Peter Gries - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Papers by Peter Gries

How are Asian and Black men and women stereotyped? Research from the gendered race and stereotype... more How are Asian and Black men and women stereotyped? Research from the gendered race and stereotype content perspectives has produced mixed empirical findings. Using BERT models pre-trained on English language books, news articles, Wikipedia, Reddit, and Twitter, with a new method for measuring propositions in natural language (the Fill-Mask Association Test, FMAT), we explored the gender (masculinity-femininity), physical strength, warmth, and competence contents of stereotypes about Asian and Black men and women. We find that Asian men (but not women) are stereotyped as less masculine and less moral/trustworthy than Black men. Compared to Black men and Black women, respectively, both Asian men and Asian women are stereotyped as less muscular/athletic and less assertive/dominant, but more sociable/friendly and more capable/intelligent. These findings suggest that Asian and Black stereotypes in natural language have multifaceted contents and gender nuances, requiring a balanced view integrating the gender schema and the stereotype content model. Exploring their semantic representations as propositions in large language models, this research reveals how intersectional race-gender stereotypes are naturally expressed in real life.

Japanese Journal of Political Science, 2016

Urban Chinese today do not appear to trust foreign countries. Why are they so suspicious? Over th... more Urban Chinese today do not appear to trust foreign countries. Why are they so suspicious? Over the past quarter century, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has utilized its educational and propaganda systems to produce historical narratives of imperial China's beneficence towards its East Asian neighbors, and of an early modern ‘Century of Humiliation’ at the hands of ‘imperialist’ foreign powers. Qualitative analysis of Chinese social media today suggests that these narratives are tied to widespread popular distrust of China's ‘ungrateful’ East Asian neighbors and the ‘hegemonic’ West today. Interrogating a 2012 survey of urban Chinese, this paper explores the sources of international attitudes quantitatively. It first examines whether Chinese today do indeed distrust foreign countries. It then tests two hypotheses about the drivers of Chinese distrust towards the world today. A ‘top-down’ socialization hypothesis holds that political (e.g. party propaganda via education and...

International Affairs, 2015

Social Science Quarterly, 2016

ObjectiveThis study revisits the idea that the American public is moderate or nonideological. In ... more ObjectiveThis study revisits the idea that the American public is moderate or nonideological. In this longstanding view, only informed elites maintain consistent ideologies that constrain their political attitudes and behaviors; the mass public is driven instead by partisan identities that they are socialized into. The study explores whether the public's liberal‐to‐conservative self‐placement is temporally stable, and whether it is predictive of political attitudes when pit against partisanship.MethodsThe study examines data from the 2010 American National Election Survey and the 2008–2012 General Social Survey longitudinal panel.ResultsThe American public today maintains coherent and consistent ideologies that systematically divide them in their sociopolitical attitudes and policy preferences.ConclusionWhile partisanship is a powerful top‐down driver of the American public's attitudes and policy preferences toward overtly partisan issues and behaviors like Obamacare and vot...

The United States in the Indo-Pacific, 2020

The China Quarterly, 2005

Following the publication of Ma Licheng's provocative article “New thinking on relations with... more Following the publication of Ma Licheng's provocative article “New thinking on relations with Japan,” 2003 China witnessed a remarkable public debate on Japan policy. Academics tangled with internet nationalists, and heavy pressure was put on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to take a tough line on Japan. The crushing defeat of the “new thinking” and a spate of anti-Japanese protests on the Chinese street and in Chinese cyberspace portends trouble in East Asia.

China and the World, 2020

This chapter assesses the domestic sources of contemporary China’s foreign policy. In particular,... more This chapter assesses the domestic sources of contemporary China’s foreign policy. In particular, it examines the importance of national identities, China’s worldviews, the socialization of Chinese, and particularly the role of nationalism. The chapter begins by arguing that social influences matter: the CCP has inextricably linked itself, society, and foreign policy by staking its domestic right to rule upon its foreign policy performance. The chapter then turns to the thorny empirical question of what we know about Chinese feelings and attitudes toward different parts of the world, from China’s Asian neighbors, to the admired and resented Euro-American First World, to Russia, and the dark and backwards Third World of Africa and Latin America. It then turns to the causes/drivers of these worldviews, arguing that both demographics (e.g., age and location) and individual predispositions (e.g., nationalism and cosmopolitanism) matter, but that political and peer socialization has a po...

What is the relationship between ideology and international relations (IR)? The extant literature... more What is the relationship between ideology and international relations (IR)? The extant literature focuses on how the former shapes the latter. Confrontation between Liberalism and Fascism, Communism, and Authoritarianism have sequentially structured IR over the past Century. While such all-encompassing Ideologies may unify the people of different nations in (often opposing) worldviews, liberal/left and conservative/right ideologies can divide citizens within nations. Dimensions of ideology like social dominance orientation (SDO) and right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) also shape international attitudes in distinct ways. These individual-level ideologies and their attendant worldviews shape state-level foreign policies and system-level IR (the micro–macro link) through elite decision-making and public opinion. An emerging literature also reverses the causal arrow, exploring how health, terrorism and other system-level threats can shape individual-level ideologies. This review essay sho...

Politics and Religion, 2016

The decline in religious identification and corresponding increase in the unaffiliated has been o... more The decline in religious identification and corresponding increase in the unaffiliated has been one of the most important religious changes in the United Kingdom (UK). The emergence of the “religious nones” is the most obvious sign of continuing secularization and the declining social and cultural relevance of religion. Yet while the religiously-unaffiliated often form the plurality — if not sometimes the majority — in many surveys, there has been little scholarly investigation into atheists, agnostics, and others who do not identify with a particular religion. This article uses a 2014 survey of UK adults to examine how those who identify as atheist or agnostic differ from the religiously-affiliated in terms of religiosity, ideology, and policy preferences. Findings reveal secular groups in the UK to be more to the ideological left than the religiously affiliated, and that atheists and agnostics differ from each other and especially the religiously affiliated on public policy.

Journal of Contemporary China, 2015

the university of oklahoma, uSa 不杀日。难解心头之恨. 'Without killing Japanese, I cannot relieve the hatre... more the university of oklahoma, uSa 不杀日。难解心头之恨. 'Without killing Japanese, I cannot relieve the hatred in my heart.' 1 (Sina Forum post from Chengdu, 16 August 2012) 这种人在日本叫做极右翼法西斯，在德国叫做纳粹，在中国叫做 '爱国者'。 'In Japan these people are called extreme right-wing fascists. In Germany they are called Nazis. In China they are called "patriots".' 2

Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 2022

During the past decade, China has rapidly emerged as a major player in Central and Eastern Europe... more During the past decade, China has rapidly emerged as a major player in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Will it divide Europe? Might these formerly communist countries align themselves again with a communist superpower to their east? Or does their past experience of Russia and communism generate suspicions of China? This article explores what public opinion data from a fall 2020 survey of six CEE countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Serbia, and Slovakia) can teach us about the drivers of CEE attitudes toward China. It suggests that China has become a “second Eastern power” beyond Russia against which many people in the CEE have come to define themselves. Although there are large differences between CEE publics in their views of China, individual-level self-identifications with the East or West, and attitudes toward the communist past and communism today consistently shape views of both Russia and China. Russia looms large for all in the CEE, but especially for La...

Journal of East Asian Studies

Do history wars shape international affairs? If so, how and for whom? Taking the historical dispu... more Do history wars shape international affairs? If so, how and for whom? Taking the historical dispute between China and South Korea over the ancient Gaogouli/Goguryeo Kingdom as a case study, this article explores the individual-level psychological micro-foundations of history wars. A 2020 survey experiment in South Korea pit “ours” vs “theirs” Goguryeo imitation Wikipedia entries to explore their downstream consequences. It revealed direct, indirect, and conditional effects. Exposure to China's claim to the Kingdom undermined Korean pride, increasing dislike of China, and lessening desires to cooperate with it. Pre-existing levels of nationalism divided South Koreans in how angry they became after exposure the Wikipedia primes. That anger, however, only shaped the China policy preferences of those South Koreans who viewed the balance of military power with China favorably. Implications for ownership disputes over kimchi and other national possessions are also discussed, as are th...

What impact does ideology have on American attitudes and policy pre-ferences toward China? Based ... more What impact does ideology have on American attitudes and policy pre-ferences toward China? Based on two large N surveys, we first utilize exploratory factor analysis to uncover six distinct American ideological dimensions and two distinct dimensions of attitudes toward China that distinguish between its government and its people. We then utilize structural equation modeling to explore how attitudes toward the Chinese people (i.e. prejudice) and attitudes toward the Chinese gov-ernment differentially mediate relationships between ideological beliefs, on the one hand, and Americans ’ China policy preferences, on the other. Results suggest both direct and indirect effects of ideology on policy preferences, with the latter effects being differentially mediated by prejudice and attitudes toward the Chinese government.

Asian Survey

The Chinese government’s cover-up of the origins of the new coronavirus, and its more openly prid... more The Chinese government’s cover-up of the origins of the new coronavirus, and its more openly prideful and aggressive foreign and human rights policies, triggered a dramatic deterioration of foreign views of China in 2020. That year also witnessed a significant increase in anti-Chinese/Asian prejudice around the world. Could the former have shaped the latter? Drawing on theories of prejudice and ideology, and using an Autumn 2020 13-nation European survey about China, this paper explores whether increasingly negative attitudes toward Chinese government policies prejudiced European views of local Chinese students, tourists, and communities. It finds substantial evidence of a spillover effect, an effect which is stronger among conservative Europeans than among progressive Europeans more motivated to avoid prejudice. The paper concludes with thoughts on the danger that China’s prideful “wolf warriors” pose for Chinese students, tourists, and local Chinese communities confronting prejudi...

Group Processes & Intergroup Relations

When objective group membership and subjective ethnic identification don’t align, which has a gre... more When objective group membership and subjective ethnic identification don’t align, which has a greater impact on how people feel towards the groups they affiliate with, and why? Deprived of many distinctiveness markers typically found in intergroup relations (e.g., physical features, obvious status differences), Taiwanese society provides a perfect natural context to explore the impact of objective group membership (Taiwanese nationality) versus subjective ethnic identification (Taiwanese or Chinese) on intergroup bias. Results from representative telephone ( N = 1,060) and Internet ( N = 500) surveys demonstrated that even among participants with no visible distinctiveness markers or differences in social status, subjective ethnic identification contributed to intergroup bias in favor of Taiwanese over Chinese Mainlanders (main effect). Both self-enhancement (collective self-esteem as Taiwanese) and perceived threat from Chinese Mainlanders helped account for this finding (mediation...

Political Research Exchange

While the existence of a 'Democratic Peace' (DP) is widely accepted, the various DP theories that... more While the existence of a 'Democratic Peace' (DP) is widely accepted, the various DP theories that seek to explain why democracies rarely fight one another are highly contested. A 'commercial/capitalist peace' counterargument maintains that the relationship between democratic politics and peace is spurious: the actual driver is greater trade among democracies. Meanwhile, Realists counter that it is alliances among democratic states, not their democratic nature, that causes peace among them. This research note utilizes novel country feeling thermometer data to explore the debate's micro-foundations: the underlying drivers of international amity and enmity among democratic citizens in the US, UK, France, and Germany. Utilizing Freedom House and other quantitative measures of freedom, trade, military strength, and racial and cultural difference, it pits the micro-foundations of the DP against its rivals to explain attitude formation among a group of Western democratic publics. Given the resurgence of authoritarianism around the world today, a better understanding of the role of regime type in shaping public opinionand subsequently war and peaceis urgently needed.

Current History

It would be a mistake to attribute to the Communist Party complete control over Chinese nationali... more It would be a mistake to attribute to the Communist Party complete control over Chinese nationalism today. With the emergence of the Internet, cell phones, and text messaging, popular nationalists in China are increasingly able to act independently of the state.

World Affairs

The Taiwan Strait is heating up, as Mainland Chinese netizens, generals, and politicians increasi... more The Taiwan Strait is heating up, as Mainland Chinese netizens, generals, and politicians increasingly talk about ‘forceful’ rather than ‘peaceful’ reunification. While Xi Jinping and Chinese nationalists desperately desire Taiwan’s reunification, Trump’s isolationist “America First” rhetoric has only encouraged reckless Chinese thinking about forcing reunification, and the Taiwanese remain largely passive, unable to confront an overwhelming threat. Wishful thinking in Beijing, Taipei, and Washington is increasing the odds of miscalculation. The 2020 presidential elections in Taiwan and the United States, and the ongoing U.S.-China trade war, furthermore, bode ill for peace in the Taiwan Strait.