M Alvarez - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Papers by M Alvarez

Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 2017

The last three decades have seen much important work on powers and dispositions: what they are an... more The last three decades have seen much important work on powers and dispositions: what they are and how they are related to the phenomena that constitute their manifestation. These debates have tended to focus on ‘paradigmatic’ dispositions, i.e. physical dispositions such as conductivity, elasticity, radioactivity, etc. It is often assumed, implicitly or explicitly, that the conclusions of these debates concerning physical dispositions can be extended to psychological dispositions, such as beliefs, desires or character traits. In this paper I identify some central features of paradigmatic dispositions that concern their manifestation, stimulus conditions, and causal bases. I then focus on a specific kind of psychological disposition, namely character traits, and argue that they are importantly different from paradigmatic dispositions in relation to these features. I conclude that this difference should lead us to re-examine our assumption that character traits are dispositions and, ...

Philosophical Explorations, 2009

Reasons can play a variety of roles in a variety of contexts. For instance, reasons can motivate ... more Reasons can play a variety of roles in a variety of contexts. For instance, reasons can motivate and guide us in our actions (and omissions), in the sense that we often act in the light of reasons. And reasons can be grounds for beliefs, desires and emotions and can be used to evaluate, and sometimes to justify, all these. In addition, reasons are used in explanations: both in explanations of human actions, beliefs, desires, emotions, etc., and in explanations of a wide range of phenomena involving all sorts of animate and inanimate substances. This diversity has encouraged the thought that the term 'reason' is ambiguous or has different senses in different contexts. Moreover, this view often goes hand in hand with the claim that reasons of these different kinds belong to different ontological categories: to facts (or something similar) in the case of normative/justifying reasons, and to mental states in the case of motivating/explanatory reasons. In this paper I shall explore some of the main roles that reasons play and, on that basis, I shall offer a classification of kinds of reasons. As will become clear, my classification of reasons is at odds with much of the literature in several respects: first, because of my views about how we should understand the claim that reasons are classified into different kinds; second, because of the kinds into which I think reasons should be classified; and, finally, because of the consequences I think this view has for the ontology of reasons.

The Philosophical Quarterly, 1994

Hans-Johann Glock attempts in his paper 'The Indispensability of Translation in Quine and Dav... more Hans-Johann Glock attempts in his paper 'The Indispensability of Translation in Quine and Davidson" to demonstrate the incoherence of the doctrines of Radical Translation and Radical Interpretation defended by Quine and Davidson respectively. He does this by trying initially to undermine, and ultimately to expose as absurd, a thesis he takes to be fundamental to both theories, and which he calls 'the thesis of the Indispensability of Translation': 'the idea that all human communication involves radical translation or interpretation' (p. 197). According to him, the thesis identifies understanding with translation. But this identification would be a distortion of our concepts. Therefore any conclusions drawn from the indispensability thesis will not touch our concept of linguistic understanding. This alone would considerably weaken any motivation for endorsing Quine's and Davidson's theories. But Glock's objective is more ambitious: he wants to demonstrate that the theories of Radical Translation and Interpretation are incoherent, and that, by generating a vicious regress, the indispensability thesis entails the nihilist conclusion that there is no such a thing as linguistic understanding or meaning. For him this conclusion amounts to a reductio ad absurdum of these theories.

Philosophical Topics, 2005

Nietzsche on Language: Before and After Wittgenstein There is a temptation to regard Nietzsche as... more Nietzsche on Language: Before and After Wittgenstein There is a temptation to regard Nietzsche as a more Wittgensteinian figure 1 than he might at first appear, as a thinker in whom − despite his highly idiosyncratic concerns and priorities − distinctively Wittgensteinian themes can be discerned. 2 Like all such temptations, however, this one needs to be treated with caution: passing resemblances are all too easy to take for premonitions, and what, when one considers two thinkers in isolation, can look like a relation of the prophetic to the prophesied, often turns out to be the effect of a quite different relation, namely, one in which both thinkers stand to a tradition that they have in common. There is also a question about what the point of a claim such as 'Nietzsche was more of a Wittgensteinian than he might look' is meant to be. Here are four possibilities. The point might be to say: 1. 'Nietzsche and Wittgenstein share certain conclusions; Nietzsche got there first, and Wittgenstein quietly helped himself to (some of) them' (as one might say that Freud did). 2. 'Nietzsche and Wittgenstein arrived at (some of) the same conclusions independently, conclusions taken to be distinctively Wittgensteinian, but Nietzsche got there first' (to describe some of Nietzsche's thoughts about modern moral philosophy as 'Anscombesque' would be an example of this). 3. 'There are themes and approaches in Nietzsche that are more clearly developed in Wittgenstein, and so respond well to being read in a Wittgensteinian spirit' (as those who wrongly describe Nietzsche as an 'existentialist' must think is true vis à vis Sartre). 4. 'Nietzsche is simply better when read as if he were Wittgenstein' (some Deleuzians appear to have a version of this in mind when they call Nietzsche 'Deleuzian'). 1 Throughout this essay, the Wittgenstein that is intended is the later one − the Wittgenstein of Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty. It is unlikely that anyone has ever been tempted to liken Nietzsche to the author of the Tractatus, except, perhaps, for reasons having to do with aphorisms, or at any rate with short numbered sections. Possibility 4 is clearly intellectually and exegetically reprehensible, whoever the philosophers in question are. Possibility 1, in the case of Nietzsche and Wittgenstein, seems to be quite certainly groundless: there is no evidence at all that Wittgenstein took anything from Nietzsche, consciously or unconsciously. Which leaves possibilities 2 and 3, both of which are plainly vulnerable to the worry about premonitions and prophecies mentioned above. So anyone who is sympathetic to the thought that Nietzsche was a more Wittgensteinian figure than he might at first appear to be will have to tread carefully. In the present essay, we try to tread carefully around, or through − or at any rate in the vicinity of − the temptation to think that Nietzsche was more of a Wittgensteinian about language than he might at first look. I A possibly attractive place to start would be with the many passages in which Nietzsche warns us of the ease with which language can lead us astray. So, for example, he claims that our knowledge "is still subject to the seduction of language" (GM I.13), that 4 The word 'revenge' is said so quickly, it almost seems as if it could not contain more than one root concept and feeling. And so people are still trying to find this root −… [a]s if all words were not pockets into which now this and now that has been put, and now many things at once! Thus 'revenge', too, is now this and now that, and now something very composite (WS 33). And to this, Kaufmann adds a further footnote: "A remarkably clear and vivid statement", he says, "of a point that is widely held to be one of Ludwig Wittgenstein's major contributions to philosophy; cf. Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations (1953), sections 65ff." 6 The relevant sections of the Investigations are of course those devoted to family resemblance concepts, and, not unreasonably, Kaufmann concludes his footnote with a reference to the anti-Platonism about meaning that Nietzsche and Wittgenstein (indeed) share. 7 Kaufmann's view, then, is that a conclusion about language taken to be distinctively Wittgensteinian was in fact arrived at by Nietzsche first. Let's agree to regard this view as plausible, at least for the moment (we return to it in section IV, below). II The second place at which Kaufmann hears a premonition of Wittgenstein is in section 354 of The Gay Science, which needs to be quoted at some length: Nietzsche 'surmises' that consciousness has developed only under the pressure of the need for communication; that from the start it was needed and useful only between human beings…; and that it also developed only in proportion to the degree of this utility. Consciousness is really only a net of communication between human beings; it is only as such that it had to develop… As the most endangered animal, man needed help and protection, he needed his peers, he had to learn to express his distress and to make himself understood; and for all of this he needed consciousness first of all… In brief, ahead of the game in this respect, as he was in so many others. But we can at least say this: to the very large extent that Nietzsche's better moments and larger thoughts are consistent with what we now know, thanks to Wittgenstein, to be true about language, there is no reason to treat those better moments and larger thoughts with scepticism, as there is, for instance, with Hume's, a great philosopher whom the subsequent history of philosophy has more or less consigned to the history of philosophy. Wittgenstein may rule; but Nietzsche lives on.

Oxford Scholarship Online, 2017

Desire plays a pivotal role in our lives. Yet in recent times, it has not been a central topic in... more Desire plays a pivotal role in our lives. Yet in recent times, it has not been a central topic in the philosophy of mind. The aim of this book is to redress this imbalance. What are desires? According to a dogma, desire is a motivational state: desiring is being disposed to act. This conception aligns with the functionalist approach to desire and the standard account of desire’s direction of fit and of its role in explaining action. According to a second influential approach, however, desire is first and foremost an evaluation: desiring is representing something as good. This is in line with the thesis that we cannot desire something without “seeing” any good in it (the “guise of the good”). Are desires motivational states? How are we to understand desire’s direction of fit? How do desires explain action? Are desires evaluative states? Is the guise of the good true? Should we adopt an alternative picture that emphasizes desire’s deontic nature? Which view of desire does the neurosci...

Philosophical Books, 2005

The idea that there is a branch of philosophy called 'the philosophy of action' can be dated roug... more The idea that there is a branch of philosophy called 'the philosophy of action' can be dated roughly to the second half of the twentieth century. But while the label is new, the subject matter is not. At least since Socrates, philosophers have concerned themselves with the themes and problems now gathered under that label. In essence, the philosophy of action seeks to offer an account of the behaviour that characterises humans as 'rational animals', to use Aristotle's phrase; behaviour that provides the grounds for judgements about people's goals, characters and values, and on account of which they are held to be causally, and sometimes morally, responsible for certain outcomes and situations. Anscombe's book Intention, which was strongly influenced by Aristotle's and Wittgenstein's views, is rightly regarded by many as the most important direct contribution to the philosophy of action in the twentieth century. 1 Intention set the agenda for subsequent work in the area by replacing questions about free will and the voluntary, which had occupied philosophers for centuries, with questions about intention and the intentional; in particular, with the question: "What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not?" (Intention, §5). Anscombe's answer was that "they are actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is of course that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting" (ibid.) Given this answer, the question about intentional actions, though not identical to, became synonymous with the question: 'What distinguishes actions done for a reason from those that are not?'. 2 In the process of clarifying both question and answer, Anscombe touched upon, or explored in some detail, most of the central issues in the theory of action; issues which might be gathered under three main headings: the nature of actions, the nature of reasons, and the relation between the two. In the years following the publication of Intention, and especially after the publication in 1963 of Davidson's paper 'Actions, Reasons and Causes', the theory of action concentrated mainly on

Ratio, 1999

Since the publication of Davidson's influential article 'The Logical Form of Action Sentences', s... more Since the publication of Davidson's influential article 'The Logical Form of Action Sentences', semantical considerations are widely thought to support the doctrine that actions are events. I shall argue that the semantics of action sentences do not imply that actions are events. This will involve defending a negative claim and a positive claim, as well as a proposal for how to formalize action sentences. The negative claim is that the semantics of action sentences do not require that we think of actions as events, even if these sentences are best formalized in the manner that Davidson himself favours. The positive claim is that the simplest way of formalizing actions sentences which captures all and only licit inferences requires quantification only over the results of actions. If this is right, then the argument from semantics evaporates, and the claim that actions are events needs to be freshly argued foror against.

Philosophical Explorations, 2008

The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with p... more The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

Philosophy, 1998

In the past thirty years or so, the doctrine that actions are events has become an essential, and... more In the past thirty years or so, the doctrine that actions are events has become an essential, and sometimes unargued, part of the received view in the philosophy of action, despite the efforts of a few philosophers to undermine the consensus. For example, the entry for Agency in a recently published reference guide to the philosophy of mind begins with the following sentence:A central task in the philosophy of action is that of spelling out the differences between events in general and those events that fall squarely into the category of human action.There is no consensus about what events are. But it is generally agreed that, whatever events may prove to be, actions are a species or a class of events. We believe that the received view is mistaken: actions are not events. We concede that for most purposes, the kind of categorial refinement which is involved in either affirming or denying that actions are events is frankly otiose. Our common idiom does not stress the difference betwe...

Oxford Scholarship Online

We often explain human actions by reference to the desires of the person whose actions we are exp... more We often explain human actions by reference to the desires of the person whose actions we are explaining: “Jane is studying law because she wants to become a judge.” But how do desires explain actions? A widely accepted view is that desires are dispositional states that are manifested in behavior. Accordingly, desires explain actions as ordinary physical dispositions, such as fragility or conductivity, explain their manifestations, namely causally. This paper argues that desires, unlike ordinary physical dispositions, are “manifestation-dependent dispositions”: dispositions whose attribution depends on their having been manifested. This feature of desires, I suggest, favours a “context-placing” approach to understanding how desires explain actions.

Ryle on Mind and Language, 2015