Yasa Nugraha - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
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Papers by Yasa Nugraha
Modelling the Law Enforcement Mechanism of Combating Money Laundering in Indonesia:A Game Theoretical Approach
This thesis is aimed to model the law enforcement mechanism of combating money laundering in Indo... more This thesis is aimed to model the law enforcement mechanism of combating money laundering in Indonesia by utilizing game theory. The mechanism is modelled in two-stage games. Stage 1 is modelled as a 2 player 2A�2 simultaneous inspection game and is played by two representative agents, namely Offender and PPATK. The analysis of stage 1 adopts the refinement of Tsebelis� Inspection Game (1989) made by Pradiptyo (2007), which then results the mixed strategy equilibrium. Next, stage 2 illustrates two scenarios of sequential game, which are played by Offender and Law Enforcer (Investigator, Prosecutor, and Judge are assumed as one player), i.e. Bribery Game (Stage 2a) and Extortion Game (Stage2b). The games in stage 2 are analyzed using backward induction method in order to find the sub-game perfect nash equilibrium. The result of analysis on stage 1 suggests that PPATK�s inspection strategy and benefits (BIP) become the Offender�s consideration to commit money laundering. Convers...
Jurnal Ekonomi Kuantitatif Terapan, 2013
Modelling the Law Enforcement Mechanism of Combating Money Laundering in Indonesia:A Game Theoretical Approach
This thesis is aimed to model the law enforcement mechanism of combating money laundering in Indo... more This thesis is aimed to model the law enforcement mechanism of combating money laundering in Indonesia by utilizing game theory. The mechanism is modelled in two-stage games. Stage 1 is modelled as a 2 player 2A�2 simultaneous inspection game and is played by two representative agents, namely Offender and PPATK. The analysis of stage 1 adopts the refinement of Tsebelis� Inspection Game (1989) made by Pradiptyo (2007), which then results the mixed strategy equilibrium. Next, stage 2 illustrates two scenarios of sequential game, which are played by Offender and Law Enforcer (Investigator, Prosecutor, and Judge are assumed as one player), i.e. Bribery Game (Stage 2a) and Extortion Game (Stage2b). The games in stage 2 are analyzed using backward induction method in order to find the sub-game perfect nash equilibrium. The result of analysis on stage 1 suggests that PPATK�s inspection strategy and benefits (BIP) become the Offender�s consideration to commit money laundering. Convers...
Jurnal Ekonomi Kuantitatif Terapan, 2013