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Videos by Martina Blečić

Video stvoren za Pint of Science Croatia. U njemu ukratko predstavljam jezičnu pragmatiku.

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Papers by Martina Blečić

Colloquium: New Philologies

In this paper, I start from the assumption that sex education, either as a separate subject or in... more In this paper, I start from the assumption that sex education, either as a separate subject or in the form of an interdisciplinary topic, is an indispensable part of the modern school curriculum. Although it has not yet entered the Croatian education system under this name, certain important topics related to human sexuality can be found in the school curriculum. However, what is missing now is the issue of intimate and sexual communication. By this I do not mean conversations about sexuality and sexual relations with parents or teachers, but those among partners who are considering entering an intimate relationship or have already done so. In recent years, the term “consent” has been widely discussed, but this speech act is only one form of sexual communication. In this paper, I consider other speech acts important in the intimate sphere, such as “invitations”, “gifts”, the use of “safe words” and “intimate overtures”, whose proper use and understanding are based on general criteria of appropriate and successful communication. By mastering these general principles and discussing specific communicational interactions between partners, young people can learn to communicate better in the intimate sphere, which would lead to the improvement of their private relationships.

Journal of Biological Education , 2021

In this paper I suggest a pragmatic model for the notion of ‘information’ used in molecular biolo... more In this paper I suggest a pragmatic model for the notion of ‘information’ used in molecular biology in the description of protein synthesis. Discarding any ontological commitments of the term ‘information’, I propose a view of information based on an analogy with communication. This view could at least supplement the existing information-metaphor that should be updated for two reasons: (i) the concept of information it presupposes, and (ii) the origin of the metaphor itself. Besides, the metaphorical nature of the notion of ‘information’ is still often overlooked, which leads to a false sense of understanding of the underlying genetic phenomena it should describe. The advantages of a model based on communication, as it is seen by the field of pragmatics, is twofold: (i) it provides a rather simple analogy between human communication and basic genetic processes, and (ii) it supplies the tools for the understanding of the non-literal use of the term ‘information’.

Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 2021

In the paper I suggest that a loose notion of logical form can be a useful tool for the understan... more In the paper I suggest that a loose notion of logical form can be a useful tool for the understanding or evaluation of everyday language and the explicit and implicit content of communication. Reconciling ordinary language and logic provides formal guidelines for rational communication, giving strength and order to ordinary communication and content to logical schemas. The starting point of the paper is the idea that the bearers of logical form are not natural language sentences, but what we communicate with them, that is, their content in a particular context. On the basis of that idea, I propose that we can ascribe logical proprieties to what is communicated using ordinary language and suggest a continuum between semantic phenomena such as explicatures and pragmatic communicational strategies such as (particularized) conversational implicatures, which challenges the idea that an implicatum is completely separate from what is said. I believe that this continuum can be best explained by the notion of logical form, taken as a propriety of sentences relative to particular interpretations.

Filozofska istraživanja, 2019

Cilj je rada propitati tradicionalnu definiciju laži. U radu ne pružam vlastitu definiciju te poj... more Cilj je rada propitati tradicionalnu definiciju laži. U radu ne pružam vlastitu definiciju te pojave, ali pokušavam pokazati da je tradicionalna definicija laži, po kojoj je za laganje nužno iskazivanje neistinitih tvrdnji, neadekvatna. Kako bih to učinila, u prvom dijelu pred-stavljam teoriju Herberta Paula Gricea o razgovornim implikaturama, čije su hotimično neistinite inačice izrijekom isključene iz tradicionalne definicije. U nastavku, pozivajući se na teoriju o zadanim značenjima, odbacujem rašireni stav da se govornik uvijek može ograditi od pragmatički prenesene poruke. Potom, predstavljam standardnu definiciju laži i sagledavam koju ulogu u njoj imaju govornikova namjera i slušateljeva odgovornost. U drugom dijelu, dotadašnje uvide primjenjujem na Shakespeareovu tragediju Otelo. Nakon kratkog predstavljanja odnosa između Otela i Jaga, razlažem tri dramska primjera onoga što smatram lažima ostvarenima razgovornom implikaturom. Takva analiza ima dvojaku ulogu. Prva joj je zadaća pokazati nedostatnost tradicionalne definicije laži kroz tvrdnju da Jago, iako ne izgovara neistine, laže. Druga je zadaća ukazivanje na ograničeni doseg mogućnosti poništavanja pragmatički prenesene poruke; Jagove pragmatičke poruke toliko su snažne da se, iako to pokušava učiniti, od njih ne uspijeva ograditi. Ključne riječi: laganje, razgovorna implikatura, namjera, pragmatika, Jago, Otelo, William Shakespeare, Herbert Paul Grice

Prolegomena, 2020

sažetak: U radu ukazujemo na neodrživost teze o neozbiljnosti poezije, odnosno na neopravdanost s... more sažetak: U radu ukazujemo na neodrživost teze o neozbiljnosti poezije, odnosno na neopravdanost stava J. L. Austina prema kojemu je poezija neozbiljno korištenje jezika koje ne zaslužuje filozofsku pažnju. Takvim je stavom Austin dugoročno izopćio poeziju iz filozofskoga promatranja, produbivši otpor koji je filozofija još od Platonova progona pjesnika osjećala prema poeziji. Kako bismo pokazale Au-stinovu pogrešku, u radu analiziramo tzv. filozofsku poeziju, odnosno način na koji poetska upotreba jezika može izazvati iste učinke kao i filozofija: potaknuti kod čitatelja intelektualne procese promišljanja, primarno o apstraktnim pojmovima. U tom smislu tvrdimo da je poezija ne samo ozbiljna, nego i vrlo bliska filozofiji u načinu na koji dotiče čitatelja, pri čemu važnu ulogu igraju poetske konvencije. ključne riječi: Poezija, filozofska poezija, (ne)ozbiljno korištenje jezika, J. L. Austin, poetske konvencije. Austin i neozbiljnost poezije J. L. Austin smatrao je poeziju neozbiljnim korištenjem jezika. Taj je svoj stav često isticao, ali ga nije ni obranio ni dokazao. Neozbiljnost koju pripisuje poetskom jeziku ovlaš je spomenuta u nekoliko navrata u njegovu djelu Kako djelovati riječima. Tako, primjerice, piše: Zar riječi ne moraju biti izgovorene "ozbiljno" da bi ih se shvatilo "ozbiljno"? To, iako nejasno, vrijedi načelno i važno je opće mjesto u raspravi o smislu baš svakog iskaza. Ne smijemo se na primjer šaliti ni pisati pjesmu (Austin 2014: 6). Ovakvim je stavom Austin produbio višestoljetno neprijateljstvo između filozofije i poezije započeto još Platonovim progonom pjesnika. Jedna od posljedica njegove teze jest i dugoročno izbacivanje poezije iz domene filozofski zanimljivih predmeta proučavanja. Kao što ističe Maximilian

Jezici u kulturu u vremenu i prostoru VIII/1, 2019

H. P. Grice razgovorne je implikature odredio kao pragmatičku jezičnu strategiju koju je s jedne ... more H. P. Grice razgovorne je implikature odredio kao pragmatičku jezičnu strategiju koju je s jedne strane moguće racionalno rekonstruirati, a s druge kontekstualno ili verbalno poništiti. U radu tvrdim kako je mogućnost izraču-navanja implikatura, koja im daje stabilnost i objektivnost te omogućava njihovo uspješno korištenje u govornoj zajednici, u suprotnosti s idejom da govornik uvijek može na komunikacijski, epistemički i moralni način poništiti implikaturu koju njegovo iskazivanje određenog sadržaja sa sobom nosi. Cilj je rada kroz primjere te uvide iz teorije argumentacije, filozofije jezika i srodnih analitičkih filozofskih grana predstaviti i obraniti ideju da je mo-gućnost njihove rekonstrukcije, i to rekonstrukcije u obliku razložnog argumenta, ono što im daje komunikacijsku snagu. Tvrdit ću kako je takva rekonstrukcija nužna odrednica svakog impliciranog sadržaja, dok će poricanje komunikacijske namjere biti moguće samo ako ne dovodi do nekonzistentnog skupa vjerovanja, pri čemu će važnu ulogu imati način na koji je slušatelj inicijalno postavio argument. Ključne riječi: razgovorna implikatura, argumentacija, racionalnost, komunikacijska odgovornost, poricanje

Knowledge International Journal , 2020

In the last years, fake news has been a widely discussed phenomenon in the general public, as wel... more In the last years, fake news has been a widely discussed phenomenon in the general public, as well as in various academic disciplines and in the media. Theories about what has caused this phenomenon differ, and in the paper I present only two possible candidates: according to the first, we are faced with a moral collapse in which fake news represent only the tip of the iceberg of a general tolerance for lies. According to the second, which I endorse in this paper, fake news is only the consequence of contemporary means of media reproduction. As an example of a fake news website, I present the case of InfoWars. Still, fake news is not necessarily linked to a specific media platform, it can be stories that are spread through otherwise legitimate media. An example of that is the impact that the deceptive claims made by Nigel Farage had on the outcome of the Brexit campaign. After these few examples, I move on to some theoretical approaches and explore the possibility that the term "fake news" is inadequate. I reject this position and present three definitions of fake news from the analytical philosophical tradition. These definitions point out a crucial characteristic of fake news-its deceptive closeness to traditional informative formats. I believe that this kind of definition is not specific enough because a definition of fake news cannot ignore the importance of indirect messages, as well as the role of social networks in its creation, propagation, and understanding. Thus I propose a definition that includes those elements and presents fake news as a subtype of propaganda.

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Pojava lažnih vijesti (fake news), kao i rasprostranjenost korištenja tog termina u javnosti i raznim akademski raspravama, ali i u medijskim tekstovima, iznimno je aktualna posljednjih nekoliko godina. Teorije o pojavi lažnih vijesti razne su, a u radu predstavljam samo dvije: onu prema kojoj se nalazimo pred moralnim kolapsom te prema kojoj su lažne vijesti samo vrh sante općeg toleriranja laži, i onu, koju u radu i podupirem, prema kojoj su lažne vijesti samo posljedica suvremenih medijskih sredstava reprodukcije. Kao primjer internetske stranice koja objavljuje lažne vijesti prikazujem stranicu InfoWars. Ipak, lažne vijesti nisu nužno vezane uz pojedine medijske platforme, može se raditi o pričama koje se šire i putem inače vjerodostojnih medija. Tako su na ishod referenduma za izlaz Velike Britanije iz Europske unije, takozvani Brexit, snažno su utjecale obmanjujuće tvrdnje Nigela Faragea. Nakon primjera, prelazim na teoriju te razmatram mogućnost da je sam pojam "lažna vijest" teorijski nepotreban. Ipak, takav stav odbacujem te predstavljam tri filozofske (analitičke) definicije te pojave. Navedene definicije izdvajaju bitnu odrednicu lažnih vijesti-njihovu bliskost tradicionalnim informativnim formatima s ciljem obmanjivanja. Smatram kako to nije dovoljno jer definicija lažnih vijesti ne može biti lišena spoznaje o važnosti neizravnih poruka, ali ni uloge društvenih mreža pri njihovom stvaranju, propagiranju i razumijevanju te stoga pružam vlastitu definiciju te pojave koja uzima u obzir te faktore koja ju tretira kao specifičnu podvrstu propagande. Ključne riječi: lažne vijesti, obmana, propaganda, epistemički učinak 1. UVOD Rad započinjem predstavljanjem mogućih uzroka pojave lažnih vijesti te čitatelju predstavljam neke od najpoznatijih primjera s globalne medijske scene. Potom, dajem uvid u filozofske pozicije o lažnim vijestima, od onih koji niječu korisnost tog pojma do samih definicija. U drugom dijelu ekspliciram veza između lažnih vijesti i istine i iskrenosti te njihovog odnosa s propagandom. Na samom kraju pružam definiciju lažnih vijesti koja se naslanja na dosadašnje pokušaje određivanja te pojave, ali koja uključuje oblike komunikacije onkraj tvrdnji te društvene mreže kao medij njihovog prenošenja. 2. KONTEKST Pojava lažnih vijesti (fake news), kao i rasprostranjenost korištenja termina u javnosti i bavljenja tom pojavom u raznim akademski disciplinama, ali i u medijskim tekstovima, recentna je pojava, barem na način na koji ju

Colloquium: New Philologies, 2019

According to H. P. Grice, the two main features of conversational implicatures are their calculab... more According to H. P. Grice, the two main features of conversational implicatures are their calculability and their cancellability. Here I present the idea that these two features are in conflict with each other. In the paper I link the calculability of implicatures with argumentation theory and rationality and distinguish between formal cancellability and communicational deniability. Then, in order to solve the conflict between calculabi-lity and deniability, I argue for the priority of calculability over cancellability. I defend this position by presenting the calculation of implicatures as the reconstruction of arguments. Consequently, the priority of their calculability over their cancellability, or more correctly, their deniability, should lead to new insights related to the communica-tional responsibility of the speaker for the content that competent hearers read from his or her utterance.

Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 2018

I suggest that the idea that conversational implicatures express argument can be signifi cant for... more I suggest that the idea that conversational implicatures express argument can be signifi cant for the notion of communicational responsibility. This underlying argument should be included in the reconstruction of conversational implicatures as a justifi cation for the belief formed by the hearer on the basis of indirect communication. What makes this argument specifi c is the fact that its only explicit element is the speaker's utterance taken as its initial premise. In order to reconstruct all the other elements, the hearer has to take into consideration factors such as the context and general knowledge of the shared language and the world. As the reconstruction of conversational implicatures in general, the reconstruction of implicatures as arguments is only potential. It is proposed that we should consider conversational implicatures as reason-giving arguments in which the speaker (arguer) addresses a hearer who does not need to reply. In those cases, the speaker is not trying to convince the hearer to accept his position but is explicitly stating a reason in support of his intended message. I believe that this approach can strengthen the idea of the speaker's communicational responsibility for an implicated message even in the case when he wants to distance himself from it.

The rationality of conversational implicatures can be assessed both from the point of view of ins... more The rationality of conversational implicatures can be assessed both from the point of view of instrumental rationality and from that of argumentative ration-ality. However, another important element of this assessment should be the speech context in which such implicatures are used. This paper analyses the local nature of the use and the interpretation of conversational implicatures that is often omitted from the Gricean picture in which the speaker generally relies on the capacity of the hearer to work out the intended implicature. I want to propose the idea that there are contexts in which the speaker is not justified in doing so. one such context is related to doctor-patient communication. This kind of verbal interaction is pervaded by strong emotional responses that make the use and interpretation of common indirect communicational strategies a potential communicational and ethical problem .

A Word which Bears a Sword, N. Miscevic and J. Perhat (eds), KruZak, 2016

In this paper I tried to propose an approach to the question whether the derogation carried by sl... more In this paper I tried to propose an approach to the question whether the
derogation carried by slurs is part of their semantic core or if it is just a
pragmatic addition to it which is focused on the variability of slurring
words. Slurs often come into existence by the evolution of previously
existing word forms of different meaning, and often the slur will continue
its development towards a neutral meaning, as is exemplified by the
phenomenon of re-appropriation.
During the evolution of slurs, the linguistic change that leads to the
birth of a slur, as a word that yields derogation and to its death, that is,
its use a non-derogatory word, speakers and hearers use and interpret
them in different ways. With a novel use, both negative and neutral, the
pragmatic meaning can, at least in theory, be cancelled. In that way the
speaker can distance himself from the established semantic meaning of
the word. Once the words starts shifting more and more into semantics
the cancellation will no longer be an option.All these elements have an impact on the ethical side of the analysis
of pejoratives. If a word is derogatory at its semantic level there will be
no possibility for the speaker to cancel the negative message he conveyed.
But, nevertheless, there is always the possibility to use the word
pragmatically in a neutral or even positive way. In this case additional
contextual information should be available to the hearer in order for
him to infer the real message of the speaker. The possibility of misunderstanding is always present and the hearer could get offended, but we should not prohibit neutral pragmatic uses of slurs since this would
impede their development towards a neutral semantic meaning. For the
same reason neutral uses should not be restricted to in-group members.

In this paper I would like to suggest that a cognitive approach to pragmatics does not lead neces... more In this paper I would like to suggest that a cognitive approach to pragmatics does not lead necessarily to the impossibility of a distinction between literal and non-literal contents and interpretations. If my reading is correct, this approach is focused on the cognitive activities that take place in the minds of regular language users and not on models applied to ideal speaker-hearers. If we accept that, then we should also accept that the distinction between the literal and the non-literal is subjective since different language users will, in certain cases, consider differently a linguistic element in regards to its belonging to the literal or non-literal domain. In order to save this dichotomy we need to return partially to a philosophical approach to pragmatics, that is, we need to establish the distinction between the literal and the non-literal on the basis of generalized objective inferential strategies. The proposal is the following: the presence of implicit or explicit inferential communicational processes (explicit and implicit conversational implicatures, as I refer to them) connected to the literal meaning of the uttered words will be the criterion for the non-literal status of a linguistic/communicational element. By applying objective criteria to the subjective inferential processes of actual language users we can retain both the subjectivity of cognitive differences between individual speakers and the objectivity of the distinction between the literal and the non-literal.

Conversational implicatures, as a widely examined instance of indirect communication, can enrich ... more Conversational implicatures, as a widely examined instance of indirect communication, can enrich philosophical pursuits in many domains. Applied to the field of the epistemology of testimony, the theory of conversational implicatures raises many questions that could in turn provide novel insights about how we should treat other people’s testimonies. The problem is not whether people acquire knowledge and form their beliefs on the basis of other people’s words or on the basis of their beliefs – the problem lies in being able to detect those cases in which beliefs and words do not match. I suggest that the use and the decoding of implicatures is a rational process and that correctly formed implicature-based beliefs are justified because of their rationality. I also suggest that minor differences between the speaker’s and the hearer’s communicative moves can generate cases of epistemic (bad) luck that can be treated as predictable outcomes of a communicational faux pas.

Book Reviews by Martina Blečić

Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 2020

One of the recent trends in dealing with the concept of lying has been to argue that the idea tha... more One of the recent trends in dealing with the concept of lying has been to argue that the idea that one needs to deceive someone in order to lie has been accepted too hastily. In Lying and Insincerity Stokke shares this opinion and proposes a defi nition of lying based on the notion of common ground that includes bald-faced lies. Additionally, he rejects the idea that lying can be accomplished with pragmatic means such as conversational implicatures and proposes a formal distinction between lying and misleading. In this review, I present the content of Stokke's book and critically discuss the two points mentioned above.

Joško Žanić se u ovoj knjizi zalaže za konceptualistički pristup semantici. Takav pristup nije ra... more Joško Žanić se u ovoj knjizi zalaže za konceptualistički pristup semantici.
Takav pristup nije raširen među hrvatskim autorima te stoga ova knjiga
pruža inovativan doprinos raspravi o semantici u nas.

The book is a festschrift written in honor of Laurence R. Horn. The editors of the book claim tha... more The book is a festschrift written in honor of Laurence R. Horn. The editors of the book claim that the volume is intended to bring together the best of the current work at the semantics/pragmatics boundary from a neo-Gricean perspective in memory of one of the most known representatives of this approach to the questions of the philosophy of linguistics, namely Laurence R. Horn. He laid the ground for what would later become known as the classic Gricean analysis of logical operator and presented to philosophers and linguists his theory of scalar implicature that will later come to be known as the theory of “Horn scales”. He examined the problem of natural language negation from a neo-Gricean perspective and formed a well known theory of Q- and R-based conversational implicature.

izdavačka kuća Disput objavila je 2014. godine, u sklopu svojih edicija thesaurus , posvećenih je... more izdavačka kuća Disput objavila je 2014. godine, u sklopu svojih edicija thesaurus , posvećenih jezičnoj problematici, djelo Kako djelovati riječima britan-skog filozofa Johna langshawa Austina. Radi se o prijevodu drugog izdanja knjige koja u izvorniku nosi naslov How to do things with words i čiji su ure-dnici J. o. Urmson i Marina Sbisà. to je izdanje objavljeno davne 1975. godine, a temelji se, kao i prvo, na Austinovim predavanjima održanim još davnije 1955. godine. 1 važnost hrvatskog prijevoda ove knjige leži u značaju Austinovog rada za razvoj filozofije jezika i lingvistike. Austin se, naime, smatra začetnikom teorije govornih činova koju je iznjedrila filozofija običnog jezika, rođena iz analitičkog bavljenja filozofijom jezika na sveučilištu oxford od 40-ih do 50-ih godina prošloga stoljeća. Sam termin " govorni čin " Austin je rijetko koristio; popularizirao ga je njegov student John Searle koji je nastavio teo-riju svog učitelja te je najviše zbog njega taj termin neraskidivo povezan i uz Austina. Nakon Searlea termin su koristili mnogi, a što je još važnije fenome-nima vezanim uz te vrste činova filozofi se nisu prestali baviti sve do danas, pa tako odjeke Austinove teorije nalazimo u radovima suvremenih autora kao što su Kent Bach, Charles travis, François Recanati i Mark Kaplan. Možemo reći da je Austin pokrenuo filozofski interes za onim što se našim riječima događa onkraj jezika, onkraj rječničkog značenja pojedinih riječi složenih u rečenice gramatičkim i sintaktičkim pravilima. Nije ga zanimalo ono što doi-sta poručujemo onim što izričemo (čime se bavio npr. H. P. Grice govoreći o implikaturama), već onime što riječima činimo. ideje J. l. Austina o govornim činovima možda bi bile sistematičnije izlo-žene, pa čak i izmijenjene, da ga u tome nisu prekinuli bolest, a zatim i smrt. ideje predstavljene u djelu Kako djelovati riječima Austin je izlagao i na raznim drugim predavanjima prije no što ih je predstavio na Harvardu, no bilješke koje je učinio za Predavanja William James donose neke preinake te predstavljaju pos-ljednju verziju autorovih ideja. Pokušat ćemo ih sada podrobnije predstaviti. Austin započinje svoja predavanja razmatranjem one vrste iskaza koji izgleda kao sud i gramatički se može kategorizirati kao izjavna rečenica, koji nije besmislen, ali ipak nije ni istinit ni neistinit. tvrdi nadalje da se, kada osoba izriče takav iskaz, može reći da ona nešto čini, da djeluje, a ne samo da govori. takve iskaze naziva performativima i suprotstavlja ih konstativima. 1 Austinovo istraživanje o govornim činovima objavljeno je prvi put posthumno 1962. u knjizi How to Do Things With Words koja se sastoji od dvanaest predavanja koja je Austin održao na sveučilištu Harvard 1955. godine povodom tradicionalnih Predavanja William James.

Drafts by Martina Blečić

H-alter, 2020

Depersonalizacija, poistovjećivanje pojedinca sa skupinom kojoj pripada, može biti dobra, staviti... more Depersonalizacija, poistovjećivanje pojedinca sa skupinom kojoj pripada, može biti dobra, staviti grupu ispred sebe kada je to bitno ključno je za političku promjenu. Ipak, ona treba biti obrambeni, a ne napadački mehanizam. Nakon obrane vlastitih vrijednosti, stavova i života, moramo se sjetiti da naš identitet tvori kombinacija raznih pripadnosti koja nas može približiti velikom broju ljudi, ne samo onima koji su dio jedne od skupina kojima pripadamo. Iako je postojanje grupe nužno za političku promjenu, i kada je netko pod napadom važno je zbiti redove, ne treba zaboraviti da nisu sve grupne politike pozitivne, posebice ako snažne skupine neprijatelja traže u nekim drugim, slabijim skupinama, posebice onim pripisanim.

H-alter, 2019

Komunikacijska odgovornost, koju nije moguće sagledati izdvojeno od moralne i političke odgovorn... more Komunikacijska odgovornost, koju nije moguće sagledati izdvojeno od moralne i političke odgovornosti, nije samo pitanje zakonskih granica slobode govora i pravno reguliranog govora mržnje, već je ona mnogo više pitanje samog osjećaja za težinu izgovorene riječi i prepoznavanje njezinih neposrednih, ali i dalekosežnih učinaka. Uz to, komunikacijska odgovornost vidljiva je u prepoznavanju situacija u kojima reći nešto nije prikladno, kao i situacija u kojima je reći nešto nužno.