Paulo Somaini - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
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Graduate Center of the City University of New York
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Papers by Paulo Somaini
Supply-side rationing is common in markets that do not rely exclusively on prices to determine al... more Supply-side rationing is common in markets that do not rely exclusively on prices to determine allocation. Examples include matching markets for schools and colleges; entry-level labor markets; and healthcare services. In these cases, consumer choice sets are constrained endogeneously by supply-side admission policies induced by capacity constraints. We use a random utility model for consumer preferences and a reduced-form rationing rule for the supply side that can be derived from models of the examples described above. We study identification of this model, propose an estimator, and apply these methods to study admissions in the market for kidney dialysis in California. Our results establish identification of the model using two sets of instruments, one that only affects consumer preferences and the other that only affects the rationing rule. These results also suggest tests of supply-side rationing, which we apply to the dialysis market. We find that dialysis facilities are less ...
Abstract. I investigate the effect of competition on bidder behavior and procurement cost using h... more Abstract. I investigate the effect of competition on bidder behavior and procurement cost using highway auction data from Michigan. While a bidder's distance to a project location is important in explaining participation and bid levels, there is no evidence of more ...
Econometrica
Waitlists are often used to ration scarce resources, but the trade‐offs in designing these mechan... more Waitlists are often used to ration scarce resources, but the trade‐offs in designing these mechanisms depend on agents' preferences. We study equilibrium allocations under alternative designs for the deceased donor kidney waitlist. We model the decision to accept an organ or wait for a preferable one as an optimal stopping problem and estimate preferences using administrative data from the New York City area. Our estimates show that while some kidney types are desirable for all patients, there is substantial match‐specific heterogeneity in values. We then develop methods to evaluate alternative mechanisms, comparing their effects on patient welfare to an equivalent change in donor supply. Past reforms to the kidney waitlist primarily resulted in redistribution, with similar welfare and organ discard rates to the benchmark first‐come, first‐served mechanism. These mechanisms and other commonly studied theoretical benchmarks remain far from optimal. We design a mechanism that incr...
Journal of Political Economy
AEA Papers and Proceedings
Many scarce public resources are allocated through wait lists that use priorities for individual ... more Many scarce public resources are allocated through wait lists that use priorities for individual agents. A new priority system for allocating deceased donor kidneys was adopted in 2014. This redesign was guided by simulations that held decision-rules fixed. We synthesize recent theoretical results to show that the welfare effects of a mechanism depend on the interaction between dynamic incentives and heterogeneity in preferences. We show evidence suggesting that patient decisions on the deceased donor kidney wait list respond to dynamic incentives. Therefore, an empirical approach to dynamic mechanism design is an essential complement to mechanism design theory in dynamic environments.
Journal of Econometric Methods, 2015
We present an algorithm to estimate the two-way fixed effect linear model. The algorithm relies o... more We present an algorithm to estimate the two-way fixed effect linear model. The algorithm relies on the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell theorem and applies to ordinary least squares (OLS), two-stage least squares (TSLS) and generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators. The coefficients of interest are computed using the residuals from the projection of all variables on the two sets of fixed effects. Our algorithm has three desirable features. First, it manages memory and computational resources efficiently which speeds up the computation of the estimates. Second, it allows the researcher to estimate multiple specifications using the same set of fixed effects at a very low computational cost. Third, the asymptotic variance of the parameters of interest can be consistently estimated using standard routines on the residualized data.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
The Journal of Industrial Economics, 2013
The Journal of Industrial Economics, 2013
Supply-side rationing is common in markets that do not rely exclusively on prices to determine al... more Supply-side rationing is common in markets that do not rely exclusively on prices to determine allocation. Examples include matching markets for schools and colleges; entry-level labor markets; and healthcare services. In these cases, consumer choice sets are constrained endogeneously by supply-side admission policies induced by capacity constraints. We use a random utility model for consumer preferences and a reduced-form rationing rule for the supply side that can be derived from models of the examples described above. We study identification of this model, propose an estimator, and apply these methods to study admissions in the market for kidney dialysis in California. Our results establish identification of the model using two sets of instruments, one that only affects consumer preferences and the other that only affects the rationing rule. These results also suggest tests of supply-side rationing, which we apply to the dialysis market. We find that dialysis facilities are less ...
Abstract. I investigate the effect of competition on bidder behavior and procurement cost using h... more Abstract. I investigate the effect of competition on bidder behavior and procurement cost using highway auction data from Michigan. While a bidder's distance to a project location is important in explaining participation and bid levels, there is no evidence of more ...
Econometrica
Waitlists are often used to ration scarce resources, but the trade‐offs in designing these mechan... more Waitlists are often used to ration scarce resources, but the trade‐offs in designing these mechanisms depend on agents' preferences. We study equilibrium allocations under alternative designs for the deceased donor kidney waitlist. We model the decision to accept an organ or wait for a preferable one as an optimal stopping problem and estimate preferences using administrative data from the New York City area. Our estimates show that while some kidney types are desirable for all patients, there is substantial match‐specific heterogeneity in values. We then develop methods to evaluate alternative mechanisms, comparing their effects on patient welfare to an equivalent change in donor supply. Past reforms to the kidney waitlist primarily resulted in redistribution, with similar welfare and organ discard rates to the benchmark first‐come, first‐served mechanism. These mechanisms and other commonly studied theoretical benchmarks remain far from optimal. We design a mechanism that incr...
Journal of Political Economy
AEA Papers and Proceedings
Many scarce public resources are allocated through wait lists that use priorities for individual ... more Many scarce public resources are allocated through wait lists that use priorities for individual agents. A new priority system for allocating deceased donor kidneys was adopted in 2014. This redesign was guided by simulations that held decision-rules fixed. We synthesize recent theoretical results to show that the welfare effects of a mechanism depend on the interaction between dynamic incentives and heterogeneity in preferences. We show evidence suggesting that patient decisions on the deceased donor kidney wait list respond to dynamic incentives. Therefore, an empirical approach to dynamic mechanism design is an essential complement to mechanism design theory in dynamic environments.
Journal of Econometric Methods, 2015
We present an algorithm to estimate the two-way fixed effect linear model. The algorithm relies o... more We present an algorithm to estimate the two-way fixed effect linear model. The algorithm relies on the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell theorem and applies to ordinary least squares (OLS), two-stage least squares (TSLS) and generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators. The coefficients of interest are computed using the residuals from the projection of all variables on the two sets of fixed effects. Our algorithm has three desirable features. First, it manages memory and computational resources efficiently which speeds up the computation of the estimates. Second, it allows the researcher to estimate multiple specifications using the same set of fixed effects at a very low computational cost. Third, the asymptotic variance of the parameters of interest can be consistently estimated using standard routines on the residualized data.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
The Journal of Industrial Economics, 2013
The Journal of Industrial Economics, 2013