Michael Weston - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Papers by Michael Weston
Sense and Reality, 2009
Howard Mounce has published books on moral philosophy (co-authored with D.Z. Phillips), Wittgenst... more Howard Mounce has published books on moral philosophy (co-authored with D.Z. Phillips), Wittgenstein's Tractatus, American Pragmatism and David Hume, and articles on a wide range of topics from Zande witchcraft to the smell of coffee, many of which express a debt to the philosophy of Wittgenstein. 1 Such a bare summary, while suggesting what is true, that Mounce is a thinker who has contributed to a variety of philosophical areas-ethics, metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of religion, and so forth-would fail to indicate a surprising unifying project which becomes increasingly apparent in his writings after the book on the Tractatus: the attempt to show that something like the classical or transcendent realism characteristic of Western philosophy from Plato to the end of the Middle Ages is justified and is in fact the message of Wittgenstein's later writings. The central ideas of this realism Mounce sets out in a chapter he contributed to an introduction to the philosophy of religion 2 in 1998. We can understand the world to the extent we do only because it has an intelligible order in which the mind shares. This order is manifest in the world but at the same time transcends it. The concepts through which the world is intelligible are manifested in the world but go beyond any particular range of instances: they are normative, determining what it is reasonable or unreasonable to think, what has sense and what doesn't. This order is already implicit in the world, it is not of our making. The intelligibility of the world, and so the possibility of truth about it, presupposes the objectivity of value. We, too, participate in this order, the nature of the human being determining the standard for human life, what we are meant to be. The intelligible order of the world is not self-explanatory but points to its source
Philosophical Investigations, 2016
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 1975
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears... more Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Kierkegaard and Modern Continental Philosophy, 2003
Introduction 1. Kierkegaard and the Metaphysical Project 2. Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and the Probl... more Introduction 1. Kierkegaard and the Metaphysical Project 2. Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and the Problem of Existence 3. Happiness, Self-Affirmation & God: Nietzsche and Kierkegaard 4. God and Heidegger's Later Thought 5. Derrida, Wittengenstein and the Question of Grounds 6. Philosophy as Hubris 7. Philosophy Always Comes Too Late: Levinas and Kierkegaard 8. A Concluding Revocation
Philosophical Investigations, 2009
The paper argues that an internal debate within Wittgensteinian philosophy leads to issues associ... more The paper argues that an internal debate within Wittgensteinian philosophy leads to issues associated rather with the later philosophy of Martin Heidegger. Rush Rhees's identification of the limitations of the notion of a “language game” to illuminate the relation between language and reality leads to his discussion of what is involved in the “reality” of language: “anything that is said has sense-if living has sense, not otherwise.” But what is it for living to have sense? Peter Winch provides an interpretation and application of Rhees's argument in his discussion of the “reality” of Zande witchcraft and magic in “Understanding a Primitive Society”. There he argues that such sense is provided by a language game concerned with the ineradicable contingency of human life, such as (he claims) Zande witchcraft to be. I argue, however, that Winch's account fails to answer the question why Zande witchcraft can find no application within our lives. I suggest that answering this requires us to raise the question of why Zande witchcraft “fits” with their other practices but cannot with ours, a question of “sense” which cannot be answered by reference to another language game. I use Joseph Epes Brown's account of Native American cultures (in Epes Brown 2001) as an exemplification of a form of coherence that constitutes what we may call a “world”. I then discuss what is involved in this, relating this coherence to a relation to the temporal, which provides an internal connection between the senses of the “real” embodied in the different linguistic practices of these cultures. I relate this to the later Heidegger's account of the “History of Being”, of the historical worlds of Western culture and increasingly of the planet. I conclude with an indication of concerns and issues this approach raises, ones characteristic of “Continental” rather than Wittgensteinian philosophy.
Philosophical Investigations, 2007
European Journal of Philosophy, 2002
If traditional metaphysics sought to find some point of reference transcendent to or immanent wit... more If traditional metaphysics sought to find some point of reference transcendent to or immanent within our forms of thought and practice which could serve to validate or discredit them, then the figures we are inclined to call 'post-modern' have, in various ways, tried to show this project as misconceived. Kierkegaard is often twinned with Nietzsche as a major source of this move. John Caputo in his new book On Religion tells us that 'today a good many "post-modernists" number [Kierkegaard] among their prime progenitors' (Caputo 2001: 51), and cites his attack on Hegel's systematic ambitions in support of this claim, an attack which was part of Kierkegaard's general rejection of the necessity for an appeal to what Johannes Climacus calls 'objective truth' to justify 'subjective truth', the 'truth of appropriation'. The possibilities of subjectivity are to be liberated from having to answer to a philosophical tribunal. Yet, when we ask what these possibilities are for Kierkegaard, we nevertheless find them subject to a demarcation of intelligibility the nature of which is far from clear. In their Supplement to Concluding Unscientific Postscript, the Hongs give us the following excerpt from Kierkegaard's Journals: their [the pseudonymous authors] entire importance. .. unconditionally does not consist in making any new proposal, some unheard of discovery. .. but simply and solely in precisely the express opposite, in once again reading through solo, if possible in a more inward way, the original text of existence-relationships, all the old and familiar text. .. (in margin) the original text of individual or human existence relationships' (Kierkegaard 1992: 115). It can be dangerous, of course, to use Journal entries: they were not intended for publication, may contain ideas Kierkegaard would have rejected, and may constitute drafts for the varied voices of the pseudonyms whose opinions cannot simply be attributed to Kierkegaard. Nevertheless, I'm inclined to think this has an authentic ring to it. The excerpt tells us that there is an 'original text of existence-relationships', that the spectrum of 'existence-relationships' is already given and that it is 'familiar', in some sense a matter of existing knowledge. The range of possible existence-relationships has already been demarcated and is already known. Kierkegaard's pseudonymous writings propose nothing new because there can be nothing new here: all has been circumscribed by the 'original text'. This immediately makes one want to ask how Kierkegaard knows this.
Philosophical Investigations, 1999
Concluding Unscientific Postscript 1 is a pseudonymous work written by Johannes Climacus which cl... more Concluding Unscientific Postscript 1 is a pseudonymous work written by Johannes Climacus which claims to raise and respond appropriately to the question 'How do I become a Christian?' Following Climacus's text there is 'A First and Last Explanation' signed by Kierkegaard himself in which he says that 'My pseudonymity. .. has. .. an essential basis in the production itself ', that the pseudonymity of works like Postscript (hereafter CUP) is essential for the kinds of work they are. And in denying that one can attribute anything the pseudonyms say to him, Kierkegaard says that what 'has been written, then, is mine, but only insofar as I, by means of audible lines, have placed the life-view of the creating, poetically actual individuality in his mouth' (p. 625). At the end of the 'Explanation' he adds that the importance of the pseudonyms is 'in wanting to have no importance, in wanting, at a remove that is the distance of doublereflection, once again to read through solo, if possible in a more inward way, the original text of individual human existencerelationships' (pp. 629-30). These remarks invite us to ask in relation to CUP 2 what the 'life-view' of the 'poetically actual individuality'
Books by Michael Weston
Sense and Reality, 2009
Howard Mounce has published books on moral philosophy (co-authored with D.Z. Phillips), Wittgenst... more Howard Mounce has published books on moral philosophy (co-authored with D.Z. Phillips), Wittgenstein's Tractatus, American Pragmatism and David Hume, and articles on a wide range of topics from Zande witchcraft to the smell of coffee, many of which express a debt to the philosophy of Wittgenstein. 1 Such a bare summary, while suggesting what is true, that Mounce is a thinker who has contributed to a variety of philosophical areas-ethics, metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of religion, and so forth-would fail to indicate a surprising unifying project which becomes increasingly apparent in his writings after the book on the Tractatus: the attempt to show that something like the classical or transcendent realism characteristic of Western philosophy from Plato to the end of the Middle Ages is justified and is in fact the message of Wittgenstein's later writings. The central ideas of this realism Mounce sets out in a chapter he contributed to an introduction to the philosophy of religion 2 in 1998. We can understand the world to the extent we do only because it has an intelligible order in which the mind shares. This order is manifest in the world but at the same time transcends it. The concepts through which the world is intelligible are manifested in the world but go beyond any particular range of instances: they are normative, determining what it is reasonable or unreasonable to think, what has sense and what doesn't. This order is already implicit in the world, it is not of our making. The intelligibility of the world, and so the possibility of truth about it, presupposes the objectivity of value. We, too, participate in this order, the nature of the human being determining the standard for human life, what we are meant to be. The intelligible order of the world is not self-explanatory but points to its source
Philosophical Investigations, 2016
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 1975
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears... more Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Kierkegaard and Modern Continental Philosophy, 2003
Introduction 1. Kierkegaard and the Metaphysical Project 2. Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and the Probl... more Introduction 1. Kierkegaard and the Metaphysical Project 2. Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and the Problem of Existence 3. Happiness, Self-Affirmation & God: Nietzsche and Kierkegaard 4. God and Heidegger's Later Thought 5. Derrida, Wittengenstein and the Question of Grounds 6. Philosophy as Hubris 7. Philosophy Always Comes Too Late: Levinas and Kierkegaard 8. A Concluding Revocation
Philosophical Investigations, 2009
The paper argues that an internal debate within Wittgensteinian philosophy leads to issues associ... more The paper argues that an internal debate within Wittgensteinian philosophy leads to issues associated rather with the later philosophy of Martin Heidegger. Rush Rhees's identification of the limitations of the notion of a “language game” to illuminate the relation between language and reality leads to his discussion of what is involved in the “reality” of language: “anything that is said has sense-if living has sense, not otherwise.” But what is it for living to have sense? Peter Winch provides an interpretation and application of Rhees's argument in his discussion of the “reality” of Zande witchcraft and magic in “Understanding a Primitive Society”. There he argues that such sense is provided by a language game concerned with the ineradicable contingency of human life, such as (he claims) Zande witchcraft to be. I argue, however, that Winch's account fails to answer the question why Zande witchcraft can find no application within our lives. I suggest that answering this requires us to raise the question of why Zande witchcraft “fits” with their other practices but cannot with ours, a question of “sense” which cannot be answered by reference to another language game. I use Joseph Epes Brown's account of Native American cultures (in Epes Brown 2001) as an exemplification of a form of coherence that constitutes what we may call a “world”. I then discuss what is involved in this, relating this coherence to a relation to the temporal, which provides an internal connection between the senses of the “real” embodied in the different linguistic practices of these cultures. I relate this to the later Heidegger's account of the “History of Being”, of the historical worlds of Western culture and increasingly of the planet. I conclude with an indication of concerns and issues this approach raises, ones characteristic of “Continental” rather than Wittgensteinian philosophy.
Philosophical Investigations, 2007
European Journal of Philosophy, 2002
If traditional metaphysics sought to find some point of reference transcendent to or immanent wit... more If traditional metaphysics sought to find some point of reference transcendent to or immanent within our forms of thought and practice which could serve to validate or discredit them, then the figures we are inclined to call 'post-modern' have, in various ways, tried to show this project as misconceived. Kierkegaard is often twinned with Nietzsche as a major source of this move. John Caputo in his new book On Religion tells us that 'today a good many "post-modernists" number [Kierkegaard] among their prime progenitors' (Caputo 2001: 51), and cites his attack on Hegel's systematic ambitions in support of this claim, an attack which was part of Kierkegaard's general rejection of the necessity for an appeal to what Johannes Climacus calls 'objective truth' to justify 'subjective truth', the 'truth of appropriation'. The possibilities of subjectivity are to be liberated from having to answer to a philosophical tribunal. Yet, when we ask what these possibilities are for Kierkegaard, we nevertheless find them subject to a demarcation of intelligibility the nature of which is far from clear. In their Supplement to Concluding Unscientific Postscript, the Hongs give us the following excerpt from Kierkegaard's Journals: their [the pseudonymous authors] entire importance. .. unconditionally does not consist in making any new proposal, some unheard of discovery. .. but simply and solely in precisely the express opposite, in once again reading through solo, if possible in a more inward way, the original text of existence-relationships, all the old and familiar text. .. (in margin) the original text of individual or human existence relationships' (Kierkegaard 1992: 115). It can be dangerous, of course, to use Journal entries: they were not intended for publication, may contain ideas Kierkegaard would have rejected, and may constitute drafts for the varied voices of the pseudonyms whose opinions cannot simply be attributed to Kierkegaard. Nevertheless, I'm inclined to think this has an authentic ring to it. The excerpt tells us that there is an 'original text of existence-relationships', that the spectrum of 'existence-relationships' is already given and that it is 'familiar', in some sense a matter of existing knowledge. The range of possible existence-relationships has already been demarcated and is already known. Kierkegaard's pseudonymous writings propose nothing new because there can be nothing new here: all has been circumscribed by the 'original text'. This immediately makes one want to ask how Kierkegaard knows this.
Philosophical Investigations, 1999
Concluding Unscientific Postscript 1 is a pseudonymous work written by Johannes Climacus which cl... more Concluding Unscientific Postscript 1 is a pseudonymous work written by Johannes Climacus which claims to raise and respond appropriately to the question 'How do I become a Christian?' Following Climacus's text there is 'A First and Last Explanation' signed by Kierkegaard himself in which he says that 'My pseudonymity. .. has. .. an essential basis in the production itself ', that the pseudonymity of works like Postscript (hereafter CUP) is essential for the kinds of work they are. And in denying that one can attribute anything the pseudonyms say to him, Kierkegaard says that what 'has been written, then, is mine, but only insofar as I, by means of audible lines, have placed the life-view of the creating, poetically actual individuality in his mouth' (p. 625). At the end of the 'Explanation' he adds that the importance of the pseudonyms is 'in wanting to have no importance, in wanting, at a remove that is the distance of doublereflection, once again to read through solo, if possible in a more inward way, the original text of individual human existencerelationships' (pp. 629-30). These remarks invite us to ask in relation to CUP 2 what the 'life-view' of the 'poetically actual individuality'