Paul Egre - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Related Authors
Uploads
Papers by Paul Egre
Reduction, 2009
1 Numerous exceptions ought to be mentioned, of course. What I mean is that few empirical data ha... more 1 Numerous exceptions ought to be mentioned, of course. What I mean is that few empirical data have been discussed by philosophers in proportion to the vast amount of theoretical work accumulated on vagueness.
for the many discussions, inspiring suggestions, and stimulating exchanges without which the pape... more for the many discussions, inspiring suggestions, and stimulating exchanges without which the paper would simply not exist in its present form (except for remaining errors, which are only mine). Special thanks are due to Denis Bonnay and Philippe Schlenker for comments on the logical aspects. I also thank Hannes Leitgeb for communicating me his review of Williamson 2000, and several audiences in Paris, Stanford and Lisbon.
Foundations of Metacognition, 2012
A state of ignorance about a proposition can result from two distinct sources: uncertainty about ... more A state of ignorance about a proposition can result from two distinct sources: uncertainty about what the correct answer actually is, and unawareness of what the answer might possibly be. Uncertainty concerns the strength of one's evidence, whereas unawareness concerns the conceptual components needed to articulate a proposition. This chapter discusses the implications of the distinction between uncertainty and unawareness for metacognition, and more specifically for the problem of what it takes to know that one knows and to know that one does not know. In particular, we relate the distinction between uncertainty-based unknowns and unawareness-based unknowns to the two-stage model proposed by Glucksberg and McCloskey for decisions about ignorance.
Synthese, 2009
In chapter 5 of Knowledge and its Limits, T. Williamson formulates an argument against the princi... more In chapter 5 of Knowledge and its Limits, T. Williamson formulates an argument against the principle (KK) of epistemic transparency, or luminosity of knowledge, namely "that if one knows something, one knows that one knows it". Williamson's argument proceeds by reductio: from the description of a situation of approximate knowledge, he shows that a contradiction can be derived on the basis of principle (KK) and additional epistemic principles that he claims are better grounded. One of them is a reflective form of the margin for error principle defended by Williamson in his account of knowledge. We argue that Williamson's reductio rests on the inappropriate identification of distinct forms of knowledge. More specifically, an important distinction between perceptual knowledge and non-perceptual knowledge is wanting in his statement and analysis of the puzzle. We present an alternative account of this puzzle, based on a modular conception of knowledge: the (KK) principle and the margin for error principle can coexist, provided their domain of application is referred to the right sort of knowledge.
Reduction, 2009
1 Numerous exceptions ought to be mentioned, of course. What I mean is that few empirical data ha... more 1 Numerous exceptions ought to be mentioned, of course. What I mean is that few empirical data have been discussed by philosophers in proportion to the vast amount of theoretical work accumulated on vagueness.
for the many discussions, inspiring suggestions, and stimulating exchanges without which the pape... more for the many discussions, inspiring suggestions, and stimulating exchanges without which the paper would simply not exist in its present form (except for remaining errors, which are only mine). Special thanks are due to Denis Bonnay and Philippe Schlenker for comments on the logical aspects. I also thank Hannes Leitgeb for communicating me his review of Williamson 2000, and several audiences in Paris, Stanford and Lisbon.
Foundations of Metacognition, 2012
A state of ignorance about a proposition can result from two distinct sources: uncertainty about ... more A state of ignorance about a proposition can result from two distinct sources: uncertainty about what the correct answer actually is, and unawareness of what the answer might possibly be. Uncertainty concerns the strength of one's evidence, whereas unawareness concerns the conceptual components needed to articulate a proposition. This chapter discusses the implications of the distinction between uncertainty and unawareness for metacognition, and more specifically for the problem of what it takes to know that one knows and to know that one does not know. In particular, we relate the distinction between uncertainty-based unknowns and unawareness-based unknowns to the two-stage model proposed by Glucksberg and McCloskey for decisions about ignorance.
Synthese, 2009
In chapter 5 of Knowledge and its Limits, T. Williamson formulates an argument against the princi... more In chapter 5 of Knowledge and its Limits, T. Williamson formulates an argument against the principle (KK) of epistemic transparency, or luminosity of knowledge, namely "that if one knows something, one knows that one knows it". Williamson's argument proceeds by reductio: from the description of a situation of approximate knowledge, he shows that a contradiction can be derived on the basis of principle (KK) and additional epistemic principles that he claims are better grounded. One of them is a reflective form of the margin for error principle defended by Williamson in his account of knowledge. We argue that Williamson's reductio rests on the inappropriate identification of distinct forms of knowledge. More specifically, an important distinction between perceptual knowledge and non-perceptual knowledge is wanting in his statement and analysis of the puzzle. We present an alternative account of this puzzle, based on a modular conception of knowledge: the (KK) principle and the margin for error principle can coexist, provided their domain of application is referred to the right sort of knowledge.