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Energy plan to address Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) Vessels Mixing Issues; IP f... more Energy plan to address Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) Vessels Mixing Issues; IP for DNFSB 2010-2. The attached report provides documentation ofthe basis for selection ofspecific test configurations for testing relative to assessing and establishing mixing capabilities and process limits across the range of WTP vessels (e.g., mixing power, contents Pulse Jet Mixer (plM) configuration). The documentation ofthe basis is provided for the 4, 8, and 14-foot vessels. Documentation ofthe basis for the single PlM test platform will be provided in the associated Request for Technology Development (IP Commitment 5.1.3.10). Large-Scale Integrated Mixing System Expert Review Team review comments and resolution are also included with this submittal. Ifyou have any questions, please contact me at (509) 376-6727 or your staffmay contact Ben Harp,

i., rn f'.J On December 13, 2011, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) issuei... more i., rn f'.J On December 13, 2011, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) issueita letter requesting a report and briefing describing specific actions the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has taken or plans to take to ensure that two safety systems at the Plutonium Facility at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) can perform their safety functions. On March 8, 2012, NNSA issued a response to the Board addressing their concerns over legacy confinement boundaries of the Glovebox System and the potential defeat of the Fire Detection and Alarm System (FDAS) by a non-safety system. As a follow-up to the March 2012 report and briefing to the Board, the NNSA Livermore Field Office (LFO) has confirmed that LLNL met its commitment to change the priority of the fire alarm announcement such that the non-safety site-wide evacuation voice/alarm system does not override the safety significant FDAS. In addition; LLNL has evaluated

Facilities. The Implementation Plan deliverables include the establishment of a Risk Assessment T... more Facilities. The Implementation Plan deliverables include the establishment of a Risk Assessment Technical Expert Working Group (RWG) to assist in the review and appropriate use of quantitative risk assessment to better inform nuclear safety decisions and the issuance of an Information Notice, Risk Assessment in Support ofNuclear Safety. Both of these documents have been previously provided to your staff informally. The purpose of this letter is to formally transmit the signed RWG Charter and the Information Notice as fulfillment of these Implementation Plan commitments. The Department ofEnergy (DOE) steering group of the RWG is represented by members from all program offices with defense nuclear facilities, the Office of Health

Building 235-F Safety identifying the Department's actions to reduce the hazards associated ... more Building 235-F Safety identifying the Department's actions to reduce the hazards associated with the material at risk that remains as residual contamination within Building 235-F. On July la, 2012, DOE accepted Recommendation 2012-1, and on October 24,2012, requested additional time to complete the IP 0 The IP details a strategy that will address the Board's concern regarding the residual Plutonium-238 in Building 235-F and will eliminate the potential for a full facility fire in an accident situation. We intend to implement the Plan in a disciplined and methodical manner and will keep you informed ofour progress in accordance with the IP. Ifyou have any further questions, please feel free to contact me or Mr. David Huizenga,

Energy, Office ofRiver Protection, Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (ORP-WTP) plan

The deliverable for Action 2-12 is a letter to the Board transmitting Program Secretarial Officer... more The deliverable for Action 2-12 is a letter to the Board transmitting Program Secretarial Officer's direction to field office managers to develop processes and control for sustainment of a robust safety culture. The enclosure to this letter is a memorandum from me that provides direction to NNSA field offices. If you have any questions, please contact me at (202) 586-4379.

DOE-HQ letter fromS. Chu to P. S. Winokur, DNFSB, "Department ofEnergy Plan

Energy, Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plan (DOE-WTP) plan to address WTP Vessels

progress reports and describes the status of activities undertaken, and results achieved to meet ... more progress reports and describes the status of activities undertaken, and results achieved to meet the U. S. Department ofEnergy's (DOE) commitments as described in Reference 1. DOE has made good progress this quarter toward closing safety issues related to Pulse Jet Mixing at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant. In accordance with the IP, no deliverables were completed or due during this reporting period. Details may be found in thc attached report. If you have any questions, please contact me at (509) 376-6727 or your staff may contact Ben Harp,

This letter provides you the deliverable responsive to Commitment 5.5.3.2 ofthe U.S.

The deliverable for Action 2-8 is a letter to the Board transmitting a consolidated rep01i on the... more The deliverable for Action 2-8 is a letter to the Board transmitting a consolidated rep01i on the Safety Conscious.Work Environment (SCWE) extent of condition reviews, and the deliverable for Action 2-9 is transmittal to the Board of a rep01i to the Deputy Secretary of Energy recommending actions to be taken for ongoing safety culture management within the DOE defense nuclear facility complex. The enclosure to this letter is a consolidated report from the DOE Recommendation 2011-1 Response Team on the SCWE extent of condition reviews, which also contains the recommended actions for ongoing safety culture management within the DOE defense nuclear facility complex. If you have any questions, please contact me, at (202) 5 86-5151. Enclosure Sincerely, ames Hutton

f.: " I f ~ , I 7 P'.! I? ' ' " I

This letter provides you the deliverable responsive to Commitment 5.7.3.4 ofthe U. S. Department ... more This letter provides you the deliverable responsive to Commitment 5.7.3.4 ofthe U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) Plan to Address Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) Vessel Mixing Issues; Implementation Plan (IP) for Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 2010-2. The attached report identifies key inputs, assumptions, safety margin uncertainties, and nuclear safety parameters required to be included in the Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) for waste delivered from the Hanford tank farms to the WTP. The information in this report also provides input to the IP deliverables for Commitments 5.5.3.1, Initial gap analysis between WTP WAC and tankfarm sampling and transfer capability, and 5.7.3.1, Establish the plan and schedule to systematically evaluate the hazards ofknow technical issue, M3 vessel assessment summary report, LOAMbenchmark data, and LSITresults. Deliverables for Commitments 5.5.3.1 and 5.7.3.1 will be provided to the DNFSB later this year per the I...

Treatment and Immobilization Plant. The Addendum was developed based on irlfornlatioll and experi... more Treatment and Immobilization Plant. The Addendum was developed based on irlfornlatioll and experiellce to date during executioll ofthe IP. TIle Addendunl supplements the IP; it does not replace the IP. On December 27, 2011, the Department sent the Board a letter transmitting DOE's IP for the Recommendation. The letter stated that "In the course ofexecuting the IP, information may be developed, for example, from independent reviews or selfassessments, which lead the Department to take additional actions." On March 2, 2012, the Board sent a letter to the Department acknowledging receipt of DOE's IP. The letter requested that DOE update the IP using information gained from

This letter transmits a deliverable consistent with Commitment I. I of the Department of Energy·s... more This letter transmits a deliverable consistent with Commitment I. I of the Department of Energy·s IP for

An attachment provides the test plan to establish Tank Farm performance capability. Testing will ... more An attachment provides the test plan to establish Tank Farm performance capability. Testing will be conducted to determine the range ofwaste physical properties that can be retrieved and transferred to WTP and determine the capability ofTank Farm staging tank sampling systems to provide samples that will characterize waste and determine compliance with the waste acceptance criteria. This test plan also identifies and describes supplemental testing activities that will be performed to address the technical risks associated with waste feed delivery mixing and sampling. Test requirements and test plan for the supplemental work will be prepared separately so that the initial test results can inform supplemental testing. Large-Scale Integrated Mixing System Expert Review Team review comments and resolution are also included with this transmittal. Ifyou have any questions, please contact me at (509) 376-8830, or your staffmay contact Ben Harp,

The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) has been following closely the the National N... more The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) has been following closely the the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) plans and progress with regard to the dismantlement of the B53 weapon system . The results of onsite review activities by the Board's staff, as well as a review of correspondence between the Pantex Site Office and site contractor (B&W Pantex), indicate that the planning for the B53 system departs from conventionaldismantlement strategy .

Energy plan to address Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) Vessels Mixing Issues; IP f... more Energy plan to address Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) Vessels Mixing Issues; IP for DNFSB 2010-2. The attached report provides documentation ofthe basis for selection ofspecific test configurations for testing relative to assessing and establishing mixing capabilities and process limits across the range of WTP vessels (e.g., mixing power, contents Pulse Jet Mixer (plM) configuration). The documentation ofthe basis is provided for the 4, 8, and 14-foot vessels. Documentation ofthe basis for the single PlM test platform will be provided in the associated Request for Technology Development (IP Commitment 5.1.3.10). Large-Scale Integrated Mixing System Expert Review Team review comments and resolution are also included with this submittal. Ifyou have any questions, please contact me at (509) 376-6727 or your staffmay contact Ben Harp,

i., rn f'.J On December 13, 2011, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) issuei... more i., rn f'.J On December 13, 2011, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) issueita letter requesting a report and briefing describing specific actions the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has taken or plans to take to ensure that two safety systems at the Plutonium Facility at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) can perform their safety functions. On March 8, 2012, NNSA issued a response to the Board addressing their concerns over legacy confinement boundaries of the Glovebox System and the potential defeat of the Fire Detection and Alarm System (FDAS) by a non-safety system. As a follow-up to the March 2012 report and briefing to the Board, the NNSA Livermore Field Office (LFO) has confirmed that LLNL met its commitment to change the priority of the fire alarm announcement such that the non-safety site-wide evacuation voice/alarm system does not override the safety significant FDAS. In addition; LLNL has evaluated

Facilities. The Implementation Plan deliverables include the establishment of a Risk Assessment T... more Facilities. The Implementation Plan deliverables include the establishment of a Risk Assessment Technical Expert Working Group (RWG) to assist in the review and appropriate use of quantitative risk assessment to better inform nuclear safety decisions and the issuance of an Information Notice, Risk Assessment in Support ofNuclear Safety. Both of these documents have been previously provided to your staff informally. The purpose of this letter is to formally transmit the signed RWG Charter and the Information Notice as fulfillment of these Implementation Plan commitments. The Department ofEnergy (DOE) steering group of the RWG is represented by members from all program offices with defense nuclear facilities, the Office of Health

Building 235-F Safety identifying the Department's actions to reduce the hazards associated ... more Building 235-F Safety identifying the Department's actions to reduce the hazards associated with the material at risk that remains as residual contamination within Building 235-F. On July la, 2012, DOE accepted Recommendation 2012-1, and on October 24,2012, requested additional time to complete the IP 0 The IP details a strategy that will address the Board's concern regarding the residual Plutonium-238 in Building 235-F and will eliminate the potential for a full facility fire in an accident situation. We intend to implement the Plan in a disciplined and methodical manner and will keep you informed ofour progress in accordance with the IP. Ifyou have any further questions, please feel free to contact me or Mr. David Huizenga,

Energy, Office ofRiver Protection, Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (ORP-WTP) plan

The deliverable for Action 2-12 is a letter to the Board transmitting Program Secretarial Officer... more The deliverable for Action 2-12 is a letter to the Board transmitting Program Secretarial Officer's direction to field office managers to develop processes and control for sustainment of a robust safety culture. The enclosure to this letter is a memorandum from me that provides direction to NNSA field offices. If you have any questions, please contact me at (202) 586-4379.

DOE-HQ letter fromS. Chu to P. S. Winokur, DNFSB, "Department ofEnergy Plan

Energy, Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plan (DOE-WTP) plan to address WTP Vessels

progress reports and describes the status of activities undertaken, and results achieved to meet ... more progress reports and describes the status of activities undertaken, and results achieved to meet the U. S. Department ofEnergy's (DOE) commitments as described in Reference 1. DOE has made good progress this quarter toward closing safety issues related to Pulse Jet Mixing at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant. In accordance with the IP, no deliverables were completed or due during this reporting period. Details may be found in thc attached report. If you have any questions, please contact me at (509) 376-6727 or your staff may contact Ben Harp,

This letter provides you the deliverable responsive to Commitment 5.5.3.2 ofthe U.S.

The deliverable for Action 2-8 is a letter to the Board transmitting a consolidated rep01i on the... more The deliverable for Action 2-8 is a letter to the Board transmitting a consolidated rep01i on the Safety Conscious.Work Environment (SCWE) extent of condition reviews, and the deliverable for Action 2-9 is transmittal to the Board of a rep01i to the Deputy Secretary of Energy recommending actions to be taken for ongoing safety culture management within the DOE defense nuclear facility complex. The enclosure to this letter is a consolidated report from the DOE Recommendation 2011-1 Response Team on the SCWE extent of condition reviews, which also contains the recommended actions for ongoing safety culture management within the DOE defense nuclear facility complex. If you have any questions, please contact me, at (202) 5 86-5151. Enclosure Sincerely, ames Hutton

f.: " I f ~ , I 7 P'.! I? ' ' " I

This letter provides you the deliverable responsive to Commitment 5.7.3.4 ofthe U. S. Department ... more This letter provides you the deliverable responsive to Commitment 5.7.3.4 ofthe U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) Plan to Address Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) Vessel Mixing Issues; Implementation Plan (IP) for Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 2010-2. The attached report identifies key inputs, assumptions, safety margin uncertainties, and nuclear safety parameters required to be included in the Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) for waste delivered from the Hanford tank farms to the WTP. The information in this report also provides input to the IP deliverables for Commitments 5.5.3.1, Initial gap analysis between WTP WAC and tankfarm sampling and transfer capability, and 5.7.3.1, Establish the plan and schedule to systematically evaluate the hazards ofknow technical issue, M3 vessel assessment summary report, LOAMbenchmark data, and LSITresults. Deliverables for Commitments 5.5.3.1 and 5.7.3.1 will be provided to the DNFSB later this year per the I...

Treatment and Immobilization Plant. The Addendum was developed based on irlfornlatioll and experi... more Treatment and Immobilization Plant. The Addendum was developed based on irlfornlatioll and experiellce to date during executioll ofthe IP. TIle Addendunl supplements the IP; it does not replace the IP. On December 27, 2011, the Department sent the Board a letter transmitting DOE's IP for the Recommendation. The letter stated that "In the course ofexecuting the IP, information may be developed, for example, from independent reviews or selfassessments, which lead the Department to take additional actions." On March 2, 2012, the Board sent a letter to the Department acknowledging receipt of DOE's IP. The letter requested that DOE update the IP using information gained from

This letter transmits a deliverable consistent with Commitment I. I of the Department of Energy·s... more This letter transmits a deliverable consistent with Commitment I. I of the Department of Energy·s IP for

An attachment provides the test plan to establish Tank Farm performance capability. Testing will ... more An attachment provides the test plan to establish Tank Farm performance capability. Testing will be conducted to determine the range ofwaste physical properties that can be retrieved and transferred to WTP and determine the capability ofTank Farm staging tank sampling systems to provide samples that will characterize waste and determine compliance with the waste acceptance criteria. This test plan also identifies and describes supplemental testing activities that will be performed to address the technical risks associated with waste feed delivery mixing and sampling. Test requirements and test plan for the supplemental work will be prepared separately so that the initial test results can inform supplemental testing. Large-Scale Integrated Mixing System Expert Review Team review comments and resolution are also included with this transmittal. Ifyou have any questions, please contact me at (509) 376-8830, or your staffmay contact Ben Harp,

The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) has been following closely the the National N... more The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) has been following closely the the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) plans and progress with regard to the dismantlement of the B53 weapon system . The results of onsite review activities by the Board's staff, as well as a review of correspondence between the Pantex Site Office and site contractor (B&W Pantex), indicate that the planning for the B53 system departs from conventionaldismantlement strategy .