Nikolai Sokov - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Papers by Nikolai Sokov

Contributions to political science, Dec 31, 2022

Routledge eBooks, Oct 9, 2018

Cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States with respect to nuclear non-proliferat... more Cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States with respect to nuclear non-proliferation or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was rooted in a shared interest in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, occasional disagreements notwithstanding. It was also characterised by an appreciation of the motives and concerns behind one another's approaches, and a willingness to compromise in pursuit of objectives that were seen as serving both countries' nationalsecurity interests. One of these objectives was to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system. The system of safeguards, which is intended to prevent the diversion of 'source or special fissionable material' for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear-explosive devices, is a vital element of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Principal safeguards obligations by states parties to the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT) are contained in Article III of the treaty, which also designates the IAEA as the body responsible for the implementation of that system. The requirement to accept safeguards applies only to non-nuclear-weapons states (NNWS) parties to

PonarsEuarasia - Policy Memos, Jul 23, 2012

Two major issues impacting Russia’s policy in the newly independent states (NIS) and U.S.Russia r... more Two major issues impacting Russia’s policy in the newly independent states (NIS) and U.S.Russia relations are the presence of U.S. and/or NATO troops in the territories of the NIS, and what might be defined as “new pragmatism” in Russian policy, especially with respect to the relationship between the economic and political components of Russian relations with the NIS. At least one of these issues has surfaced in three crucial regions in the NIS: Central Asia now houses U.S. troops (the insertion of U.S. troops into the NIS has long been one of Russia’s most feared scenarios); the Baltic states are likely to be invited to join NATO in the 2002 Prague summit; and Georgia will probably be the first to experience the burden of the “new pragmatism” of Putin’s foreign policy on the area.

PonarsEuarasia - Policy Memos, Jul 23, 2012

The recent announcement by vice-premier Yuri Masliukov that Russia would produce 30-40 Topol-M (S... more The recent announcement by vice-premier Yuri Masliukov that Russia would produce 30-40 Topol-M (SS-27) single-warhead ICBMs annually put the finishing touches on Russia's defense policy under the conditions of economic crisis. This statement would have come as a surprise to anyone who expected that nuclear weapons production would be scaled down or even discontinued after August 1998. This seemingly paradoxical policy begs for an explanation.

The Nonproliferation Review, Jun 1, 2002

PonarsEuarasia - Policy Memos, Nov 19, 2019

The role of nuclear weapons in Russia’s national security policy moved to the center of attention... more The role of nuclear weapons in Russia’s national security policy moved to the center of attention last year following the new U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, which contained recommendations based, in part, on the assumption that Russia had reduced its nuclear threshold under an “escalate to de-escalate“ strategy. Many contested the U.S. claim and pointed out that the Russian doctrine did not contain those terms or that strategy, and that its nuclear weapons would only be assigned to situations when the “very existence” of the country was at stake. This certainly does not conform to the image of a lowered threshold.

PonarsEuarasia - Policy Memos, Jul 23, 2012

Still, the passing of the ABM Treaty ushers in an era of uncertainty because the parameters of th... more Still, the passing of the ABM Treaty ushers in an era of uncertainty because the parameters of the future U.S.-Russian political-military relationship is not entirely clear. The main risk is no longer a direct confrontation between the two powers, but a crisis generated by misperception, misunderstanding, or even provocation that might upset the emerging atmosphere of partnership. The next several years appear particularly delicate and require careful handling. New opportunities have generated excessive optimism, including plans to quickly and even hastily, do away with such traditional elements of the relationship as nuclear deterrence and existing arms control treaties. Prudence dictates a considerably more cautious attitude toward these traditional elements, or old problems may return with a vengeance.

PonarsEuarasia - Policy Memos, Jul 23, 2012

As NATO contemplates the second wave of enlargement, many wonder what the Russian response might ... more As NATO contemplates the second wave of enlargement, many wonder what the Russian response might be. The experience of 1996-98 might suggest an optimistic scenario: the first wave was met with harsh words and threats, but the actual response was mild. Russia signed the Founding Act, largely on Western terms, and has entered a cooperative relationship with NATO. For Russia, historical memory reaches back further, and offers other precedents with less promising scenarios. The emergence of the Entente Cordiale, the Russo-French-British alliance against Germany in the late 19th century, is one such precedent. Patterns of behavior change slowly, rendering a century-old experience contemporary validity.

The Nonproliferation Review, Mar 1, 1997

longing to the air force) and 600 warheads on 240 aircraft, which belong to the navy. Additionall... more longing to the air force) and 600 warheads on 240 aircraft, which belong to the navy. Additionally, 1,000 nuclear warheads are assigned to other sealaunched systems, but they should have been withdrawn in accordance with the 1991 initiatives and, as The Bulletin notes, Russian officials say that the initiatives are being followed. Indeed, in September 1996, a representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry officially announced that Russia did continue to implement the 1991 obligations and intended to complete implementation by the year 2000.

PonarsEuarasia - Policy Memos, Jul 23, 2012

PonarsEuarasia - Policy Memos, Jul 23, 2012

Negotiations on a new strategic arms control treaty, proposed by Russian President Vladimir Putin... more Negotiations on a new strategic arms control treaty, proposed by Russian President Vladimir Putin in July 2006, are likely to be a challenging but fascinating exercise. The new treaty, which for convenience we may dub START+, is supposed to replace the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), set to expire in December 2009. If successful, these negotiations could provide a stable long-term framework for the U.S.Russian strategic nuclear relationship.

PonarsEuarasia - Policy Memos, Jul 23, 2012

Washington Quarterly, Sep 1, 1997

The Nonproliferation Review, Jun 27, 2013

As the United States and Russia contemplate the next stage of nuclear arms reductions beyond the ... more As the United States and Russia contemplate the next stage of nuclear arms reductions beyond the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, another issue enters the agenda—that of the impact of possible deep reductions on the shape of the global nuclear balance. As the gap between the US/Russian arsenals and the arsenals of “second-tier” nuclear weapon states narrows, the familiar shape of the global balance, which remains, to a large extent, bipolar, is likely to change. The article explores the Russian approach to the relationship between further US-Russian reductions and the prospect of “nuclear multipolarity,” and assesses the relative weight of this issue in Russian arms control policy as well as the views on the two specific regional balances—the one in Europe (including UK and French nuclear weapons) and in Asia (the possible dynamic of the Russian-Chinese nuclear balance).

Bulletin of the atomic scientists, Jul 1, 1997

The Nonproliferation Review, Sep 2, 2017

From any piece written by Lewis Dunn, one expects sophisticated, in-depth analytical work that is... more From any piece written by Lewis Dunn, one expects sophisticated, in-depth analytical work that is grounded in sound theory and facts and offers equally sound practical recommendations. His new article outlines a truly strategic, sweeping, long-range plan to redraw the vision of nuclear disarmament. The plan is intended to bridge the increasingly wide gap between two approaches. One foresees the elimination of nuclear weapons in one big move while the other emphasizes a gradual, step-by-step process, which, the proponents of the former fear, will take too long or not succeed at all. With the recently concluded TPNW, that gap has reached dangerous proportions. Each of the two approaches has its strengths and weaknesses. The proposal by Dunn is intended to identify a practical solution, which builds on more than fifty years of arms-control experience and seeks to incorporate the stronger elements of the two approaches. It is designed to bring the world as close as possible to "true" nuclear disarmament (i.e., complete elimination of nuclear weapons) without completely redesigning the international system. An urgent fix for Article VI Dunn's proposal about "strategic elimination" is motivated by concern over the likely consequences of the split between the nuclear "haves" and "have-nots," which has reached its apex with the 2017 completion of the TPNW. The so-called "ban treaty" de facto replaces Article VI of the NPT, which contains a commitment to nuclear disarmament. By doing so, the new treaty could undermine the entire NPT and, with it, most or all of the network of arms-control, confidence-building, transparency, and similar regimes. Nuclear-weapon states, in turn, could lose motivation to uphold Article VI and abandon the goal of nuclear disarmament in practice, if not in words.

The Nonproliferation Review, Jul 1, 2007

Contributions to political science, Dec 31, 2022

Routledge eBooks, Oct 9, 2018

Cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States with respect to nuclear non-proliferat... more Cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States with respect to nuclear non-proliferation or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was rooted in a shared interest in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, occasional disagreements notwithstanding. It was also characterised by an appreciation of the motives and concerns behind one another's approaches, and a willingness to compromise in pursuit of objectives that were seen as serving both countries' nationalsecurity interests. One of these objectives was to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system. The system of safeguards, which is intended to prevent the diversion of 'source or special fissionable material' for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear-explosive devices, is a vital element of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Principal safeguards obligations by states parties to the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT) are contained in Article III of the treaty, which also designates the IAEA as the body responsible for the implementation of that system. The requirement to accept safeguards applies only to non-nuclear-weapons states (NNWS) parties to

PonarsEuarasia - Policy Memos, Jul 23, 2012

Two major issues impacting Russia’s policy in the newly independent states (NIS) and U.S.Russia r... more Two major issues impacting Russia’s policy in the newly independent states (NIS) and U.S.Russia relations are the presence of U.S. and/or NATO troops in the territories of the NIS, and what might be defined as “new pragmatism” in Russian policy, especially with respect to the relationship between the economic and political components of Russian relations with the NIS. At least one of these issues has surfaced in three crucial regions in the NIS: Central Asia now houses U.S. troops (the insertion of U.S. troops into the NIS has long been one of Russia’s most feared scenarios); the Baltic states are likely to be invited to join NATO in the 2002 Prague summit; and Georgia will probably be the first to experience the burden of the “new pragmatism” of Putin’s foreign policy on the area.

PonarsEuarasia - Policy Memos, Jul 23, 2012

The recent announcement by vice-premier Yuri Masliukov that Russia would produce 30-40 Topol-M (S... more The recent announcement by vice-premier Yuri Masliukov that Russia would produce 30-40 Topol-M (SS-27) single-warhead ICBMs annually put the finishing touches on Russia's defense policy under the conditions of economic crisis. This statement would have come as a surprise to anyone who expected that nuclear weapons production would be scaled down or even discontinued after August 1998. This seemingly paradoxical policy begs for an explanation.

The Nonproliferation Review, Jun 1, 2002

PonarsEuarasia - Policy Memos, Nov 19, 2019

The role of nuclear weapons in Russia’s national security policy moved to the center of attention... more The role of nuclear weapons in Russia’s national security policy moved to the center of attention last year following the new U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, which contained recommendations based, in part, on the assumption that Russia had reduced its nuclear threshold under an “escalate to de-escalate“ strategy. Many contested the U.S. claim and pointed out that the Russian doctrine did not contain those terms or that strategy, and that its nuclear weapons would only be assigned to situations when the “very existence” of the country was at stake. This certainly does not conform to the image of a lowered threshold.

PonarsEuarasia - Policy Memos, Jul 23, 2012

Still, the passing of the ABM Treaty ushers in an era of uncertainty because the parameters of th... more Still, the passing of the ABM Treaty ushers in an era of uncertainty because the parameters of the future U.S.-Russian political-military relationship is not entirely clear. The main risk is no longer a direct confrontation between the two powers, but a crisis generated by misperception, misunderstanding, or even provocation that might upset the emerging atmosphere of partnership. The next several years appear particularly delicate and require careful handling. New opportunities have generated excessive optimism, including plans to quickly and even hastily, do away with such traditional elements of the relationship as nuclear deterrence and existing arms control treaties. Prudence dictates a considerably more cautious attitude toward these traditional elements, or old problems may return with a vengeance.

PonarsEuarasia - Policy Memos, Jul 23, 2012

As NATO contemplates the second wave of enlargement, many wonder what the Russian response might ... more As NATO contemplates the second wave of enlargement, many wonder what the Russian response might be. The experience of 1996-98 might suggest an optimistic scenario: the first wave was met with harsh words and threats, but the actual response was mild. Russia signed the Founding Act, largely on Western terms, and has entered a cooperative relationship with NATO. For Russia, historical memory reaches back further, and offers other precedents with less promising scenarios. The emergence of the Entente Cordiale, the Russo-French-British alliance against Germany in the late 19th century, is one such precedent. Patterns of behavior change slowly, rendering a century-old experience contemporary validity.

The Nonproliferation Review, Mar 1, 1997

longing to the air force) and 600 warheads on 240 aircraft, which belong to the navy. Additionall... more longing to the air force) and 600 warheads on 240 aircraft, which belong to the navy. Additionally, 1,000 nuclear warheads are assigned to other sealaunched systems, but they should have been withdrawn in accordance with the 1991 initiatives and, as The Bulletin notes, Russian officials say that the initiatives are being followed. Indeed, in September 1996, a representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry officially announced that Russia did continue to implement the 1991 obligations and intended to complete implementation by the year 2000.

PonarsEuarasia - Policy Memos, Jul 23, 2012

PonarsEuarasia - Policy Memos, Jul 23, 2012

Negotiations on a new strategic arms control treaty, proposed by Russian President Vladimir Putin... more Negotiations on a new strategic arms control treaty, proposed by Russian President Vladimir Putin in July 2006, are likely to be a challenging but fascinating exercise. The new treaty, which for convenience we may dub START+, is supposed to replace the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), set to expire in December 2009. If successful, these negotiations could provide a stable long-term framework for the U.S.Russian strategic nuclear relationship.

PonarsEuarasia - Policy Memos, Jul 23, 2012

Washington Quarterly, Sep 1, 1997

The Nonproliferation Review, Jun 27, 2013

As the United States and Russia contemplate the next stage of nuclear arms reductions beyond the ... more As the United States and Russia contemplate the next stage of nuclear arms reductions beyond the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, another issue enters the agenda—that of the impact of possible deep reductions on the shape of the global nuclear balance. As the gap between the US/Russian arsenals and the arsenals of “second-tier” nuclear weapon states narrows, the familiar shape of the global balance, which remains, to a large extent, bipolar, is likely to change. The article explores the Russian approach to the relationship between further US-Russian reductions and the prospect of “nuclear multipolarity,” and assesses the relative weight of this issue in Russian arms control policy as well as the views on the two specific regional balances—the one in Europe (including UK and French nuclear weapons) and in Asia (the possible dynamic of the Russian-Chinese nuclear balance).

Bulletin of the atomic scientists, Jul 1, 1997

The Nonproliferation Review, Sep 2, 2017

From any piece written by Lewis Dunn, one expects sophisticated, in-depth analytical work that is... more From any piece written by Lewis Dunn, one expects sophisticated, in-depth analytical work that is grounded in sound theory and facts and offers equally sound practical recommendations. His new article outlines a truly strategic, sweeping, long-range plan to redraw the vision of nuclear disarmament. The plan is intended to bridge the increasingly wide gap between two approaches. One foresees the elimination of nuclear weapons in one big move while the other emphasizes a gradual, step-by-step process, which, the proponents of the former fear, will take too long or not succeed at all. With the recently concluded TPNW, that gap has reached dangerous proportions. Each of the two approaches has its strengths and weaknesses. The proposal by Dunn is intended to identify a practical solution, which builds on more than fifty years of arms-control experience and seeks to incorporate the stronger elements of the two approaches. It is designed to bring the world as close as possible to "true" nuclear disarmament (i.e., complete elimination of nuclear weapons) without completely redesigning the international system. An urgent fix for Article VI Dunn's proposal about "strategic elimination" is motivated by concern over the likely consequences of the split between the nuclear "haves" and "have-nots," which has reached its apex with the 2017 completion of the TPNW. The so-called "ban treaty" de facto replaces Article VI of the NPT, which contains a commitment to nuclear disarmament. By doing so, the new treaty could undermine the entire NPT and, with it, most or all of the network of arms-control, confidence-building, transparency, and similar regimes. Nuclear-weapon states, in turn, could lose motivation to uphold Article VI and abandon the goal of nuclear disarmament in practice, if not in words.

The Nonproliferation Review, Jul 1, 2007