Minas Vlassis - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Papers by Minas Vlassis
Journal of Macroeconomics, 2005
This paper offers reasoning for the endogenous sustainability of the National Minimum Wage Instit... more This paper offers reasoning for the endogenous sustainability of the National Minimum Wage Institution (NMWI). In an economy with asymmetries in productivity among unionized firms, high-tech firms may often opt for minimum wage agreements covering all unionized ...
DEOS Working Papers, 1998
This paper investigates whether compliance with sectoral wages, or "underground" wages ... more This paper investigates whether compliance with sectoral wages, or "underground" wages (ie equilibrium wages lower than the, officially minimum, sectoral ones), may emerge endogenously in industries with market power. Wage bargaining is centralized and it is conducted by ...
Journal of Macroeconomics, 2005
This paper offers reasoning for the endogenous sustainability of the National Minimum Wage Instit... more This paper offers reasoning for the endogenous sustainability of the National Minimum Wage Institution (NMWI). In an economy with asymmetries in productivity among unionized firms, high-tech firms may often opt for minimum wage agreements covering all unionized ...
In contrast with previous studies we assume no ex-ante commitment over the ─price or quantity─ ty... more In contrast with previous studies we assume no ex-ante commitment over the ─price or quantity─ type of contract which downstream firms will independently offer consumers in a two-tier oligopoly. Under competing vertical chains, we propose that the downstream mode of competition which in equilibrium emerges is the outcome of independent implicit agreements, between each downstream firm and its exclusive input supplier, in each vertical chain. Our findings suggest that input suppliers may thus act as commitment devices sufficient to endogenously sustain the quantity (Cournot) mode of competition. JEL Classification: D43; L13; L42
In contrast with previous studies, we postulate that there is no ex-ante commitment over the type... more In contrast with previous studies, we postulate that there is no ex-ante commitment over the type of contract (i.e., price or quantity) which a firm offers consumers. In the context of a unionized symmetric duopoly we instead argue that the mode of competition which in equilibrium emerges is the one that entails the most beneficial outcome for both the firm and its labour union, in each firm/union pair, given the choice of the rival pair. Our findings suggest that monopoly unions with risk-averse/neutral members may effectively act as commitment devices driving firms to the symmetric Cournot mode of competition.
Whilst their products are substituable for the consumer, there exist technological asymmetries ac... more Whilst their products are substituable for the consumer, there exist technological asymmetries across the unionized sectors of an economy. There are high-tech as well as low-tech sectors. We show, that, due to those asymmetries in productivity, inter-sectoral minimum wage agreements may endogenously emerge, always being the medianvoter's most preferred outcome.
Undeclared labour constitutes a complex phenomenon that has not yet been analyzed within I/O fram... more Undeclared labour constitutes a complex phenomenon that has not yet been analyzed within I/O framework. In a unionized duopoly under decentralized wage bargaining context, we reveal the opportunity cost that exists between the taxation and the contributions for social insurance. Comparing to a benchmarking state where no undeclared labour exist, our findings indicate that if the tax rate is low enough, the rate of undeclared labour that maximizes firms' profit will yield greater clearing wages, greater output and thus employment, greater consumer surplus and lower price. Furthermore, in contrast to common knowledge, we showed that under certain circumstances, undeclared labour may increase firmsAƒÂ¢A¯Â?½A¯Â?½ profits and unions' utility, but it may also increase public revenues and social welfare. Finally, we propose a Pareto optimal tax rate for the case that firms practice undeclared labour. The proposed tax rate will render greater values in all market's magnitudes ...
In a union-oligopoly framework with differentiated products, this paper endogenizes the mode of p... more In a union-oligopoly framework with differentiated products, this paper endogenizes the mode of product market competition by exploring its strategic role on firms’ incentives for collusion. It is shown that in a one-shot game setup, provided that union members are endowed with risk-neutral and monopoly bargaining power during the negotiations, cartel formation is an unavoidable equilibrium in the product market, hence industry’s outcomes and market participants surpluses/rents equal to that of collusive play. The cartel is proved to be welfare improving, if and only if products’ substitutability is sufficiently high under Cournot competition. Moreover and given firms’ competition, we conclude that among modes of competition, under Bertrand competition Social Welfare is higher than Cournot, while under a Mix of Strategies it lies in-between. Consequently, it is welfare improving to be a benevolent policy maker that deters cartel formation and gives firms’ incentive for Bertrand comp...
There are supporters that claim that there is a negative correlation between them and consequentl... more There are supporters that claim that there is a negative correlation between them and consequently centralized wage-setting structure is harmful for the industry, as well as that there is positive correlation as R&D investments increase. The opinions vary, as each one is studying the same subject from a different perspective. It is recognized also, that relevant literature lacks dynamic analysis on the above field. In order to contribute in this area, we propose a dynamic version of a model that we first introduced in our previous work. More specifically, in the context of a dynamic game-theoretic analysis, we consider a union-duopoly model with differentiated products and R&D investments on product quality improvement, in where two technologically identical firms compete by independently adjusting their own quantities. As regards the labor market, there are two firm-level unions with monopoly power over the firm-specific wage bargaining. Unions independently decide about their stra...
The Manchester School, 2010
By means of a field experiment we investigate whether low-skilled male Albanians face discriminat... more By means of a field experiment we investigate whether low-skilled male Albanians face discrimination in the Greek labour market. To test for discrimination in occupational access, curriculum vitae which differed only in ethnicity were faxed to firms. The probability for Albanians to ...
In the context of a homogenous good industry with Cournot rivalry and technological asymmetries a... more In the context of a homogenous good industry with Cournot rivalry and technological asymmetries among firms, equally skilled workers can be grouped according to their different reservation wages. Under decentralized firm-union bargaining, we show that unions may offer to firms the option to discriminate wages across such groups of employees and, by that, to achieve cost sub-additivity in the equilibrium. We subsequently propose that to combat the emerging wage discrimination a benevolent policy maker may activate either taxation, or subsidization, policy. Interestingly, while the former policy always entails a welfare loss, a welfare gain may emerge under the latter policy, relative to the no policy-wage discrimination status quo. Thus our findings suggest that the E.Uantidiscrimination directives may prove to be effective on both egalitarian and efficiency grounds.
Acceso de usuarios registrados. Acceso de usuarios registrados Usuario Contraseña. ...
In a duopoly where firms are competing by adjusting their quantities and the wages are exogenousl... more In a duopoly where firms are competing by adjusting their quantities and the wages are exogenously determined, we analyze the undeclared labour phenomenon and its side effects in product market. Our analysis focuses on the opportunity cost between the taxation and the contributions for social security. The findings of our analysis indicate that there is a strong relationship between the tax rate, the rate of contributions for social insurance and undeclared labour. It is furthermore determined that any combination of tax (t) / contributions (k) rates under the t*1=k/(1+k) curve, will lead firms to practice undeclared labour, in order to avoid paying contributions for social security, since the alternative choice is more costly.
Journal of Macroeconomics, 2005
This paper offers reasoning for the endogenous sustainability of the National Minimum Wage Instit... more This paper offers reasoning for the endogenous sustainability of the National Minimum Wage Institution (NMWI). In an economy with asymmetries in productivity among unionized firms, high-tech firms may often opt for minimum wage agreements covering all unionized ...
DEOS Working Papers, 1998
This paper investigates whether compliance with sectoral wages, or "underground" wages ... more This paper investigates whether compliance with sectoral wages, or "underground" wages (ie equilibrium wages lower than the, officially minimum, sectoral ones), may emerge endogenously in industries with market power. Wage bargaining is centralized and it is conducted by ...
Journal of Macroeconomics, 2005
This paper offers reasoning for the endogenous sustainability of the National Minimum Wage Instit... more This paper offers reasoning for the endogenous sustainability of the National Minimum Wage Institution (NMWI). In an economy with asymmetries in productivity among unionized firms, high-tech firms may often opt for minimum wage agreements covering all unionized ...
In contrast with previous studies we assume no ex-ante commitment over the ─price or quantity─ ty... more In contrast with previous studies we assume no ex-ante commitment over the ─price or quantity─ type of contract which downstream firms will independently offer consumers in a two-tier oligopoly. Under competing vertical chains, we propose that the downstream mode of competition which in equilibrium emerges is the outcome of independent implicit agreements, between each downstream firm and its exclusive input supplier, in each vertical chain. Our findings suggest that input suppliers may thus act as commitment devices sufficient to endogenously sustain the quantity (Cournot) mode of competition. JEL Classification: D43; L13; L42
In contrast with previous studies, we postulate that there is no ex-ante commitment over the type... more In contrast with previous studies, we postulate that there is no ex-ante commitment over the type of contract (i.e., price or quantity) which a firm offers consumers. In the context of a unionized symmetric duopoly we instead argue that the mode of competition which in equilibrium emerges is the one that entails the most beneficial outcome for both the firm and its labour union, in each firm/union pair, given the choice of the rival pair. Our findings suggest that monopoly unions with risk-averse/neutral members may effectively act as commitment devices driving firms to the symmetric Cournot mode of competition.
Whilst their products are substituable for the consumer, there exist technological asymmetries ac... more Whilst their products are substituable for the consumer, there exist technological asymmetries across the unionized sectors of an economy. There are high-tech as well as low-tech sectors. We show, that, due to those asymmetries in productivity, inter-sectoral minimum wage agreements may endogenously emerge, always being the medianvoter's most preferred outcome.
Undeclared labour constitutes a complex phenomenon that has not yet been analyzed within I/O fram... more Undeclared labour constitutes a complex phenomenon that has not yet been analyzed within I/O framework. In a unionized duopoly under decentralized wage bargaining context, we reveal the opportunity cost that exists between the taxation and the contributions for social insurance. Comparing to a benchmarking state where no undeclared labour exist, our findings indicate that if the tax rate is low enough, the rate of undeclared labour that maximizes firms' profit will yield greater clearing wages, greater output and thus employment, greater consumer surplus and lower price. Furthermore, in contrast to common knowledge, we showed that under certain circumstances, undeclared labour may increase firmsAƒÂ¢A¯Â?½A¯Â?½ profits and unions' utility, but it may also increase public revenues and social welfare. Finally, we propose a Pareto optimal tax rate for the case that firms practice undeclared labour. The proposed tax rate will render greater values in all market's magnitudes ...
In a union-oligopoly framework with differentiated products, this paper endogenizes the mode of p... more In a union-oligopoly framework with differentiated products, this paper endogenizes the mode of product market competition by exploring its strategic role on firms’ incentives for collusion. It is shown that in a one-shot game setup, provided that union members are endowed with risk-neutral and monopoly bargaining power during the negotiations, cartel formation is an unavoidable equilibrium in the product market, hence industry’s outcomes and market participants surpluses/rents equal to that of collusive play. The cartel is proved to be welfare improving, if and only if products’ substitutability is sufficiently high under Cournot competition. Moreover and given firms’ competition, we conclude that among modes of competition, under Bertrand competition Social Welfare is higher than Cournot, while under a Mix of Strategies it lies in-between. Consequently, it is welfare improving to be a benevolent policy maker that deters cartel formation and gives firms’ incentive for Bertrand comp...
There are supporters that claim that there is a negative correlation between them and consequentl... more There are supporters that claim that there is a negative correlation between them and consequently centralized wage-setting structure is harmful for the industry, as well as that there is positive correlation as R&D investments increase. The opinions vary, as each one is studying the same subject from a different perspective. It is recognized also, that relevant literature lacks dynamic analysis on the above field. In order to contribute in this area, we propose a dynamic version of a model that we first introduced in our previous work. More specifically, in the context of a dynamic game-theoretic analysis, we consider a union-duopoly model with differentiated products and R&D investments on product quality improvement, in where two technologically identical firms compete by independently adjusting their own quantities. As regards the labor market, there are two firm-level unions with monopoly power over the firm-specific wage bargaining. Unions independently decide about their stra...
The Manchester School, 2010
By means of a field experiment we investigate whether low-skilled male Albanians face discriminat... more By means of a field experiment we investigate whether low-skilled male Albanians face discrimination in the Greek labour market. To test for discrimination in occupational access, curriculum vitae which differed only in ethnicity were faxed to firms. The probability for Albanians to ...
In the context of a homogenous good industry with Cournot rivalry and technological asymmetries a... more In the context of a homogenous good industry with Cournot rivalry and technological asymmetries among firms, equally skilled workers can be grouped according to their different reservation wages. Under decentralized firm-union bargaining, we show that unions may offer to firms the option to discriminate wages across such groups of employees and, by that, to achieve cost sub-additivity in the equilibrium. We subsequently propose that to combat the emerging wage discrimination a benevolent policy maker may activate either taxation, or subsidization, policy. Interestingly, while the former policy always entails a welfare loss, a welfare gain may emerge under the latter policy, relative to the no policy-wage discrimination status quo. Thus our findings suggest that the E.Uantidiscrimination directives may prove to be effective on both egalitarian and efficiency grounds.
Acceso de usuarios registrados. Acceso de usuarios registrados Usuario Contraseña. ...
In a duopoly where firms are competing by adjusting their quantities and the wages are exogenousl... more In a duopoly where firms are competing by adjusting their quantities and the wages are exogenously determined, we analyze the undeclared labour phenomenon and its side effects in product market. Our analysis focuses on the opportunity cost between the taxation and the contributions for social security. The findings of our analysis indicate that there is a strong relationship between the tax rate, the rate of contributions for social insurance and undeclared labour. It is furthermore determined that any combination of tax (t) / contributions (k) rates under the t*1=k/(1+k) curve, will lead firms to practice undeclared labour, in order to avoid paying contributions for social security, since the alternative choice is more costly.