Michael Newall - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Papers by Michael Newall

A Philosophy of the Art School, 2018

Synthese

Philosophers rarely write in an extended way about particular colors. So, why write about brown? ... more Philosophers rarely write in an extended way about particular colors. So, why write about brown? We shall see that an investigation of brown unsettles some established ideas about color in significant ways. In particular, I will (i) explore reasons for thinking that brown is an elementary color, (ii) reassess attitudes in color science that are taken to rule that possibility out, and (iii) present a new reason for rejecting most forms of color realism.

Analysis, 2012

Edited by CATHARINE ABELL and KATERINA BANTINAKI Oxford University Press, 2010. xii þ 242 pp. £40... more Edited by CATHARINE ABELL and KATERINA BANTINAKI Oxford University Press, 2010. xii þ 242 pp. £40 cloth In their introduction, the editors of this book, Catharine Abell and Katerina Bantinaki, give an excellent account of the present state of play in the philosophy of pictures. Depiction, the mode of representation distinctive of pictures, has seen a growth in philosophical interest over the past few years, and Abell and Bantinaki think the field holds even more potential: 'While the philosophy of language has long been considered a philosophical discipline in its own right, the philosophy of depiction is usually thought of, when it is thought of at all, as a sub-discipline of aesthetics. This is like conflating the philosophy of language with the philosophy of literature' (1). That the study of depiction may grow to occupy a position comparable to philosophy of language might seem doubtful to us now, but Abell and Bantinaki are right to draw attention to the fact that the place of depiction within aesthetics is an historical happenstance. As the papers collected in this volume illustrate, there is usually only incidental concern with the aesthetic and artistic in the literature on depiction. The big issue addressed by that literature in the past is symptomatic of this unconcern with art and aesthetics: it has centred on finding a definition of depiction, one that applies equally to snapshots and Signorellis. This collection largely avoids the problem of definition to focus on issues that are only now beginning to attract substantial attention. It is telling of the state of the field just how much one such issue, the experience of pictures, dominates: it is the central topic of five of the book's eight chapters. But let me say something about the other three chapters first. The first of these, by John Kulvicki, investigates the commonplace that there are many different ways-styles and systems-of picturing. Kulvicki argues that the situation is, in some ways, simpler than this suggests: there are many different ways of producing a picture, but rather fewer ways of interpreting it. The key is to recognize that it is not the multitude of different styles and systems of picturing that are significant for interpretation, so much as the representationally salient properties they instantiate-and these present much less diversity. Kulvicki goes on to argue, with some justification to my mind, that the constraints on interpretation are explained by the fact that pictures resemble what they depict, a central plank of his own (2006) theory of depiction. Abell includes a paper of her own, investigating the epistemic value of photographs. Photographs are generally superior to handmade pictures as sources of knowledge about what they depict. Abell argues, in the face of opposing views, that this fact has its roots in the reliability of the standardized, mechanical processes of photography. Abell's position has the appeal of common sense, and it does seem to me that this is one instance where common sense has it pretty much right. Dominic Lopes's chapter begins with a less commonsensical proposal. Looking at a picture of X, it often seems natural to say 'That's X', rather than 'That's a picture of X'-something we would never do in the presence of a description of X. Lopes holds that this 'image-based demonstrative'-'That's X'-is literally, and not just figuratively, true. He argues that this is so because pictures perceptually ground such reference through deixis, an aspect of visual experience usually associated with actually being in the presence of

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2011

Ted Cohen's work on metaphor is well known in the profession, so it comes as no surprise to us th... more Ted Cohen's work on metaphor is well known in the profession, so it comes as no surprise to us that he has now written a splendid book on the subject. It is a very short book. But as was famously said by someone who did not practice what he preached, "Brevity is the soul of wit," a metaphor, for sure, and one indeed admirably suited to describe Ted Cohen himself, who, without preaching, practices the virtue in question. Having said that Cohen's book is on metaphor, however, and that is certainly how it will be "shelved," it is a book on why metaphor is so important to us, what its significance is, and, as the subtitle of the book tells us, it is on the talent for metaphor too, as well as on our ability to identify with and understand others. That being said, now on to business. I first give the reader a general survey of Cohen's book, and then, in the end, try to raise two issues for the future discussion which, I am certain, Thinking of Others will inevitably motivate. Cohen begins by narrowing his topic down to metaphors of the form "A is B," perhaps the most frequently adduced example being "Juliet is the sun." "It seems obviously true," he avers, "that a metaphor 'A is B' induces one to think of A as B. How this happens," Cohen goes on to say, "is a wonderful mystery, and the ability to do it, to 'see' A as B is an indispensible human ability I am calling the talent for metaphor" (p. 3). Furthermore, Cohen suggests that "a leading aim of many metaphor-makers is the communication of some feelings they have about the subject of their metaphors, and the often hoped-for inducement of similar feelings in those who grasp their metaphors" (p. 6). Cohen further narrows his subject down to what he calls the "metaphor of personal identification," in which "a person is said to be either another person or a person of a different kind." "I will be concentrating on cases," he says, "in which the person is oneself,

The British Journal of Aesthetics, 2021

The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 2010

The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. Users ar... more The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the published version of record.

What is a picture? Is it a symbol, a likeness, a trigger of certain visual experiences or cogniti... more What is a picture? Is it a symbol, a likeness, a trigger of certain visual experiences or cognitive states? Each of these ideas, wrongly placed in competition by earlier theorists, gives some insight into what a picture is. This book draws together, criticises and refines these ideas to develop a new theory of pictures, that understands pictures to be an intrinsically visual from of representation. Using an approach deeply informed by art history and perceptual psychology, it explores the ramifications such a theory has for the visual arts, developing a new theory of pictorial realism, reconsidering the special status often granted to perspective-based realism in art, and giving a powerful new analysis of abstraction in modern painting.

Perception

This article considers evidence, primarily drawn from art, that one kind of impossible colour, ye... more This article considers evidence, primarily drawn from art, that one kind of impossible colour, yellowish blue, can be experienced.

A range of theories of depiction incorporate a ‘standard of correctness’ in order to defend thems... more A range of theories of depiction incorporate a ‘standard of correctness’ in order to defend themselves against certain kinds of potential counter-examples. However, disagreement exists about what sets the standard of correctness. Richard Wollheim and Robert Hopkins hold that it is the picture-maker’s intention, while Dominic Lopes argues that it is the source of the information embodied in the picture. This paper criticises these existing approaches and presents a new account, in which non-photographic and photographic pictures have different standards of correctness. These standards of correctness, however, are determined by a single rule that takes into account the different kinds of information these two ways of picturemaking can reliably convey.

Curator: The Museum Journal

A Philosophy of the Art School