Niklas Möller - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Papers by Niklas Möller
The thesis aims at analyzing the concepts of risk and safety as well as the class of concepts to ... more The thesis aims at analyzing the concepts of risk and safety as well as the class of concepts to which they belong, thick concepts, focusing in particular on the normative aspects involved. Essay I analyzes thick concepts, i.e. concepts such as cruelty and kindness that seem to combine descriptive and evaluative features. The traditional account, in which thick concepts are analyzed as the conjunction of a factual description and an evaluation, is criticized. Instead, it is argued that the descriptive and evaluative aspects must be understood as a whole. Furthermore, it is argued that the two main worries evoked against non-naturalism – that non-naturalism cannot account for disagreement and that it is not genuinely explanatory – can be met. Essay II investigates the utilization of the Kripke/Putnam causal theory of reference in relation to the Open Question Argument. It is argued that the Open Question Argument suitably interpreted provides prima facie evidence against the claim th...
The thesis aims at analyzing the concepts of risk and safety as well as the class of concepts to ... more The thesis aims at analyzing the concepts of risk and safety as well as the class of concepts to which they belong, thick concepts, focusing in particular on the normative aspects involved. Essay I analyzes thick concepts, i.e. concepts such as cruelty and kindness that seem to combine descriptive and evaluative features. The traditional account, in which thick concepts are analyzed as the conjunction of a factual description and an evaluation, is criticized. Instead, it is argued that the descriptive and evaluative aspects must be understood as a whole. Furthermore, it is argued that the two main worries evoked against non-naturalismthat non-naturalism cannot account for disagreement and that it is not genuinely explanatory-can be met. Essay II investigates the utilization of the Kripke/Putnam causal theory of reference in relation to the Open Question Argument. It is argued that the Open Question Argument suitably interpreted provides prima facie evidence against the claim that moral kinds are natural kinds, and that the causal theory, as interpreted by leading naturalist defenders, actually underscores this conclusion. Essay III utilizes the interpretation of the Open Question Argument argued for in the previous essay in order to argue against naturalistic reduction of risk, i.e. reduction of risk into natural concepts such as probability and harm. Three different normative aspects of risk and safety are put forward-epistemic uncertainty, distributive normativity and border normativity-and it is argued that these normative aspects cannot be reduced to a natural measure. Essay IV provides a conceptual analysis of safety in the context of societal decisionmaking, and argues for a notion that explicitly includes epistemic uncertainty, the degree to which we are uncertain of our knowledge of the situation at hand. Some formal versions of a comparative safety concept are also proposed. Essay V puts forward a normative critique against a common argument, viz. the claim that the public should follow the experts' advice in recommending an activity whenever the experts have the best knowledge of the risk involved. The importance of safety in risk acceptance together with considerations from epistemic uncertainty makes the claim incorrect even after including plausible limitations to exclude 'external' considerations. Furthermore, it is shown that the scope of the objection covers risk assessment as well as risk management. Essay VI provides a systematized account of safety engineering practices that clarifies their relation to the goal of safety engineering, namely to increase safety. A list of 24 principles referred to in the literature of safety engineering is provided, divided into four major categories. It is argued that important aspects of these methods can be better understood with the help of the distinction between risk and uncertainty, in addition to the common distinction between risk and probability.
The thesis aims at analyzing the concepts of risk and safety as well as the class of concepts to ... more The thesis aims at analyzing the concepts of risk and safety as well as the class of concepts to which they belong, thick concepts, focusing in particular on the normative aspects involved. Essay I analyzes thick concepts, i.e. concepts such as cruelty and kindness that seem to combine descriptive and evaluative features. The traditional account, in which thick concepts are analyzed as the conjunction of a factual description and an evaluation, is criticized. Instead, it is argued that the descriptive and evaluative aspects must be understood as a whole. Furthermore, it is argued that the two main worries evoked against non-naturalism – that non-naturalism cannot account for disagreement and that it is not genuinely explanatory – can be met. Essay II investigates the utilization of the Kripke/Putnam causal theory of reference in relation to the Open Question Argument. It is argued that the Open Question Argument suitably interpreted provides prima facie evidence against the claim that moral kinds are natural kinds, and that the causal theory, as interpreted by leading naturalist defenders, actually underscores this conclusion. Essay III utilizes the interpretation of the Open Question Argument argued for in the previous essay in order to argue against naturalistic reduction of risk, i.e. reduction of risk into natural concepts such as probability and harm. Three different normative aspects of risk and safety are put forward – epistemic uncertainty, distributive normativity and border normativity – and it is argued that these normative aspects cannot be reduced to a natural measure. Essay IV provides a conceptual analysis of safety in the context of societal decision-making, and argues for a notion that explicitly includes epistemic uncertainty, the degree to which we are uncertain of our knowledge of the situation at hand. Some formal versions of a comparative safety concept are also proposed. Essay V puts forward a normative critique against a common argument, viz. the claim that the public should follow the experts’ advice in recommending an activity whenever the experts have the best knowledge of the risk involved. The importance of safety in risk acceptance together with considerations from epistemic uncertainty makes the claim incorrect even after including plausible limitations to exclude ‘external’ considerations. Furthermore, it is shown that the scope of the objection covers risk assessment as well as risk management. Essay VI provides a systematized account of safety engineering practices that clarifies their relation to the goal of safety engineering, namely to increase safety. A list of 24 principles referred to in the literature of safety engineering is provided, divided into four major categories. It is argued that important aspects of these methods can be better understood with the help of the distinction between risk and uncertainty, in addition to the common distinction between risk and probability.
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2014
Bart Streumer argues that it is not possible for us to believe the error theory, where by 'error ... more Bart Streumer argues that it is not possible for us to believe the error theory, where by 'error theory' he means the claim that our normative beliefs are committed to the existence of normative properties even though such properties do not exist. In this paper, we argue that it is indeed possible to believe the error theory. First, we suggest a critical improvement to Streumer's argument. As it stands, one crucial premise of that argument-that we cannot have a belief while believing that there is no reason to have it-is implausibly strong. We argue that for his purposes, Streumer's argument only requires a weaker premise, namely that we cannot rationally have a belief while believing that there is no reason to have it. Secondly, we go on to refute the improved argument. Even in its weaker form, Streumer's argument is either invalid or the crucial premise should be rejected.
Theoria, 2013
IN THE FACE of potentially severe hazard, we should act with precaution. This idea forms the base... more IN THE FACE of potentially severe hazard, we should act with precaution. This idea forms the base of what is commonly called the Precautionary Principle (PP), one of the most popular norms in the risk policy debate. Many scholars see PP as deeply problematic, however. There are many alternative formulations of the principle in the debate, and critics claim that it is either too unclear to give us any action-guidance, or lacks proper justification. In The Price of Precaution and the Ethics of Risk, Christian Munthe responds to this criticism by putting forward an ambitious defence of an ideal of precaution, which he aims to show is justified, sufficiently clear and practically useful. Munthe argues that such an ideal, which he calls the requirement of precaution, must tell us how much we should be prepared to sacrifice in terms of increased cost, present harms and new threats. Several alternative suggestions for how to justify such a price of precaution are discussed-and rejected-in favour of Munthe's explicitly moral theory about precaution. Our moral responsibility in relation to risk impositions, he ultimately argues, prescribes that we put a greater moral weight on potential harms than on benefits. Furthermore, those extra negative weights to harms should be proportional to their magnitudes as well as contextual in the sense that they should be relative to what other harms and benefits are at stake. Munthe argues that even if his requirement remains somewhat vague, it is still practically useful. Indeed, he ends the book with a chapter demonstrating the (often far-reaching) practical consequences of the theory, applying it to a number of actual cases-climate change, pollution, energy production and biotechnology-as well as addressing policy questions in a national context. Munthe's argumentation covers decision theory, ethics and practical applications. This ambitious strategy is motivated by Munthe's methodological commitment, which starts out from the presumption that much of the current criticism of the precautionary principle is the result of too much conceptual analysis and too little normative analysis. What is at stake in the debate "is not primarily what PP or the word 'precaution' means, but what requirements environmental and technological policy making should meet" (p. 20). The conceptual and justificatory work, Munthe concludes, must be done in tandem. Munthe takes this justificatory task seriously throughout, investigating several potential sources of justification before settling on his own alternative.
Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 2008
... Niklas Möller Corresponding Author Contact Information , a , E-mail The Corresponding Author ... more ... Niklas Möller Corresponding Author Contact Information , a , E-mail The Corresponding Author and Sven Ove Hansson a. ... Furthermore, there is a common denominator that we will focus on in the sections belowthe aim of reducing not only the risk but also the epistemic ...
Journal of Applied Philosophy, 2006
Even though much research has been devoted to studies of safety, the concept of safety i... more Even though much research has been devoted to studies of safety, the concept of safety is in itself under-theorised, especially concerning its relation to epistemic uncertainty. In this paper we propose a conceptual analysis of safety. The paper explores the distinction between absolute and relative safety, as well as that between objective and subjective safety. Four potential dimensions of safety are discussed, viz. harm, probability, epistemic uncertainty, and control. The first three of these are used in the proposed definition of safety, whereas it is argued that control should not be included in a reasonable definition of safety. It is shown that strictly speaking, an objective safety concept is not attainable. Instead, an intersubjective concept is proposed that brings us as close as possible to an objective concept.
Perspectives on Politics, 2019
The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology, 2019
Many political theorists in current debates have argued that pragmatist theories of mind and lang... more Many political theorists in current debates have argued that pragmatist theories of mind and language place certain constraints on our normative political theories. In a couple of papers, we have a ...
The Journal of Politics, 2022
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2021
Political realists’ rejection of the so-called ‘ethics first’ approach of political moralists (ma... more Political realists’ rejection of the so-called ‘ethics first’ approach of political moralists (mainstream liberals), has raised concerns about their own source of normativity. Some realists have responded to such concerns by theorizing a distinctively political normativity. According to this view, politics is seen as an autonomous, independent domain with its own evaluative standards. Therefore, it is in this source, rather than in some moral values ‘outside’ of this domain, that normative justification should be sought when theorizing justice, democracy, political legitimacy, and the like. For realists the question about a distinctively political normativity is important, because they take the fact that politics is a distinct affair to have severe consequences for both how to approach the subject matter as such and for which principles and values can be justified. Still, realists have had a hard time clarifying what this distinctively political normativity consists of and why, more...
Perspectives on Politics, 2019
Perspectives on Politics, 2019
The Journal of Politics, 2018
A common denominator of recent proposals suggested by political realists has been a rather pessim... more A common denominator of recent proposals suggested by political realists has been a rather pessimistic view of what we may rightfully demand of political authorities in terms of legitimacy. In our analysis, three main justificatory strategies are utilized by realists, each supposedly generating normative premises for this “low bar conclusion.” These strategies make use of the concept of politics, the constitutive features of politics, and feasibility constraints, respectively. In this article, we make three claims: first, that the two justificatory strategies of utilizing the concept of politics and the constitutive features of politics fail, since they rely on implausible normative premises; second, that while the feasibility strategy relies on reasonable premises, the low bar conclusion does not follow from them; third, that relativist premises fit better with the low bar conclusion, but that this also makes the realist position less attractive and casts doubt on several of its basic assumptions.
Social Theory and Practice, 2016
In recent years, philosophers influenced by Peirce's pragmatism have contributed to the democ... more In recent years, philosophers influenced by Peirce's pragmatism have contributed to the democracy debate by offering not simply a justification of democracy that relies on epistemic as well as mora ...
Res Publica, 2019
Although the discussion about feasibility in political theory is still in its infancy, some impor... more Although the discussion about feasibility in political theory is still in its infancy, some important progress has been made in the last years to advance our understanding. In this paper, we intend to make a contribution to this growing literature by investigating the proper place of feasibility considerations in political theory. A motivating force behind this study is a suspicion that many presumptions made about feasibility in several current debates-such as that between practice-independence and practice-dependence, ideal and non-ideal theory, and political moralism and political realism-are too rigid and underestimate the numerous different ways in which feasibility concerns may enter into our theorizing. To chisel out this feasibility space, our aim is to suggest two metatheoretical constraints on normative political principles as intuitively plausible, the so-called 'fitness constraint' and the 'functional constraint', through which we elucidate five central aspects for determining proper feasibility constraints of an account in political theory.
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 2017
Abstract In his most recent work, Sangiovanni has retreated from his stronger claims about practi... more Abstract In his most recent work, Sangiovanni has retreated from his stronger claims about practice-dependence. Instead of claiming that principles of justice must be practice-dependent, he now expresses his claim in a modal form, arguing that there are several ways in which practices may matter. While merely mapping out the logical space of possibilities seems to look like a modest ambition, the conditions for when practices do matter according to Sangiovanni’s analysis are easily met in actuality. Consequently, if he is right, the practice-dependent approach covers a significant number of political theories. Sangiovanni’s main claim is that higher-level principles with an open texture, which include most higher-level principles in political philosophy, justify a practice-dependent method in the form of a mode of application called ‘mediated deduction,’ according to which a thoroughgoing investigation is made of the nature of the target practice. Our task in this paper is to reject this claim. This is done in two steps. First, we question Sangiovanni’s distinction between instrumental application and mediated deduction, arguing that it remains unclear whether it marks out two sufficiently distinct ‘modes’ to do any theoretical work. Second, we argue that the practice-dependent method is not required even if two such modes are established.
Journal of Global Ethics, 2017
ABSTRACT A shared presumption among practice-dependent theorists is that a principle of justice i... more ABSTRACT A shared presumption among practice-dependent theorists is that a principle of justice is dependent on the function or aim of the practice to which it is supposed to be applied. In recent contributions to this debate, the condition of epistemic uncertainty plays a significant role for motivating and justifying a practice-dependent view. This paper analyses the role of epistemic uncertainty in justifying a practice-dependent approach. We see two kinds of epistemic uncertainty allegedly playing this justificatory role. What we call ‘normative epistemic uncertainty’ emerges from dealing with the problem of value uncertainty in justifying applied principles when our higher-level principles are open-textured, that is, when their content is too vague or unclear to generate determinate prescriptions. What we call ‘descriptive epistemic uncertainty’ emerges from dealing with uncertainty about empirical facts, such as the problem of moral assurance, that is, the problem that the requirements of justice cannot go beyond arrangements that we can know with reasonable confidence that we can jointly establish and maintain. In both cases, practice-dependent theorists conclude that the condition of epistemic uncertainty justifies a practice-dependent approach, which puts certain restrictions on theorizing regulative principles and has wide-ranging practical implications for the scope of justice. Our claim in this paper is that neither kind of epistemic uncertainty justifies a practice-dependent approach.
The thesis aims at analyzing the concepts of risk and safety as well as the class of concepts to ... more The thesis aims at analyzing the concepts of risk and safety as well as the class of concepts to which they belong, thick concepts, focusing in particular on the normative aspects involved. Essay I analyzes thick concepts, i.e. concepts such as cruelty and kindness that seem to combine descriptive and evaluative features. The traditional account, in which thick concepts are analyzed as the conjunction of a factual description and an evaluation, is criticized. Instead, it is argued that the descriptive and evaluative aspects must be understood as a whole. Furthermore, it is argued that the two main worries evoked against non-naturalism – that non-naturalism cannot account for disagreement and that it is not genuinely explanatory – can be met. Essay II investigates the utilization of the Kripke/Putnam causal theory of reference in relation to the Open Question Argument. It is argued that the Open Question Argument suitably interpreted provides prima facie evidence against the claim th...
The thesis aims at analyzing the concepts of risk and safety as well as the class of concepts to ... more The thesis aims at analyzing the concepts of risk and safety as well as the class of concepts to which they belong, thick concepts, focusing in particular on the normative aspects involved. Essay I analyzes thick concepts, i.e. concepts such as cruelty and kindness that seem to combine descriptive and evaluative features. The traditional account, in which thick concepts are analyzed as the conjunction of a factual description and an evaluation, is criticized. Instead, it is argued that the descriptive and evaluative aspects must be understood as a whole. Furthermore, it is argued that the two main worries evoked against non-naturalismthat non-naturalism cannot account for disagreement and that it is not genuinely explanatory-can be met. Essay II investigates the utilization of the Kripke/Putnam causal theory of reference in relation to the Open Question Argument. It is argued that the Open Question Argument suitably interpreted provides prima facie evidence against the claim that moral kinds are natural kinds, and that the causal theory, as interpreted by leading naturalist defenders, actually underscores this conclusion. Essay III utilizes the interpretation of the Open Question Argument argued for in the previous essay in order to argue against naturalistic reduction of risk, i.e. reduction of risk into natural concepts such as probability and harm. Three different normative aspects of risk and safety are put forward-epistemic uncertainty, distributive normativity and border normativity-and it is argued that these normative aspects cannot be reduced to a natural measure. Essay IV provides a conceptual analysis of safety in the context of societal decisionmaking, and argues for a notion that explicitly includes epistemic uncertainty, the degree to which we are uncertain of our knowledge of the situation at hand. Some formal versions of a comparative safety concept are also proposed. Essay V puts forward a normative critique against a common argument, viz. the claim that the public should follow the experts' advice in recommending an activity whenever the experts have the best knowledge of the risk involved. The importance of safety in risk acceptance together with considerations from epistemic uncertainty makes the claim incorrect even after including plausible limitations to exclude 'external' considerations. Furthermore, it is shown that the scope of the objection covers risk assessment as well as risk management. Essay VI provides a systematized account of safety engineering practices that clarifies their relation to the goal of safety engineering, namely to increase safety. A list of 24 principles referred to in the literature of safety engineering is provided, divided into four major categories. It is argued that important aspects of these methods can be better understood with the help of the distinction between risk and uncertainty, in addition to the common distinction between risk and probability.
The thesis aims at analyzing the concepts of risk and safety as well as the class of concepts to ... more The thesis aims at analyzing the concepts of risk and safety as well as the class of concepts to which they belong, thick concepts, focusing in particular on the normative aspects involved. Essay I analyzes thick concepts, i.e. concepts such as cruelty and kindness that seem to combine descriptive and evaluative features. The traditional account, in which thick concepts are analyzed as the conjunction of a factual description and an evaluation, is criticized. Instead, it is argued that the descriptive and evaluative aspects must be understood as a whole. Furthermore, it is argued that the two main worries evoked against non-naturalism – that non-naturalism cannot account for disagreement and that it is not genuinely explanatory – can be met. Essay II investigates the utilization of the Kripke/Putnam causal theory of reference in relation to the Open Question Argument. It is argued that the Open Question Argument suitably interpreted provides prima facie evidence against the claim that moral kinds are natural kinds, and that the causal theory, as interpreted by leading naturalist defenders, actually underscores this conclusion. Essay III utilizes the interpretation of the Open Question Argument argued for in the previous essay in order to argue against naturalistic reduction of risk, i.e. reduction of risk into natural concepts such as probability and harm. Three different normative aspects of risk and safety are put forward – epistemic uncertainty, distributive normativity and border normativity – and it is argued that these normative aspects cannot be reduced to a natural measure. Essay IV provides a conceptual analysis of safety in the context of societal decision-making, and argues for a notion that explicitly includes epistemic uncertainty, the degree to which we are uncertain of our knowledge of the situation at hand. Some formal versions of a comparative safety concept are also proposed. Essay V puts forward a normative critique against a common argument, viz. the claim that the public should follow the experts’ advice in recommending an activity whenever the experts have the best knowledge of the risk involved. The importance of safety in risk acceptance together with considerations from epistemic uncertainty makes the claim incorrect even after including plausible limitations to exclude ‘external’ considerations. Furthermore, it is shown that the scope of the objection covers risk assessment as well as risk management. Essay VI provides a systematized account of safety engineering practices that clarifies their relation to the goal of safety engineering, namely to increase safety. A list of 24 principles referred to in the literature of safety engineering is provided, divided into four major categories. It is argued that important aspects of these methods can be better understood with the help of the distinction between risk and uncertainty, in addition to the common distinction between risk and probability.
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2014
Bart Streumer argues that it is not possible for us to believe the error theory, where by 'error ... more Bart Streumer argues that it is not possible for us to believe the error theory, where by 'error theory' he means the claim that our normative beliefs are committed to the existence of normative properties even though such properties do not exist. In this paper, we argue that it is indeed possible to believe the error theory. First, we suggest a critical improvement to Streumer's argument. As it stands, one crucial premise of that argument-that we cannot have a belief while believing that there is no reason to have it-is implausibly strong. We argue that for his purposes, Streumer's argument only requires a weaker premise, namely that we cannot rationally have a belief while believing that there is no reason to have it. Secondly, we go on to refute the improved argument. Even in its weaker form, Streumer's argument is either invalid or the crucial premise should be rejected.
Theoria, 2013
IN THE FACE of potentially severe hazard, we should act with precaution. This idea forms the base... more IN THE FACE of potentially severe hazard, we should act with precaution. This idea forms the base of what is commonly called the Precautionary Principle (PP), one of the most popular norms in the risk policy debate. Many scholars see PP as deeply problematic, however. There are many alternative formulations of the principle in the debate, and critics claim that it is either too unclear to give us any action-guidance, or lacks proper justification. In The Price of Precaution and the Ethics of Risk, Christian Munthe responds to this criticism by putting forward an ambitious defence of an ideal of precaution, which he aims to show is justified, sufficiently clear and practically useful. Munthe argues that such an ideal, which he calls the requirement of precaution, must tell us how much we should be prepared to sacrifice in terms of increased cost, present harms and new threats. Several alternative suggestions for how to justify such a price of precaution are discussed-and rejected-in favour of Munthe's explicitly moral theory about precaution. Our moral responsibility in relation to risk impositions, he ultimately argues, prescribes that we put a greater moral weight on potential harms than on benefits. Furthermore, those extra negative weights to harms should be proportional to their magnitudes as well as contextual in the sense that they should be relative to what other harms and benefits are at stake. Munthe argues that even if his requirement remains somewhat vague, it is still practically useful. Indeed, he ends the book with a chapter demonstrating the (often far-reaching) practical consequences of the theory, applying it to a number of actual cases-climate change, pollution, energy production and biotechnology-as well as addressing policy questions in a national context. Munthe's argumentation covers decision theory, ethics and practical applications. This ambitious strategy is motivated by Munthe's methodological commitment, which starts out from the presumption that much of the current criticism of the precautionary principle is the result of too much conceptual analysis and too little normative analysis. What is at stake in the debate "is not primarily what PP or the word 'precaution' means, but what requirements environmental and technological policy making should meet" (p. 20). The conceptual and justificatory work, Munthe concludes, must be done in tandem. Munthe takes this justificatory task seriously throughout, investigating several potential sources of justification before settling on his own alternative.
Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 2008
... Niklas Möller Corresponding Author Contact Information , a , E-mail The Corresponding Author ... more ... Niklas Möller Corresponding Author Contact Information , a , E-mail The Corresponding Author and Sven Ove Hansson a. ... Furthermore, there is a common denominator that we will focus on in the sections belowthe aim of reducing not only the risk but also the epistemic ...
Journal of Applied Philosophy, 2006
Even though much research has been devoted to studies of safety, the concept of safety i... more Even though much research has been devoted to studies of safety, the concept of safety is in itself under-theorised, especially concerning its relation to epistemic uncertainty. In this paper we propose a conceptual analysis of safety. The paper explores the distinction between absolute and relative safety, as well as that between objective and subjective safety. Four potential dimensions of safety are discussed, viz. harm, probability, epistemic uncertainty, and control. The first three of these are used in the proposed definition of safety, whereas it is argued that control should not be included in a reasonable definition of safety. It is shown that strictly speaking, an objective safety concept is not attainable. Instead, an intersubjective concept is proposed that brings us as close as possible to an objective concept.
Perspectives on Politics, 2019
The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology, 2019
Many political theorists in current debates have argued that pragmatist theories of mind and lang... more Many political theorists in current debates have argued that pragmatist theories of mind and language place certain constraints on our normative political theories. In a couple of papers, we have a ...
The Journal of Politics, 2022
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2021
Political realists’ rejection of the so-called ‘ethics first’ approach of political moralists (ma... more Political realists’ rejection of the so-called ‘ethics first’ approach of political moralists (mainstream liberals), has raised concerns about their own source of normativity. Some realists have responded to such concerns by theorizing a distinctively political normativity. According to this view, politics is seen as an autonomous, independent domain with its own evaluative standards. Therefore, it is in this source, rather than in some moral values ‘outside’ of this domain, that normative justification should be sought when theorizing justice, democracy, political legitimacy, and the like. For realists the question about a distinctively political normativity is important, because they take the fact that politics is a distinct affair to have severe consequences for both how to approach the subject matter as such and for which principles and values can be justified. Still, realists have had a hard time clarifying what this distinctively political normativity consists of and why, more...
Perspectives on Politics, 2019
Perspectives on Politics, 2019
The Journal of Politics, 2018
A common denominator of recent proposals suggested by political realists has been a rather pessim... more A common denominator of recent proposals suggested by political realists has been a rather pessimistic view of what we may rightfully demand of political authorities in terms of legitimacy. In our analysis, three main justificatory strategies are utilized by realists, each supposedly generating normative premises for this “low bar conclusion.” These strategies make use of the concept of politics, the constitutive features of politics, and feasibility constraints, respectively. In this article, we make three claims: first, that the two justificatory strategies of utilizing the concept of politics and the constitutive features of politics fail, since they rely on implausible normative premises; second, that while the feasibility strategy relies on reasonable premises, the low bar conclusion does not follow from them; third, that relativist premises fit better with the low bar conclusion, but that this also makes the realist position less attractive and casts doubt on several of its basic assumptions.
Social Theory and Practice, 2016
In recent years, philosophers influenced by Peirce's pragmatism have contributed to the democ... more In recent years, philosophers influenced by Peirce's pragmatism have contributed to the democracy debate by offering not simply a justification of democracy that relies on epistemic as well as mora ...
Res Publica, 2019
Although the discussion about feasibility in political theory is still in its infancy, some impor... more Although the discussion about feasibility in political theory is still in its infancy, some important progress has been made in the last years to advance our understanding. In this paper, we intend to make a contribution to this growing literature by investigating the proper place of feasibility considerations in political theory. A motivating force behind this study is a suspicion that many presumptions made about feasibility in several current debates-such as that between practice-independence and practice-dependence, ideal and non-ideal theory, and political moralism and political realism-are too rigid and underestimate the numerous different ways in which feasibility concerns may enter into our theorizing. To chisel out this feasibility space, our aim is to suggest two metatheoretical constraints on normative political principles as intuitively plausible, the so-called 'fitness constraint' and the 'functional constraint', through which we elucidate five central aspects for determining proper feasibility constraints of an account in political theory.
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 2017
Abstract In his most recent work, Sangiovanni has retreated from his stronger claims about practi... more Abstract In his most recent work, Sangiovanni has retreated from his stronger claims about practice-dependence. Instead of claiming that principles of justice must be practice-dependent, he now expresses his claim in a modal form, arguing that there are several ways in which practices may matter. While merely mapping out the logical space of possibilities seems to look like a modest ambition, the conditions for when practices do matter according to Sangiovanni’s analysis are easily met in actuality. Consequently, if he is right, the practice-dependent approach covers a significant number of political theories. Sangiovanni’s main claim is that higher-level principles with an open texture, which include most higher-level principles in political philosophy, justify a practice-dependent method in the form of a mode of application called ‘mediated deduction,’ according to which a thoroughgoing investigation is made of the nature of the target practice. Our task in this paper is to reject this claim. This is done in two steps. First, we question Sangiovanni’s distinction between instrumental application and mediated deduction, arguing that it remains unclear whether it marks out two sufficiently distinct ‘modes’ to do any theoretical work. Second, we argue that the practice-dependent method is not required even if two such modes are established.
Journal of Global Ethics, 2017
ABSTRACT A shared presumption among practice-dependent theorists is that a principle of justice i... more ABSTRACT A shared presumption among practice-dependent theorists is that a principle of justice is dependent on the function or aim of the practice to which it is supposed to be applied. In recent contributions to this debate, the condition of epistemic uncertainty plays a significant role for motivating and justifying a practice-dependent view. This paper analyses the role of epistemic uncertainty in justifying a practice-dependent approach. We see two kinds of epistemic uncertainty allegedly playing this justificatory role. What we call ‘normative epistemic uncertainty’ emerges from dealing with the problem of value uncertainty in justifying applied principles when our higher-level principles are open-textured, that is, when their content is too vague or unclear to generate determinate prescriptions. What we call ‘descriptive epistemic uncertainty’ emerges from dealing with uncertainty about empirical facts, such as the problem of moral assurance, that is, the problem that the requirements of justice cannot go beyond arrangements that we can know with reasonable confidence that we can jointly establish and maintain. In both cases, practice-dependent theorists conclude that the condition of epistemic uncertainty justifies a practice-dependent approach, which puts certain restrictions on theorizing regulative principles and has wide-ranging practical implications for the scope of justice. Our claim in this paper is that neither kind of epistemic uncertainty justifies a practice-dependent approach.