Miguel dos santos - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
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Università degli Studi di Milano - State University of Milan (Italy)
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Papers by Miguel dos santos
Evolution, 2013
The threat of punishment usually promotes cooperation. However, punishing itself is costly, 22 ra... more The threat of punishment usually promotes cooperation. However, punishing itself is costly, 22 rare in non-human animals, and humans who punish often finish with low payoffs in 23 economic experiments. The evolution of punishment has therefore been unclear. Recent 24 theoretical developments suggest that punishment has evolved in the context of reputation 25 games. We tested this idea in a simple helping game with observers and with punishment and 26 punishment reputation (experimentally controlling for other possible reputational effects). We 27 show that punishers fully compensate their costs as they receive help more often. The more 28 likely defection is punished within a group, the higher the level of within-group cooperation. 29 These beneficial effects perish if the punishment reputation is removed. We conclude that 30 reputation is key to the evolution of punishment.
Evolution, 2013
The threat of punishment usually promotes cooperation. However, punishing itself is costly, 22 ra... more The threat of punishment usually promotes cooperation. However, punishing itself is costly, 22 rare in non-human animals, and humans who punish often finish with low payoffs in 23 economic experiments. The evolution of punishment has therefore been unclear. Recent 24 theoretical developments suggest that punishment has evolved in the context of reputation 25 games. We tested this idea in a simple helping game with observers and with punishment and 26 punishment reputation (experimentally controlling for other possible reputational effects). We 27 show that punishers fully compensate their costs as they receive help more often. The more 28 likely defection is punished within a group, the higher the level of within-group cooperation. 29 These beneficial effects perish if the punishment reputation is removed. We conclude that 30 reputation is key to the evolution of punishment.