Mark Hailwood - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Papers by Mark Hailwood
Technische Ueberwachung, Nov 15, 2006
Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 2022
Chemical accident disasters are unplanned events involving hazardous substances, causing harm to ... more Chemical accident disasters are unplanned events involving hazardous substances, causing harm to human health, the environment, or economic loss or social disruption. While there is a long history of chemical accidents, with events recorded even more than 100 years ago, the study and implementation of technologies and approaches to preventing, preparing and responding to chemical accidents, only gained widespread attention in the last 40 years. There have been significant advancements in understanding accident phenomena, and in development of technology and management systems to control risks. Nonetheless, beyond a certain level of prevention, meaningful gains in prevention seem to elude our grasp. Indeed, in developed countries, such as European Union (EU) Member States and the USA, that have by far the most sophisticated understanding and oversight of chemical accident prevention, there are still a high frequency of serious chemical accidents each year, resulting in severe human, environmental and economic consequences. Moreover, there is an increasing presence of hazardous industries and of volumes of hazardous substances in commercial use in many developing countries where experience with industrial processing hazards and risks is relatively recent and where social and political infrastructures for dealing with the plethora of externalities accompanying industrial production are inadequate. Most experts do not believe that chemical accidents occur today because our understanding of engineering possibilities runs ahead of our understanding and predictive powers regarding their downsides. Rather, our challenges today stem from a myriad of inputs whose influence on chemical process risks is broadly known and understood, but that go largely unrecognized and unmanaged in organizations and on sites where the risks are actually present. Hence, it is not our lack of knowledge and understanding of how the technology works, but in many cases a lack of access to such knowledge, and in other cases, a failure to prioritize and use it wisely to prevent serious loss. Chemical accidents will continue to happen in the foreseeable future as long as chemicals and chemical processing are important for society. In particular, the usage and applications of chemicals is spreading and not decreasing. Moreover, production, transport and storage of dangerous substances are happening in places where these risks were never a problem before. In the meantime, there is evidence from the repetition of accidents from previous generations within industrialized economies that lessons of the past have been forgotten or ignored. This paper outlines the trends that threaten to increase chemical accident risks and proposes some recommendations to address them.
Chemie Ingenieur Technik, 2009
The fire and explosion at the Nypro Works, Flixborough, UK in 1974 led to the setting up of a cou... more The fire and explosion at the Nypro Works, Flixborough, UK in 1974 led to the setting up of a court of inquiry which reported in 1975. In the closing paragraphs of the report (Department of Employment, 1975) various lessons are listed as well as issues to be referred to other bodies. Two aspects are worth highlighting, as they have to a certain extent been lost in the mists of time. Firstly, “that the management structure should be so organised that the feedback from the bottom to the top should be effective.” This is not only to ensure that instructions are effectively carried out, but also that those responsible for certain tasks are competent, that top management has a clear understanding of the responsibilities and demands placed on individuals including the potential for overloading. The second issue which was raised, but referred to other bodies for urgent consideration, is that of the siting of offices, laboratories and the like well removed from hazardous plants and the cons...
Process Safety and Environmental Protection
Ullmann's Encyclopedia of Industrial Chemistry, 2000
Loss Prevention Bulletin, Jan 1, 2009
Loss Prevention Bulletin, Jan 1, 2010
Chemical …, Jan 1, 2009
In both incidents, as a result of overfilling, a very large mass of winter gasoline (m f = 300 t ... more In both incidents, as a result of overfilling, a very large mass of winter gasoline (m f = 300 t in Buncefield, m f = 700 t in Naples) was released, which in both cases led to a major fire of several days duration and involved 22 of a total of 41 tanks (Buncefield) and 24 of a total of 31 tanks (Naples). Whilst the Buncefield site was unconfined or only slightly confined, the Naples site had a high degree of confinement due to walls, buildings as well as a high embankment. The most important, current consequence models as well as new consequence models for the prediction of the extraordinarily high flame heights, extraordinarily high thermal radiation as well as the extraordinarily high maximum peak overpressure are described and discussed. The analysis of the Buncefield incident so far has shown that the maximum visible relative flame height lies in the region of 2.5 < (H/d) max,Bunc < 6.5 and the predicted value lies in the region 1.8 < (H/d) max,calc < 1.9. For large, black smoky fires the estimation of the critical thermal separation distance is not dependent on the total fire, but on the height of a hot, clear burning zone. In addition, for multiple tank fires there is a considerable increase in the mass burning rate, the flame height, the surface emission power as well as the thermal separation distance. With the new consequence models maximum peak overpressures for an unconfined vapor cloud explosion (UVCE) of ≈ 1.3 bar (Buncefield) and of ≈ 1.5 bar (Naples) are predicted. For a partially confined vapor cloud explosion (VCE) a maximum peak overpressure of ≈ 3 bar for a jet ignition into a corridor is predicted.
Loss Prevention Bulletin, Jan 1, 2010
Chemical …, Jan 1, 2009
Abstract Accidents and disruptions in chemical process installations can, in principle, lead to t... more Abstract Accidents and disruptions in chemical process installations can, in principle, lead to the rare events in which the release of flammable and/or toxic substances occurs, and which at particular distances from the installation can result in a hazard potential due to thermal ...
Technische Ueberwachung, Nov 15, 2006
Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 2022
Chemical accident disasters are unplanned events involving hazardous substances, causing harm to ... more Chemical accident disasters are unplanned events involving hazardous substances, causing harm to human health, the environment, or economic loss or social disruption. While there is a long history of chemical accidents, with events recorded even more than 100 years ago, the study and implementation of technologies and approaches to preventing, preparing and responding to chemical accidents, only gained widespread attention in the last 40 years. There have been significant advancements in understanding accident phenomena, and in development of technology and management systems to control risks. Nonetheless, beyond a certain level of prevention, meaningful gains in prevention seem to elude our grasp. Indeed, in developed countries, such as European Union (EU) Member States and the USA, that have by far the most sophisticated understanding and oversight of chemical accident prevention, there are still a high frequency of serious chemical accidents each year, resulting in severe human, environmental and economic consequences. Moreover, there is an increasing presence of hazardous industries and of volumes of hazardous substances in commercial use in many developing countries where experience with industrial processing hazards and risks is relatively recent and where social and political infrastructures for dealing with the plethora of externalities accompanying industrial production are inadequate. Most experts do not believe that chemical accidents occur today because our understanding of engineering possibilities runs ahead of our understanding and predictive powers regarding their downsides. Rather, our challenges today stem from a myriad of inputs whose influence on chemical process risks is broadly known and understood, but that go largely unrecognized and unmanaged in organizations and on sites where the risks are actually present. Hence, it is not our lack of knowledge and understanding of how the technology works, but in many cases a lack of access to such knowledge, and in other cases, a failure to prioritize and use it wisely to prevent serious loss. Chemical accidents will continue to happen in the foreseeable future as long as chemicals and chemical processing are important for society. In particular, the usage and applications of chemicals is spreading and not decreasing. Moreover, production, transport and storage of dangerous substances are happening in places where these risks were never a problem before. In the meantime, there is evidence from the repetition of accidents from previous generations within industrialized economies that lessons of the past have been forgotten or ignored. This paper outlines the trends that threaten to increase chemical accident risks and proposes some recommendations to address them.
Chemie Ingenieur Technik, 2009
The fire and explosion at the Nypro Works, Flixborough, UK in 1974 led to the setting up of a cou... more The fire and explosion at the Nypro Works, Flixborough, UK in 1974 led to the setting up of a court of inquiry which reported in 1975. In the closing paragraphs of the report (Department of Employment, 1975) various lessons are listed as well as issues to be referred to other bodies. Two aspects are worth highlighting, as they have to a certain extent been lost in the mists of time. Firstly, “that the management structure should be so organised that the feedback from the bottom to the top should be effective.” This is not only to ensure that instructions are effectively carried out, but also that those responsible for certain tasks are competent, that top management has a clear understanding of the responsibilities and demands placed on individuals including the potential for overloading. The second issue which was raised, but referred to other bodies for urgent consideration, is that of the siting of offices, laboratories and the like well removed from hazardous plants and the cons...
Process Safety and Environmental Protection
Ullmann's Encyclopedia of Industrial Chemistry, 2000
Loss Prevention Bulletin, Jan 1, 2009
Loss Prevention Bulletin, Jan 1, 2010
Chemical …, Jan 1, 2009
In both incidents, as a result of overfilling, a very large mass of winter gasoline (m f = 300 t ... more In both incidents, as a result of overfilling, a very large mass of winter gasoline (m f = 300 t in Buncefield, m f = 700 t in Naples) was released, which in both cases led to a major fire of several days duration and involved 22 of a total of 41 tanks (Buncefield) and 24 of a total of 31 tanks (Naples). Whilst the Buncefield site was unconfined or only slightly confined, the Naples site had a high degree of confinement due to walls, buildings as well as a high embankment. The most important, current consequence models as well as new consequence models for the prediction of the extraordinarily high flame heights, extraordinarily high thermal radiation as well as the extraordinarily high maximum peak overpressure are described and discussed. The analysis of the Buncefield incident so far has shown that the maximum visible relative flame height lies in the region of 2.5 < (H/d) max,Bunc < 6.5 and the predicted value lies in the region 1.8 < (H/d) max,calc < 1.9. For large, black smoky fires the estimation of the critical thermal separation distance is not dependent on the total fire, but on the height of a hot, clear burning zone. In addition, for multiple tank fires there is a considerable increase in the mass burning rate, the flame height, the surface emission power as well as the thermal separation distance. With the new consequence models maximum peak overpressures for an unconfined vapor cloud explosion (UVCE) of ≈ 1.3 bar (Buncefield) and of ≈ 1.5 bar (Naples) are predicted. For a partially confined vapor cloud explosion (VCE) a maximum peak overpressure of ≈ 3 bar for a jet ignition into a corridor is predicted.
Loss Prevention Bulletin, Jan 1, 2010
Chemical …, Jan 1, 2009
Abstract Accidents and disruptions in chemical process installations can, in principle, lead to t... more Abstract Accidents and disruptions in chemical process installations can, in principle, lead to the rare events in which the release of flammable and/or toxic substances occurs, and which at particular distances from the installation can result in a hazard potential due to thermal ...