Matías Pailos - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Papers by Matías Pailos

Analisis Filosofico, 2005

Proyecto académico sin fines de lucro, desarrollado bajo la iniciativa de acceso abierto

Principia: an international journal of epistemology, Aug 22, 2018

The Review of Symbolic Logic

We will present a three-valued consequence relation for metainferences, called CM, defined throug... more We will present a three-valued consequence relation for metainferences, called CM, defined through ST and TS, two well known substructural consequence relations for inferences. While ST recovers every classically valid inference, it invalidates some classically valid metainferences. While CM works as ST at the inferential level, it also recovers every classically valid metainference. Moreover, CM can be safely expanded with a transparent truth predicate. Nevertheless, CM cannot recapture every classically valid meta-metainference. We will afterwards develop a hierarchy of consequence relations CM n for metainferences of level n (for 1 ≤ n < ω). Each CM n recovers every metainference of level n or less, and can be nontrivially expanded with a transparent truth predicate, but cannot recapture every classically valid metainferences of higher levels. Finally, we will present a logic CMω, based on the hierarchy of logics CM n , that is fully classical, in the sense that every classica...

Revista de filosofía, 2014

Crispin Wright afirma que tanto la norma que insta a afirmar lo verdadero como la que exhorta a a... more Crispin Wright afirma que tanto la norma que insta a afirmar lo verdadero como la que exhorta a afirmar lo justificado son distintivas de la práctica asertórica. A pesar de que ellas no son diferentes en la práctica, son distintas. Pero Richard Rorty argumenta que las razones ofrecidas obligarían a Wright a aceptar demasiadas reglas como propias de dicha práctica. Wright admitiría que las normas pueden ser ilimitadas, pero no que son ilimitadas las normas correctas. Para defender esta posición, basta con distinguir, como hace, las normas descriptivas de las prescriptivas. A pesar de ello, la posición de Rorty es admisible, pues no parece haber ventajas visibles en distinguir ambas normas. Si no se exponen (y Wright no lo hace) estas ventajas, la teoría resultante será más débil que una que no lo pretenda (como la que Rorty defiende). palabRas clave: normas, verdad, justificación, aserción, práctica. the Behavior of truth and justification and their relationship to the assertive practice Crispin Wright argues that both the standard that urges to assert the truth, and the one that told to assert what is justified, are distinctive of the assertoric practice. Despite that there's no difference in practice between them, they are different. But Richard Rorty argues that the reasons given, would force Wright to accept too many rules as distinctive of the practice. Wright admits that those kinds of standards can be unlimited, but that the correct standards are not. To defend this position, it's enough to distinguish descriptive rules from the prescriptive ones. However, Rorty's position is admissible, because there seems to be no advantages in distinguishing between those two standards. If these advantages are not presented (and Wright does not), the resulting theory will be weaker than one that doesn't pretend to do it (as Rorty claims).

Principia: an international journal of epistemology, 2013

Conciliatory views on disagreement claim that one should "split the difference" between the epist... more Conciliatory views on disagreement claim that one should "split the difference" between the epistemic peers' opinions. Nevertheless, when they apply to the disagreement on conciliatory positions themselves, they give incoherent instructions. A semi-conciliatory position is one that accepts that the peers' opinions are part of the whole body of evidence relevant in these situations. If one adopts this kind of view, all cases that seems to favor conciliatory views can be explained, and without compromising with the anti-intuitive consequences conciliatory positions have. In particular, a semi-conciliatory view is not condemned to give incoherent instructions when applied to disagreement about it.

Dianoia, 2003

Proyecto académico sin fines de lucro, desarrollado bajo la iniciativa de acceso abierto

Analisis Filosofico, 2005

Proyecto académico sin fines de lucro, desarrollado bajo la iniciativa de acceso abierto

Principia: an international journal of epistemology, Aug 22, 2018

The Review of Symbolic Logic

We will present a three-valued consequence relation for metainferences, called CM, defined throug... more We will present a three-valued consequence relation for metainferences, called CM, defined through ST and TS, two well known substructural consequence relations for inferences. While ST recovers every classically valid inference, it invalidates some classically valid metainferences. While CM works as ST at the inferential level, it also recovers every classically valid metainference. Moreover, CM can be safely expanded with a transparent truth predicate. Nevertheless, CM cannot recapture every classically valid meta-metainference. We will afterwards develop a hierarchy of consequence relations CM n for metainferences of level n (for 1 ≤ n < ω). Each CM n recovers every metainference of level n or less, and can be nontrivially expanded with a transparent truth predicate, but cannot recapture every classically valid metainferences of higher levels. Finally, we will present a logic CMω, based on the hierarchy of logics CM n , that is fully classical, in the sense that every classica...

Revista de filosofía, 2014

Crispin Wright afirma que tanto la norma que insta a afirmar lo verdadero como la que exhorta a a... more Crispin Wright afirma que tanto la norma que insta a afirmar lo verdadero como la que exhorta a afirmar lo justificado son distintivas de la práctica asertórica. A pesar de que ellas no son diferentes en la práctica, son distintas. Pero Richard Rorty argumenta que las razones ofrecidas obligarían a Wright a aceptar demasiadas reglas como propias de dicha práctica. Wright admitiría que las normas pueden ser ilimitadas, pero no que son ilimitadas las normas correctas. Para defender esta posición, basta con distinguir, como hace, las normas descriptivas de las prescriptivas. A pesar de ello, la posición de Rorty es admisible, pues no parece haber ventajas visibles en distinguir ambas normas. Si no se exponen (y Wright no lo hace) estas ventajas, la teoría resultante será más débil que una que no lo pretenda (como la que Rorty defiende). palabRas clave: normas, verdad, justificación, aserción, práctica. the Behavior of truth and justification and their relationship to the assertive practice Crispin Wright argues that both the standard that urges to assert the truth, and the one that told to assert what is justified, are distinctive of the assertoric practice. Despite that there's no difference in practice between them, they are different. But Richard Rorty argues that the reasons given, would force Wright to accept too many rules as distinctive of the practice. Wright admits that those kinds of standards can be unlimited, but that the correct standards are not. To defend this position, it's enough to distinguish descriptive rules from the prescriptive ones. However, Rorty's position is admissible, because there seems to be no advantages in distinguishing between those two standards. If these advantages are not presented (and Wright does not), the resulting theory will be weaker than one that doesn't pretend to do it (as Rorty claims).

Principia: an international journal of epistemology, 2013

Conciliatory views on disagreement claim that one should "split the difference" between the epist... more Conciliatory views on disagreement claim that one should "split the difference" between the epistemic peers' opinions. Nevertheless, when they apply to the disagreement on conciliatory positions themselves, they give incoherent instructions. A semi-conciliatory position is one that accepts that the peers' opinions are part of the whole body of evidence relevant in these situations. If one adopts this kind of view, all cases that seems to favor conciliatory views can be explained, and without compromising with the anti-intuitive consequences conciliatory positions have. In particular, a semi-conciliatory view is not condemned to give incoherent instructions when applied to disagreement about it.

Dianoia, 2003

Proyecto académico sin fines de lucro, desarrollado bajo la iniciativa de acceso abierto