Michael Kraig - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Papers by Michael Kraig
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, 2006
The spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technologies, materials, and manufacturing proces... more The spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technologies, materials, and manufacturing processes to the developing world has overtaken many issues on the U.S. national security agenda, at least as measured in human resources (intelligence, diplomatic, and military), technological innovations, military procurements, and the formal statements of U.S. strategy documents. Globally, it has become the central focus of heated debates about international stability, security, and prosperity in the post-Cold War world, both in United Nations circles and in European and Asian capitals. Since Saddam Hussein made the fateful decision to expand the Iraqi state via aggressive military means in 1990–1991—backed up by committed WMD programs that were either weaponized or very near to producing a working weapon—the “WMD proliferation threat” has replaced the nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet Union as the central planning concern of the U.S. national security community. The subject also dominates many meetings and debates within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Brussels, and it has led to the creation of a new European Union WMD nonproliferation strategy with the imprimatur of European Union President Javier Solana.1
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, 2006
The spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technologies, materials, and manufacturing proces... more The spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technologies, materials, and manufacturing processes to the developing world has overtaken many issues on the U.S. national security agenda, at least as measured in human resources (intelligence, diplomatic, and military), technological innovations, military procurements, and the formal statements of U.S. strategy documents. Globally, it has become the central focus of heated debates about international stability, security, and prosperity in the post-Cold War world, both in United Nations circles and in European and Asian capitals. Since Saddam Hussein made the fateful decision to expand the Iraqi state via aggressive military means in 1990–1991—backed up by committed WMD programs that were either weaponized or very near to producing a working weapon—the “WMD proliferation threat” has replaced the nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet Union as the central planning concern of the U.S. national security community. The subject also dominates many meetings and debates within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Brussels, and it has led to the creation of a new European Union WMD nonproliferation strategy with the imprimatur of European Union President Javier Solana.1
The opinions in this article are solely those of Michael Kraig as an independent security analyst... more The opinions in this article are solely those of Michael Kraig as an independent security analyst and do not reflect the positions or programs of the Stanley Foundation. Three Alternative Frameworks for Gulf Security 4 Existing Security Practices in the Region 11 Can Comprehensive Multilateral Coalitions 13 Ensure Peace and Stability? Barriers to Regional Cooperation 17 Conclusion 24
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per resp... more Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
1. Beyond "Full Spectrum Dominance" and "Friends and Allies" 2. Interpreting ... more 1. Beyond "Full Spectrum Dominance" and "Friends and Allies" 2. Interpreting Great Power Conflict History: Material Interests, Nationalism, and War 3. Managed Competition in the 21st Century Asia-Pacific: Identity, Sovereign Autonomy, and Globalized Wealth 4. Great Power Crisis Bargaining and Conflict Management: Lessons for the "Asia Pivot" 5. Amending the "American Way of War": A Critique of Decisive Battle 6. The US Military and Conflict Management in the Asia Pacific
1. Beyond "Full Spectrum Dominance" and "Friends and Allies" 2. Interpreting ... more 1. Beyond "Full Spectrum Dominance" and "Friends and Allies" 2. Interpreting Great Power Conflict History: Material Interests, Nationalism, and War 3. Managed Competition in the 21st Century Asia-Pacific: Identity, Sovereign Autonomy, and Globalized Wealth 4. Great Power Crisis Bargaining and Conflict Management: Lessons for the "Asia Pivot" 5. Amending the "American Way of War": A Critique of Decisive Battle 6. The US Military and Conflict Management in the Asia Pacific
India Review, 2003
Page 1. The Political and Strategic Imperatives of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia MICHAEL RYAN ... more Page 1. The Political and Strategic Imperatives of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia MICHAEL RYAN KRAIG Comparing and Contrasting Superpower and South Asian Deterrence There has been a plethora of Western policy ...
India Review, 2003
Page 1. The Political and Strategic Imperatives of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia MICHAEL RYAN ... more Page 1. The Political and Strategic Imperatives of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia MICHAEL RYAN KRAIG Comparing and Contrasting Superpower and South Asian Deterrence There has been a plethora of Western policy ...
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2003
THE 50-YEAR EFFORT TO CONTROL THE SPREAD of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction... more THE 50-YEAR EFFORT TO CONTROL THE SPREAD of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction-and even the concept of nonproliferation itself-are in crisis. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), signed in 1970, is threatened from within by weapon-seeking member states like Iran and treaty dropout North Korea, as well as from without, by non-signatories like Israel, India, and Pakistan. At the same time, the policies enunciated by the Bush administration, which substitute the unilateral (and preemptive) use of force for multilateral consultation and international agreements, could spell the final blow for the treaty, which looks less and less like a living institution, and more like a dying remnant of the Cold War. Worse yet, if the NPT falls under the weight of its many assaults, it seems likely that the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention will go down along with it, fellow victims of debates over the difficulty of verification, inadequate funding, and American hostility. In February, the Stanley Foundation held a roundtable discussion that engaged both U.N. officials and experts from around the world, who considered hard questions about global security and the treaties' futures: What is the future role of arms control in stemming proliferation? Is there still a role for universal treaty regimes? Should nonproliferation efforts and nuclear powers' promises to disarm be decoupled? And what sort of leadership should the United States take in July 1, 1968: British shaping global security? Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2003
THE 50-YEAR EFFORT TO CONTROL THE SPREAD of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction... more THE 50-YEAR EFFORT TO CONTROL THE SPREAD of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction-and even the concept of nonproliferation itself-are in crisis. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), signed in 1970, is threatened from within by weapon-seeking member states like Iran and treaty dropout North Korea, as well as from without, by non-signatories like Israel, India, and Pakistan. At the same time, the policies enunciated by the Bush administration, which substitute the unilateral (and preemptive) use of force for multilateral consultation and international agreements, could spell the final blow for the treaty, which looks less and less like a living institution, and more like a dying remnant of the Cold War. Worse yet, if the NPT falls under the weight of its many assaults, it seems likely that the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention will go down along with it, fellow victims of debates over the difficulty of verification, inadequate funding, and American hostility. In February, the Stanley Foundation held a roundtable discussion that engaged both U.N. officials and experts from around the world, who considered hard questions about global security and the treaties' futures: What is the future role of arms control in stemming proliferation? Is there still a role for universal treaty regimes? Should nonproliferation efforts and nuclear powers' promises to disarm be decoupled? And what sort of leadership should the United States take in July 1, 1968: British shaping global security? Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 1999
(1999). Safe or sorry: The “Y2K problem” and nuclear weapons. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: ... more (1999). Safe or sorry: The “Y2K problem” and nuclear weapons. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: Vol. 55, No. 2, pp. 38-43.
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, 2006
The spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technologies, materials, and manufacturing proces... more The spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technologies, materials, and manufacturing processes to the developing world has overtaken many issues on the U.S. national security agenda, at least as measured in human resources (intelligence, diplomatic, and military), technological innovations, military procurements, and the formal statements of U.S. strategy documents. Globally, it has become the central focus of heated debates about international stability, security, and prosperity in the post-Cold War world, both in United Nations circles and in European and Asian capitals. Since Saddam Hussein made the fateful decision to expand the Iraqi state via aggressive military means in 1990–1991—backed up by committed WMD programs that were either weaponized or very near to producing a working weapon—the “WMD proliferation threat” has replaced the nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet Union as the central planning concern of the U.S. national security community. The subject also dominates many meetings and debates within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Brussels, and it has led to the creation of a new European Union WMD nonproliferation strategy with the imprimatur of European Union President Javier Solana.1
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, 2006
The spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technologies, materials, and manufacturing proces... more The spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technologies, materials, and manufacturing processes to the developing world has overtaken many issues on the U.S. national security agenda, at least as measured in human resources (intelligence, diplomatic, and military), technological innovations, military procurements, and the formal statements of U.S. strategy documents. Globally, it has become the central focus of heated debates about international stability, security, and prosperity in the post-Cold War world, both in United Nations circles and in European and Asian capitals. Since Saddam Hussein made the fateful decision to expand the Iraqi state via aggressive military means in 1990–1991—backed up by committed WMD programs that were either weaponized or very near to producing a working weapon—the “WMD proliferation threat” has replaced the nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet Union as the central planning concern of the U.S. national security community. The subject also dominates many meetings and debates within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Brussels, and it has led to the creation of a new European Union WMD nonproliferation strategy with the imprimatur of European Union President Javier Solana.1
The opinions in this article are solely those of Michael Kraig as an independent security analyst... more The opinions in this article are solely those of Michael Kraig as an independent security analyst and do not reflect the positions or programs of the Stanley Foundation. Three Alternative Frameworks for Gulf Security 4 Existing Security Practices in the Region 11 Can Comprehensive Multilateral Coalitions 13 Ensure Peace and Stability? Barriers to Regional Cooperation 17 Conclusion 24
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per resp... more Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
1. Beyond "Full Spectrum Dominance" and "Friends and Allies" 2. Interpreting ... more 1. Beyond "Full Spectrum Dominance" and "Friends and Allies" 2. Interpreting Great Power Conflict History: Material Interests, Nationalism, and War 3. Managed Competition in the 21st Century Asia-Pacific: Identity, Sovereign Autonomy, and Globalized Wealth 4. Great Power Crisis Bargaining and Conflict Management: Lessons for the "Asia Pivot" 5. Amending the "American Way of War": A Critique of Decisive Battle 6. The US Military and Conflict Management in the Asia Pacific
1. Beyond "Full Spectrum Dominance" and "Friends and Allies" 2. Interpreting ... more 1. Beyond "Full Spectrum Dominance" and "Friends and Allies" 2. Interpreting Great Power Conflict History: Material Interests, Nationalism, and War 3. Managed Competition in the 21st Century Asia-Pacific: Identity, Sovereign Autonomy, and Globalized Wealth 4. Great Power Crisis Bargaining and Conflict Management: Lessons for the "Asia Pivot" 5. Amending the "American Way of War": A Critique of Decisive Battle 6. The US Military and Conflict Management in the Asia Pacific
India Review, 2003
Page 1. The Political and Strategic Imperatives of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia MICHAEL RYAN ... more Page 1. The Political and Strategic Imperatives of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia MICHAEL RYAN KRAIG Comparing and Contrasting Superpower and South Asian Deterrence There has been a plethora of Western policy ...
India Review, 2003
Page 1. The Political and Strategic Imperatives of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia MICHAEL RYAN ... more Page 1. The Political and Strategic Imperatives of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia MICHAEL RYAN KRAIG Comparing and Contrasting Superpower and South Asian Deterrence There has been a plethora of Western policy ...
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2003
THE 50-YEAR EFFORT TO CONTROL THE SPREAD of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction... more THE 50-YEAR EFFORT TO CONTROL THE SPREAD of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction-and even the concept of nonproliferation itself-are in crisis. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), signed in 1970, is threatened from within by weapon-seeking member states like Iran and treaty dropout North Korea, as well as from without, by non-signatories like Israel, India, and Pakistan. At the same time, the policies enunciated by the Bush administration, which substitute the unilateral (and preemptive) use of force for multilateral consultation and international agreements, could spell the final blow for the treaty, which looks less and less like a living institution, and more like a dying remnant of the Cold War. Worse yet, if the NPT falls under the weight of its many assaults, it seems likely that the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention will go down along with it, fellow victims of debates over the difficulty of verification, inadequate funding, and American hostility. In February, the Stanley Foundation held a roundtable discussion that engaged both U.N. officials and experts from around the world, who considered hard questions about global security and the treaties' futures: What is the future role of arms control in stemming proliferation? Is there still a role for universal treaty regimes? Should nonproliferation efforts and nuclear powers' promises to disarm be decoupled? And what sort of leadership should the United States take in July 1, 1968: British shaping global security? Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2003
THE 50-YEAR EFFORT TO CONTROL THE SPREAD of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction... more THE 50-YEAR EFFORT TO CONTROL THE SPREAD of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction-and even the concept of nonproliferation itself-are in crisis. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), signed in 1970, is threatened from within by weapon-seeking member states like Iran and treaty dropout North Korea, as well as from without, by non-signatories like Israel, India, and Pakistan. At the same time, the policies enunciated by the Bush administration, which substitute the unilateral (and preemptive) use of force for multilateral consultation and international agreements, could spell the final blow for the treaty, which looks less and less like a living institution, and more like a dying remnant of the Cold War. Worse yet, if the NPT falls under the weight of its many assaults, it seems likely that the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention will go down along with it, fellow victims of debates over the difficulty of verification, inadequate funding, and American hostility. In February, the Stanley Foundation held a roundtable discussion that engaged both U.N. officials and experts from around the world, who considered hard questions about global security and the treaties' futures: What is the future role of arms control in stemming proliferation? Is there still a role for universal treaty regimes? Should nonproliferation efforts and nuclear powers' promises to disarm be decoupled? And what sort of leadership should the United States take in July 1, 1968: British shaping global security? Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 1999
(1999). Safe or sorry: The “Y2K problem” and nuclear weapons. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: ... more (1999). Safe or sorry: The “Y2K problem” and nuclear weapons. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: Vol. 55, No. 2, pp. 38-43.