P. Vries - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Papers by P. Vries

International Review of Social History

Global history seems to be the history for our times. Huge syntheses such as the seven-volume Cam... more Global history seems to be the history for our times. Huge syntheses such as the seven-volume Cambridge World History or the six-volume A History of the World suggest the field has come to fruition. Robert Moore, in his contribution to the book under review, The Prospect of Global History, is quite confident in this respect: if there is a single reason for “the rise of world history”, it is “the collapse of every alternative paradigm” (pp. 84–85). As early as 2012, the journal Itinerario published an interview with David Armitage with the title “Are We All Global Historians Now?” That may have been provocative but Armitage obliged by claiming “the hegemony of national historiography is over”.

Journal of Modern European History

Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis/ The Low Countries Journal of Social and Economic History

Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis/ The Low Countries Journal of Social and Economic History

Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis/ The Low Countries Journal of Social and Economic History

The Journal of Economic History

State, Economy and the Great Divergence : Great Britain and China, 1680s–1850s

International Review of Social History

Bas van Bavel is distinguished professor at the University of Utrecht and a prolific writer. He i... more Bas van Bavel is distinguished professor at the University of Utrecht and a prolific writer. He is best known for his Manors and Markets: Economy and Society in the Low Countries, 500-1600 (Oxford, 2010) and has now vastly extended the scale and scope of his research with this highly ambitious The Invisible Hand? How Market Economies have Emerged and Declined since AD 500. The title of the book is somewhat misleading, in two respects. It suggests that the book is about market economies since AD 500, but, as the author himself explicitly indicates in the text, it discusses "only" economies in which factor markets became dominant. Moreover, in its empirical analysis it concentrates heavily on three pre-industrial economies: Iraq, AD 500-1100; central and northern Italy, AD 1000-1500; and the Low Countries, AD 1100-1800. The Epilogue of some forty pages, in a text totalling 287 pages, is devoted to markets in modern states: England, the United States, and Western Europe in the period 1500-2000. That is quite substantial for an epilogue, but not sufficient to deal in any depth with such a huge topic. On industrialized societies with modern economic growth, it provides only sketchy information: the period after 1950 is dealt with in thirteen pages. Nevertheless, considering the long Introduction and the equally long Conclusion, both of which contain many wide-ranging general claims about markets, growth, and inequality, any reader may be excused for thinking the book contains a thesis about how factor-market economies terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms.

The Journal of Economic History, Dec 1, 2000

Op 19 september hield Peter Burke een lezing in het Amsterdams Historisch Museum met als titel 'L... more Op 19 september hield Peter Burke een lezing in het Amsterdams Historisch Museum met als titel 'Louis X I V. The fabrication of an image'. In deze lezing gaf Burke de aanwezigen een voorproefje van zijn nieuwste, nog te verschijnen boek, waarin hij de beeldvorming rond Lodewijk de Veertiende bekijkt vanuit historischantropologisch perspectief. Leidschrift maakte van de gelegenheid gebruik om deze bekende Britse historicus te interviewen. Peter Burke, reader in cultural history aan de Universiteit van Cambridge en fellow aan het Emmanuel College van diezelfde universiteit, is een zeer vruchtbaar schrijver. In brede kring staat hij waarschijnlijk vooral bekend als auteur vanPopular culture in early modern Europe (Londen 1978) en als specialist op het terrein van de Italiaanse Renaisssance. Behalve de in de tekst genoemde boeken schreef hij-naast een zeer groot aantal artikelen-ook nog de volgende:

In gesprek met Charles Tilly Peer Vries en Birgit van den Hoven We will focus this interview on y... more In gesprek met Charles Tilly Peer Vries en Birgit van den Hoven We will focus this interview on your most recent book Coercion, capital and European states, AD 990-1990 (Cambridge Mass. en Oxford 1990). The central subject of this book is the relationship between on the one hand capital-the bourgeoisie-and on the other hand coercion-the coercive power of the state apparatus-in the process of state formation. I think everybody will agree that in any case during the early modern period this relationship can be described as you do as a 'dangerous liaison'. But even dangerous liaisons are liaisons. What exactly is the trade-off between capital and coercion? Why do they co-operate? Well, each one has an advantage to gain. The warmakers often want to buy the means of war and the bourgeoisie are the people who organize the markets, not only for soldiers, but also for arms, supplies and the transport of military goods. And because they are the professionals in that kind of organizing, they can complement the efforts of the people who run the armies. The trade-off for the bourgeoisie is often a good deal of profit. After all some of the great mercantile families of Europe made their money either by lending to the crown or by engaging in the supply of armies. And many of them lost their money in doing so. In the pre-industrial period states always were rather voracious and therefore always also a possible threat to capitalists. 1 But is it not true that after the Industrial Revolution the relationship between coercion and capital changed fundamentally and became more of a 'companionate marriage'? Let us first clarify one little confusion here. I regard the state as a synthesis of coercion and capital, not just as the locus of coercion. The question I wanted to answer in this book and in the work I am still doing, is how the environment in which the state grows up affects the kind of state that appears. You have some environments that are, for a very long period, very heavy with capital. Places such as Genoa, Venice and the Low Countries. There are other places that are very heavy with coercion, not only statecoercion. One should also think of landlords with their private armies, or bandits. It is true that kings grew up to a larger degree out of the ranks of great landlords than they did out of the ranks of the merchants. There are relatively few 'merchant-kings'. So I agree that there is an affinity between the state and coercion. But all states from a long 'As a matter offact there are very few nation-states'

Birgit van den Hoven en Peer Vries in gesprek met Jonathan Israel* I would like to start with som... more Birgit van den Hoven en Peer Vries in gesprek met Jonathan Israel* I would like to start with some general questions concerning your position as a historian. Would yon describe yourself as an economic historian or as a general historian? I would not describe myself a an economic historian. I have written quite alot in several different áreas of history, economic history certainly, but also social history, political history, and some intellectual history. I do not like these labels as a rule. I think one of the main things I am trying to do really in the work that I am engaged in now, and in the past, is to look at the interactions between the different dimensions of history. Does this imply you do not see a place in history for a more theoretical approach? From the point of view of an economist your books look rather 'descriptive'. No, I do not think it means that. There are certainly a lot of problems in economic history which can only be solved by historians with a solid training in economic history. My point is not so much that what is being done by most economic historians is invalid. My point is that a lot of things are being missed. They are concentrating on economic problems without looking at the way that economic developments are the product of interactions with other things.

In gesprek met Eric Hobsbawm Peer Vries en Marjolein van Rotterdam In your book you défend a thes... more In gesprek met Eric Hobsbawm Peer Vries en Marjolein van Rotterdam In your book you défend a thesis that is populär amongstudents of nationalism by asserting that in your opinion the nation, and therefore nationalism, is a 'novelty'. I agree that these concepts, in the specific sensé in which you use them, are modern. But on the other hand there is a chapter in your book called 'Populär proto-nationalism', which suggests nationalism is not a complete novelty after ail. What exactly in your opinion is the relationship between this proto-nationalism and nationalism? Is there a fundamental break and différence between them? I do not think they are fundamentally the same. The essence of nationalism, as it develops from the eighteenth Century on wards, is that the idea of a particular people and the idea of the state should coincide, however the people is defined. In the case of what I call 'proto-nationalism', and what other people call ' national consciousness ' or something like that, there is practically never the assumption that this consciousness has anything to do with the actual form of political Organization under which people live. The two examples I give in my book, are those of the Jews and the Germans. Among the Jews the consciousness is age-old that they are a people different from all the other people they live among. But that never in fact implied the longing for a particular, special state for Jews. Very possibly because this kind of state was not recognized any where during this period. The Germans have lived in various colonies and Settlements over large parts of Europe. But to the best of my knowledge until the nineteenth Century there has never been a problem which arises from the fact that they lived under rulers who were not Germans or in states that were not identified with Germans.

is thans president van het prestigieuze Corpus Christi College te Oxford. H i j is vooral beroemd... more is thans president van het prestigieuze Corpus Christi College te Oxford. H i j is vooral beroemd geworden als auteur van Religion and the decline of magie. Studies in popular beliefs in sixteenth and seventeenth-century England (Londen 1971) en Man and the natural world. Changing attitudes in England 1500-1800 (Londen 1983). Daarnaast schreef hij talloze artikelen, onder andere in Past and Present. Zoals uit de genoemde boeken al blijkt, gaat zijn aandacht vooral uit naar de cultuurgeschiedenis van Engeland in de vroeg-moderne tijd. Hoewel hij zelf waarschijnlijk niet erg gelukkig is met de aanduiding 'cultuurhistoricus', geldt hij als één van de bekendste beoefenaren van de cultuurgeschiedenis. Om die reden was hij uitgenodigd als gastspreker op het grote congres Balans en perspectief van de Nederlandse cultuurgeschiedenis dat op 18 en 19 oktober 1989 in Utrecht werd gehouden. Zijn verblijf in ons land viel samen met het op de markt verschijnen van het boek De ondergang van de magische wereld. Godsdienst en magie in Engeland, 1500-1700 (Amsterdam 1989), de Nederlandse vertaling van zijn boek uit 1971. Aangezien in diverse interviews al uitvoerig aandacht is geschonken aan de inhoud van dit boek, zal het in het hier afgedrukte gesprek tussen hem en Peer Vries slechts terloops aan de orde komen. Gezien de ware hausse die de cultuurgeschiedenis thans doormaakt, leek het zinvoller om een zo beroemd exponent van deze nieuwste mode binnen de geschiedbeoefening te vragen naar zijn visie op geschiedenis in het algemeen en cultuurgeschiedenis in het bijzonder.

International Review of Social History

Global history seems to be the history for our times. Huge syntheses such as the seven-volume Cam... more Global history seems to be the history for our times. Huge syntheses such as the seven-volume Cambridge World History or the six-volume A History of the World suggest the field has come to fruition. Robert Moore, in his contribution to the book under review, The Prospect of Global History, is quite confident in this respect: if there is a single reason for “the rise of world history”, it is “the collapse of every alternative paradigm” (pp. 84–85). As early as 2012, the journal Itinerario published an interview with David Armitage with the title “Are We All Global Historians Now?” That may have been provocative but Armitage obliged by claiming “the hegemony of national historiography is over”.

Journal of Modern European History

Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis/ The Low Countries Journal of Social and Economic History

Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis/ The Low Countries Journal of Social and Economic History

Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis/ The Low Countries Journal of Social and Economic History

The Journal of Economic History

State, Economy and the Great Divergence : Great Britain and China, 1680s–1850s

International Review of Social History

Bas van Bavel is distinguished professor at the University of Utrecht and a prolific writer. He i... more Bas van Bavel is distinguished professor at the University of Utrecht and a prolific writer. He is best known for his Manors and Markets: Economy and Society in the Low Countries, 500-1600 (Oxford, 2010) and has now vastly extended the scale and scope of his research with this highly ambitious The Invisible Hand? How Market Economies have Emerged and Declined since AD 500. The title of the book is somewhat misleading, in two respects. It suggests that the book is about market economies since AD 500, but, as the author himself explicitly indicates in the text, it discusses "only" economies in which factor markets became dominant. Moreover, in its empirical analysis it concentrates heavily on three pre-industrial economies: Iraq, AD 500-1100; central and northern Italy, AD 1000-1500; and the Low Countries, AD 1100-1800. The Epilogue of some forty pages, in a text totalling 287 pages, is devoted to markets in modern states: England, the United States, and Western Europe in the period 1500-2000. That is quite substantial for an epilogue, but not sufficient to deal in any depth with such a huge topic. On industrialized societies with modern economic growth, it provides only sketchy information: the period after 1950 is dealt with in thirteen pages. Nevertheless, considering the long Introduction and the equally long Conclusion, both of which contain many wide-ranging general claims about markets, growth, and inequality, any reader may be excused for thinking the book contains a thesis about how factor-market economies terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms.

The Journal of Economic History, Dec 1, 2000

Op 19 september hield Peter Burke een lezing in het Amsterdams Historisch Museum met als titel 'L... more Op 19 september hield Peter Burke een lezing in het Amsterdams Historisch Museum met als titel 'Louis X I V. The fabrication of an image'. In deze lezing gaf Burke de aanwezigen een voorproefje van zijn nieuwste, nog te verschijnen boek, waarin hij de beeldvorming rond Lodewijk de Veertiende bekijkt vanuit historischantropologisch perspectief. Leidschrift maakte van de gelegenheid gebruik om deze bekende Britse historicus te interviewen. Peter Burke, reader in cultural history aan de Universiteit van Cambridge en fellow aan het Emmanuel College van diezelfde universiteit, is een zeer vruchtbaar schrijver. In brede kring staat hij waarschijnlijk vooral bekend als auteur vanPopular culture in early modern Europe (Londen 1978) en als specialist op het terrein van de Italiaanse Renaisssance. Behalve de in de tekst genoemde boeken schreef hij-naast een zeer groot aantal artikelen-ook nog de volgende:

In gesprek met Charles Tilly Peer Vries en Birgit van den Hoven We will focus this interview on y... more In gesprek met Charles Tilly Peer Vries en Birgit van den Hoven We will focus this interview on your most recent book Coercion, capital and European states, AD 990-1990 (Cambridge Mass. en Oxford 1990). The central subject of this book is the relationship between on the one hand capital-the bourgeoisie-and on the other hand coercion-the coercive power of the state apparatus-in the process of state formation. I think everybody will agree that in any case during the early modern period this relationship can be described as you do as a 'dangerous liaison'. But even dangerous liaisons are liaisons. What exactly is the trade-off between capital and coercion? Why do they co-operate? Well, each one has an advantage to gain. The warmakers often want to buy the means of war and the bourgeoisie are the people who organize the markets, not only for soldiers, but also for arms, supplies and the transport of military goods. And because they are the professionals in that kind of organizing, they can complement the efforts of the people who run the armies. The trade-off for the bourgeoisie is often a good deal of profit. After all some of the great mercantile families of Europe made their money either by lending to the crown or by engaging in the supply of armies. And many of them lost their money in doing so. In the pre-industrial period states always were rather voracious and therefore always also a possible threat to capitalists. 1 But is it not true that after the Industrial Revolution the relationship between coercion and capital changed fundamentally and became more of a 'companionate marriage'? Let us first clarify one little confusion here. I regard the state as a synthesis of coercion and capital, not just as the locus of coercion. The question I wanted to answer in this book and in the work I am still doing, is how the environment in which the state grows up affects the kind of state that appears. You have some environments that are, for a very long period, very heavy with capital. Places such as Genoa, Venice and the Low Countries. There are other places that are very heavy with coercion, not only statecoercion. One should also think of landlords with their private armies, or bandits. It is true that kings grew up to a larger degree out of the ranks of great landlords than they did out of the ranks of the merchants. There are relatively few 'merchant-kings'. So I agree that there is an affinity between the state and coercion. But all states from a long 'As a matter offact there are very few nation-states'

Birgit van den Hoven en Peer Vries in gesprek met Jonathan Israel* I would like to start with som... more Birgit van den Hoven en Peer Vries in gesprek met Jonathan Israel* I would like to start with some general questions concerning your position as a historian. Would yon describe yourself as an economic historian or as a general historian? I would not describe myself a an economic historian. I have written quite alot in several different áreas of history, economic history certainly, but also social history, political history, and some intellectual history. I do not like these labels as a rule. I think one of the main things I am trying to do really in the work that I am engaged in now, and in the past, is to look at the interactions between the different dimensions of history. Does this imply you do not see a place in history for a more theoretical approach? From the point of view of an economist your books look rather 'descriptive'. No, I do not think it means that. There are certainly a lot of problems in economic history which can only be solved by historians with a solid training in economic history. My point is not so much that what is being done by most economic historians is invalid. My point is that a lot of things are being missed. They are concentrating on economic problems without looking at the way that economic developments are the product of interactions with other things.

In gesprek met Eric Hobsbawm Peer Vries en Marjolein van Rotterdam In your book you défend a thes... more In gesprek met Eric Hobsbawm Peer Vries en Marjolein van Rotterdam In your book you défend a thesis that is populär amongstudents of nationalism by asserting that in your opinion the nation, and therefore nationalism, is a 'novelty'. I agree that these concepts, in the specific sensé in which you use them, are modern. But on the other hand there is a chapter in your book called 'Populär proto-nationalism', which suggests nationalism is not a complete novelty after ail. What exactly in your opinion is the relationship between this proto-nationalism and nationalism? Is there a fundamental break and différence between them? I do not think they are fundamentally the same. The essence of nationalism, as it develops from the eighteenth Century on wards, is that the idea of a particular people and the idea of the state should coincide, however the people is defined. In the case of what I call 'proto-nationalism', and what other people call ' national consciousness ' or something like that, there is practically never the assumption that this consciousness has anything to do with the actual form of political Organization under which people live. The two examples I give in my book, are those of the Jews and the Germans. Among the Jews the consciousness is age-old that they are a people different from all the other people they live among. But that never in fact implied the longing for a particular, special state for Jews. Very possibly because this kind of state was not recognized any where during this period. The Germans have lived in various colonies and Settlements over large parts of Europe. But to the best of my knowledge until the nineteenth Century there has never been a problem which arises from the fact that they lived under rulers who were not Germans or in states that were not identified with Germans.

is thans president van het prestigieuze Corpus Christi College te Oxford. H i j is vooral beroemd... more is thans president van het prestigieuze Corpus Christi College te Oxford. H i j is vooral beroemd geworden als auteur van Religion and the decline of magie. Studies in popular beliefs in sixteenth and seventeenth-century England (Londen 1971) en Man and the natural world. Changing attitudes in England 1500-1800 (Londen 1983). Daarnaast schreef hij talloze artikelen, onder andere in Past and Present. Zoals uit de genoemde boeken al blijkt, gaat zijn aandacht vooral uit naar de cultuurgeschiedenis van Engeland in de vroeg-moderne tijd. Hoewel hij zelf waarschijnlijk niet erg gelukkig is met de aanduiding 'cultuurhistoricus', geldt hij als één van de bekendste beoefenaren van de cultuurgeschiedenis. Om die reden was hij uitgenodigd als gastspreker op het grote congres Balans en perspectief van de Nederlandse cultuurgeschiedenis dat op 18 en 19 oktober 1989 in Utrecht werd gehouden. Zijn verblijf in ons land viel samen met het op de markt verschijnen van het boek De ondergang van de magische wereld. Godsdienst en magie in Engeland, 1500-1700 (Amsterdam 1989), de Nederlandse vertaling van zijn boek uit 1971. Aangezien in diverse interviews al uitvoerig aandacht is geschonken aan de inhoud van dit boek, zal het in het hier afgedrukte gesprek tussen hem en Peer Vries slechts terloops aan de orde komen. Gezien de ware hausse die de cultuurgeschiedenis thans doormaakt, leek het zinvoller om een zo beroemd exponent van deze nieuwste mode binnen de geschiedbeoefening te vragen naar zijn visie op geschiedenis in het algemeen en cultuurgeschiedenis in het bijzonder.