Nobufumi Nishimura - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Uploads

Papers by Nobufumi Nishimura

Research paper thumbnail of Equally Efficient Competitor and the Case of Deutsche Telekom: Economic Perspective

International Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Mar 18, 2015

We examine the implication of the assumption in two types of regulatory environments that a new e... more We examine the implication of the assumption in two types of regulatory environments that a new entrant is an equally efficient competitor, on which the price squeeze test is built. Under partial regulation the entrant exits a market because of the higher access rates set by the authority. If we consider this assumption under no regulation, the entrant exits the market by its own inefficiency, and not by the exclusionary strategies of the incumbent. Regardless of the regulatory environments, the incumbent is not responsible for the exit and the assumption is contradictory to the EC decision.

Research paper thumbnail of Vertical integration with fixed cost in an upstream market: NSK/Amatsuji merger

In this paper, we discuss the case of the integration between NSK and Amatsuji Steel Ball by usin... more In this paper, we discuss the case of the integration between NSK and Amatsuji Steel Ball by using the successive oligopoly model. We show that the integration does not lead to input foreclosure. However, it leads to customer foreclosure, if the fixed cost of a rival firm in the upstream market is high. Even in the case of customer foreclosure, since the integration reduces the final goods price, it is always beneficial for consumers.

Research paper thumbnail of Equally Efficient Competitor and the Case of Deutsche Telekom: Economic Perspective

International Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Mar 18, 2015

We examine the implication of the assumption in two types of regulatory environments that a new e... more We examine the implication of the assumption in two types of regulatory environments that a new entrant is an equally efficient competitor, on which the price squeeze test is built. Under partial regulation the entrant exits a market because of the higher access rates set by the authority. If we consider this assumption under no regulation, the entrant exits the market by its own inefficiency, and not by the exclusionary strategies of the incumbent. Regardless of the regulatory environments, the incumbent is not responsible for the exit and the assumption is contradictory to the EC decision.

Research paper thumbnail of Vertical integration with fixed cost in an upstream market: NSK/Amatsuji merger

In this paper, we discuss the case of the integration between NSK and Amatsuji Steel Ball by usin... more In this paper, we discuss the case of the integration between NSK and Amatsuji Steel Ball by using the successive oligopoly model. We show that the integration does not lead to input foreclosure. However, it leads to customer foreclosure, if the fixed cost of a rival firm in the upstream market is high. Even in the case of customer foreclosure, since the integration reduces the final goods price, it is always beneficial for consumers.

Log In