one's trust. So in the practical domain there is an opposition between self-governance and trust. A good human life will strike a suitable balance between retaining control oneself of how things that matter to one progress, and allowing delegation of this to trusted others; and it will find a suitable balance between emotional neediness and self-reliance. In the practical domain of action, and in one's personal and social life, self-governance is not an absolute unqualified good, but one to be traded off against the goods that come with dependence on others. But what about one's epistemic life? Is there a similar incompatibility between epistemic self-governance, maintaining responsibility oneself for one's beliefs, and trust in others? The trust here is about matters relating to acquiring knowledge, what we will call 'epistemic trust' 1 : most obviously, and the topic of this chapter, trust in others for what they tell us. 2 As I have argued in a previous paper, the supposed ideal of the autonomous knower-someone who never takes another's word on any topic, and only believes what she can find out through her own cognitive resources-is no such thing (see (Fricker 2006)). Each one of us (cognitively normal adult humans) is able to understand the limitations on what one can find out for oneself imposed by one's finite cognitive powers and restricted place in the world, and to appreciate the contrasted capacities and placing of others. And this understanding shows to one that, on many topics, others are in a position to know about them, and are better placed than oneself to know. So it is irrational not to accept another's word on a topic when one knows she is in such a superior epistemic position to oneself. In that previous paper I argued that believing on the basis of accepting another's testimony is consistent with maintaining responsibility for one's beliefs, and thus with epistemic self-governance, if one is discriminating in whom one trusts-if one believes what someone tells one only when one has good evidence of her honesty and competence on her topic. In this chapter I consolidate the thesis of that earlier paper. I first briefly discuss self-governance in relation to one's actions and desires (sect.2). I then propose that epistemic self-governance 1 On the account developed below epistemic trust has the same analysis as trust generally; it is distinguished by what it is trust for. Trust in a teller with respect to her utterance is epistemic firstly, in that one trusts the speaker to give one new knowledge; secondly, what one trusts in is the speaker's epistemic and character virtues as knower and communicator-one trusts her qua epistemic agent. 2 One trusts others in the dynamics of knowledge-generation when one delegates to them, or shares with them, the collection of data, conducting of experiments and so forth.

Williamson on Knowledge, 2009

I examine Timothy Williamson's arguments for his thesis that knowing is a metaphysically simple m... more I examine Timothy Williamson's arguments for his thesis that knowing is a metaphysically simple mental state, and maintain he provides at most a permissive, not a compelling case for this view.

I offer an account of what trust is, and of what epistemic self-trust consists in. I identify fiv... more I offer an account of what trust is, and of what epistemic self-trust consists in. I identify five distinct arguments extracted from Ch.2 of Zagzebski's Epistemic Authority for the rationality and epistemic legitimacy of epistemic self-trust. I take issue with the general account of human rational self-regulation on which one of her arguments rests. Zagzebski maintains that this consists in restoring harmony in the psyche by eliminating conflict and so ending 'dissonance'. I argue that epistemic rationality is distinct from psychic mechanisms aimed at eliminating dissonance, and these two sometimes pull in opposed directions. In Epistemic Authority (EA) Linda Zagzebski sets out to show how reflective self-consciousness leads the reflecting human subject into a case for accepting the epistemic authority of others. Specifically, Zagzebski argues, the epistemic and broader 1 intellectual self-trust that is basic to each self's operation and which is, happily, ratified by the conscientious self's reflections on her epistemic situation, ramifies into a mandated trust in certain others. Such is Zagzebski's programme in this ambitious and important work. In this discussion I focus on the starting point of this enterprise: Zagzebski's account of epistemic self-trust, and the case she makes for its legitimacy. 2 In Ch.2 of EA Zagzebski offers a package of theses and arguments which taken together underwrite her conclusion that epistemic self-trust is not only cognitively basic and unavoidable but also 'rational on reflection' (EA p.45). We start, inevitably, by unreflectively reposing trust in our cognitive faculties. Fortunately, as Zagzebski argues, this trust is vindicated as rational and epistemically legitimate when the initially unreflective self engages in epistemic self-examination and critique.

European Journal of Philosophy, 2019

Moran argues that when a recipient of testimony accepts what she is told and 'believes the speake... more Moran argues that when a recipient of testimony accepts what she is told and 'believes the speaker', this provides a reason for belief different in kind from that provided by evidence. I first clarify and then contest this claim. Testimony that P is evidence that P, and when one accepts a speaker's word, this is or should be a matter of accepting a truth-related reason for belief.

In modern society each one of us incurs extensive dependence on others to obtain the outputs of s... more In modern society each one of us incurs extensive dependence on others to obtain the outputs of skills that they possess, and oneself lacks-for epistemic skills, specialist knowledge; for practical skills, material outputs. But we each face choices over time as to which skills to seek to acquire oneself. I consider whether there is non-instrumental prudential normative reason for one to seek to acquire skills. I argue that there is an enjoyment-based case for each person to acquire the skills she would enjoy exercising, since the pleasure of exercising a particular skill is a distinct sui generis one, that cannot be obtained except through its exercise. I further argue that each one of us has some reason to ensure she is not skill-less, since possessing some skills is necessary for self-respect, which is necessary for leading a happy life. Finally, I suggest that there are certain abstract skill types that all have some reason to acquire, since they are necessary facilitating conditions for leading a happy life. Amongst these, I argue, are the skills needed to maintain a cognitive map of one's environment, and the ability to make one's way around in it. These are closely linked to autonomy, being in control of the progress of one's life, and hence to a happy human life.

I define a social norm as a regularity in behavior whose persistence is causally explained by the... more I define a social norm as a regularity in behavior whose persistence is causally explained by the existence of sanctioning attitudes of participants to violations – without these sanctions individuals have motive to violate the norm. I show how a universal precept " When in circumstances S, do action F " can be sustained by the conditional preference of each to conform given that others do of a convention, and also reinforced by the sanctions of a norm. I observe that a precept with moral force can be reinforced by a social norm. I then consider constitutive norms and show by means of an example, competitive figure skating, how a type of activity or practise G can have a constitutive norm NG. An ongoing activity in a community is engagement in that practice only if NG is reinforced as a social norm by participants. I apply this to the case of assertion: the speech act type assertion has a constitutive norm NA, and a practice of making speech acts in a community is one of making assertions only if it is controlled by NA enforced by the sanctions of a social norm.

I develop a local reductionist account of what is required for testimonial beliefs to be justifie... more I develop a local reductionist account of what is required for testimonial beliefs to be justified, and argue that human recipients of testimony typically form their beliefs in accordance with these requirements. Recipients estimate the trustworthiness of a speaker's assertion by constructing a mini-‐psychological theory of her, arriving at this by inference to the best explanation, and accept what they are told only if this theory has it that the speaker is expressing her knowledge. The existence of a social norm governing assertion, the knowledge norm, is a key factor making such an explanation accessible to recipients. This local reductionsm supports explanationism as a general account of the justification of empirical beliefs.

Papers by Lizzie Fricker

Philosophy & technology, Mar 28, 2024

Oxford University Press eBooks, Jun 22, 2023

Burge proposes the "Acceptance Principle", which states that it is apriori that a hearer may prop... more Burge proposes the "Acceptance Principle", which states that it is apriori that a hearer may properly accept what she is told in the absence of defeaters, since any giver of testimony is a rational agent, and as such one can presume she is a "source of truth". It is claimed that Burge's Principle is not intuitively compelling, so that a suasive, not merely an explanatory justification for it is needed; and that the considerations advanced by him are too weak to constitute a persuasive case for the Principle. It is further argued that Burge's apriorist, neo-Kantian approach to testimony is mistaken, and that testimony is best understood by examining the detailed context of the human socio-linguistic institutions of language, including the speech act of telling. Normally socially skilled human adults have a background of relevant knowledge about human nature and social roles, which they deploy in assessing the likely veracity of particular acts of testimony, and its epistemology is to be understood by focussing on this.

Episteme, Oct 21, 2019

Testimony poses a challenge to systematic epistemology. I cite two kinds of testimony situation w... more Testimony poses a challenge to systematic epistemology. I cite two kinds of testimony situation where the recipient's belief is not safe, yet intuitively counts as knowledge. Can Sosa's more sophisticated virtue reliabilism, which theorises animal knowledge as apt belief, yield the intuitively correct verdict on these cases? Sosa shows that a belief can be apt, though it is not safe, and so it may seem a quick positive answer is forthcoming. However, I explore complications in applying his AAA framework, regarding what we take as the circumstances in which the subject's attempt is made: the AAA framework does not mandate a particular choice, yet this affects whether the attempt (in particular, a believing in the endeavour to attain truth) comes out as apt or not. I conclude that Sosa's theory is subject to a familiar charge: it does not give a reductive account of knowledge, since we must deploy independent intuitions about whether knowledge is gained in a case, in order to apply it.

Oxford University Press eBooks, Oct 1, 2009

I examine Timothy Williamson's arguments for his thesis that knowing is a metaphysically ... more I examine Timothy Williamson's arguments for his thesis that knowing is a metaphysically simple mental state, and maintain he provides at most a permissive, not a compelling case for this view.

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Jun 1, 2002

Abstract Testimony is indispensable in the sciences. To deny the propriety of relying on it engen... more Abstract Testimony is indispensable in the sciences. To deny the propriety of relying on it engenders an untenable scepticism. But this leaves open the issue of what exactly confers a scientist’s epistemic right to rely upon the word of her colleagues. Some authors have suggested a recipient of testimony enjoys an epistemic entitlement to trust the word of another as such, not requiring evidence of her trustworthiness, so long as there is not evidence of her untrustworthiness. I argue that, whether or not such an on-no-evidence entitlement to believe what one is told exists, it shrinks to irrelevance in the explanation of the basis on which scientists take each other’s word in the scientific community. This is so, since a normally knowledgeable adult hearer is typically awash with relevant evidence, direct and circumstantial, for and against, concerning a teller’s trustworthiness, and this swamps any alleged entitlement to believe in the absence of such evidence. There need not be personal knowledge of the teller, since social role and topic provide evidence regarding trustworthiness. I also discuss the individuation of ‘testimony’ as an epistemic kind. I suggest that we should not attempt to define a category with sharp boundaries, but instead characterise a paradigm case—one person telling another something in face-to-face personal communication—and then notice other cases which both resemble and diverge from this in epistemically relevant features—lectures, media broadcasts, personal letters, personal diaries, etc.

Linguistic Luck, 2023

Contemporary Debates in Epistemology 3rd Edn, 2023

Linguistic Luck (edited book), 2022

Philosophical Topics, 2021

Epistemic Autonomy, 2021

Royal Institute of Philosophy Proceedings, 2021

Epistemic Autonomy (Routledge Studies in Epistemology series), 2021

Williamson on Knowledge, 2009

European Journal of Philosophy, 2019

Philosophy & technology, Mar 28, 2024

Oxford University Press eBooks, Jun 22, 2023

Episteme, Oct 21, 2019

Oxford University Press eBooks, Oct 1, 2009

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Jun 1, 2002

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society for the Systematic Study of Philosophy, Jun 1, 1983

John Wiley & Sons, Inc. eBooks, Aug 19, 2016

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Jul 1, 1987

... My explanations in section 1 of the topic of this paper, and indeed its very title, presuppos... more ... My explanations in section 1 of the topic of this paper, and indeed its very title, presuppose that within epistemology there are distinct sub-topics, to some extent independent of each other; theepistemologies of particular ways in which we acquire or retain beliefs, such as the ...

Philosophical Topics, 2021

I develop a thin account of trust as trust-based reliance on an occasion. I argue that this thin ... more I develop a thin account of trust as trust-based reliance on an occasion. I argue that this thin notion describes the trust a recipient of testimony has in a speaker when she forms belief on his say-so. This basis for trusting belief in what one is told is also available to those who overhear and correctly understand the teller’s speech act. I contrast my account of trusting testimonial uptake with an alternative account that invokes a thicker notion: reciprocal trust. This involves mutual awareness of their trusting relation between truster and trustee, and so is not available to mere overhearers of an utterance. Reciprocal trust involves norms to be trusting, and to be trustworthy. I explore how these second-personal norms make visible the possibility of an epistemology of testimony that includes second-personal reasons to trust a speaker’s testimony, ones that hold only for the addressee. Crucially, if the account of trust is a non-doxastic one—that is to say, trust does not analytically entail belief in trustworthiness—then this possibility arises without prior rejection of a core canon of mainstream epistemology: that only evidence can serve as grounds for belief. We find that non-doxastic testimonial trust has the potential to work epistemic magic: to enable one to reach justified beliefs that are not reachable except via second-personal trust in what one is told. But this result obtains only if trust is not only analytically possible without belief in trustworthiness, but can be justified by norms of trust when the latter would not be. My own account rejects this thesis, at least in the case of trusting a speaker as regards her utterance. But my analysis makes sense of the idea of second-personal reasons for testimonial belief, as posited by so-called ‘assurance theorists’ of testimony, and allows that debate to proceed further.

Philosophical Books, Jul 1, 1991

American Philosophical Quarterly, Oct 1, 2017

I define a social norm as a regularity in behavior whose persistence is causally explained by the... more I define a social norm as a regularity in behavior whose persistence is causally explained by the existence of sanctioning attitudes of participants toward violations—without these sanctions, individuals have motive to violate the norm. I show how a universal precept "When in circumstances S, do action F" can be sustained by the conditional preference of each to conform, given that others do, of a convention, and also reinforced by the sanctions of a norm. I observe that a precept with moral force can be reinforced by a social norm. I then consider constitutive norms and show by means of an example, competitive figure skating, how a type of activity or practice G can have a constitutive norm NG. An ongoing activity in a community is engagement in that practice only if NG is reinforced as a social norm by participants. I apply this to the case of assertion: the speech act type Assertion has a constitutive norm NA, and a practice of making speech acts in a community is one of making assertions only if it is controlled by NA enforced by the sanctions of a social norm.

Episteme, Apr 24, 2015

2 There is logical space for a disjunctivist account of testimony, on which the proprietary core ... more 2 There is logical space for a disjunctivist account of testimony, on which the proprietary core mechanism only occurs on favourable occasions, when it yields knowledge. This would be formally analogous to an account of visual perception according to which 'seeing that P' is an epistemic process that, whenever it occurs, yields knowledge; and which does not occur in cases of hallucination etc. My account is not of this kind, but describes a 'highest common factor' of both good and bad casesthat is, a way in which a recipient may respond both to suitably grounded truthful testimony (on the view I argue for, this means knowledge-expressing testimony), and to false testimony.

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Nov 1, 2006

Some early landmarks in the recent literature are Coady (1992), Matilal and Chakrabarti (1994). W... more Some early landmarks in the recent literature are Coady (1992), Matilal and Chakrabarti (1994). Welbourne (1986). Testimony, that is communication of knowledge, through the hearer's trust in what the speaker presents as being so, can occur also when a shared language is not used literally, and when the language of the message is not fully understood by both parties-successful uptake of the intended message can still be achieved, and the same commitment to its truth incurred by the speaker. There are also non-linguistic Gricean acts which successfully communicate a message, which certainly share some features of testimony. See Grice (1957), Schiffer (1972) , Searle (1969).

Oxford University Press eBooks, Jun 8, 2006

A reference point in philosophical investigation of knowledge from testimony is the ideal of the ... more A reference point in philosophical investigation of knowledge from testimony is the ideal of the 'autonomous knower'. This ideal type relies on no one else for any of her knowledge. Thus she takes no one else's word for anything, but accepts only what she has found out for herself, relying only on her own cognitive faculties and investigative and inferential powers. Descartes explicitly espoused this ideal, and method, in his Meditations (Descartes 1641). Locke equally rejected 'other men's opinions floating in one's brain' as not constituting knowledge (Locke 1690). The wholly autonomous knower will not accept any proposition, unless she herself possesses the evidence establishing it. Thus she will not accept anything on the basis of another's word for it, even when she has evidence of their trustworthiness on the topic in question. Such extreme purism restricts how much one can come to know very severely. We humans are essentially social creatures, and it is not clear that we do or could possess any knowledge at all which is not in some way, perhaps obliquely, dependent on testimony. How exactly does the system of empirical beliefhopefully knowledge-of each of us depend on others' testimony? There is certainly massive causal reliance on testimony in the process by which each of us develops into a language-user and thinker, 'grows into possession of a world'.¹ The initial stages of language acquisition by a child inevitably occur through a Earlier versions of this paper were given at a workshop on 'Testimony, Trust and Action' in King's College Cambridge in September 2003, at a conference on 'Moral Testimony' in the Philosophy Department at Birmingham University in March 2004, and at a conference at the Inter-University Centre in Dbrovnik, Croatia, in May 2005. I received very useful comments from audiences at these events, in light of which I corrected various errors. I am also very grateful to both John Hawthorne and Stephen Schiffer for valuable comments and discussion on an earlier draft. The research for this paper was done between January and June 2002, during a period of leave funded by my employers, Magdalen College and Oxford University, and by a Fellowship from the Mind Association. My thanks for their support.

Springer eBooks, 2004

The expression ‘testimony’ in everyday usage in English is confined to reports by witnesses or by... more The expression ‘testimony’ in everyday usage in English is confined to reports by witnesses or by experts given in a courtroom, or other formal setting. But in analytic philosophy the expression is used as a label for the process by which knowledge or belief is gained from understanding and believing the spoken or written reports of others generally, regardless of setting. In a modern society testimony thus broadly understood is one of the main sources of belief. Very many of an individual’s beliefs are gained second-hand: from personal communication, from all sorts of purportedly factual books, from written records of many kinds, and from newspapers, television and the internet. Testimony enables the diffusion of current news, information (or misinformation), opinion and gossip throughout a community with a shared language. It also enables the preservation and passing on of our accumulated heritage of knowledge and belief: in history, geography, the sciences, technology, etc. We would be almost unimaginably epistemically impoverished, without the resources provided by testimony in its various forms.

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Jun 1, 2012

An utterer may convey a message to her intended audience by means of an explicit statement; or by... more An utterer may convey a message to her intended audience by means of an explicit statement; or by a non-conventionally mediated one-off signal from which the audience is able to work out the intended message; or by conversational implicature. I investigate whether the last two are equivalent to explicit testifying, as communicative act and epistemic source. I find that there are important differences between explicit statement and insinuation; only with the first does the utterer assume full responsibility for the truth of what she communicates to her audience.

Oxford University Press eBooks, Oct 1, 2015