Patricia Clavin - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Papers by Patricia Clavin
History: Reviews of New Books, 2014
Current History, 2014
The modern, globalized economy had emerged with vigor and reach in the nineteenth century, but wa... more The modern, globalized economy had emerged with vigor and reach in the nineteenth century, but was no more a guarantor of domestic or world peace after 1918 than it had been in 1914.
Refugees from the Third Reich in Britain, 2002
... 7 Moritz Bonn, Die englische Kolonisation in Irland (Stuttgart: JG Cotta, 1906), translated a... more ... 7 Moritz Bonn, Die englische Kolonisation in Irland (Stuttgart: JG Cotta, 1906), translated as Modern Ireland and Her ... publications include Die Eingeborenenpolitik in Britisch Südafrika (Berlin: Wegweiser-Verlag, 1908); and Nationale Kolonialpolitik (München: Reger, 1910). ...
Journal of European Economic History, 1991
Routledge Explorations in Economic History, 1998
The Failure of Economic Diplomacy, 1996
docked in New York. The celebratory cannon salute which was to have welcomed both the British del... more docked in New York. The celebratory cannon salute which was to have welcomed both the British delegation and their French counterparts was cancelled hastily as the dollar devaluation now made such festivities inappropriate. Instead, the delegations arrived in sombre silence.' They were the first of over eleven foreign missions received in Washington that spring, including visits by Canadian, Argentine, Italian, German, Chinese, Mexican, Brazilian, Japanese and Chilean representatives. Not all national missions to Washington were represented at a ministerial level. Some countries, such as Rumania, Norway, Poland and Austria, chose to rely on their established diplomatic representation and there were over thirty ambassadorial meetings regarding the forthcoming conference. But the ministerial delegations of Britain and France were of greatest interest to Roosevelt. The White House had advertised the talks as a welcome opportunity for the new President to meet with European leaders and, more importantly, to make preparations for the forthcoming World Conference. The talks could not have come at a worse time for the new administration. The legislative maelstrom of the first Hundred Days of Roosevelt's administration and, from the perspective of overseas delegates, the President's apparent attraction to nationalist recovery measures, created an uncomfortable backdrop to the discussions. Nor were Britain and France impressed by the 'Great Communicator's' relaxed demeanour and his comparatively unprepared manner of negotiating. Detailed preparations were not Roosevelt's style and his advisers were too busy to prepare an agenda, so the Draft Annotated Agenda drawn-up for the World Conference was adopted for the Washington talks, too, although it quickly proved too large, imprecise and inappropriate for intimate meetings between foreign ministers and the President. There was a broad consensus on the purpose of the Washington talks and the subsequent conference-to revive the world economy and improve the climate for international relations-but there was no agreement on specific measures and any sense of direction or progress was lost amid a 'medley of ideas and desires,"
The Failure of Economic Diplomacy, 1996
‘There has never been’, wrote Chamberlain to his sister Ida on 15 July, ‘a case of a conference b... more ‘There has never been’, wrote Chamberlain to his sister Ida on 15 July, ‘a case of a conference being so completely smashed by one of its participants.’ According to the Chancellor, the ‘bombshell message’ had left the London conference in disarray, yet it was not a perspective shared by the French or the Americans. Without a stabilisation agreement, the French declared that they ‘might as well go home’, but this did not mean that, in their eyes, Britain was blameless. Sterling had been floating since 1931 with no sign of a likely return to gold and while Moure asserts that the British ‘subordinated their actions to American policy’ at the World Conference, in fact the priorities of the National Government were governed, first and foremost, by the requirements of the domestic economy. However, despite the French view that there was little to choose between the two Anglo-Saxon inflationary villains, the power of the dollar and the character of its floatation posed a much greater threat to the stability of the franc than that of the pound.1 Months of negotiation also had brought little progress on debts and the apparent impossibility of securing even a temporary stabilisation agreement had destroyed much of the monetary half of the conference agenda.
The Failure of Economic Diplomacy, 1996
Even before the Economic Conference adjourned, post-mortems into the spectacular failure of inter... more Even before the Economic Conference adjourned, post-mortems into the spectacular failure of international co-operation in London had already begun. The European delegations reached the almost uniform conclusion that both the conference and the prospects for future co-operation on economic questions had been scuppered by Roosevelt’s ‘bombshell message’. In public the United States was an easy target, although many of the European powers privately acknowledged that even if temporary stabilisation had been realised in London, it would have been difficult to secure agreement on other contentious issues like protectionism and cartelization. Indeed, as the delighted delegate Carl Vincent Krogmann, Lord Mayor of Hamburg and NSDAP member, told Hitler Germany should now capitalise on the fact that, as a result of London, the United States was ‘apparently looking about for friends’.1 Given the future direction of German foreign policy, there were obvious advantages to be had from exploiting the bitter divisions which had emerged in London between Britain, the United States and France.
The Failure of Economic Diplomacy, 1996
In July 1932 Whitehall made a start on the considerable preparations demanded for a World Economi... more In July 1932 Whitehall made a start on the considerable preparations demanded for a World Economic Conference. From the outset such enthusiasm as there was for the conference amongst its principal international sponsors — Britain, the United States and France — depended upon their perception that it would afford opportunities to debate (and criticise) the economic and monetary policies of the other participants. The French government saw the conference as an opportunity to air their misgivings about the Federal Reserve’s increased open-market operations which had fuelled rumours that the United States would devalue the dollar sometime soon.1 More importantly, it offered the chance to determine the future direction of British monetary policy and to press for the return of sterling to gold. This French interest was shared by the US Treasury and Federal Reserve, although the Americans also paid close attention to the evolution of the British tariff (the General Tariff was introduced in April 1932 and the Imperial Tariff in July 1932), an issue of little interest to France but which Germany recognised to be, for reasons which will become apparent below, of potential benefit to its plans to secure further debt concessions from its creditors.
Securing the World Economy, 2013
Securing the World Economy, 2013
Securing the World Economy, 2013
The English Historical Review, 1999
The English Historical Review, 2014
Este volumen es la continuación de La Edad Media y El mundo moderno de Helli Koenigsberger* En un... more Este volumen es la continuación de La Edad Media y El mundo moderno de Helli Koenigsberger* En un principio, los tres volúmenes tendrían que haber constituido una unidad, de acuerdo con el plan que nos trazamos Koenigsberger y yo, y escribí el ...
The Historical Journal, 1995
Diplomacy & Statecraft, 2005
This paper explores how policy-makers during the Second World War attempted to "learn the lessons... more This paper explores how policy-makers during the Second World War attempted to "learn the lessons" of history from the reparations settlement imposed after the First World War. It shows how these lessons were developed and articulated in the formulation of, in particular, American foreign policy, and also their consequences for foreign policy during and after the Second World War. The paper demonstrates the important role of European advisors in shaping American policy, thereby illustrating that not all American lessons of history were born in the USA. It also draws out how many of these lessons have found an echo in the historiography of German reparations that has emerged over the past fifty years. In both periods the issues of enforcement and compliance, the issues that concern us generally in this volume, dominated the debate between advisors and policy-makers.
Contemporary European History, 2005
This article offers an introduction to the essays in the theme issue, an overview of the reasons ... more This article offers an introduction to the essays in the theme issue, an overview of the reasons behind the recent resurgence of interest in transnationalist phenomena and a consideration of what the term means. Its places the topic in the different fields of international, world, regional, local and national history. The essay argues that transnationalism is best understood not as fostering bounded networks, but as creating honeycombs, a structure that sustains and gives shapes to the identities of nation-states, international and local institutions, and particular social and geographic spaces. A honeycomb binds, but it also contains hollowed-out spaces where organisations, individuals and ideas can wither away to be replaced by new groups, people and innovations.
Contemporary European History, 2008
Gerald D. Feldman, professor emeritus of the Department of History at the University of Californi... more Gerald D. Feldman, professor emeritus of the Department of History at the University of California, Berkeley, died on 31 October 2007 at his home in Berkeley at the age of 70. He was a member of the editorial board of Contemporary European History from the journal's foundation in 1992.
The American Historical Review, 1997
History: Reviews of New Books, 2014
Current History, 2014
The modern, globalized economy had emerged with vigor and reach in the nineteenth century, but wa... more The modern, globalized economy had emerged with vigor and reach in the nineteenth century, but was no more a guarantor of domestic or world peace after 1918 than it had been in 1914.
Refugees from the Third Reich in Britain, 2002
... 7 Moritz Bonn, Die englische Kolonisation in Irland (Stuttgart: JG Cotta, 1906), translated a... more ... 7 Moritz Bonn, Die englische Kolonisation in Irland (Stuttgart: JG Cotta, 1906), translated as Modern Ireland and Her ... publications include Die Eingeborenenpolitik in Britisch Südafrika (Berlin: Wegweiser-Verlag, 1908); and Nationale Kolonialpolitik (München: Reger, 1910). ...
Journal of European Economic History, 1991
Routledge Explorations in Economic History, 1998
The Failure of Economic Diplomacy, 1996
docked in New York. The celebratory cannon salute which was to have welcomed both the British del... more docked in New York. The celebratory cannon salute which was to have welcomed both the British delegation and their French counterparts was cancelled hastily as the dollar devaluation now made such festivities inappropriate. Instead, the delegations arrived in sombre silence.' They were the first of over eleven foreign missions received in Washington that spring, including visits by Canadian, Argentine, Italian, German, Chinese, Mexican, Brazilian, Japanese and Chilean representatives. Not all national missions to Washington were represented at a ministerial level. Some countries, such as Rumania, Norway, Poland and Austria, chose to rely on their established diplomatic representation and there were over thirty ambassadorial meetings regarding the forthcoming conference. But the ministerial delegations of Britain and France were of greatest interest to Roosevelt. The White House had advertised the talks as a welcome opportunity for the new President to meet with European leaders and, more importantly, to make preparations for the forthcoming World Conference. The talks could not have come at a worse time for the new administration. The legislative maelstrom of the first Hundred Days of Roosevelt's administration and, from the perspective of overseas delegates, the President's apparent attraction to nationalist recovery measures, created an uncomfortable backdrop to the discussions. Nor were Britain and France impressed by the 'Great Communicator's' relaxed demeanour and his comparatively unprepared manner of negotiating. Detailed preparations were not Roosevelt's style and his advisers were too busy to prepare an agenda, so the Draft Annotated Agenda drawn-up for the World Conference was adopted for the Washington talks, too, although it quickly proved too large, imprecise and inappropriate for intimate meetings between foreign ministers and the President. There was a broad consensus on the purpose of the Washington talks and the subsequent conference-to revive the world economy and improve the climate for international relations-but there was no agreement on specific measures and any sense of direction or progress was lost amid a 'medley of ideas and desires,"
The Failure of Economic Diplomacy, 1996
‘There has never been’, wrote Chamberlain to his sister Ida on 15 July, ‘a case of a conference b... more ‘There has never been’, wrote Chamberlain to his sister Ida on 15 July, ‘a case of a conference being so completely smashed by one of its participants.’ According to the Chancellor, the ‘bombshell message’ had left the London conference in disarray, yet it was not a perspective shared by the French or the Americans. Without a stabilisation agreement, the French declared that they ‘might as well go home’, but this did not mean that, in their eyes, Britain was blameless. Sterling had been floating since 1931 with no sign of a likely return to gold and while Moure asserts that the British ‘subordinated their actions to American policy’ at the World Conference, in fact the priorities of the National Government were governed, first and foremost, by the requirements of the domestic economy. However, despite the French view that there was little to choose between the two Anglo-Saxon inflationary villains, the power of the dollar and the character of its floatation posed a much greater threat to the stability of the franc than that of the pound.1 Months of negotiation also had brought little progress on debts and the apparent impossibility of securing even a temporary stabilisation agreement had destroyed much of the monetary half of the conference agenda.
The Failure of Economic Diplomacy, 1996
Even before the Economic Conference adjourned, post-mortems into the spectacular failure of inter... more Even before the Economic Conference adjourned, post-mortems into the spectacular failure of international co-operation in London had already begun. The European delegations reached the almost uniform conclusion that both the conference and the prospects for future co-operation on economic questions had been scuppered by Roosevelt’s ‘bombshell message’. In public the United States was an easy target, although many of the European powers privately acknowledged that even if temporary stabilisation had been realised in London, it would have been difficult to secure agreement on other contentious issues like protectionism and cartelization. Indeed, as the delighted delegate Carl Vincent Krogmann, Lord Mayor of Hamburg and NSDAP member, told Hitler Germany should now capitalise on the fact that, as a result of London, the United States was ‘apparently looking about for friends’.1 Given the future direction of German foreign policy, there were obvious advantages to be had from exploiting the bitter divisions which had emerged in London between Britain, the United States and France.
The Failure of Economic Diplomacy, 1996
In July 1932 Whitehall made a start on the considerable preparations demanded for a World Economi... more In July 1932 Whitehall made a start on the considerable preparations demanded for a World Economic Conference. From the outset such enthusiasm as there was for the conference amongst its principal international sponsors — Britain, the United States and France — depended upon their perception that it would afford opportunities to debate (and criticise) the economic and monetary policies of the other participants. The French government saw the conference as an opportunity to air their misgivings about the Federal Reserve’s increased open-market operations which had fuelled rumours that the United States would devalue the dollar sometime soon.1 More importantly, it offered the chance to determine the future direction of British monetary policy and to press for the return of sterling to gold. This French interest was shared by the US Treasury and Federal Reserve, although the Americans also paid close attention to the evolution of the British tariff (the General Tariff was introduced in April 1932 and the Imperial Tariff in July 1932), an issue of little interest to France but which Germany recognised to be, for reasons which will become apparent below, of potential benefit to its plans to secure further debt concessions from its creditors.
Securing the World Economy, 2013
Securing the World Economy, 2013
Securing the World Economy, 2013
The English Historical Review, 1999
The English Historical Review, 2014
Este volumen es la continuación de La Edad Media y El mundo moderno de Helli Koenigsberger* En un... more Este volumen es la continuación de La Edad Media y El mundo moderno de Helli Koenigsberger* En un principio, los tres volúmenes tendrían que haber constituido una unidad, de acuerdo con el plan que nos trazamos Koenigsberger y yo, y escribí el ...
The Historical Journal, 1995
Diplomacy & Statecraft, 2005
This paper explores how policy-makers during the Second World War attempted to "learn the lessons... more This paper explores how policy-makers during the Second World War attempted to "learn the lessons" of history from the reparations settlement imposed after the First World War. It shows how these lessons were developed and articulated in the formulation of, in particular, American foreign policy, and also their consequences for foreign policy during and after the Second World War. The paper demonstrates the important role of European advisors in shaping American policy, thereby illustrating that not all American lessons of history were born in the USA. It also draws out how many of these lessons have found an echo in the historiography of German reparations that has emerged over the past fifty years. In both periods the issues of enforcement and compliance, the issues that concern us generally in this volume, dominated the debate between advisors and policy-makers.
Contemporary European History, 2005
This article offers an introduction to the essays in the theme issue, an overview of the reasons ... more This article offers an introduction to the essays in the theme issue, an overview of the reasons behind the recent resurgence of interest in transnationalist phenomena and a consideration of what the term means. Its places the topic in the different fields of international, world, regional, local and national history. The essay argues that transnationalism is best understood not as fostering bounded networks, but as creating honeycombs, a structure that sustains and gives shapes to the identities of nation-states, international and local institutions, and particular social and geographic spaces. A honeycomb binds, but it also contains hollowed-out spaces where organisations, individuals and ideas can wither away to be replaced by new groups, people and innovations.
Contemporary European History, 2008
Gerald D. Feldman, professor emeritus of the Department of History at the University of Californi... more Gerald D. Feldman, professor emeritus of the Department of History at the University of California, Berkeley, died on 31 October 2007 at his home in Berkeley at the age of 70. He was a member of the editorial board of Contemporary European History from the journal's foundation in 1992.
The American Historical Review, 1997