Okoh Jeremaih - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Papers by Okoh Jeremaih

Journal of Law & Economics, Jan 1, 1975

International Review of Law and Economics, Jan 1, 2004

We use panel data on Israeli courts to estimate the “production function” for case dispositions. ... more We use panel data on Israeli courts to estimate the “production function” for case dispositions. Our results show that the number of case dispositions is independent of the number of serving judges, and that “productivity”, as measured by completed cases per judge, varies directly with the caseload per judge. These results suggest that the productivity of judges is endogenous; for the same caseload judges complete more cases under pressure, and complete less when new judges are appointed. They also suggest that the practice of determining the number of judges by fixed “Leontieff” input–output coefficients is not appropriate.

Communist and Post-communist Studies, Jan 1, 1996

Employing the conceptual framework of Weber as interpreted and adapted by Schmidhauser, this arti... more Employing the conceptual framework of Weber as interpreted and adapted by Schmidhauser, this article focuses on problems associated with creating an independent judiciary in a transitional society. This information came from a series of in-depth interviews conducted with Bulgarian legal professionals and politicians, through media reports, and from available court opinions. Indicators of problems associated with judicial independence included parliamentary interference with the selection of judges, an attempt by the Council of Ministers to impose budgetary constraints upon the judiciary, an attempt by parliament to limit the tenure of judicial officials, and finally, an attempt by the government to evict the Constitutional Court from its quarters.

Constitutional Political Economy, Jan 1, 1994

William Landes and Richard Posner contend that judicial independence maximizes the value of legis... more William Landes and Richard Posner contend that judicial independence maximizes the value of legislative deals with interest groups by enhancing the durability of those deals. Despite its acceptance among economics-minded scholars, we argue that this theory is seriously deficient. The ‘strong’ positive version of this theory fails as an attempt to explain the origin and maintenance of judicial independence because it ignores collective-action problems plaguing both the legislature and the judiciary in fostering judicial independence. The ‘weak’ descriptive version inadequately describes the full historical record. We re-interpret some empirical findings—previously thought to support the Landes-Posner theory—in light of our analysis. We conclude that the United States federal judiciary is truly independent of Congress and the President, and that this independence was designed by the Constitution's framers as a means of furthering sound government.

The independence of the judiciary is sometimes portrayed as necessary to ensure that this branch ... more The independence of the judiciary is sometimes portrayed as necessary to ensure that this branch of government functions as an effective counterweight to the legislative and executive branches. Many scholars have defended the ‘independence’ of the judiciary on normative grounds, arguing that the welfare of society is thereby enhanced (cf. Buchanan, 1974). According to this view, the role of the judiciary is to protect society from unconstitutional actions by the other branches, the judges being motivated to behave in this way by their concern for the public interest. Consistent with this view, the independent judiciary might be regarded as an agent representing the interests of groups which would otherwise be unrepresented (or under-represented) in other political forums.

Journal of Law & Economics, Jan 1, 1975

International Review of Law and Economics, Jan 1, 2004

We use panel data on Israeli courts to estimate the “production function” for case dispositions. ... more We use panel data on Israeli courts to estimate the “production function” for case dispositions. Our results show that the number of case dispositions is independent of the number of serving judges, and that “productivity”, as measured by completed cases per judge, varies directly with the caseload per judge. These results suggest that the productivity of judges is endogenous; for the same caseload judges complete more cases under pressure, and complete less when new judges are appointed. They also suggest that the practice of determining the number of judges by fixed “Leontieff” input–output coefficients is not appropriate.

Communist and Post-communist Studies, Jan 1, 1996

Employing the conceptual framework of Weber as interpreted and adapted by Schmidhauser, this arti... more Employing the conceptual framework of Weber as interpreted and adapted by Schmidhauser, this article focuses on problems associated with creating an independent judiciary in a transitional society. This information came from a series of in-depth interviews conducted with Bulgarian legal professionals and politicians, through media reports, and from available court opinions. Indicators of problems associated with judicial independence included parliamentary interference with the selection of judges, an attempt by the Council of Ministers to impose budgetary constraints upon the judiciary, an attempt by parliament to limit the tenure of judicial officials, and finally, an attempt by the government to evict the Constitutional Court from its quarters.

Constitutional Political Economy, Jan 1, 1994

William Landes and Richard Posner contend that judicial independence maximizes the value of legis... more William Landes and Richard Posner contend that judicial independence maximizes the value of legislative deals with interest groups by enhancing the durability of those deals. Despite its acceptance among economics-minded scholars, we argue that this theory is seriously deficient. The ‘strong’ positive version of this theory fails as an attempt to explain the origin and maintenance of judicial independence because it ignores collective-action problems plaguing both the legislature and the judiciary in fostering judicial independence. The ‘weak’ descriptive version inadequately describes the full historical record. We re-interpret some empirical findings—previously thought to support the Landes-Posner theory—in light of our analysis. We conclude that the United States federal judiciary is truly independent of Congress and the President, and that this independence was designed by the Constitution's framers as a means of furthering sound government.

The independence of the judiciary is sometimes portrayed as necessary to ensure that this branch ... more The independence of the judiciary is sometimes portrayed as necessary to ensure that this branch of government functions as an effective counterweight to the legislative and executive branches. Many scholars have defended the ‘independence’ of the judiciary on normative grounds, arguing that the welfare of society is thereby enhanced (cf. Buchanan, 1974). According to this view, the role of the judiciary is to protect society from unconstitutional actions by the other branches, the judges being motivated to behave in this way by their concern for the public interest. Consistent with this view, the independent judiciary might be regarded as an agent representing the interests of groups which would otherwise be unrepresented (or under-represented) in other political forums.