Nivedita Gangopadhyay - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Papers by Nivedita Gangopadhyay

Efficient prospective motor control, evident in human activity from birth, reveals an adaptive in... more Efficient prospective motor control, evident in human activity from birth, reveals an adaptive intentionality of a primary, pre-reflective, and pre-conceptual nature that we identify here as sensorimotor intentionality. We identify a structural continuity between the emergence of this earliest form of prospective movement and the structure of mental states as intentional or content-directed in more advanced forms. We base our proposal on motor control studies, from foetal observations through infancy. These studies reveal movements are guided by anticipations of future effects, even from before birth. This implies that these movements, even if they are simple and discrete, are the actions of an intentional agent. We develop this notion to present a theory of the developing organisation of a core feature of cognition as embodied agent action, from early single actions with proximal prospectivity to the complex serial ordering of actions into projects to reach distal goals. We claim t...

SATS Northern European Journal of Philosophy, 2021

Our linguistic communication often takes the form of creating texts. In this paper, we propose th... more Our linguistic communication often takes the form of creating texts. In this paper, we propose that creating texts or "texting" is a form of joint action. We examine the nature and evolution of this joint action. We argue that creating texts ushers in a special type of joint action, which while lacking some central features of normal, everyday joint actions such as spatio-temporal collocation of agency and embodiment, nonetheless results in an authentic, strong and unique type of joint action agency. This special type of agency is already present in creating texts in general and is further augmented in creating texts through digital media. We propose that such a unique type of joint action agency has a transformative effect on the experience of our sense of agency and subjectivity. We conclude with the implications of the proposal for social cognition and social agency. The paper combines research in philosophy of mind with the emerging fields of digital humanities and text technology.

In this paper we address the epistemological debate between emerging perceptual accounts (PA) of ... more In this paper we address the epistemological debate between emerging perceptual accounts (PA) of knowing other minds and traditional theory of mind (ToM) approaches to the problem of other minds. We argue that the current formulations of the debate are conceptually misleading and empirically unfounded. Rather, the real contribution of PA is to point out a certain 'immediacy' that characterizes episodes of mindreading. We claim that while the intuition of immediacy should be preserved for explaining the nature and function of some cognitive processes of mindreading, the notion of immediacy should apply for describing a particular epistemic attitude and not a particular type of epistemic access. We draw on Wittgenstein's discussions of one's relation to other minds to elaborate our claims and to move the epistemological discussions beyond stalling debates between ToM and PA.

Since the publication of Premack and Woodruff’s classic paper introducing the notion of a ‘theory... more Since the publication of Premack and Woodruff’s classic paper introducing the notion of a ‘theory of mind’ (ToM) (Premack & Woodruff 1978), interdisciplinary research in social cognition has witnessed the development of theory-theory, simulation theory, hybrid approaches, and most recently interactionist and perceptual accounts of other minds. The challenges that these various approaches present for each other and for research in social cognition range from adequately defining central concepts to designing experimental paradigms for testing empirical hypotheses. But is there any approach that promises to dominate future interdisciplinary research in social cognition? Is social cognition witnessing a gradual paradigm shift where hitherto grounding notions such as theory of mind are no longer viewed as explanatorily necessary? Or have we simply lost our way in attempting to devise adequate experimental setups that could sway the debate in favour of one of the contending accounts? This special issue addresses these questions in an attempt to discover what the future holds for interdisciplinary research in social cognition.

In opposition to mainstream theory of mind approaches, some contemporary perceptual accounts of s... more In opposition to mainstream theory of mind approaches, some contemporary perceptual accounts of social cognition do not consider the central question of social cognition to be the problem of access to other minds. These perceptual accounts draw heavily on phenomenological philosophy and propose that others' mental states are “directly” given in the perception of the others' expressive behavior. Furthermore, these accounts contend that phenomenological insights into the nature of social perception lead to the dissolution of the access problem. We argue, on the contrary, that the access problem is a genuine problem that must be addressed by any account of social cognition, perceptual or non-perceptual, because we cannot cast the access problem as a false problem without violating certain fundamental intuitions about other minds. We elaborate the fundamental intuitions as three constraints on any theory of social perception: the Immediacy constraint; the Transcendence constraint; and the Accessibility constraint. We conclude with an outline of an account of perceiving other minds that meets the three constraints.

This special issue targets two topics in social cognition that appear to increasingly structure t... more This special issue targets two topics in social cognition that appear to increasingly structure the nature of interdisciplinary discourse but are themselves not very well understood. These are the notions of empathy and embodiment. Both have a history rooted in phenomenological philosophy and both have found extensive application in contemporary interdisciplinary theories of social cognition, at times to establish claims that are arguably contrary to the ones made by the phenomenologists credited with giving us these notions. But this special issue is not about defending any philosophical tradition or theoretical stance against all others. It is about understanding some central aspects of the nature of our experience of other people.

Efficient prospective motor control, evident in human activity from birth, reveals an adaptive in... more Efficient prospective motor control, evident in human activity from birth, reveals an adaptive intentionality of a primary, pre-reflective, and pre-conceptual nature that we identify here as sensorimotor intentionality. We identify a structural continuity between the emergence of this earliest form of prospective movement and the structure of mental states as intentional or content-directed in more advanced forms. We base our proposal on motor control studies, from foetal observations through infancy. These studies reveal movements are guided by anticipations of future effects, even from before birth. This implies that these movements, even if they are simple and discrete, are the actions of an intentional agent. We develop this notion to present a theory of the developing organisation of a core feature of cognition as embodied agent action, from early single actions with proximal prospectivity to the complex serial ordering of actions into projects to reach distal goals. We claim the prospective structural continuity from early and simple actions to later complex projects of serially-ordered actions confirms the existence of an ontogenetically primary form of content-directedness that is a driver for learning and development. Its implications for understanding autism are discussed.

Language is conceived as an intersubjective engagement enabling shared cognition.Experimental stu... more Language is conceived as an intersubjective engagement enabling shared cognition.Experimental studies highlight ways in which language enables intersubjective informational and behavioural synergies.We therefore argue for language as skilful joint activity leading to dialogically extended minds.A growing conceptual and empirical literature is advancing the idea that language extends our cognitive skills. One of the most influential positions holds that language – qua material symbols – facilitates individual thought processes by virtue of its material properties (Clark, 2006a). Extending upon this model, we argue that language enhances our cognitive capabilities in a much more radical way: the skilful engagement of public material symbols facilitates evolutionarily unprecedented modes of collective perception, action and reasoning (interpersonal synergies) creating dialogically extended minds. We relate our approach to other ideas about collective minds ( , and ) and review a number of empirical studies to identify the mechanisms enabling the constitution of interpersonal cognitive systems.

Social Neuroscience, 2011

Phenomenology and The Cognitive Sciences

The extended mind hypothesis (Clark and Chalmers in Analysis 58(1):7–19, 1998; Clark 2008) is an ... more The extended mind hypothesis (Clark and Chalmers in Analysis 58(1):7–19, 1998; Clark 2008) is an influential hypothesis in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. I argue that the extended mind hypothesis is born to be wild. It has undeniable and irrepressible tendencies of flouting grounding assumptions of the traditional information-processing paradigm. I present case-studies from social cognition which not only support the extended mind proposal but also bring out its inherent wildness. In particular, I focus on cases of action-understanding and discuss the role of embodied intentionality in the extended mind project. I discuss two theories of action-understanding for exploring the support for the extended mind hypothesis in embodied intersubjective interaction, namely, simulation theory and a non-simulationist perceptual account. I argue that, if the extended mind adopts a simulation theory of action-understanding, it rejects representationalism. If it adopts a non-simulationist perceptual account of action-understanding, it rejects the classical sandwich view of the mind.

Br J Philos Sci

s Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology and Neuroscience of Mindreading is a major contrib... more s Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology and Neuroscience of Mindreading is a major contribution from a philosopher to the interdisciplinary debate on how we attribute mental states to others and to ourselves. It covers an impressive range of topics in mindreading as discussed in philosophy of mind, developmental and social psychology, and cognitive neuroscience.

Consciousness in Interaction : The role of the natural and social context in shaping consciousness

Cognitive Systems Research, 2010

The sensorimotor theory (38 and 39) discusses a special instance of lack of perceptual experience... more The sensorimotor theory (38 and 39) discusses a special instance of lack of perceptual experience despite no sensory impairment. The phenomenon dubbed “experiential blindness” is cited as evidence for a constitutive relation between sensorimotor skills and perceptual experience. Recently it has been objected (3 and 4) that the cases described by Noë as experiential blindness are cases of pure sensory deficit. This paper argues that while the objections bring out limitations of Noë’s sensorimotor theory they do not do enough to challenge a robust perception–action interdependence claim. There are genuine cases of experiential blindness and these are better explained by the hypothesis of the interdependence of perception and action rather than by a passive vision approach. The cases provide support for a strong thesis of embodied cognition where ongoing sensorimotor dynamics non-trivially constrain perceptual content.

Topoi-an International Review of Philosophy, 2009

This paper contrasts two enactive theories of visual experience: the sensorimotor theory Noë, Beh... more This paper contrasts two enactive theories of visual experience: the sensorimotor theory Noë, Behav Brain Sci 24(5):939-1031, 2001; Noë and O'Regan, Vision and mind, 2002; Noë, Action in perception, 2004) and Susan Hurley's (Consciousness in action, 1998, Synthese 129:3-40, 2001) theory of active perception. We criticise the sensorimotor theory for its commitment to a distinction between mere sensorimotor behaviour and cognition. This is a distinction that is firmly rejected by Hurley. Hurley argues that personal level cognitive abilities emerge out of a complex dynamic feedback system at the subpersonal level. Moreover reflection on the role of eye movements in visual perception establishes a further sense in which a distinction between sensorimotor behaviour and cognition cannot be sustained. The sensorimotor theory has recently come under critical fire (see e.g. Block, J Philos CII(5):259-272, 2005; Prinz, Psyche, 12(1):1-19, 2006; Aizawa, J Philos CIV(1), 2007) for mistaking a merely causal contribution of action to perception for a constitutive contribution. We further argue that the sensorimotor theory is particularly vulnerable to this objection in a way that Hurley's active perception theory is not. This presents an additional reason for preferring Hurley's theory as providing a conceptual framework for the enactive programme.

Formal Ontology by Nivedita Gangopadhyay

Filosophia e Digitale, 2021

Knowledge is one of humanity's highest achievements. But the formal representation of cultural an... more Knowledge is one of humanity's highest achievements. But the formal representation of cultural and in particular philosophical knowledge still poses great difficulties to information science due to the inherently complex, contextual, indeterminate and contested nature of these disciplines'concepts and knowledge statements. Moreover, while we are seeing rapid technological development and the adoption of machine learning and semantic technologies in all sectors of society, philosophy has not yet risen to the challenge of properly relating to and adequately integrating them. This paper has two aims: First, it argues that we need a potent response to precisely this double challenge and to tackle it from a crossdisciplinary perspective involving philosophy, computational ontology, knowledge graphs, linguistics, lexicology, disagreement research and argumentation theory. Second, the paper also outlines a research agenda for finally opening up and making philosophy's multiperspectival knowledge contents available to the strongest models of formal knowledge representation: computational ontologies. Our aim is to achieve this, however, without compromising on the computational strengths of ontology nor imposing false stability and consistency on the knowledge base itself.

Efficient prospective motor control, evident in human activity from birth, reveals an adaptive in... more Efficient prospective motor control, evident in human activity from birth, reveals an adaptive intentionality of a primary, pre-reflective, and pre-conceptual nature that we identify here as sensorimotor intentionality. We identify a structural continuity between the emergence of this earliest form of prospective movement and the structure of mental states as intentional or content-directed in more advanced forms. We base our proposal on motor control studies, from foetal observations through infancy. These studies reveal movements are guided by anticipations of future effects, even from before birth. This implies that these movements, even if they are simple and discrete, are the actions of an intentional agent. We develop this notion to present a theory of the developing organisation of a core feature of cognition as embodied agent action, from early single actions with proximal prospectivity to the complex serial ordering of actions into projects to reach distal goals. We claim t...

SATS Northern European Journal of Philosophy, 2021

Our linguistic communication often takes the form of creating texts. In this paper, we propose th... more Our linguistic communication often takes the form of creating texts. In this paper, we propose that creating texts or "texting" is a form of joint action. We examine the nature and evolution of this joint action. We argue that creating texts ushers in a special type of joint action, which while lacking some central features of normal, everyday joint actions such as spatio-temporal collocation of agency and embodiment, nonetheless results in an authentic, strong and unique type of joint action agency. This special type of agency is already present in creating texts in general and is further augmented in creating texts through digital media. We propose that such a unique type of joint action agency has a transformative effect on the experience of our sense of agency and subjectivity. We conclude with the implications of the proposal for social cognition and social agency. The paper combines research in philosophy of mind with the emerging fields of digital humanities and text technology.

In this paper we address the epistemological debate between emerging perceptual accounts (PA) of ... more In this paper we address the epistemological debate between emerging perceptual accounts (PA) of knowing other minds and traditional theory of mind (ToM) approaches to the problem of other minds. We argue that the current formulations of the debate are conceptually misleading and empirically unfounded. Rather, the real contribution of PA is to point out a certain 'immediacy' that characterizes episodes of mindreading. We claim that while the intuition of immediacy should be preserved for explaining the nature and function of some cognitive processes of mindreading, the notion of immediacy should apply for describing a particular epistemic attitude and not a particular type of epistemic access. We draw on Wittgenstein's discussions of one's relation to other minds to elaborate our claims and to move the epistemological discussions beyond stalling debates between ToM and PA.

Since the publication of Premack and Woodruff’s classic paper introducing the notion of a ‘theory... more Since the publication of Premack and Woodruff’s classic paper introducing the notion of a ‘theory of mind’ (ToM) (Premack & Woodruff 1978), interdisciplinary research in social cognition has witnessed the development of theory-theory, simulation theory, hybrid approaches, and most recently interactionist and perceptual accounts of other minds. The challenges that these various approaches present for each other and for research in social cognition range from adequately defining central concepts to designing experimental paradigms for testing empirical hypotheses. But is there any approach that promises to dominate future interdisciplinary research in social cognition? Is social cognition witnessing a gradual paradigm shift where hitherto grounding notions such as theory of mind are no longer viewed as explanatorily necessary? Or have we simply lost our way in attempting to devise adequate experimental setups that could sway the debate in favour of one of the contending accounts? This special issue addresses these questions in an attempt to discover what the future holds for interdisciplinary research in social cognition.

In opposition to mainstream theory of mind approaches, some contemporary perceptual accounts of s... more In opposition to mainstream theory of mind approaches, some contemporary perceptual accounts of social cognition do not consider the central question of social cognition to be the problem of access to other minds. These perceptual accounts draw heavily on phenomenological philosophy and propose that others' mental states are “directly” given in the perception of the others' expressive behavior. Furthermore, these accounts contend that phenomenological insights into the nature of social perception lead to the dissolution of the access problem. We argue, on the contrary, that the access problem is a genuine problem that must be addressed by any account of social cognition, perceptual or non-perceptual, because we cannot cast the access problem as a false problem without violating certain fundamental intuitions about other minds. We elaborate the fundamental intuitions as three constraints on any theory of social perception: the Immediacy constraint; the Transcendence constraint; and the Accessibility constraint. We conclude with an outline of an account of perceiving other minds that meets the three constraints.

This special issue targets two topics in social cognition that appear to increasingly structure t... more This special issue targets two topics in social cognition that appear to increasingly structure the nature of interdisciplinary discourse but are themselves not very well understood. These are the notions of empathy and embodiment. Both have a history rooted in phenomenological philosophy and both have found extensive application in contemporary interdisciplinary theories of social cognition, at times to establish claims that are arguably contrary to the ones made by the phenomenologists credited with giving us these notions. But this special issue is not about defending any philosophical tradition or theoretical stance against all others. It is about understanding some central aspects of the nature of our experience of other people.

Efficient prospective motor control, evident in human activity from birth, reveals an adaptive in... more Efficient prospective motor control, evident in human activity from birth, reveals an adaptive intentionality of a primary, pre-reflective, and pre-conceptual nature that we identify here as sensorimotor intentionality. We identify a structural continuity between the emergence of this earliest form of prospective movement and the structure of mental states as intentional or content-directed in more advanced forms. We base our proposal on motor control studies, from foetal observations through infancy. These studies reveal movements are guided by anticipations of future effects, even from before birth. This implies that these movements, even if they are simple and discrete, are the actions of an intentional agent. We develop this notion to present a theory of the developing organisation of a core feature of cognition as embodied agent action, from early single actions with proximal prospectivity to the complex serial ordering of actions into projects to reach distal goals. We claim the prospective structural continuity from early and simple actions to later complex projects of serially-ordered actions confirms the existence of an ontogenetically primary form of content-directedness that is a driver for learning and development. Its implications for understanding autism are discussed.

Language is conceived as an intersubjective engagement enabling shared cognition.Experimental stu... more Language is conceived as an intersubjective engagement enabling shared cognition.Experimental studies highlight ways in which language enables intersubjective informational and behavioural synergies.We therefore argue for language as skilful joint activity leading to dialogically extended minds.A growing conceptual and empirical literature is advancing the idea that language extends our cognitive skills. One of the most influential positions holds that language – qua material symbols – facilitates individual thought processes by virtue of its material properties (Clark, 2006a). Extending upon this model, we argue that language enhances our cognitive capabilities in a much more radical way: the skilful engagement of public material symbols facilitates evolutionarily unprecedented modes of collective perception, action and reasoning (interpersonal synergies) creating dialogically extended minds. We relate our approach to other ideas about collective minds ( , and ) and review a number of empirical studies to identify the mechanisms enabling the constitution of interpersonal cognitive systems.

Social Neuroscience, 2011

Phenomenology and The Cognitive Sciences

The extended mind hypothesis (Clark and Chalmers in Analysis 58(1):7–19, 1998; Clark 2008) is an ... more The extended mind hypothesis (Clark and Chalmers in Analysis 58(1):7–19, 1998; Clark 2008) is an influential hypothesis in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. I argue that the extended mind hypothesis is born to be wild. It has undeniable and irrepressible tendencies of flouting grounding assumptions of the traditional information-processing paradigm. I present case-studies from social cognition which not only support the extended mind proposal but also bring out its inherent wildness. In particular, I focus on cases of action-understanding and discuss the role of embodied intentionality in the extended mind project. I discuss two theories of action-understanding for exploring the support for the extended mind hypothesis in embodied intersubjective interaction, namely, simulation theory and a non-simulationist perceptual account. I argue that, if the extended mind adopts a simulation theory of action-understanding, it rejects representationalism. If it adopts a non-simulationist perceptual account of action-understanding, it rejects the classical sandwich view of the mind.

Br J Philos Sci

s Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology and Neuroscience of Mindreading is a major contrib... more s Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology and Neuroscience of Mindreading is a major contribution from a philosopher to the interdisciplinary debate on how we attribute mental states to others and to ourselves. It covers an impressive range of topics in mindreading as discussed in philosophy of mind, developmental and social psychology, and cognitive neuroscience.

Consciousness in Interaction : The role of the natural and social context in shaping consciousness

Cognitive Systems Research, 2010

The sensorimotor theory (38 and 39) discusses a special instance of lack of perceptual experience... more The sensorimotor theory (38 and 39) discusses a special instance of lack of perceptual experience despite no sensory impairment. The phenomenon dubbed “experiential blindness” is cited as evidence for a constitutive relation between sensorimotor skills and perceptual experience. Recently it has been objected (3 and 4) that the cases described by Noë as experiential blindness are cases of pure sensory deficit. This paper argues that while the objections bring out limitations of Noë’s sensorimotor theory they do not do enough to challenge a robust perception–action interdependence claim. There are genuine cases of experiential blindness and these are better explained by the hypothesis of the interdependence of perception and action rather than by a passive vision approach. The cases provide support for a strong thesis of embodied cognition where ongoing sensorimotor dynamics non-trivially constrain perceptual content.

Topoi-an International Review of Philosophy, 2009

This paper contrasts two enactive theories of visual experience: the sensorimotor theory Noë, Beh... more This paper contrasts two enactive theories of visual experience: the sensorimotor theory Noë, Behav Brain Sci 24(5):939-1031, 2001; Noë and O'Regan, Vision and mind, 2002; Noë, Action in perception, 2004) and Susan Hurley's (Consciousness in action, 1998, Synthese 129:3-40, 2001) theory of active perception. We criticise the sensorimotor theory for its commitment to a distinction between mere sensorimotor behaviour and cognition. This is a distinction that is firmly rejected by Hurley. Hurley argues that personal level cognitive abilities emerge out of a complex dynamic feedback system at the subpersonal level. Moreover reflection on the role of eye movements in visual perception establishes a further sense in which a distinction between sensorimotor behaviour and cognition cannot be sustained. The sensorimotor theory has recently come under critical fire (see e.g. Block, J Philos CII(5):259-272, 2005; Prinz, Psyche, 12(1):1-19, 2006; Aizawa, J Philos CIV(1), 2007) for mistaking a merely causal contribution of action to perception for a constitutive contribution. We further argue that the sensorimotor theory is particularly vulnerable to this objection in a way that Hurley's active perception theory is not. This presents an additional reason for preferring Hurley's theory as providing a conceptual framework for the enactive programme.

Filosophia e Digitale, 2021

Knowledge is one of humanity's highest achievements. But the formal representation of cultural an... more Knowledge is one of humanity's highest achievements. But the formal representation of cultural and in particular philosophical knowledge still poses great difficulties to information science due to the inherently complex, contextual, indeterminate and contested nature of these disciplines'concepts and knowledge statements. Moreover, while we are seeing rapid technological development and the adoption of machine learning and semantic technologies in all sectors of society, philosophy has not yet risen to the challenge of properly relating to and adequately integrating them. This paper has two aims: First, it argues that we need a potent response to precisely this double challenge and to tackle it from a crossdisciplinary perspective involving philosophy, computational ontology, knowledge graphs, linguistics, lexicology, disagreement research and argumentation theory. Second, the paper also outlines a research agenda for finally opening up and making philosophy's multiperspectival knowledge contents available to the strongest models of formal knowledge representation: computational ontologies. Our aim is to achieve this, however, without compromising on the computational strengths of ontology nor imposing false stability and consistency on the knowledge base itself.