Petra Todd - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Petra Todd is the Edmund J. and Louise W. Kahn Term Professor of Economics atthe University of Pennsylvania. She is a research associate of NBER, of the Population Studies Center at U Penn, of HCEO (at U of Chicago), and of IZA. She is also a fellow of the Econometric Society and the Society of Labor Economics. Her main fields of research are social program evaluation, labor economics, and microeconometrics. She has published papers on the determinants of cognitive achievement, testing for discrimination in motor vehicle searches, sources of racial wage disparities, and methods for evaluating and optimally designing conditional cash transfer programs. She has recently finished a book manuscript Impact Evaluation in Developing Countries: Theory, Methods and Practice, coauthored with Paul Glewwe. Some of her current research projects include a paper that models the school-going decisions and grade progression of adolescent girls in Malawi, in which she analyzes the optimal design of a conditional cash transfer program. She also recent papers that analyze the role of personality traits in educational and working decisions and in time allocation of husbands and wives. She is on the editorial board of the Journal of Economic Literature.
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... PRINCIPALES RESULTADOS Autor: David Bravo, Javiera Vásquez, Jere R. Behrman, Olivia S. Mitche... more ... PRINCIPALES RESULTADOS Autor: David Bravo, Javiera Vásquez, Jere R. Behrman, Olivia S. Mitchell y Petra E. Todd ... Principales Resultados David Bravo y Javiera Vásquez Universidad de Chile Jere R. Behrman, Olivia S. Mitchell y Petra E. Todd University of Pennsylvania ...
Annales D Economie Et De Statistique, 2008
Nber Working Papers, Oct 1, 1995
The Journal of Economic History, Jun 1, 2001
Education Policy in Developing Countries, 2013
Competition across money managers, along with market entry, in theory could ensure that capital m... more Competition across money managers, along with market entry, in theory could ensure that capital market remains competitive. But in Chile, which has had a privatized pension system for 25 years, high rates of switching between the funds and little downward movement on fees, have been interpreted as evidence of market inefficiency. This chapter uses a change in the regulatory rules governing the marketing of AFP pensions (Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones) in Chile to investigate the empirical basis for sources of market frictions. We find that switching patterns are on a par with trading in US 401(k) accounts, and further, that switchers tend to be highly educated and relatively more highly paid. Switching is also more common among those with higher levels of financial literacy. The 1997 regulatory change appears to have reduced switching, particularly among the better educated.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
Editor-in-Chief Isaac Ehrlich works with an editorial board of leading economists in developing t... more Editor-in-Chief Isaac Ehrlich works with an editorial board of leading economists in developing the JOURNAL OF HUMAN CAPITAL. This important new journal explores the role human capital plays in the production, ...
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol 4a, 2011
ABSTRACT The purpose of this chapter is twofold: (1) to provide an accessible introduction to the... more ABSTRACT The purpose of this chapter is twofold: (1) to provide an accessible introduction to the methods of structural estimation of discrete choice dynamic programming (DCDP) models and (2) to survey the contributions of applications of these methods to substantive and policy issues in labor economics. The first part of the chapter describes solution and estimation methods for DCDP models using, for expository purposes, a prototypical female labor force participation model. The next part reviews the contribution of the DCDP approach to three leading areas in labor economics: labor supply, job search and human capital. The final section discusses approaches to validating DCDP models.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
ABSTRACT This paper evaluates the impact of three different performance incentives schemes using ... more ABSTRACT This paper evaluates the impact of three different performance incentives schemes using data from a social experiment that randomized 88 Mexican high schools with over 40,000 students into three treatment groups and a control group. Treatment one provides individual incentives for performance on curriculum-based mathematics tests to students only, treatment two to teachers only and treatment three gives both individual and group incentives to students, teachers and school administrators. Program impact estimates reveal the largest average effects for treatment three, smaller impacts for treatment one and no impact for treatment two.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
... PRINCIPALES RESULTADOS Autor: David Bravo, Javiera Vásquez, Jere R. Behrman, Olivia S. Mitche... more ... PRINCIPALES RESULTADOS Autor: David Bravo, Javiera Vásquez, Jere R. Behrman, Olivia S. Mitchell y Petra E. Todd ... Principales Resultados David Bravo y Javiera Vásquez Universidad de Chile Jere R. Behrman, Olivia S. Mitchell y Petra E. Todd University of Pennsylvania ...
Annales D Economie Et De Statistique, 2008
Nber Working Papers, Oct 1, 1995
The Journal of Economic History, Jun 1, 2001
Education Policy in Developing Countries, 2013
Competition across money managers, along with market entry, in theory could ensure that capital m... more Competition across money managers, along with market entry, in theory could ensure that capital market remains competitive. But in Chile, which has had a privatized pension system for 25 years, high rates of switching between the funds and little downward movement on fees, have been interpreted as evidence of market inefficiency. This chapter uses a change in the regulatory rules governing the marketing of AFP pensions (Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones) in Chile to investigate the empirical basis for sources of market frictions. We find that switching patterns are on a par with trading in US 401(k) accounts, and further, that switchers tend to be highly educated and relatively more highly paid. Switching is also more common among those with higher levels of financial literacy. The 1997 regulatory change appears to have reduced switching, particularly among the better educated.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
Editor-in-Chief Isaac Ehrlich works with an editorial board of leading economists in developing t... more Editor-in-Chief Isaac Ehrlich works with an editorial board of leading economists in developing the JOURNAL OF HUMAN CAPITAL. This important new journal explores the role human capital plays in the production, ...
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol 4a, 2011
ABSTRACT The purpose of this chapter is twofold: (1) to provide an accessible introduction to the... more ABSTRACT The purpose of this chapter is twofold: (1) to provide an accessible introduction to the methods of structural estimation of discrete choice dynamic programming (DCDP) models and (2) to survey the contributions of applications of these methods to substantive and policy issues in labor economics. The first part of the chapter describes solution and estimation methods for DCDP models using, for expository purposes, a prototypical female labor force participation model. The next part reviews the contribution of the DCDP approach to three leading areas in labor economics: labor supply, job search and human capital. The final section discusses approaches to validating DCDP models.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
ABSTRACT This paper evaluates the impact of three different performance incentives schemes using ... more ABSTRACT This paper evaluates the impact of three different performance incentives schemes using data from a social experiment that randomized 88 Mexican high schools with over 40,000 students into three treatment groups and a control group. Treatment one provides individual incentives for performance on curriculum-based mathematics tests to students only, treatment two to teachers only and treatment three gives both individual and group incentives to students, teachers and school administrators. Program impact estimates reveal the largest average effects for treatment three, smaller impacts for treatment one and no impact for treatment two.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000