Vyacheslav Nekrasov - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Papers by Vyacheslav Nekrasov
Modern History of Russia, 2017
XIII Апрельская международная научная конференция по проблемам развития экономики и общества [Текст] : в 4 кн. / отв. ред. Е. Г. Ясин ; Нац. исслед. ун-т «Высшая школа экономики». — М. : Изд. дом Высшей школы экономики, 2012, 2012
В фокусе внимания исследования находится проблема формирования и функционирования организованных ... more В фокусе внимания исследования находится проблема формирования и функционирования организованных групп интересов - отраслевых и региональных лобби. В российской и зарубежной историографии признается существование в советской экономике групп организованных агентов. Однако, проблема формирования и функционирования групп интересов в советской экономике остается малоисследованной темой в российской историографии. Имплицитно данная проблема рассматривалась в ряде исследований по политической и социально-экономической истории Сибири второй половины ХХ в. Однако, в историографии вопрос формирования групп интересов, практиках ими лоббирования индустриальных проектов объясняется в рамках простых (линейных) аналитических схем и «моделей» - «региональная/отраслевая инициатива (проект) - результат», «государственная директива - результат». Так, в новейших исследованиях, посвященных экономической истории Сибири утверждается, что «Конец 1950-х – начало 1960-х гг. – стали временем активных поисков концептуальных оснований социально-экономического развития Сибири. В связи с этим на первый план снова выдвигается идея рационального размещения производительных сил на основе создания преимущественно индустриальных производств. Теперь, … эта идея…, активно разрабатывается, вносится в государственные планы и решения, в которых предполагается учитывать интересы территории во вторую очередь после интересов страны».
Фактически в исследованиях остаются без внимания и игнорируются множество методологических вопросов – «как формировались группы интересов?», «каковы были формы организации участников групп интересов?», «каковы были механизмы принятия альтернативных решений», «каким образом осуществлялся выбор стратегии агентами», «какую роль играли информационные издержки и проблемы мотивации поведения агентов в принятии экономических решений?», «какую роль играла длительность истории индустриального проекта при принятии решении о его реализации» и т.п. С точки зрения аналитического нарратива, выбранный нами объект исследования – формирования организованных групп агентов в советской экономике второй половине 1950-х - первой половине 1960-х гг. предоставляет репрезентативный эмпирический материал для разработки и апробации аналитических моделей, поскольку насыщен межведомственными и межгрупповыми конфликтами при разработке и реализации множества индустриальных проектов, появлением новых стратегических игроков, стремлением высшей политической власти изменить модели экономического поведения стратегических игроков, повысить качество информационного обеспечения процесса планирования и оперативного управления экономикой.
Определение Госплана СССР в качестве отправной точки анализа связано с рядом обстоятельств. Во-первых, в советской экономической системе Госплан СССР был одним из ключевых органов государственной власти, отвечавший за подготовку государственных народнохозяйственных планов, координировавший деятельность различных ведомств, контролирующий и отстаивающий «общегосударственные интересы» в борьбе с «ведомственным эгоизмом» и местничеством.
Во-вторых, Госплан СССР - государственный институт, наделенный полномочиями по утверждению проектов, включению их в «титульные списки» народнохозяйственного плана, что создавало правовую базу для выделения финансовых и материальных лимитов и начала работы над проектами. Госплан СССР выступал координатором проектов, которые носили межведомственный характер, и мог устанавливать приоритеты при реализации проекта, если он того пожелает. Для включения проекта в титульные списки плана министерствам и ведомствам было необходимо предоставить в Госплан СССР технико-экономическое обоснование проекта и схематический план проекта. Данная техническая документация должна была пройти экспертизу в соответствующих отделах и Совете технико-экономической экспертизы Госплана СССР. Индустриальные проекты, успешно проходившие экспертизу и признававшиеся экономически оправданными, включались в титульные списки планов [Gregory, 1990. P. 30-38]. Тем самым, Госплан СССР являлся объектом лоббирования со стороны различных групп агентов, образовавших «коалиции поддержки» своих проектов.
В-третьих, лоббирование индустриальных проектов в советской экономике во второй половине 1950-х – первой половине 1960-х гг. осуществлялось, как правило, не отдельными министерствами или ведомствами, а группами интересов, образующими «коалиции поддержки», которые выступали как агенты, способными оказывать давление на «политико-бюрократические центры власти».
Стратегии агентов анализируются на примере реализации крупного индустриального проекта во второй половине 1950-х – первой половине 1960-х гг. - строительство Нижне-Обской ГЭС и освоение нефтегазовых ресурсов на Севере Западной Сибири. На основе анализа архивных документов выдвигается гипотеза, что институциональным решением проблемы агентских отношений в советской экономике второй половины 1950-х - первой половины 1960-х гг. при разработке и реализации крупных индустриальных проектов выступили неформальные «коалиции поддержки» - институт многосторонних неформальных соглашений, позволяющий разрешать межведомственные конфликты. Возможность реализации того или иного индустриального проекта зависела от способности агентов, формировать «коалиции поддержки».
Вестник Сургутского государственного педагогического университета , 2018
In the article on the basis of the new documents of the Russian State Archive of Econom- ics and ... more In the article on the basis of the new documents of the Russian State Archive of Econom- ics and the Russian State Archive of Modern History the history of the project of exporting natural gas in Western Siberia and Sakhalin is being studied in the context of the develop- ment of the Soviet oil and gas complex in the first half of the 1960s. Special attention is paid to the dilemmas in the development of oil and gas policy in the early 1960s, the position policy of the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N.S. Khrushchev regarding the economic value of oil and gas resources, the impact of the Cold War, the actions of interest groups and the causes of the project of ex- porting liquefied gas, rental potential and technical and economic dimensions of the project.
Вестник Томского государственного университета. , 2011
Examines the participation of Khrushchev as head of party and government in the development and i... more Examines the participation of Khrushchev as head of party and government in the development and implementation of programs and projects of development of fuel and energy complex. The focus is on the relationship of the formation of a new energy policy in the USSR with Khrushchev's struggle for political power, his initiatives to reform management of the economy, ideas about achieving Communist goals of the Soviet society.
The article analyzes one of the major reform activities undertaken by the Soviet leader Nikita S.... more The article analyzes one of the major reform activities undertaken by the Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev in 1955–1964. This activity aimed at form- ing a new governance body for economic management has not yet been fully studied in Russian and foreign historiography. The author of the article used numerous documents of the CPSU Central Committee and the Gosplan of the USSR which were previously classi ed and became available to researchers in the early 2000s. Having analyzed the documents in the light of institutional theory, the author assumes that it was essential for the authoritarian reformer Khrushchev to create a new governance body to reform the system of plan- ning and, more importantly, “to invent” a new model of economic development. This new model was designed to ensure the USSR’s victory in the economic competition with the leading capitalist countries. The State Scienti c-Economic Council (Goseconomsovet) of the Council of Ministers of the USSR initiated by Nikita Khrushchev in 1959 became such body, at rst, a consultative one, under the Council of Ministers of the USSR and, consequently, in 1960–1962, reporting directly to Khrushchev, it became the centre of economic reforms. Its key feature was the participation of the leading Soviet academic economists and its close cooperation with the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. However, the activity of the Goseconomsovet led to a competition with the Gosplan of the USSR, which re ected controversy going on among the leaders of the party- state bureaucracy as to how the Soviet economy should be managed. With the Goseconomsovet disbanded by Khrushchev in 1962, it became clear that his economic reforms were doomed to failure.
Modern History of Russia, 2017
The article comprises papers presented at the roundtable “Soviet globalism: theory and practice o... more The article comprises papers presented at the roundtable “Soviet globalism: theory and practice of the world socialist system from the 1950s to the 1970s” conducted at the Institute of World History of the Russian Academy of Sciences on May 19, 2017 within the frames of a new research project on the history of the “world system of socialism”. It unites new approaches to the discipline (Mikhail Lipkin, Viacheslav Nekrasov), historiogra- phy and terminology studies (Samuel Volfson, Artem Ulunyan) and new archival evidence from unilateral, bilateral and multilateral perspectives (Teimur Dzhalilov, Anna Gladysheva, Nikita Pivovarov, Irina Aggeeva, Alessandro Salacone, Eugeny Osipov). Following the new recently declassi ed sources from the Russian, West and East European archives and using global history tools, it opens a serious discussion on the role of economic strategy in competition between socialist and capitalist systems and searches for an answer to the question of why China won while the USSR lost after a several waves of inner reforms and a nal shift towards economic détente with the West in the middle of 1970s.
The Soviet Economic Model: Institutions, Oil and Gas Resources and the Challenge of “Resource Cur... more The Soviet Economic Model: Institutions, Oil and Gas Resources and the Challenge of “Resource Curse”
V. Nekrasov
Surgut State Pedagogical University Russian Federation, Surgut
Abstract
Our study is based on new evidences, including those which are not known to the present time in scientific circulation and little-known sources from Khrushchev and Brezhnev funds, the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the State Planning Committee of the USSR, the State Scientific and Economic Council of the USSR and the State Committee for Science and Technology of the USSR, and also the NATO Archive, allowing to analyze the political and economic institutions that formed the policy of using oil and gas resources in the Soviet economy in the so-called the period of the formation of the system of allocation “oil and gas rents” (the second half of the 1950s — the first half of the 1970s). In the second half of the 1950s — the first half of the 1970s soviet leaders, thanks to geological discoveries, received a large “prize”, huge reserves of oil and natural gas in the Volga region, the North of Western Siberia and Central Asia, which they could use to achieve their strategic goals. Soviet leaders could choose three possible strategies — to limit the extraction of oil and gas resources by internal consumption (“gasification”), to recycle resources and export petrochemical materials (the “petrochemical project”), to increase the extraction and export of oil and gas resources (“oil and gas maneuver”). This article challenges mainstream of modern historiography about the single of the strategy of soviet leaders in the use of oil and gas resources in the 1960s — 1970s. In the choice of strategy, a significant role was played by interest groups — planners and ministers, their preferences about the economic value of oil and gas resources for the modernization of the Soviet economy. As oil and gas rents grew, interest groups began to fight (“rag war”) for its allocation. In the case of the «petrochemical project» strategy in 1957—1964, for the ministers, the benefits of redistributing resources to the chemical industry were not too obvious, and the strategy of exporting hydrocarbon resources was more preferable, which eventually led to the abandonment of the petrochemical project and accelerated the formation of a “resource curse” in the Soviet economy, as gradually the priorities shifted from processing to exporting a crude oil. In the case of the “oil and gas maneuver” strategy for planners and ministers, the benefits of redistributing resources to the oil and gas complex were evident; they received an opportunity to purchase abroad equipment and materials in return. However, the implementation of the “oil and gas maneuver” strategy in 1972—1975 led to the rapid development of the “resource curse” in the Soviet economy and the planners saw no alternative to oil and gas rents as a source for the purchase of raw materials and technologies.
Keywords: USSR, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Gosplan, the oil and gas complex, resources rent, pipelines, decision-making
Nekrasov V. The Soviet Economic Model: Institutions, Oil and Gas Resources and the Challenge of “Resource Curse” // Istoriya. 2016. Issue 10 (54) [Electronic resource]. Access for registered users. URL: http://history.jes.su/s207987840001894-2-1 (circulation date: 20.10.2017). DOI: 10.18254/S0001894-2-1
Гуманитарные науки в Сибири. 2012. № 4. С. 66-70 https://elibrary.ru/item.asp?id=18753636 The pap... more Гуманитарные науки в Сибири. 2012. № 4. С. 66-70 https://elibrary.ru/item.asp?id=18753636
The paper focuses on the issues related to the changing status of the Gosplan's Chairman in the top political leadership; factors that determined his political influence; problems of his loyalty to the leader of the country; level of professionalism of the heads of planning bodies; institutional characteristics of the heads of Gosplan and “images of planners”. The author comes to conclusion that during N.S.Khrushchev's reign the State Planning Committee of the USSR lost its political influence and was entirely submitted to the Party machinery.
Cold War Energy. A Transnational History of Soviet Oil and Gas / Editor J. Perovic. L.: Palgrave... more Cold War Energy. A Transnational History of Soviet Oil and Gas / Editor J. Perovic. L.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.
https://www.palgrave.com/de/book/9783319495316
This chapter examines the Soviet Union’s energy policy during the
Khrushchev period from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, and seeks to explain why the Soviet leaders’ quest for an effective strategy for achieving these goals largely failed. The analysis focuses mainly on Khrushchev’s “petrochemical project,” a complex endeavor involving various institutional and economic measures that aimed to leverage the country’s hydrocarbon resources and chemical materials for the modernization of the economy, and thus to raise the population’s standard of living and progress toward a “bright communist future.” Based on a large amount of both published and unpublished material, this chapter investigates the evolution of Soviet energy policy during the Khrushchev years. It seeks to explain Khrushchev’s specific choices of priorities within the area of energy policy, and asks why his policies faced obstacles and were ultimately not implemented the way he envisioned. This chapter argues that a key factor in understanding Soviet energy policy-making was the institutional setup of the Soviet economy. Far from being able to dictate policy, Khrushchev had to deal with influential interest and lobby groups representing different sectors of the economy, some of which were opposed to certain aspects of Khrushchev’s “petrochemical project.” Especially the State Planning Committee of the Soviet Union (Gosplan), where the various sectoral and regional economic interests were represented and coordinated, was unwilling—or proved at times simply incapable—to carry out the plans accordingly. Given the significance of the institutional setup, an important goal of this chapter is to analyze the complex mechanisms of economic policy decision-making, especially in the sphere of energy policy, and to provide insights into the various “mentalities” that prevailed among the top political leadership and the Soviet bureaucracy regarding economic strategy. This chapter examines the structure of key interest groups and their influence on policy-making, as well as the nature of in-fighting among these groups over allocation of rents to the different branches of the economy. This chapter also looks into the issue of oil and gas production and exports, and elucidates the diverse positions within the Soviet political and economic elite on this topic.
The article is devoted to the history of the Khrushchev`s petrochemical project in the secondhalf... more The article is devoted to the history of the Khrushchev`s petrochemical project in the secondhalf of 1950 — the first half of 1960. The study is based on archival documents from the Russian State Archiveof Contemporary History, Russian State Archives of Economics, Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History. This article discusses the question of whether the strategic choice N. S. Khrushchev «voluntarist» or dictated bypurely ideological motives or wore an objective character that is associated with a realistic understanding of theproblems of the Soviet economy? The Khrushchev`s petrochemical project treated as a set of measures for theuse of hydrocarbon resources and chemical materials for the modernization of the economy, welfareimprovement and achievement of communist objectives. The Soviet leader was represented by the developmentof chemical and petroleum industry as a personal program of technological and institutional modernization of the Soviet economy. Reformer sought to find the limits of centralization and decentralization of Soviet economicmanagement, «reconstructing» traditional and «grow» new institutions of economic power, including “non-system”, but are able to solve specific practical problems of development.
Books by Vyacheslav Nekrasov
В монографии на основе обширного круга источников из российских архивов рассматривается проблема... more В монографии на основе обширного круга источников из российских архивов рассматривается проблема экономической и технологической модернизации СССР в период Н.С. Хрущева и внешних вызовов советской системы. Особый акцент делается на анализ государственных через призму внутренних институтов и бюрократической системы в СССР.
Работа выполнена при финансовой поддержке Российского
научного фонда, грант № 17-18-01728 "Мировая система социализма» и глобальная экономика в середине 1950-х -
середине 1970-х годов: эволюция теории и практики экономического и технологического лидерства".
The monograph studies the economic and institutional factors in the development of the oil and ga... more The monograph studies the economic and institutional factors in the development of the oil and gas complex of the USSR in the second half of the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s. The study is based on archival documents and materials of archives of the Russian Federation. The monograph analyzes the issues of strategic development and reforming of the oil and gas complex that have been little-researched in historiography in 1957-1965. It considers the process of formation of branch and regional groups of interests in the Soviet economy, special attention is paid to the socio-political characteristics of the regional elite of Siberia, its influence on the adoption of economic decisions of the industrial development of the regions of Siberia. In the context of interaction between interest groups, the initial stage of development of the West Siberian oil and gas province (1956-1965) is considered. Using the example of individual industrial projects in the Tyumen and Tomsk regions, the mechanisms of interaction between interests in the mineral-raw complex of the Soviet economy.
Talks by Vyacheslav Nekrasov
24 ноября 2012 г. в Челябинске в рамках II-й Всероссийской научной конференции «Мобилизационная м... more 24 ноября 2012 г. в Челябинске в рамках II-й Всероссийской научной конференции «Мобилизационная модель экономики: исто- рический опыт России XX века», организо- ванной Центром экономической истории Че- лябинского государственного университета и Научным советом РАН по проблемам Рос- сийской и мировой экономической истории, состоялся круглый стол, объединивший ин- тересы известных историков и экономистов вокруг заданной темы: «Мобилизационное развитие и его компоненты».
Drafts by Vyacheslav Nekrasov
The thesis was prepared for the International conference “Technological Innovation and the Spread... more The thesis was prepared for the International conference “Technological Innovation and the Spread of Globalization in the Cold War”, which will take place at University of Vienna on October 11-13, 2018; with the financial support by the Russian Science Foundation, project № 17-18-01728, The “Socialist World System” and the Global Economy in the mid 1950s - mid 1970s: the Evolution of Theories and Practices of Soviet Economic and Technological Leadership.
Modern History of Russia, 2017
XIII Апрельская международная научная конференция по проблемам развития экономики и общества [Текст] : в 4 кн. / отв. ред. Е. Г. Ясин ; Нац. исслед. ун-т «Высшая школа экономики». — М. : Изд. дом Высшей школы экономики, 2012, 2012
В фокусе внимания исследования находится проблема формирования и функционирования организованных ... more В фокусе внимания исследования находится проблема формирования и функционирования организованных групп интересов - отраслевых и региональных лобби. В российской и зарубежной историографии признается существование в советской экономике групп организованных агентов. Однако, проблема формирования и функционирования групп интересов в советской экономике остается малоисследованной темой в российской историографии. Имплицитно данная проблема рассматривалась в ряде исследований по политической и социально-экономической истории Сибири второй половины ХХ в. Однако, в историографии вопрос формирования групп интересов, практиках ими лоббирования индустриальных проектов объясняется в рамках простых (линейных) аналитических схем и «моделей» - «региональная/отраслевая инициатива (проект) - результат», «государственная директива - результат». Так, в новейших исследованиях, посвященных экономической истории Сибири утверждается, что «Конец 1950-х – начало 1960-х гг. – стали временем активных поисков концептуальных оснований социально-экономического развития Сибири. В связи с этим на первый план снова выдвигается идея рационального размещения производительных сил на основе создания преимущественно индустриальных производств. Теперь, … эта идея…, активно разрабатывается, вносится в государственные планы и решения, в которых предполагается учитывать интересы территории во вторую очередь после интересов страны».
Фактически в исследованиях остаются без внимания и игнорируются множество методологических вопросов – «как формировались группы интересов?», «каковы были формы организации участников групп интересов?», «каковы были механизмы принятия альтернативных решений», «каким образом осуществлялся выбор стратегии агентами», «какую роль играли информационные издержки и проблемы мотивации поведения агентов в принятии экономических решений?», «какую роль играла длительность истории индустриального проекта при принятии решении о его реализации» и т.п. С точки зрения аналитического нарратива, выбранный нами объект исследования – формирования организованных групп агентов в советской экономике второй половине 1950-х - первой половине 1960-х гг. предоставляет репрезентативный эмпирический материал для разработки и апробации аналитических моделей, поскольку насыщен межведомственными и межгрупповыми конфликтами при разработке и реализации множества индустриальных проектов, появлением новых стратегических игроков, стремлением высшей политической власти изменить модели экономического поведения стратегических игроков, повысить качество информационного обеспечения процесса планирования и оперативного управления экономикой.
Определение Госплана СССР в качестве отправной точки анализа связано с рядом обстоятельств. Во-первых, в советской экономической системе Госплан СССР был одним из ключевых органов государственной власти, отвечавший за подготовку государственных народнохозяйственных планов, координировавший деятельность различных ведомств, контролирующий и отстаивающий «общегосударственные интересы» в борьбе с «ведомственным эгоизмом» и местничеством.
Во-вторых, Госплан СССР - государственный институт, наделенный полномочиями по утверждению проектов, включению их в «титульные списки» народнохозяйственного плана, что создавало правовую базу для выделения финансовых и материальных лимитов и начала работы над проектами. Госплан СССР выступал координатором проектов, которые носили межведомственный характер, и мог устанавливать приоритеты при реализации проекта, если он того пожелает. Для включения проекта в титульные списки плана министерствам и ведомствам было необходимо предоставить в Госплан СССР технико-экономическое обоснование проекта и схематический план проекта. Данная техническая документация должна была пройти экспертизу в соответствующих отделах и Совете технико-экономической экспертизы Госплана СССР. Индустриальные проекты, успешно проходившие экспертизу и признававшиеся экономически оправданными, включались в титульные списки планов [Gregory, 1990. P. 30-38]. Тем самым, Госплан СССР являлся объектом лоббирования со стороны различных групп агентов, образовавших «коалиции поддержки» своих проектов.
В-третьих, лоббирование индустриальных проектов в советской экономике во второй половине 1950-х – первой половине 1960-х гг. осуществлялось, как правило, не отдельными министерствами или ведомствами, а группами интересов, образующими «коалиции поддержки», которые выступали как агенты, способными оказывать давление на «политико-бюрократические центры власти».
Стратегии агентов анализируются на примере реализации крупного индустриального проекта во второй половине 1950-х – первой половине 1960-х гг. - строительство Нижне-Обской ГЭС и освоение нефтегазовых ресурсов на Севере Западной Сибири. На основе анализа архивных документов выдвигается гипотеза, что институциональным решением проблемы агентских отношений в советской экономике второй половины 1950-х - первой половины 1960-х гг. при разработке и реализации крупных индустриальных проектов выступили неформальные «коалиции поддержки» - институт многосторонних неформальных соглашений, позволяющий разрешать межведомственные конфликты. Возможность реализации того или иного индустриального проекта зависела от способности агентов, формировать «коалиции поддержки».
Вестник Сургутского государственного педагогического университета , 2018
In the article on the basis of the new documents of the Russian State Archive of Econom- ics and ... more In the article on the basis of the new documents of the Russian State Archive of Econom- ics and the Russian State Archive of Modern History the history of the project of exporting natural gas in Western Siberia and Sakhalin is being studied in the context of the develop- ment of the Soviet oil and gas complex in the first half of the 1960s. Special attention is paid to the dilemmas in the development of oil and gas policy in the early 1960s, the position policy of the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N.S. Khrushchev regarding the economic value of oil and gas resources, the impact of the Cold War, the actions of interest groups and the causes of the project of ex- porting liquefied gas, rental potential and technical and economic dimensions of the project.
Вестник Томского государственного университета. , 2011
Examines the participation of Khrushchev as head of party and government in the development and i... more Examines the participation of Khrushchev as head of party and government in the development and implementation of programs and projects of development of fuel and energy complex. The focus is on the relationship of the formation of a new energy policy in the USSR with Khrushchev's struggle for political power, his initiatives to reform management of the economy, ideas about achieving Communist goals of the Soviet society.
The article analyzes one of the major reform activities undertaken by the Soviet leader Nikita S.... more The article analyzes one of the major reform activities undertaken by the Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev in 1955–1964. This activity aimed at form- ing a new governance body for economic management has not yet been fully studied in Russian and foreign historiography. The author of the article used numerous documents of the CPSU Central Committee and the Gosplan of the USSR which were previously classi ed and became available to researchers in the early 2000s. Having analyzed the documents in the light of institutional theory, the author assumes that it was essential for the authoritarian reformer Khrushchev to create a new governance body to reform the system of plan- ning and, more importantly, “to invent” a new model of economic development. This new model was designed to ensure the USSR’s victory in the economic competition with the leading capitalist countries. The State Scienti c-Economic Council (Goseconomsovet) of the Council of Ministers of the USSR initiated by Nikita Khrushchev in 1959 became such body, at rst, a consultative one, under the Council of Ministers of the USSR and, consequently, in 1960–1962, reporting directly to Khrushchev, it became the centre of economic reforms. Its key feature was the participation of the leading Soviet academic economists and its close cooperation with the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. However, the activity of the Goseconomsovet led to a competition with the Gosplan of the USSR, which re ected controversy going on among the leaders of the party- state bureaucracy as to how the Soviet economy should be managed. With the Goseconomsovet disbanded by Khrushchev in 1962, it became clear that his economic reforms were doomed to failure.
Modern History of Russia, 2017
The article comprises papers presented at the roundtable “Soviet globalism: theory and practice o... more The article comprises papers presented at the roundtable “Soviet globalism: theory and practice of the world socialist system from the 1950s to the 1970s” conducted at the Institute of World History of the Russian Academy of Sciences on May 19, 2017 within the frames of a new research project on the history of the “world system of socialism”. It unites new approaches to the discipline (Mikhail Lipkin, Viacheslav Nekrasov), historiogra- phy and terminology studies (Samuel Volfson, Artem Ulunyan) and new archival evidence from unilateral, bilateral and multilateral perspectives (Teimur Dzhalilov, Anna Gladysheva, Nikita Pivovarov, Irina Aggeeva, Alessandro Salacone, Eugeny Osipov). Following the new recently declassi ed sources from the Russian, West and East European archives and using global history tools, it opens a serious discussion on the role of economic strategy in competition between socialist and capitalist systems and searches for an answer to the question of why China won while the USSR lost after a several waves of inner reforms and a nal shift towards economic détente with the West in the middle of 1970s.
The Soviet Economic Model: Institutions, Oil and Gas Resources and the Challenge of “Resource Cur... more The Soviet Economic Model: Institutions, Oil and Gas Resources and the Challenge of “Resource Curse”
V. Nekrasov
Surgut State Pedagogical University Russian Federation, Surgut
Abstract
Our study is based on new evidences, including those which are not known to the present time in scientific circulation and little-known sources from Khrushchev and Brezhnev funds, the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the State Planning Committee of the USSR, the State Scientific and Economic Council of the USSR and the State Committee for Science and Technology of the USSR, and also the NATO Archive, allowing to analyze the political and economic institutions that formed the policy of using oil and gas resources in the Soviet economy in the so-called the period of the formation of the system of allocation “oil and gas rents” (the second half of the 1950s — the first half of the 1970s). In the second half of the 1950s — the first half of the 1970s soviet leaders, thanks to geological discoveries, received a large “prize”, huge reserves of oil and natural gas in the Volga region, the North of Western Siberia and Central Asia, which they could use to achieve their strategic goals. Soviet leaders could choose three possible strategies — to limit the extraction of oil and gas resources by internal consumption (“gasification”), to recycle resources and export petrochemical materials (the “petrochemical project”), to increase the extraction and export of oil and gas resources (“oil and gas maneuver”). This article challenges mainstream of modern historiography about the single of the strategy of soviet leaders in the use of oil and gas resources in the 1960s — 1970s. In the choice of strategy, a significant role was played by interest groups — planners and ministers, their preferences about the economic value of oil and gas resources for the modernization of the Soviet economy. As oil and gas rents grew, interest groups began to fight (“rag war”) for its allocation. In the case of the «petrochemical project» strategy in 1957—1964, for the ministers, the benefits of redistributing resources to the chemical industry were not too obvious, and the strategy of exporting hydrocarbon resources was more preferable, which eventually led to the abandonment of the petrochemical project and accelerated the formation of a “resource curse” in the Soviet economy, as gradually the priorities shifted from processing to exporting a crude oil. In the case of the “oil and gas maneuver” strategy for planners and ministers, the benefits of redistributing resources to the oil and gas complex were evident; they received an opportunity to purchase abroad equipment and materials in return. However, the implementation of the “oil and gas maneuver” strategy in 1972—1975 led to the rapid development of the “resource curse” in the Soviet economy and the planners saw no alternative to oil and gas rents as a source for the purchase of raw materials and technologies.
Keywords: USSR, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Gosplan, the oil and gas complex, resources rent, pipelines, decision-making
Nekrasov V. The Soviet Economic Model: Institutions, Oil and Gas Resources and the Challenge of “Resource Curse” // Istoriya. 2016. Issue 10 (54) [Electronic resource]. Access for registered users. URL: http://history.jes.su/s207987840001894-2-1 (circulation date: 20.10.2017). DOI: 10.18254/S0001894-2-1
Гуманитарные науки в Сибири. 2012. № 4. С. 66-70 https://elibrary.ru/item.asp?id=18753636 The pap... more Гуманитарные науки в Сибири. 2012. № 4. С. 66-70 https://elibrary.ru/item.asp?id=18753636
The paper focuses on the issues related to the changing status of the Gosplan's Chairman in the top political leadership; factors that determined his political influence; problems of his loyalty to the leader of the country; level of professionalism of the heads of planning bodies; institutional characteristics of the heads of Gosplan and “images of planners”. The author comes to conclusion that during N.S.Khrushchev's reign the State Planning Committee of the USSR lost its political influence and was entirely submitted to the Party machinery.
Cold War Energy. A Transnational History of Soviet Oil and Gas / Editor J. Perovic. L.: Palgrave... more Cold War Energy. A Transnational History of Soviet Oil and Gas / Editor J. Perovic. L.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.
https://www.palgrave.com/de/book/9783319495316
This chapter examines the Soviet Union’s energy policy during the
Khrushchev period from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, and seeks to explain why the Soviet leaders’ quest for an effective strategy for achieving these goals largely failed. The analysis focuses mainly on Khrushchev’s “petrochemical project,” a complex endeavor involving various institutional and economic measures that aimed to leverage the country’s hydrocarbon resources and chemical materials for the modernization of the economy, and thus to raise the population’s standard of living and progress toward a “bright communist future.” Based on a large amount of both published and unpublished material, this chapter investigates the evolution of Soviet energy policy during the Khrushchev years. It seeks to explain Khrushchev’s specific choices of priorities within the area of energy policy, and asks why his policies faced obstacles and were ultimately not implemented the way he envisioned. This chapter argues that a key factor in understanding Soviet energy policy-making was the institutional setup of the Soviet economy. Far from being able to dictate policy, Khrushchev had to deal with influential interest and lobby groups representing different sectors of the economy, some of which were opposed to certain aspects of Khrushchev’s “petrochemical project.” Especially the State Planning Committee of the Soviet Union (Gosplan), where the various sectoral and regional economic interests were represented and coordinated, was unwilling—or proved at times simply incapable—to carry out the plans accordingly. Given the significance of the institutional setup, an important goal of this chapter is to analyze the complex mechanisms of economic policy decision-making, especially in the sphere of energy policy, and to provide insights into the various “mentalities” that prevailed among the top political leadership and the Soviet bureaucracy regarding economic strategy. This chapter examines the structure of key interest groups and their influence on policy-making, as well as the nature of in-fighting among these groups over allocation of rents to the different branches of the economy. This chapter also looks into the issue of oil and gas production and exports, and elucidates the diverse positions within the Soviet political and economic elite on this topic.
The article is devoted to the history of the Khrushchev`s petrochemical project in the secondhalf... more The article is devoted to the history of the Khrushchev`s petrochemical project in the secondhalf of 1950 — the first half of 1960. The study is based on archival documents from the Russian State Archiveof Contemporary History, Russian State Archives of Economics, Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History. This article discusses the question of whether the strategic choice N. S. Khrushchev «voluntarist» or dictated bypurely ideological motives or wore an objective character that is associated with a realistic understanding of theproblems of the Soviet economy? The Khrushchev`s petrochemical project treated as a set of measures for theuse of hydrocarbon resources and chemical materials for the modernization of the economy, welfareimprovement and achievement of communist objectives. The Soviet leader was represented by the developmentof chemical and petroleum industry as a personal program of technological and institutional modernization of the Soviet economy. Reformer sought to find the limits of centralization and decentralization of Soviet economicmanagement, «reconstructing» traditional and «grow» new institutions of economic power, including “non-system”, but are able to solve specific practical problems of development.
В монографии на основе обширного круга источников из российских архивов рассматривается проблема... more В монографии на основе обширного круга источников из российских архивов рассматривается проблема экономической и технологической модернизации СССР в период Н.С. Хрущева и внешних вызовов советской системы. Особый акцент делается на анализ государственных через призму внутренних институтов и бюрократической системы в СССР.
Работа выполнена при финансовой поддержке Российского
научного фонда, грант № 17-18-01728 "Мировая система социализма» и глобальная экономика в середине 1950-х -
середине 1970-х годов: эволюция теории и практики экономического и технологического лидерства".
The monograph studies the economic and institutional factors in the development of the oil and ga... more The monograph studies the economic and institutional factors in the development of the oil and gas complex of the USSR in the second half of the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s. The study is based on archival documents and materials of archives of the Russian Federation. The monograph analyzes the issues of strategic development and reforming of the oil and gas complex that have been little-researched in historiography in 1957-1965. It considers the process of formation of branch and regional groups of interests in the Soviet economy, special attention is paid to the socio-political characteristics of the regional elite of Siberia, its influence on the adoption of economic decisions of the industrial development of the regions of Siberia. In the context of interaction between interest groups, the initial stage of development of the West Siberian oil and gas province (1956-1965) is considered. Using the example of individual industrial projects in the Tyumen and Tomsk regions, the mechanisms of interaction between interests in the mineral-raw complex of the Soviet economy.
24 ноября 2012 г. в Челябинске в рамках II-й Всероссийской научной конференции «Мобилизационная м... more 24 ноября 2012 г. в Челябинске в рамках II-й Всероссийской научной конференции «Мобилизационная модель экономики: исто- рический опыт России XX века», организо- ванной Центром экономической истории Че- лябинского государственного университета и Научным советом РАН по проблемам Рос- сийской и мировой экономической истории, состоялся круглый стол, объединивший ин- тересы известных историков и экономистов вокруг заданной темы: «Мобилизационное развитие и его компоненты».
The thesis was prepared for the International conference “Technological Innovation and the Spread... more The thesis was prepared for the International conference “Technological Innovation and the Spread of Globalization in the Cold War”, which will take place at University of Vienna on October 11-13, 2018; with the financial support by the Russian Science Foundation, project № 17-18-01728, The “Socialist World System” and the Global Economy in the mid 1950s - mid 1970s: the Evolution of Theories and Practices of Soviet Economic and Technological Leadership.