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Matthew Bell defends Jean-Paul Sartre against Terri Murray. Murray’s rebuttal of Sartre is underm... more Matthew Bell defends Jean-Paul Sartre against Terri Murray. Murray’s rebuttal of Sartre is undermined by a failure to distinguish two senses of “cowardice” and “homosexuality.” This leads Murray to misinterpret Sartre. When the terms are carefully disambiguated, Sartre’s point is upheld and shown to apply equally to heterosexuality and homosexuality.
Firstly, I will sketch an evidential argument from evil. Secondly, I will suggest an "argument fr... more Firstly, I will sketch an evidential argument from evil. Secondly, I will suggest an "argument from good" that is isomorphic
with the argument from evil. I will treat the arguments both initially in a broad and general form and then I will treat them in
a more nuanced and specific form, trying to show that the isomorphisms are sustained at every investigative level. Finally, I
will pose a few possible objections to the argument from good, try to provide satisfactory answers and suggest the argument
from good does at least as much violence, if not more, violence against naturalism as the argument from evil is supposed to
do against theism.
Herein, first, I will sketch a brief history of naturalism. This sketch should illuminate Plato's... more Herein, first, I will sketch a brief history of naturalism. This sketch should illuminate Plato's continued relevance in the worldview debate between naturalism and versions of non- or super-naturalism (e.g., versions of theism). Second, I will look at naturalism's argument from evil against theism (a specific variety of super-naturalism). Third, I will suggest that a Platonic 'argument from good' – one that is isomorphic with the argument from evil – can be advanced against naturalism. I will treat the arguments both initially in a broad and general form and then I will treat them in a more nuanced and specific form, trying to show that the isomorphisms are sustained at every investigative level. Fourthly, I will put forth a few possible objections to the argument from good and try to provide satisfactory answers. Finally, in conclusion, I will hint that, quite possibly, the problem of good poses a greater difficulty for naturalism than the problem of evil poses for theism. But, if not, I will suggest that the argument from good makes at least as much trouble for naturalism as the naturalistic argument from evil makes for theism. And, in my opinion, theist's owe its discovery and initial rough articulation to Plato.
Matthew Bell defends Jean-Paul Sartre against Terri Murray. Murray’s rebuttal of Sartre is underm... more Matthew Bell defends Jean-Paul Sartre against Terri Murray. Murray’s rebuttal of Sartre is undermined by a failure to distinguish two senses of “cowardice” and “homosexuality.” This leads Murray to misinterpret Sartre. When the terms are carefully disambiguated, Sartre’s point is upheld and shown to apply equally to heterosexuality and homosexuality.
Firstly, I will sketch an evidential argument from evil. Secondly, I will suggest an "argument fr... more Firstly, I will sketch an evidential argument from evil. Secondly, I will suggest an "argument from good" that is isomorphic
with the argument from evil. I will treat the arguments both initially in a broad and general form and then I will treat them in
a more nuanced and specific form, trying to show that the isomorphisms are sustained at every investigative level. Finally, I
will pose a few possible objections to the argument from good, try to provide satisfactory answers and suggest the argument
from good does at least as much violence, if not more, violence against naturalism as the argument from evil is supposed to
do against theism.
Herein, first, I will sketch a brief history of naturalism. This sketch should illuminate Plato's... more Herein, first, I will sketch a brief history of naturalism. This sketch should illuminate Plato's continued relevance in the worldview debate between naturalism and versions of non- or super-naturalism (e.g., versions of theism). Second, I will look at naturalism's argument from evil against theism (a specific variety of super-naturalism). Third, I will suggest that a Platonic 'argument from good' – one that is isomorphic with the argument from evil – can be advanced against naturalism. I will treat the arguments both initially in a broad and general form and then I will treat them in a more nuanced and specific form, trying to show that the isomorphisms are sustained at every investigative level. Fourthly, I will put forth a few possible objections to the argument from good and try to provide satisfactory answers. Finally, in conclusion, I will hint that, quite possibly, the problem of good poses a greater difficulty for naturalism than the problem of evil poses for theism. But, if not, I will suggest that the argument from good makes at least as much trouble for naturalism as the naturalistic argument from evil makes for theism. And, in my opinion, theist's owe its discovery and initial rough articulation to Plato.