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Arguments from Evil by Michael Almeida
Nick Trakakis and Yujin Nagasawa (2004) criticise the argument in Almeida and Oppy (2003). Accord... more Nick Trakakis and Yujin Nagasawa (2004) criticise the argument in Almeida and Oppy (2003). According to Trakakis and Nagasawa, we are mistaken in our claim that the sceptical theist response to evidential arguments from evil is unacceptable because it would undermine ordinary moral reasoning. In their view, there is no good reason to think that sceptical theism leads to an objectionable form of moral scepticism.
We beg to differ. In our view, the criticisms of Trakakis and Nagasawa do not touch the heart of our objection to sceptical theism. However, in order to defend this contention, we need to begin by recapping the discussion to this point.
Papers by Michael Almeida
Oxford University Press eBooks, Aug 30, 2012
Religious Studies, Mar 24, 2022
The article aims to show that, if S5 is the logic of metaphysical necessity, then no state of aff... more The article aims to show that, if S5 is the logic of metaphysical necessity, then no state of affairs in any possible world constitutes any non-trivial evidence for or against the existence of the traditional God. There might well be states of affairs in some worlds describing extraordinary goods and extraordinary evils, but it is false that these states of affairs constitute any (non-trivial) evidence for or against the existence of God. The epistemological and metaphysical consequences for philosophical theology of assuming that S4 or K σρ is the logic of metaphysical necessity are equally untenable. S4 guarantees that God does not exist if there is the slightest evidence against the existence of God. And K σρ guarantees that God might survive the loss or acquisition of any essential property at all.
European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Sep 24, 2020
The Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Religion, Nov 16, 2021
One doctrine that is agreed on by most Jews, Christians, and Muslims is that God is, in some sens... more One doctrine that is agreed on by most Jews, Christians, and Muslims is that God is, in some sense, absolutely perfect. The same idea occurs in other traditions as well some strains of Advaita Vedanta, and in the Mah a¯ ya¯ na doctrine of the Buddha - nature, for example (see, eg, ...
Introduction 1. A Moderate Anselmian Plea 2. Metaphysical Atheological Arguments and the Free Wil... more Introduction 1. A Moderate Anselmian Plea 2. Metaphysical Atheological Arguments and the Free Will Defense 3. Three Important Objections 4. Unrestricted Actualization, Freedom and Morally Perfect Worlds 5. The Logical Problem of Evil Redux 6. Four Important Objections 7. Four More Objections 8. Redeeming Worlds 9. Conclusions Bibliography Index
Oxford University Press eBooks, Aug 30, 2012
Oxford University Press eBooks, Feb 23, 2017
Bloomsbury Academic eBooks, 2023
God unrestrictedly actualizes a state of affairs just in case God predicts that some state of aff... more God unrestrictedly actualizes a state of affairs just in case God predicts that some state of affairs obtains. Unrestricted actualization ensures, inter alia, that, necessarily, God can actualize a morally perfect world—whether or not those worlds include libertarian free agents—and can actualize any possible future—whether or not that future is open. Chapter 11 addresses a series of thoughtful objections from Bruce Langtry on the possibility of unrestricted actualization (Chapter 10 in this volume).
The Philosophical Quarterly, Nov 18, 2013
Bloomsbury Academic eBooks, 2021
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Sep 1, 2013
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. ix + 172, US$85.00 (hardcover). The book aspires to be a ... more New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. ix + 172, US$85.00 (hardcover). The book aspires to be a broad critique of the author's vision of analytic or Anglo-American approaches to philosophy: Overal...
Routledge eBooks, Feb 27, 2012
observed that our explanations of material phenomena exclude any role for supernatural demons, wi... more observed that our explanations of material phenomena exclude any role for supernatural demons, witches, and spirits of any kind, including the gods from Adonai to Zeus. Lewontin, it is worth noting, does not say that such explanations preclude such a role. It is the central aim of Theism and Explanation to consider, on the contrary, whether explanations of material phenomena might include a role for divine action.
Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy, Jun 7, 2017
Review of Metaphysics, Nov 1, 2012
Oxford University Press eBooks, Aug 30, 2012
Nick Trakakis and Yujin Nagasawa (2004) criticise the argument in Almeida and Oppy (2003). Accord... more Nick Trakakis and Yujin Nagasawa (2004) criticise the argument in Almeida and Oppy (2003). According to Trakakis and Nagasawa, we are mistaken in our claim that the sceptical theist response to evidential arguments from evil is unacceptable because it would undermine ordinary moral reasoning. In their view, there is no good reason to think that sceptical theism leads to an objectionable form of moral scepticism.
We beg to differ. In our view, the criticisms of Trakakis and Nagasawa do not touch the heart of our objection to sceptical theism. However, in order to defend this contention, we need to begin by recapping the discussion to this point.
Oxford University Press eBooks, Aug 30, 2012
Religious Studies, Mar 24, 2022
The article aims to show that, if S5 is the logic of metaphysical necessity, then no state of aff... more The article aims to show that, if S5 is the logic of metaphysical necessity, then no state of affairs in any possible world constitutes any non-trivial evidence for or against the existence of the traditional God. There might well be states of affairs in some worlds describing extraordinary goods and extraordinary evils, but it is false that these states of affairs constitute any (non-trivial) evidence for or against the existence of God. The epistemological and metaphysical consequences for philosophical theology of assuming that S4 or K σρ is the logic of metaphysical necessity are equally untenable. S4 guarantees that God does not exist if there is the slightest evidence against the existence of God. And K σρ guarantees that God might survive the loss or acquisition of any essential property at all.
European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Sep 24, 2020
The Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Religion, Nov 16, 2021
One doctrine that is agreed on by most Jews, Christians, and Muslims is that God is, in some sens... more One doctrine that is agreed on by most Jews, Christians, and Muslims is that God is, in some sense, absolutely perfect. The same idea occurs in other traditions as well some strains of Advaita Vedanta, and in the Mah a¯ ya¯ na doctrine of the Buddha - nature, for example (see, eg, ...
Introduction 1. A Moderate Anselmian Plea 2. Metaphysical Atheological Arguments and the Free Wil... more Introduction 1. A Moderate Anselmian Plea 2. Metaphysical Atheological Arguments and the Free Will Defense 3. Three Important Objections 4. Unrestricted Actualization, Freedom and Morally Perfect Worlds 5. The Logical Problem of Evil Redux 6. Four Important Objections 7. Four More Objections 8. Redeeming Worlds 9. Conclusions Bibliography Index
Oxford University Press eBooks, Aug 30, 2012
Oxford University Press eBooks, Feb 23, 2017
Bloomsbury Academic eBooks, 2023
God unrestrictedly actualizes a state of affairs just in case God predicts that some state of aff... more God unrestrictedly actualizes a state of affairs just in case God predicts that some state of affairs obtains. Unrestricted actualization ensures, inter alia, that, necessarily, God can actualize a morally perfect world—whether or not those worlds include libertarian free agents—and can actualize any possible future—whether or not that future is open. Chapter 11 addresses a series of thoughtful objections from Bruce Langtry on the possibility of unrestricted actualization (Chapter 10 in this volume).
The Philosophical Quarterly, Nov 18, 2013
Bloomsbury Academic eBooks, 2021
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Sep 1, 2013
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. ix + 172, US$85.00 (hardcover). The book aspires to be a ... more New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. ix + 172, US$85.00 (hardcover). The book aspires to be a broad critique of the author's vision of analytic or Anglo-American approaches to philosophy: Overal...
Routledge eBooks, Feb 27, 2012
observed that our explanations of material phenomena exclude any role for supernatural demons, wi... more observed that our explanations of material phenomena exclude any role for supernatural demons, witches, and spirits of any kind, including the gods from Adonai to Zeus. Lewontin, it is worth noting, does not say that such explanations preclude such a role. It is the central aim of Theism and Explanation to consider, on the contrary, whether explanations of material phenomena might include a role for divine action.
Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy, Jun 7, 2017
Review of Metaphysics, Nov 1, 2012
Oxford University Press eBooks, Aug 30, 2012
Dialogue, 2005
Recent work in moral theory includes an intriguing new argument that the vagueness of moral prope... more Recent work in moral theory includes an intriguing new argument that the vagueness of moral properties, together with two well-known and well-received metaethical principles, entails the incredible conclusion that it is impossible to be moral. I show that the argument equivocates between "it is true that A and B are morally indistinguishable" and "it is not false that A and B are morally indistinguishable." As expected the argument is interesting but unsound. It is therefore not impossible to be moral. RESUME: Les travaux recents en theorie morale comprennent un nouvel argument intrigant voulant que le caractere vague despropriites morales, joint a deuxprincipes metaethiques bien connus et giniralement admis, entralne une conclusion incroyable, soit qu'il est impossible d'etre moral. Je montre que cet argument entretient I'equivoque entre «il est vrai que A et B sont moralement impossibles a distinguer» et «il n'est pas faux que A et B soient moralement impossibles a distinguer». Comme on s'y attendait, V argument est interessant mais malfonde. II n'est done pas impossible d'etre moral.