Mark Jamieson - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
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Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research (IGIDR), Mumbai, India
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Papers by Mark Jamieson
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2005
I treat international merger policy as a repeated veto game. I show that there exists a unique ef... more I treat international merger policy as a repeated veto game. I show that there exists a unique efficient equilibrium within a particular class of trigger strategy equilibria. I then consider a series of comparative statics and extensions: (a) if for some exogenous reason one of the countries becomes more lenient towards mergers, than the other country becomes more lenient as well; (b) merger remedies increase the probability that a merger is approved and increase total welfare; (c) the effects of a merger wave are magnified by the equilibrium approval policy.
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2005
I treat international merger policy as a repeated veto game. I show that there exists a unique ef... more I treat international merger policy as a repeated veto game. I show that there exists a unique efficient equilibrium within a particular class of trigger strategy equilibria. I then consider a series of comparative statics and extensions: (a) if for some exogenous reason one of the countries becomes more lenient towards mergers, than the other country becomes more lenient as well; (b) merger remedies increase the probability that a merger is approved and increase total welfare; (c) the effects of a merger wave are magnified by the equilibrium approval policy.