Olav Asheim - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
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Papers by Olav Asheim
... Bibliography Arsenault, Dominic and Bernard Perron (2009). ... 9 WITHOUT CONTACTING THE AUTHO... more ... Bibliography Arsenault, Dominic and Bernard Perron (2009). ... 9 WITHOUT CONTACTING THE AUTHORS Eco, Umberto (1985 [1979]). Lector in Fabula ou la coopération interprétative dans les textes narratifs, Paris : Grasset. Ferrari di Pippo, Alexander (2000). ...
There are two big obstacles to making sense of quantification into belief and other propositional... more There are two big obstacles to making sense of quantification into belief and other propositional attitude contexts: one that the object referred to may not exist, the other that the principle of substitutivity of co-referential terms breaks down in such contexts. I shall argue in this paper that the first problem can be solved by recognizing objects of belief as entities that can be referred to regardless of whether they exist, and I shall sketch a theory of existentials that makes this plausible. In addition I shall argue that demonstrative reference is not in itself direct reference, and I shall argue that there is no problem of substitutivity when the co-referential terms in question are both used directly referentially.
Meinong is notorious for his|in the prevailing opinion: bizarre and clearly untenable|view on bei... more Meinong is notorious for his|in the prevailing opinion: bizarre and clearly untenable|view on being and existence. Not only did he argue that there are things that do not exist, but on his view this has as a consequence for example that there is a certain nonexistent entity which can be referred to as \the present king of France", and in his theory of objects1 he actually went so far as to recognize impossible abstract entities like The Round Square. No wonder that this theory as a whole has few adherents today.2 However, because of Meinong’s notoriety, the very distinction between being and existence has come to share the bad reputation of his more extravagant ontological claims and is commonly labeled \Meinongian", even though Meinong was neither the rst nor the last philosopher to make it. It is really a very old and digni ed distinction, which has a tendency to recur in new versions as philosophical positions shift. Aristotle distinguished between dierent senses of the...
Fictional antirealism in my usage is the metaphysical position that fictional objects like made-u... more Fictional antirealism in my usage is the metaphysical position that fictional objects like made-up characters in a story are unreal in the sense that they can never be talked about nonfictionally: they cannot be referred to, and they cannot be quantified over. According to this position we cannot make assertions about Sherlock Holmes, for instance, neither by referring to him by that name nor by denoting him with a definite description like ”the best known fictional character in Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s stories.” An attempt to designate an object as Sherlock Holmes is doomed to failure from the beginning because there is no such object, and then we will fail to make an assertion about him: whatever we say it can have no truth-value. We indulge in makebelieve again when we go into our reader’s experiences as literary critics.
Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift, Dec 9, 2013
Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift, Dec 9, 2013
Philosophy of Engineering and Technology, 2012
... Bibliography Arsenault, Dominic and Bernard Perron (2009). ... 9 WITHOUT CONTACTING THE AUTHO... more ... Bibliography Arsenault, Dominic and Bernard Perron (2009). ... 9 WITHOUT CONTACTING THE AUTHORS Eco, Umberto (1985 [1979]). Lector in Fabula ou la coopération interprétative dans les textes narratifs, Paris : Grasset. Ferrari di Pippo, Alexander (2000). ...
There are two big obstacles to making sense of quantification into belief and other propositional... more There are two big obstacles to making sense of quantification into belief and other propositional attitude contexts: one that the object referred to may not exist, the other that the principle of substitutivity of co-referential terms breaks down in such contexts. I shall argue in this paper that the first problem can be solved by recognizing objects of belief as entities that can be referred to regardless of whether they exist, and I shall sketch a theory of existentials that makes this plausible. In addition I shall argue that demonstrative reference is not in itself direct reference, and I shall argue that there is no problem of substitutivity when the co-referential terms in question are both used directly referentially.
Meinong is notorious for his|in the prevailing opinion: bizarre and clearly untenable|view on bei... more Meinong is notorious for his|in the prevailing opinion: bizarre and clearly untenable|view on being and existence. Not only did he argue that there are things that do not exist, but on his view this has as a consequence for example that there is a certain nonexistent entity which can be referred to as \the present king of France", and in his theory of objects1 he actually went so far as to recognize impossible abstract entities like The Round Square. No wonder that this theory as a whole has few adherents today.2 However, because of Meinong’s notoriety, the very distinction between being and existence has come to share the bad reputation of his more extravagant ontological claims and is commonly labeled \Meinongian", even though Meinong was neither the rst nor the last philosopher to make it. It is really a very old and digni ed distinction, which has a tendency to recur in new versions as philosophical positions shift. Aristotle distinguished between dierent senses of the...
Fictional antirealism in my usage is the metaphysical position that fictional objects like made-u... more Fictional antirealism in my usage is the metaphysical position that fictional objects like made-up characters in a story are unreal in the sense that they can never be talked about nonfictionally: they cannot be referred to, and they cannot be quantified over. According to this position we cannot make assertions about Sherlock Holmes, for instance, neither by referring to him by that name nor by denoting him with a definite description like ”the best known fictional character in Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s stories.” An attempt to designate an object as Sherlock Holmes is doomed to failure from the beginning because there is no such object, and then we will fail to make an assertion about him: whatever we say it can have no truth-value. We indulge in makebelieve again when we go into our reader’s experiences as literary critics.
Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift, Dec 9, 2013
Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift, Dec 9, 2013
Philosophy of Engineering and Technology, 2012