Paulo Juarez - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Papers by Paulo Juarez

Scientia et Fides

In this paper I pursue an avenue of argument implicit in Patristic thinkers-such as Tertullian an... more In this paper I pursue an avenue of argument implicit in Patristic thinkers-such as Tertullian and Athanasius-and explicit in the thomistic and scholastic tradition. I argue that there is an ontological unity to the world, and that this unity calls for an explanation in terms of a transcendent cause, traditionally identified with God.

I present and defend several formulations of the Aristotelian argument from motion, according to ... more I present and defend several formulations of the Aristotelian argument from motion, according to which the reality of change in the physical world ultimately requires the existence of a sustaining source of all change, a reality which can impart to all things the power to change and to undergo change, but which cannot itself be subject to change or undergo change. Second, I defend the Aristotelian project from a number of objections, including the viability of Aristotle's argument in light of challenges from modern physics, such as the challenge of inertial motion and special relativity. Finally, I show that an unchanging cause of all change must be such as to possess the attributes definitive of the God of classical theism.

In this paper I pursue an avenue of argument implicit in Patristic thinkers — such as Tertullian ... more In this paper I pursue an avenue of argument implicit in Patristic thinkers — such as Tertullian and Athanasius — and explicit in the thomistic and scholastic tradition. I argue that there is an ontological unity to the world, and that this unity calls for an explanation in terms of a transcendent cause, traditionally identified with God.

The problem of evil is typically thought to be a problem for theism, the view that there is an om... more The problem of evil is typically thought to be a problem for theism, the view that there is an omnipotent, omniscient, and essentially good God. The existence of horrendous evils stands out as particularly problematic for the theist: surely if an all-knowing, all-powerful and all-good God existed, we would not find ourselves in a world in which horrendous evils obtain. The following paper, while not a theodicy, takes the reality of horrendous evils as its point of departure. I argue that, if the problem of horrendous evils were sound, and God did not exist, then justice would fall to us and no one else. But there is a disproportion between the justice we are able to enact in this life, and the kind of justice we in our heart of hearts desire: justice for every person to ever live and to ever have lived. This desire for a unique order of justice, unconditioned and absolute – what I call 'cosmic justice' – can only obtain if God exists, and so the very argument intended to show an incompatibility between the existence of God and the existence of horrendous evils fails, so far as only if God exists can there in principle be justice for every sufferer of horrendous evils. This conclusion gives rise to two arguments for the existence of God, one metaphysical – an argument from our desire for cosmic justice to its corresponding source, namely God – and one pragmatic – a Pascalian argument from our desire for cosmic justice to the existence of God as the most rational doxastic commitment.

In the book "Debating Christian Theism " we find an interesting exchange between two prominent ph... more In the book "Debating Christian Theism " we find an interesting exchange between two prominent philosophers of religion, William Lane Craig and Wes Morriston, on the ​ kalam cosmological argument. Craig offers a spirited defense of the argument, while Morriston expresses doubts about its validity​. In particular, he casts grave doubt on the major premise of the argument, namely, the claim that 'whatever begins to exist must have a cause of its existence' ​ – this is known as the principle of causality. I argue that Morriston's objections to the principle of causality are not insurmountable, and hence that Craig has good reasons to believe it to be true. I also seek to remedy what I take to be Craig's underdeveloped defense of the principle, building upon arguments he employs in its favor. Finally, I argue that the principle of causality is not merely plausible, but metaphysically certain, by drawing on the resources of scholastic philosophy. To be sure, in all of this I do not mean to suggest, ​ a fortiori​, that the kalam cosmological argument is a successful argument – I leave that question open for future inquiry. My concern is solely to defend the principle of causality against Morriston's objections, to strengthen Craig's defense of the principle in ways previously unconsidered, and finally to defend its status as a fundamental metaphysical principle.

Scientia et Fides

In this paper I pursue an avenue of argument implicit in Patristic thinkers-such as Tertullian an... more In this paper I pursue an avenue of argument implicit in Patristic thinkers-such as Tertullian and Athanasius-and explicit in the thomistic and scholastic tradition. I argue that there is an ontological unity to the world, and that this unity calls for an explanation in terms of a transcendent cause, traditionally identified with God.

I present and defend several formulations of the Aristotelian argument from motion, according to ... more I present and defend several formulations of the Aristotelian argument from motion, according to which the reality of change in the physical world ultimately requires the existence of a sustaining source of all change, a reality which can impart to all things the power to change and to undergo change, but which cannot itself be subject to change or undergo change. Second, I defend the Aristotelian project from a number of objections, including the viability of Aristotle's argument in light of challenges from modern physics, such as the challenge of inertial motion and special relativity. Finally, I show that an unchanging cause of all change must be such as to possess the attributes definitive of the God of classical theism.

In this paper I pursue an avenue of argument implicit in Patristic thinkers — such as Tertullian ... more In this paper I pursue an avenue of argument implicit in Patristic thinkers — such as Tertullian and Athanasius — and explicit in the thomistic and scholastic tradition. I argue that there is an ontological unity to the world, and that this unity calls for an explanation in terms of a transcendent cause, traditionally identified with God.

The problem of evil is typically thought to be a problem for theism, the view that there is an om... more The problem of evil is typically thought to be a problem for theism, the view that there is an omnipotent, omniscient, and essentially good God. The existence of horrendous evils stands out as particularly problematic for the theist: surely if an all-knowing, all-powerful and all-good God existed, we would not find ourselves in a world in which horrendous evils obtain. The following paper, while not a theodicy, takes the reality of horrendous evils as its point of departure. I argue that, if the problem of horrendous evils were sound, and God did not exist, then justice would fall to us and no one else. But there is a disproportion between the justice we are able to enact in this life, and the kind of justice we in our heart of hearts desire: justice for every person to ever live and to ever have lived. This desire for a unique order of justice, unconditioned and absolute – what I call 'cosmic justice' – can only obtain if God exists, and so the very argument intended to show an incompatibility between the existence of God and the existence of horrendous evils fails, so far as only if God exists can there in principle be justice for every sufferer of horrendous evils. This conclusion gives rise to two arguments for the existence of God, one metaphysical – an argument from our desire for cosmic justice to its corresponding source, namely God – and one pragmatic – a Pascalian argument from our desire for cosmic justice to the existence of God as the most rational doxastic commitment.

In the book "Debating Christian Theism " we find an interesting exchange between two prominent ph... more In the book "Debating Christian Theism " we find an interesting exchange between two prominent philosophers of religion, William Lane Craig and Wes Morriston, on the ​ kalam cosmological argument. Craig offers a spirited defense of the argument, while Morriston expresses doubts about its validity​. In particular, he casts grave doubt on the major premise of the argument, namely, the claim that 'whatever begins to exist must have a cause of its existence' ​ – this is known as the principle of causality. I argue that Morriston's objections to the principle of causality are not insurmountable, and hence that Craig has good reasons to believe it to be true. I also seek to remedy what I take to be Craig's underdeveloped defense of the principle, building upon arguments he employs in its favor. Finally, I argue that the principle of causality is not merely plausible, but metaphysically certain, by drawing on the resources of scholastic philosophy. To be sure, in all of this I do not mean to suggest, ​ a fortiori​, that the kalam cosmological argument is a successful argument – I leave that question open for future inquiry. My concern is solely to defend the principle of causality against Morriston's objections, to strengthen Craig's defense of the principle in ways previously unconsidered, and finally to defend its status as a fundamental metaphysical principle.