RALF BOSCHECK - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Papers by RALF BOSCHECK

Estrategia Financiera, 1994

Part 1: Institutional Perspectives on Economic Coordination Part 2: The Governanace of Market Rel... more Part 1: Institutional Perspectives on Economic Coordination Part 2: The Governanace of Market Relations - the Case of Judging Veritcal Control Part 3: The Nature of Regulatory Contracts - the Case of the Water Industry in England and Wales Part 4: The Governance of Global Market Relations - the Case of Substituting Antitrust for Antidumping Part 5: The Constitution of Economic Coordination

Strategies, Markets and Governance, 2001

Strategies, Markets and Governance addresses governance concerns at firm, industry, country and i... more Strategies, Markets and Governance addresses governance concerns at firm, industry, country and international levels. How do regulatory authorities deal with new business models, organizational structures and blurring market relations? What limits regulatory control and what are the implications of corporate self-regulation? What drives the spread of new regulation and what limits its effectiveness? How does 'the organized public' shape political and corporate interests and what is its legitimacy and impact on business? How do corporate strategies turn tighter regulation into profit opportunities, deliver public benefits in the face of predatory states and when is exit the only option left? The contributing authors are leading researchers on governance and public policy, and present assessments of these questions in a variety of institutional and international contexts. The book is ideally suited to advanced students of business, public policy and business regulation, as wel...

International Journal of Energy Sector Management, 2007

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to offer an appreciation of the role of national oil companie... more PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to offer an appreciation of the role of national oil companies (NOCs) which control roughly 90 percent of the global hydrocarbon reserves, and whose operating and investment decisions affect prices, demand adjustments as well as their countries' policy options. Given that the role of NOCs is poorly understood largely due to prevailing economic and political clichés that substitute for analysis, this paper takes an institutional economics perspective to analyse the issue of NOC governance and related issues.Design/methodology/approachThe paper adopts an integrative approach. First, it introduces the language of institutional economics to broadly structure a review of NOC governance. It then links the theoretical discussion to an assessment of the macro‐economic imperatives to which the NOC and its governance may need to respond. Finally, an audit trail is used for assessing cases in their particular institutional, cultural and physical conditio...

Intereconomics, 2006

Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch ge... more Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes. You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.

Intereconomics, 2008

European Management Journal, 1993

In July 1991, the European Commission imposed its highest-ever fine for abuse of market power and... more In July 1991, the European Commission imposed its highest-ever fine for abuse of market power and restraint of competition against Tetra Pak, the Swedish/Swiss packaging company. Ralf Boscheck presents a case study of this decision arguing that the EC investigators may not have defined the market correctly and, in fact, may have misinterpreted the true basis of Tetra Pak's competitive

California Management Review, 1994

The recent enforcement records of international competition policy authorities reveal a marked in... more The recent enforcement records of international competition policy authorities reveal a marked increase in antitrust investigations on charges of "abuse of market power" and "restraints to competition." A review of policy discussions surrounding this development indicates that what initially appeared to be a periodic upsurge in regulatory interest in fact reflects a global trend towards more comprehensive and stringent competition controls. In the process, the very ingredients of business-school models for successful, long-term strategies may be, and in some instances have already been, interpreted as illegal monopolization. This apparent distancing between market realities and competition standards requires companies and policy makers to engage in a dialogue on what it takes to attain, sustain, and exploit a competitive advantage and how to assess its consequences for society at large. This article contrasts the dominant business, economic, and legal perspectives on "competitive advantage" in terms of four recent competition policy cases. It formulates key questions with regard to "market definition" and "permissible restraints to trade" that need to be answered before business can efficiently tackle emerging patterns of industrial organization.

World Competition

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) expects market-driven reforms t... more The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) expects market-driven reforms to increase the efficiency of health-care systems particularly if policymakers succeed in aligning incentives for multiple product and service suppliers to guarantee treatment outcome. The health-care reform of the Obama Administration reflects this approach. However, similar to the previous reform initiatives, it will be unable to ensure an efficient supply of necessary care unless performance is clearly defined in terms of treatment outcome. US regulatory initiatives, complementing the health-care bill, could put an end to the recent history of ill-defined market-driven reforms. The challenge is to navigate rather different views on the accessibility and marketability of different levels of outcome data and to coordinate seemingly conflicting regulatory agendas to promote properly constituted health-care markets.

World Competition

After more than twenty years of debate, regulatory under-enforcement and weighing overall welfare... more After more than twenty years of debate, regulatory under-enforcement and weighing overall welfare benefits against particular stakeholder concerns, the EU’s third legislative package, as adopted by the Council on 29 June 2009, offers Member States a menu of regulatory futures to choose from. Even if these options were functionally equivalent in creating ‘effective unbundling’, their respective regulatory requirements are clearly not. Broadening the definition of unbundling may turn out to be the political price that the Commission is willing to pay for ultimately seeing its preferred model of ownership unbundling (OU) adopted across the EU. However, it is not the economic evidence supporting OU that makes it an attractive option. Rather, the regulatory burden imposed on its alternatives will cause integrated operators to consider transmission ownership a liability rather than an asset. Meanwhile regulatory diversity may persist and by negatively affecting investments and competition...

World Competition

On 9 March 2012, India's Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trademarks granted a non-... more On 9 March 2012, India's Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trademarks granted a non-exclusive and non-assignable compulsory license to NatcoPharma to manufacture and sell a generic version of Bayer's cancer drug Nexavar at a discount of 97% on the innovator price. The ruling revives a drawn-out debate on the use and abuse of intellectual property rights in international commerce. The inclusion of the agreement of trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS) in WTO rules in 1994 committed member countries to honour patent rights and to apply common compulsory licensing standards when seeking market relief. Lately, however, the criteria for such interventions seem to have been slipping. Applying the 'public non-commercial use' rationale to non-emergency, non-infectious diseases, Thailand converted compulsory licensing into an effectively unconstrained method of pure cost containment. Widespread use of that model would require the developed wor...

World Competition

On both sides of the Atlantic, fast growing drug expenditures and an apparent slow–down in the in... more On both sides of the Atlantic, fast growing drug expenditures and an apparent slow–down in the introduction of new pharmaceutical compounds and generics had rekindled antitrust concerns. Yet while the EU Commission was entering largely uncharted territory, US authorities seemed guided by relevant legislation and case law that has no equivalent in Europe. Still, the US experience so far also shows that public outcries over high–profi le cases are no substitute for a dispassionate assessment of conflicting incentives, inconsistent regulatory standards and essential welfare trade–offs. In fact, it suggests the need to reconsider fundamental policy options and to establish efficient rules so as to ensure a competitive supply of innovative drugs. Contemplating the US experience, this article is organised in five parts. By way of introduction, Part I links US healthcare expenditures, drug research costs and elements of drug regulation and reimbursement to identify four corporate imperativ...

World Competition

US healthcare spending has made healthcare market reforms a critical and ongoing priority of regu... more US healthcare spending has made healthcare market reforms a critical and ongoing priority of regulatory policy. Healthcare markets are intrinsically fragile simply because providers deliver heterogeneous services to generally ill-informed patients who cover only a fraction of the costs. Intermediaries respond to the root causes of failing market coordination by injecting knowhow, aggregating demand and screening supplies. But they themselves are subject to regulatory concerns, as non-transparent practices could give rise to deceptive conduct and the scale of operations may eliminate actual, or foreclose potential, competition. Pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) are a case in point. PBMs organize the sale and reimbursement of prescription drugs between producers, pharmacists and diverse sets of private and public health plans. They are also the focal point in the current ‘drug-price blame game’ with independent pharmacists and drug producers zeroing in on PBMs as the main culprits. At ...

World Competition

Applying transaction cost thinking to specific case assessments often results in welfare implicat... more Applying transaction cost thinking to specific case assessments often results in welfare implications that contrast sharply with the respective positions taken by more prominent schools of antitrust analysis. And yet, difficulties in generalising and operationalising transaction cost economics for the purpose of policy formulation and guidance appear to forestall a broader endorsement. Unsurprisingly therefore, the EU’s new “economic-based” competition rules on vertical and horizontal restraints make little use of the approach’s superior ability to shape contract analysis. But even though transaction cost economics may seem out of reach for authorities aiming to devise simple, higher level default standards, transferred as an assessment tool to lower level regulation and case assessment, it may provide for efficient regulatory delegation in line with the White Paper’s broader competition policy reforms. What is required is an explanation of the broader economic contracting logic tha...

Estrategia Financiera, 1994

Strategies, Markets and Governance, 2001

International Journal of Energy Sector Management, 2007

Intereconomics, 2006

Intereconomics, 2008

European Management Journal, 1993

California Management Review, 1994

World Competition