Brian Okelly - Profile on Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Papers by Brian Okelly
Journal of International Money and Finance, 2012
Although the US credit crisis precipitated it, the Irish credit crisis is an identifiably separat... more Although the US credit crisis precipitated it, the Irish credit crisis is an identifiably separate one, which might have occurred in the absence of the U.S. crash. The distinctive differences between them are notable. Almost all the apparent causal factors of the U.S. crisis are missing in the Irish case; and the same applies vice-versa. At a deeper level, we identify four common features of the two credit crises: capital bonanzas, irrational exuberance, regulatory imprudence, and moral hazard. The particular manifestations of these four "deep" common features are quite different in the two cases.
O Kelly Brian Gerard the Valuation of Collateralised Debt Obligations Multi Period Modelling in a Risk Neutral Framework Phd Thesis Dublin City University, 2005
I wish to thank a number o f people who helped me as I prepared this document: I would especially... more I wish to thank a number o f people who helped me as I prepared this document: I would especially like to thank m y supervisor, Professor Liam Gallagher, for his wise counsel and good humour over the period. I would also like to thank Professor Emmanuel Buffet for his advice and direction in the early stages o f this project. M y friend and mentor, Professor Finbarr Bradley, was a constant source o f encouragement throughout this venture. Without his guidance, this thesis would never have been completed. M ile buiochas, Fionbarra-taim faoi chomaoin agat. I received much encouragement from my colleagues in AIB and benefited greatly from their insights. Two colleagues in particular, Edward Murray and Sean Cooke, were especially helpful. Without the benefit o f their knowledge and programming skills, I could not have completed this work. Edward and Sean, sincere thanks. My own family bore the brunt o f this project. A project such as this could not have been undertaken were it not for the good humour and love at home. To Brenda, Orla, Ronan and Aoife, thanks a million-I appreciate very much that you made this possible. Finally, the resolve to undertake a project such as this is borne out o f an environment which affirms and encourages. I have been privileged that m y late mother and my father provided such an environment.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
The Eurozone needs a bank resolution regime that can work across seventeen independent nations of... more The Eurozone needs a bank resolution regime that can work across seventeen independent nations of diverse sizes with varying levels of financial development, limited fiscal coresponsibility, and with systemic instability induced by quick and low-cost deposit transfers across borders. We advocate a Coasean approach to bank resolution policy in the Eurozone, which emphasises clear and consistent contracts and makes explicit the public ownership of the externality costs of bank distress. A variety of resolution mechanisms are compared including bank debt holder bail-in, prompt corrective action, and contingent convertible bonds. We argue that the "dilute-in" of bank debt holders via contingent convertibility provides a clearer and simpler Coasean bargain for the Eurozone than the more conventional alternatives of debt holder bail-in or prompt corrective action.
SSRN Electronic Journal
The Eurozone needs a bank resolution regime that can work across seventeen independent nations of... more The Eurozone needs a bank resolution regime that can work across seventeen independent nations of diverse sizes with varying levels of financial development, limited fiscal co-responsibility, and with systemic instability induced by quick and low-cost deposit transfers across borders. We advocate a Coasean approach to bank resolution policy in the Eurozone, which emphasises clear and consistent contracts and makes explicit the public ownership of the externality costs of bank distress. A variety of resolution mechanisms are compared including bank debt holder bail-in, prompt corrective action, and contingent convertible bonds. We argue that the “dilute-in” of bank debt holders via contingent convertibility provides a clearer and simpler Coasean bargain for the Eurozone than the more conventional alternatives of debt holder bail-in or prompt corrective action.
Sliding Doors Cost Measurement.A Restrictive Approach to Analyzing the Net Economic Cost of Policy Decisions and an Application to Irish Financial Regulation
This paper develops a restrictive procedure for evaluating economic policy decisions, by comparin... more This paper develops a restrictive procedure for evaluating economic policy decisions, by comparing actual economic history to a simulated history where a specific policy decision is replaced with a counterfactual, but credible, alternative. Our procedure is theoretically straightforward, but empirically problematic since it requires the identification of a feasible policy alternative and a model linking a specific policy choice to
Journal of International Money and Finance, 2012
Although the US credit crisis precipitated it, the Irish credit crisis is an identifiably separat... more Although the US credit crisis precipitated it, the Irish credit crisis is an identifiably separate one, which might have occurred in the absence of the U.S. crash. The distinctive differences between them are notable. Almost all the apparent causal factors of the U.S. crisis are missing in the Irish case; and the same applies vice-versa. At a deeper level, we identify four common features of the two credit crises: capital bonanzas, irrational exuberance, regulatory imprudence, and moral hazard. The particular manifestations of these four "deep" common features are quite different in the two cases.
Journal of International Money and Finance, 2012
Although the US credit crisis precipitated it, the Irish credit crisis is an identifiably separat... more Although the US credit crisis precipitated it, the Irish credit crisis is an identifiably separate one, which might have occurred in the absence of the U.S. crash. The distinctive differences between them are notable. Almost all the apparent causal factors of the U.S. crisis are missing in the Irish case; and the same applies vice-versa. At a deeper level, we identify four common features of the two credit crises: capital bonanzas, irrational exuberance, regulatory imprudence, and moral hazard. The particular manifestations of these four "deep" common features are quite different in the two cases.
O Kelly Brian Gerard the Valuation of Collateralised Debt Obligations Multi Period Modelling in a Risk Neutral Framework Phd Thesis Dublin City University, 2005
I wish to thank a number o f people who helped me as I prepared this document: I would especially... more I wish to thank a number o f people who helped me as I prepared this document: I would especially like to thank m y supervisor, Professor Liam Gallagher, for his wise counsel and good humour over the period. I would also like to thank Professor Emmanuel Buffet for his advice and direction in the early stages o f this project. M y friend and mentor, Professor Finbarr Bradley, was a constant source o f encouragement throughout this venture. Without his guidance, this thesis would never have been completed. M ile buiochas, Fionbarra-taim faoi chomaoin agat. I received much encouragement from my colleagues in AIB and benefited greatly from their insights. Two colleagues in particular, Edward Murray and Sean Cooke, were especially helpful. Without the benefit o f their knowledge and programming skills, I could not have completed this work. Edward and Sean, sincere thanks. My own family bore the brunt o f this project. A project such as this could not have been undertaken were it not for the good humour and love at home. To Brenda, Orla, Ronan and Aoife, thanks a million-I appreciate very much that you made this possible. Finally, the resolve to undertake a project such as this is borne out o f an environment which affirms and encourages. I have been privileged that m y late mother and my father provided such an environment.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
The Eurozone needs a bank resolution regime that can work across seventeen independent nations of... more The Eurozone needs a bank resolution regime that can work across seventeen independent nations of diverse sizes with varying levels of financial development, limited fiscal coresponsibility, and with systemic instability induced by quick and low-cost deposit transfers across borders. We advocate a Coasean approach to bank resolution policy in the Eurozone, which emphasises clear and consistent contracts and makes explicit the public ownership of the externality costs of bank distress. A variety of resolution mechanisms are compared including bank debt holder bail-in, prompt corrective action, and contingent convertible bonds. We argue that the "dilute-in" of bank debt holders via contingent convertibility provides a clearer and simpler Coasean bargain for the Eurozone than the more conventional alternatives of debt holder bail-in or prompt corrective action.
SSRN Electronic Journal
The Eurozone needs a bank resolution regime that can work across seventeen independent nations of... more The Eurozone needs a bank resolution regime that can work across seventeen independent nations of diverse sizes with varying levels of financial development, limited fiscal co-responsibility, and with systemic instability induced by quick and low-cost deposit transfers across borders. We advocate a Coasean approach to bank resolution policy in the Eurozone, which emphasises clear and consistent contracts and makes explicit the public ownership of the externality costs of bank distress. A variety of resolution mechanisms are compared including bank debt holder bail-in, prompt corrective action, and contingent convertible bonds. We argue that the “dilute-in” of bank debt holders via contingent convertibility provides a clearer and simpler Coasean bargain for the Eurozone than the more conventional alternatives of debt holder bail-in or prompt corrective action.
Sliding Doors Cost Measurement.A Restrictive Approach to Analyzing the Net Economic Cost of Policy Decisions and an Application to Irish Financial Regulation
This paper develops a restrictive procedure for evaluating economic policy decisions, by comparin... more This paper develops a restrictive procedure for evaluating economic policy decisions, by comparing actual economic history to a simulated history where a specific policy decision is replaced with a counterfactual, but credible, alternative. Our procedure is theoretically straightforward, but empirically problematic since it requires the identification of a feasible policy alternative and a model linking a specific policy choice to
Journal of International Money and Finance, 2012
Although the US credit crisis precipitated it, the Irish credit crisis is an identifiably separat... more Although the US credit crisis precipitated it, the Irish credit crisis is an identifiably separate one, which might have occurred in the absence of the U.S. crash. The distinctive differences between them are notable. Almost all the apparent causal factors of the U.S. crisis are missing in the Irish case; and the same applies vice-versa. At a deeper level, we identify four common features of the two credit crises: capital bonanzas, irrational exuberance, regulatory imprudence, and moral hazard. The particular manifestations of these four "deep" common features are quite different in the two cases.