Luke Maring - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Papers by Luke Maring

Routledge eBooks, Oct 16, 2023

Imagine a moral agent with the native capacity to act rightly in every kind of circumstance. She ... more Imagine a moral agent with the native capacity to act rightly in every kind of circumstance. She will never, that is, find herself thrust into conditions she isn't equipped to handle. Relationships turned tricky, evolving challenges of parenthood, or living in the midst of global pandemic-she is never mistaken about what must be done, nor does she lack the skills to do it. When we are thrust into a new kind of circumstance, by contrast, we often need time to practice discernment, new forms of compassion, different kinds of courage, or whatever else conditions call for. Whereas our imaginary agent has the native capacity to act rightly, we need to practice skills and habits appropriate to new circumstances. Unfortunately, practice usually takes the form of on-the-job training-it is hard to cultivate the skills of an excellent parent, for example, until we actually are parents. On-the-job training has an obvious drawback: mistakes are basically guaranteed. This paper focuses on errors that (a) cause harm to others, and that (b) we make non-culpably because our skills are (understandably) not yet up to snuff. What attitude should we take towards these significant-yet-non-culpable failures? According to much moral philosophy, non-culpable failures call for agent-regret. My aim is not to discredit agent-regret; it does serve an important moral function. Rather, my aim is to complicate a too-simple picture. If we take seriously our need to practice moral skills-such as discernment, new forms of compassion, different kinds of courage, or whatever else new conditions call for-we will have reason to cultivate an attitude I call stoic determination. §1 explains how we practice new moral skills. It focuses on Stohr (2019), which gives us a framework to understand the mechanics of moral practicing, and, thereby, to understand the predicament of an agent who does not yet have the skills or habits she needs. §2 is an extended interlude that illuminates the limitations of agentregret. Some kinds of non-culpable mistakes, §2 argues, call not for agent-regret, but an attitude I call stoic determination. §3 returns to the predicament of on-the-job

The Journal of Value Inquiry, 2023

Lisa Tessman (2016: 164) recounts the case of a Jewish mother, running from Nazis, who faced a te... more Lisa Tessman (2016: 164) recounts the case of a Jewish mother, running from Nazis, who faced a terrible choice. She could (a) drown her infant, or (b) accept the virtual certainty that her baby’s cries would doom the refugee group she was fleeing with. Given those options, (b) is worse. Still, preemptively drowning a baby—indeed one’s own baby—is a terrible act.

To make sense of cases like this, Tessman turns to the concept of moral failure: an act that violates an important moral value such that the loss cannot be fully redeemed by gains elsewhere. I will argue that criminal justice needs a moral framework like Tessman’s. It needs to make sense of the fact that some options are genuinely better than others, without letting honorifics like ‘justice’ obscure the equally important fact the best available option might be terrible. More specifically, I will argue that when punishment involves prison, as it often does, it is a moral failure. It can be justified only in the sense that preemptively drowning an infant can be justified: like the fleeing mother, society might on some terrible occasions find itself with no better alternative.

Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy, 2018

This Article argues that just as the act of forcing sex upon a rapist is itself rape, the executi... more This Article argues that just as the act of forcing sex upon a rapist is itself rape, the execution of a murderer is itself murder. Part I clears the way by defeating three simple, but common, arguments that capital punishment is not murder. Part II shows that despite moral theorists' best attempts to show otherwise, executions seem to instantiate all the morally relevant properties of murder. Part III notes a lacuna in the literature on capital punishment: Even if there is a good moral reason to execute murderers, the distinction between capital punishment and murder requires a plausible account of the state's right to execute citizens. We have no such account

The Journal of Value Inquiry, 2021

Standard definitions represent political authority as the power to give reasons (or pro tanto dut... more Standard definitions represent political authority as the power to give reasons (or pro tanto duties) by using speech. But the giving of reasons (or pro tanto duties) is routine among ordinary folk. Why, then, is establishing the reason-giving powers of the state not the very same problem as establishing the reason-giving powers of ordinary people? This article (i) shows that the literature does not have the resources to answer, (ii) develops a pragmatist answer, and then (iii) closes by suggesting that, properly understood, the problem of political authority calls not for more permutations of, say, consent theory, but concrete, genuinely democratic political systems.

Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, 2021

ABSTRACT After initially pitting partisans against purists, the literature on the ethics of fando... more ABSTRACT After initially pitting partisans against purists, the literature on the ethics of fandom has coalesced around a pluralist position: purists and partisans each have their own merits, and there is no ideal form of fandom. In this literature, however, the fair-weather fan continues to be viewed with dismissal and (sometimes) derision. While some fair-weather fans may earn this contempt, many fair-weather fans, we argue, are not only acceptable, they have important advantages over partisans and purists, and as such are in a better position to navigate some of the moral complexities inherent in modern sports. We develop this argument first by clarifying the nature of the fair-weather fan. We then examine challenges that fans face in many modern sports, first owing to their economic nature and, second, due to the morally tainted status of many of them. We argue that the fair-weather fan meets these challenges in ways that the partisan and purist cannot replicate.

Philosophia, 2020

Imagine a case of wrongdoing-not something trivial, but nothing so serious that adequate reparati... more Imagine a case of wrongdoing-not something trivial, but nothing so serious that adequate reparations are impossible. Imagine, further, that the wrongdoer makes those reparations and sincerely apologizes. Does she have a moral right to be forgiven? The standard view is that she does not, but this paper contends that the standard view is mistaken. It begins by showing that the arguments against a right to be forgiven are inconclusive. It ends by making two arguments in defense of that right. Keywords Forgiveness. Making amends. Right to be forgiven Imagine a case of wrongdoing-not something trivial, but nothing so serious that adequate reparations are impossible. Imagine, further, that the wrongdoer makes those reparations and sincerely apologizes. She becomes what I will call an amends-making offender. 1 Does she have a moral right to be forgiven? The question is not whether there can be weighty moral reasons to forgive, for there surely can be. It might be important to preserve a valuable relationship. Or, perhaps, holding on to resentment will poison your character. The question is not about moral reasons in general, but about moral rights in particular: does the amends-making offender-the wrongdoer who makes adequate reparations and sincerely apologizes-have a right to be forgiven? There is some pressure to answer 'No.' We are typically entitled to demand our rights. Blacks in the civil rights movement did not meekly request equality; they demanded equal treatment as their moral due. But we typically ask for forgivenesswe say "Please forgive me," not "Forgive me now!" On the other hand, there is some 1 I am defining "amends-making offender" as "someone who makes adequate amends and sincerely apologizes." If the worst offenses do not admit of adequate amends, it will be impossible for the worst offenders to qualify as amends-making.

Journal of Philosophical Research, 2018

It is common to assume (a) that democracy is intrinsically valuable, and (b) that nation-states h... more It is common to assume (a) that democracy is intrinsically valuable, and (b) that nation-states have the authority to exclude would-be immigrants from their territory. Are (a) and (b) in tension? This paper argues that they are. Every account of democracy’s intrinsic value suggests that nation-states lack the authority to exclude would-be immigrants. In fact, reflection on democratic values suggests an even more heterodox conclusion: nation-states should not be the privileged sites of decision-making that we often take them to be.

Dialogue, 2017

Certain non-voluntarists have recently defended political authority by advancing views with a two... more Certain non-voluntarists have recently defended political authority by advancing views with a two-fold structure. First, they argue that the state, or the law, is best (or uniquely) capable of accomplishing something important. Second, they defend a substantive normative principle on which being so situated is sufficient for de jure authority. Widely accepted tenets undermine all such views.

Journal of Political Philosophy, 2015

I N large nation-states, the effect of a single vote is negligible. Jason Brennan asks us to imag... more I N large nation-states, the effect of a single vote is negligible. Jason Brennan asks us to imagine that a particular candidate's victory is worth 33billiontothecommongood(supposesheisacivic−minded,financialwizard),thatthereare122,293,322voters(asinthe2004U.S.presidentialelection),andthattheprobabilityofanygivenvotersupportingourfinancialwizardis50.533 billion to the common good (suppose she is a civic-minded, financial wizard), that there are 122,293,322 voters (as in the 2004 U.S. presidential election), and that the probability of any given voter supporting our financial wizard is 50.5%. With the stakes artificially raised, one might expect that individual votes are impactful. But the expected value to the common good of one's vote for the financial wizard is a mere 33billiontothecommongood(supposesheisacivic−minded,financialwizard),thatthereare122,293,322voters(asinthe2004U.S.presidentialelection),andthattheprobabilityofanygivenvotersupportingourfinancialwizardis50.54.77 × 10 −2650. 1 We might wonder whether expected financial return is the best way to measure the value of casting a ballot. But however those wonderings turn out, Brennan's example illustrates that an individual vote is a drop in the ocean. How, then, could there be a moral duty to vote? The literature on voting is young, but arguments have begun to form three camps. The first defends a moral duty to vote in a roughly consequentialist fashion: a citizen's duty to vote derives from her duty to promote the good. These arguments are not promising. Not only is one's vote a drop in the ocean, whatever the good turns out to be, it is probably better served by other actions. We can likely do more good by using whatever resources we devote to educating ourselves and voting to instead serve in a soup kitchen, donate to Oxfam, or clean up a neighborhood park. 2 The second camp advances two arguments with a Kantian flavor. The first notes that it would be disastrous if no one voted, and argues that it is permissible to act only in ways that can be universalized. This is not a promising strategy either. It would be disastrous if everybody quit farming, but there is no general duty to take up agriculture. 3 According to the second argument, failing to vote violates standards of fairness. If they vote well, diligent voters help provide the public good of effective governance. The problem with non-voters is that they

Faith and Philosophy, 2014

Religious Studies, 2012

The traditional problem of evil sets theists the task of reconciling two things: God and evil. I ... more The traditional problem of evil sets theists the task of reconciling two things: God and evil. I argue that theists face the more difficult task of reconciling God and evils that God is specially obligated to prevent. Because of His authority, God's obligation to curtail evil goes far beyond our Samaritan duty to prevent evil when doing so isn't overly hard. Authorities owe their subjects a positive obligation to prevent certain evils; we have a right against our authorities that they protect us. God's apparent mistake is not merely the impersonal wrong of failing to do enough good – though it is that too. It is the highly personal wrong of failing to live up to a moral requirement that comes bundled with authority over persons. To make my argument, I use the resources of political philosophy and defend a novel change to the orthodox account of authority.

Moral Philosophy and Politics, 2019

The best arguments for a nation-state’s right to exclude unwanted outsiders actually condemn nati... more The best arguments for a nation-state’s right to exclude unwanted outsiders actually condemn nation-level regimes of restriction. Two argumentative steps lead to this conclusion. The first points out that the best arguments for exclusion generalize: if they show that nation-states have the right to exclude, they perform the same service for a great many towns, cities, subnational states, and provinces. The second step constructs a dilemma. The right to exclude is important enough to justify the suffering of would-be immigrants, or it is not. If it is, the right to exclude is very important indeed–would-be immigrants often suffer grievously. But nation-level regimes would then be a serious moral problem: they would deprive a great many municipalities of a right that matters a great deal. Turning to the dilemma’s second horn, if the right to exclude is not important enough to justify the suffering of would-be immigrants, nation-level regimes are straightforwardly immoral. Either way, ...