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Números publicados by Marcelo Ferrante
Revista de Derecho Penal con referato doble ciego.
Papers by Marcelo Ferrante
Legal Theory, 2009
I offer in this paper an argument in support of the orthodox view that resultant luck should not ... more I offer in this paper an argument in support of the orthodox view that resultant luck should not affect judgments of blameworthiness—and so, for example, that we should not blame the successful assassin more than the attempted assassin who equally tries but fails. This view, though widely held among moral philosophers and legal scholars, has been severely challenged as implying either the implausible rejection of moral luck or an equally implausible theory of wrongness according to which actual consequences may play no wrong-making role. The argument I offer, however, assumes both challenges to be true and shows that the orthodox view is consistent with holding them. Indeed, I argue that all other things being equal, successful offenders are no more to blame than their unsuccessful counterparts, even though agents are responsible for what they actually do (and therefore are subject to moral luck), and successful offenders do more wrong than their unsuccessful counterparts do (and th...
Estudio sobre la teoria de la imputacion objetiva y la influencia de la responsabilidad de la vic... more Estudio sobre la teoria de la imputacion objetiva y la influencia de la responsabilidad de la victima en la tipicidad de la conducta del autor, temas poco explorados aun en los paises con larga tradicion en discusiones teoricas. Las distintas opticas de estos tres autores permiten reconocer, sin embargo, un patron comun: el estudio critico de las tesis de Jakobs, que han interesado a la dogmatica penal durante los ultimos veinte anos.
Louisiana Law Review, 2005
We often criminalize types of actions, at least partially, because they cause or are likely to ca... more We often criminalize types of actions, at least partially, because they cause or are likely to cause bad states of affairs, typically, harm to others. In his article Criminalizing Endangerment,' Professor Antony Duff proposes classifying offenses into two separate groups, attacks and endangerments, depending on whether or not offenders act with the intention to cause harm (or risk of harm). 2 Roughly stated, the rationale for the distinction between attacks and endangerments is that each kind of offense expresses a distinctive attitude toward the people or interests it harms (or threatens to harm). This distinction marks a significant moral difference in that each kind of offense instantiates a different kind of moral wrong. Professor Duff articulates this difference as follows: whereas attacks express "a practical hostility toward the interests or people" against whom they are addressed, 3 endangerments do not express such an attitude. At most, they manifest only a certain degree of indifference. 4 The core of Professor Duff s argument is best described as the conjunction of two separate theses. First, actions that equally cause (risk of) harm to others instantiate different kinds of moral wrongs, depending on whether or not such actions express an attitude of hostility. (I will call this the thesis of attitudes as wrong-makers.) Second, actions driven by the intention to cause (risk of) harm' always express hostility, whereas actions not so guided never express hostility. At most, they express merely indifference. (I will call this the perfect correspondence thesis.) The conjunction of these two theses yields that: 1) actions causing (risk of) harm that are performed with the intention to cause such harm (or risk thereof) and 2) actions that are not guided by such intention but are otherwise equal in effect to the former type of actions are instances of two
El trabajo discute las ideas principales presentes en el trabajo de Silva Sánchez en este volumen... more El trabajo discute las ideas principales presentes en el trabajo de Silva Sánchez en este volumen 7 de Discusiones
No es raro encontrar en el derecho penal comparado reglas de responsabilidad penal por tentativa ... more No es raro encontrar en el derecho penal comparado reglas de responsabilidad penal por tentativa que exigen que, para que un agente sea punible como autor de una tentativa, debe haber obrado con el fin o la intención de cometer el delito correspondiente. El derecho penal argentino parece ser un ejemplo de esa tendencia. En su art. 42, el CP argentino establece que quien fracasa en la comisión de un delito es punible como autor de una tentativa si, entre otras condiciones, actuó “con el fin de cometer un delito determinado” .1 Los tribunales argentinos han tendido a darle a esta regla la interpretación según la cual la regla requiere que el autor haya obrado con la intención de realizar el delito que se ha frustrado, aun cuando esa intención no sea jurídicamente necesaria para la comisión del delito consumado correspondiente. En 1972, Esteban Righi publicó una nota objetando esa tendencia jurisprudencial .2 Quiero contribuir a este homenaje de quien fue mi primer profesor de Derecho ...
... Marcelo Ferrante. ... por la acción del necesitado -a quien llamaré "intolerante"- ... more ... Marcelo Ferrante. ... por la acción del necesitado -a quien llamaré "intolerante"- impide la afectación de su interés mediante una acción que, evaluada con independencia de sus consecuencias para el necesitado, sería indudablemente lícita; por ejemplo: cierra la puerta de su ...
New Criminal Law Review, 2007
... REVIEW ESSAY Explaining Mens Rea FIVE WAYS PATRICIA CAN KILL HER HUSBAND: ATHEORY OF INTENTIO... more ... REVIEW ESSAY Explaining Mens Rea FIVE WAYS PATRICIA CAN KILL HER HUSBAND: ATHEORY OF INTENTIONALITY AND BLAME. By Leo Zaibert. Chicago and La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 2005. Pp. xii, 261. $34.95 (paper). Reviewed by Marcelo Ferrante* ...
ABSTRACT Estudio sobre la teoría de la imputación objetiva y la influencia de la responsabilidad ... more ABSTRACT Estudio sobre la teoría de la imputación objetiva y la influencia de la responsabilidad de la víctima en la tipicidad de la conducta del autor, temas poco explorados aún en los países con larga tradición en discusiones teóricas. Las distintas ópticas de estos tres autores permiten reconocer, sin embargo, un patrón común: el estudio crítico de las tesis de Jakobs, que han interesado a la dogmática penal durante los últimos veinte años.
Estudio sobre la teoría de la imputación objetiva y la influencia de la responsabilidad de la víc... more Estudio sobre la teoría de la imputación objetiva y la influencia de la responsabilidad de la víctima en la tipicidad de la conducta del autor, temas poco explorados aún en los países con larga tradición en discusiones teóricas. Las distintas ópticas de estos tres autores permiten reconocer, sin embargo, un patrón común: el estudio crítico de las tesis de Jakobs, que han interesado a la dogmática penal durante los últimos veinte años.
New Criminal Law Review, 2008
I challenge in this paper a popular view on the causal requirement of criminal liability. The vie... more I challenge in this paper a popular view on the causal requirement of criminal liability. The view, which I call physicalism about the causal relation (or physicalism, for short), puts together the claim that the causal requirement demands that the agent causes a crime result (e.g., the death of a person) for her to be paradigmatically responsible for that result, with a conception of causation according to which a causal relation is such that it can only hold between actual events, and never between omissions (or other absences) and events. Physicalism's apparent merit is that it yields an account of the differential treatment actions and omissions receive in criminal law. However, I argue, it does so at the expense of rendering puzzling other uncontroversial features of the criminal law. Moreover, I contend that physicalism is groundless; it picks out a property that just can't play the role that the causal requirement is meant to play. I sketch, finally, an alternative co...
New Criminal Law Review: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal, 2011
New Criminal Law Review: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal, 2007
This article offers a comprehensive study of the merits of the legal practice of punishing accomp... more This article offers a comprehensive study of the merits of the legal practice of punishing accomplished crimes more severely than attempted crimes all other things being equal (differential punishment)vis-àà-vis the alternative of punishing them with equal sanctions (equal punishment).Unlike the overwhelming majority of the literature on the issue--which focuses on which practice better mirrors the offenders' relative moral deserts--the article evaluates both practices from a consequentialist, deterrence-based point of view. In particular, it shows first that traditional economic theories of the criminal law should yield the conclusion that differential punishment is not superior to equal punishment.The few arguments that the economic literature offers against such conclusion, the article shows, are mistaken. Secondly, drawing on social and psychological findings, the article advances three new arguments showing that, under some likely social and psychological conditions, differ...
Revista de Derecho Penal con referato doble ciego.
Legal Theory, 2009
I offer in this paper an argument in support of the orthodox view that resultant luck should not ... more I offer in this paper an argument in support of the orthodox view that resultant luck should not affect judgments of blameworthiness—and so, for example, that we should not blame the successful assassin more than the attempted assassin who equally tries but fails. This view, though widely held among moral philosophers and legal scholars, has been severely challenged as implying either the implausible rejection of moral luck or an equally implausible theory of wrongness according to which actual consequences may play no wrong-making role. The argument I offer, however, assumes both challenges to be true and shows that the orthodox view is consistent with holding them. Indeed, I argue that all other things being equal, successful offenders are no more to blame than their unsuccessful counterparts, even though agents are responsible for what they actually do (and therefore are subject to moral luck), and successful offenders do more wrong than their unsuccessful counterparts do (and th...
Estudio sobre la teoria de la imputacion objetiva y la influencia de la responsabilidad de la vic... more Estudio sobre la teoria de la imputacion objetiva y la influencia de la responsabilidad de la victima en la tipicidad de la conducta del autor, temas poco explorados aun en los paises con larga tradicion en discusiones teoricas. Las distintas opticas de estos tres autores permiten reconocer, sin embargo, un patron comun: el estudio critico de las tesis de Jakobs, que han interesado a la dogmatica penal durante los ultimos veinte anos.
Louisiana Law Review, 2005
We often criminalize types of actions, at least partially, because they cause or are likely to ca... more We often criminalize types of actions, at least partially, because they cause or are likely to cause bad states of affairs, typically, harm to others. In his article Criminalizing Endangerment,' Professor Antony Duff proposes classifying offenses into two separate groups, attacks and endangerments, depending on whether or not offenders act with the intention to cause harm (or risk of harm). 2 Roughly stated, the rationale for the distinction between attacks and endangerments is that each kind of offense expresses a distinctive attitude toward the people or interests it harms (or threatens to harm). This distinction marks a significant moral difference in that each kind of offense instantiates a different kind of moral wrong. Professor Duff articulates this difference as follows: whereas attacks express "a practical hostility toward the interests or people" against whom they are addressed, 3 endangerments do not express such an attitude. At most, they manifest only a certain degree of indifference. 4 The core of Professor Duff s argument is best described as the conjunction of two separate theses. First, actions that equally cause (risk of) harm to others instantiate different kinds of moral wrongs, depending on whether or not such actions express an attitude of hostility. (I will call this the thesis of attitudes as wrong-makers.) Second, actions driven by the intention to cause (risk of) harm' always express hostility, whereas actions not so guided never express hostility. At most, they express merely indifference. (I will call this the perfect correspondence thesis.) The conjunction of these two theses yields that: 1) actions causing (risk of) harm that are performed with the intention to cause such harm (or risk thereof) and 2) actions that are not guided by such intention but are otherwise equal in effect to the former type of actions are instances of two
El trabajo discute las ideas principales presentes en el trabajo de Silva Sánchez en este volumen... more El trabajo discute las ideas principales presentes en el trabajo de Silva Sánchez en este volumen 7 de Discusiones
No es raro encontrar en el derecho penal comparado reglas de responsabilidad penal por tentativa ... more No es raro encontrar en el derecho penal comparado reglas de responsabilidad penal por tentativa que exigen que, para que un agente sea punible como autor de una tentativa, debe haber obrado con el fin o la intención de cometer el delito correspondiente. El derecho penal argentino parece ser un ejemplo de esa tendencia. En su art. 42, el CP argentino establece que quien fracasa en la comisión de un delito es punible como autor de una tentativa si, entre otras condiciones, actuó “con el fin de cometer un delito determinado” .1 Los tribunales argentinos han tendido a darle a esta regla la interpretación según la cual la regla requiere que el autor haya obrado con la intención de realizar el delito que se ha frustrado, aun cuando esa intención no sea jurídicamente necesaria para la comisión del delito consumado correspondiente. En 1972, Esteban Righi publicó una nota objetando esa tendencia jurisprudencial .2 Quiero contribuir a este homenaje de quien fue mi primer profesor de Derecho ...
... Marcelo Ferrante. ... por la acción del necesitado -a quien llamaré "intolerante"- ... more ... Marcelo Ferrante. ... por la acción del necesitado -a quien llamaré "intolerante"- impide la afectación de su interés mediante una acción que, evaluada con independencia de sus consecuencias para el necesitado, sería indudablemente lícita; por ejemplo: cierra la puerta de su ...
New Criminal Law Review, 2007
... REVIEW ESSAY Explaining Mens Rea FIVE WAYS PATRICIA CAN KILL HER HUSBAND: ATHEORY OF INTENTIO... more ... REVIEW ESSAY Explaining Mens Rea FIVE WAYS PATRICIA CAN KILL HER HUSBAND: ATHEORY OF INTENTIONALITY AND BLAME. By Leo Zaibert. Chicago and La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 2005. Pp. xii, 261. $34.95 (paper). Reviewed by Marcelo Ferrante* ...
ABSTRACT Estudio sobre la teoría de la imputación objetiva y la influencia de la responsabilidad ... more ABSTRACT Estudio sobre la teoría de la imputación objetiva y la influencia de la responsabilidad de la víctima en la tipicidad de la conducta del autor, temas poco explorados aún en los países con larga tradición en discusiones teóricas. Las distintas ópticas de estos tres autores permiten reconocer, sin embargo, un patrón común: el estudio crítico de las tesis de Jakobs, que han interesado a la dogmática penal durante los últimos veinte años.
Estudio sobre la teoría de la imputación objetiva y la influencia de la responsabilidad de la víc... more Estudio sobre la teoría de la imputación objetiva y la influencia de la responsabilidad de la víctima en la tipicidad de la conducta del autor, temas poco explorados aún en los países con larga tradición en discusiones teóricas. Las distintas ópticas de estos tres autores permiten reconocer, sin embargo, un patrón común: el estudio crítico de las tesis de Jakobs, que han interesado a la dogmática penal durante los últimos veinte años.
New Criminal Law Review, 2008
I challenge in this paper a popular view on the causal requirement of criminal liability. The vie... more I challenge in this paper a popular view on the causal requirement of criminal liability. The view, which I call physicalism about the causal relation (or physicalism, for short), puts together the claim that the causal requirement demands that the agent causes a crime result (e.g., the death of a person) for her to be paradigmatically responsible for that result, with a conception of causation according to which a causal relation is such that it can only hold between actual events, and never between omissions (or other absences) and events. Physicalism's apparent merit is that it yields an account of the differential treatment actions and omissions receive in criminal law. However, I argue, it does so at the expense of rendering puzzling other uncontroversial features of the criminal law. Moreover, I contend that physicalism is groundless; it picks out a property that just can't play the role that the causal requirement is meant to play. I sketch, finally, an alternative co...
New Criminal Law Review: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal, 2011
New Criminal Law Review: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal, 2007
This article offers a comprehensive study of the merits of the legal practice of punishing accomp... more This article offers a comprehensive study of the merits of the legal practice of punishing accomplished crimes more severely than attempted crimes all other things being equal (differential punishment)vis-àà-vis the alternative of punishing them with equal sanctions (equal punishment).Unlike the overwhelming majority of the literature on the issue--which focuses on which practice better mirrors the offenders' relative moral deserts--the article evaluates both practices from a consequentialist, deterrence-based point of view. In particular, it shows first that traditional economic theories of the criminal law should yield the conclusion that differential punishment is not superior to equal punishment.The few arguments that the economic literature offers against such conclusion, the article shows, are mistaken. Secondly, drawing on social and psychological findings, the article advances three new arguments showing that, under some likely social and psychological conditions, differ...