Ramírez Calle - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Papers by Ramírez Calle
Episteme, Jun 1, 2008
Resumen: La pregunta por una fundamentación realista de la moral no tardará en ser enfocada hacía... more Resumen: La pregunta por una fundamentación realista de la moral no tardará en ser enfocada hacía la pregunta por la justificación y verdad de los juicios morales. Considerándose, a veces, que una respuesta a esta última pregunta serviría a los propósitos de la primera. En esta línea los defensores del realismo moral contemporáneo asumen que sus propuestas con respecto a la verdad de los enunciados morales sirven a los propósitos de la fundamentación. Desde una perspectiva realista de este corte, precisamente, algunos han cuestionado recientemente la plausibilidad de tentativas de fundamentación de la moral de corte kantiano, mientras otros defienden la necesidad de complementarlas con base realista si éstas no han de devenir meros formalismos vacíos. El objetivo más inmediato de este trabajo es considerar en qué medida las críticas que desde tales posiciones realistas se han hecho a la Ética del Discurso son acertadas. A este fin, me centraré, de un lado, en los trabajos de H. Putnam, y, de otro, en la propuesta de C. Lafont; concluyendo que la Ética del Discurso puede resistir la demanda de hacer concesiones, o convertirse a un realismo moral, en ambos frentes. Para terminar, no obstante, y como meta última de estas consideraciones, abordaré en términos generales el tema inicial-hasta que punto planteamientos de este tipo, en torno a la verdad de los enunciados, sirven al problema de la fundamentación-. Palabras clave: fundamentación, realismo moral, ética del discurso. 1 Este trabajo fue presentado en las VI Jornadas sobre Teorías de la Verdad que tuvieron lugar en Granada del 19-20 de abril del 2007. Una anterior versión, algo más corta, fue el tema de una ponencia presentada bajo el título 'La crítica del Realismo Moral a la Ética del Discurso' en Frankfurt/M el 28.06.2006 en una serie de conferencias sobre Realismo Moral.
Theoria, Mar 24, 2020
This article aims to defend the need to recognize the independent role of those cognitive abiliti... more This article aims to defend the need to recognize the independent role of those cognitive abilities on whose behalf linguistic meaning is introduced from the proper institution of language. I call this capacity "private pattern recognition" (PPR) and argue that it plays an essential part not just in the instauration of linguistic meaning but also in other relevant cognitive phenomena such as artistic creation and understanding. Moreover, it is precisely the failure to separate both aspects that gives rise to important perplexities associated with the underdetermination of meaning. The first part of the article makes a case for this thesis and addresses its compatibility with Wittgenstein's private language argument. It then focuses on the example of art to illustrate the differing roles of private pattern recognition and shared linguistic meaning. The second part of the article focuses on the paradox of resemblance (RP). It (i) considers the difficulties of Williamson's response, (ii) illustrates how they instead support the current thesis, (iii) attempts to delineate how the role of meaning should be understood, and (iv) briefly revisits the rule-following paradox (RFP).
Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 2020
E-LOGOS, Mar 30, 2018
This paper attempts to be a contribution to the epistemological project of explaining complex con... more This paper attempts to be a contribution to the epistemological project of explaining complex conceptual structures departing from more basic ones. The central thesis of the paper is that there are what I call "functionally structured concepts", these are non-harmonic concepts in Dummett's sense that might be legitimized if there is a function that justifies the tie between the inferential connection the concept allows us to trace. Proving this requires enhancing the russellian existential analysis of definite descriptions to apply to functions and using this in proving the legitimacy of such concepts. The utility of the proposal is shown for the case of thick ethical terms and an attempt is made to use it in explaining the development of natural numbers. This last move could allow us to go one step lower in explaining the genesis of natural numbers while maintaining the notion of abstract numbers as higher order entities.
The paper attempts to conciliate the important distinction between what-is, or exists, and what-i... more The paper attempts to conciliate the important distinction between what-is, or exists, and what-is-not, thereby supporting Russell’s existential analysis, with some Meinongian insights. For this purpose, it surveys the varied inhabitants of the realm of ‘non-being’ and tries to clarify their diverse statuses. The position that results makes it possible to rescue them back in surprising but non-threatening form, leaving our ontology safe from contradiction.
E-Logos Electronic Journal for Philosophy, 2020
This paper aspires to meet a philosophical challenge posed to the author to give treatment to wha... more This paper aspires to meet a philosophical challenge posed to the author to give treatment to what was seen as a particularly nice Meinongian case 2 ; namely the case of Galician Meigas. However, through the playful footpaths of enchanted Galician Meigas, I rehabilitate some relevant discussion on the justification of belief formation and come to some poignant philosophical insights regarding the understanding of possibilities. I hope both the leading promoter of the challenge and, of course, other philosophical readers are satisfied with the outcome.
Analiza i Egzystencja, 2020
Theoria, 2020
This article aims to defend the need to recognize the independent role of those cognitive abiliti... more This article aims to defend the need to recognize the independent role of those cognitive abilities on whose behalf linguistic meaning is introduced from the proper institution of language. I call this capacity "private pattern recognition" (PPR) and argue that it plays an essential part not just in the instauration of linguistic meaning but also in other relevant cognitive phenomena such as artistic creation and understanding. Moreover, it is precisely the failure to separate both aspects that gives rise to important perplexities associated with the underdetermination of meaning. The first part of the article makes a case for this thesis and addresses its compatibility with Wittgenstein's private language argument. It then focuses on the example of art to illustrate the differing roles of private pattern recognition and shared linguistic meaning. The second part of the article focuses on the paradox of resemblance (RP). It (i) considers the difficulties of Williamson's response, (ii) illustrates how they instead support the current thesis, (iii) attempts to delineate how the role of meaning should be understood, and (iv) briefly revisits the rule-following paradox (RFP).
Revista de Filosofía Laguna
In the face of the criticism raised against Habermas distinction between morality and ethics and ... more In the face of the criticism raised against Habermas distinction between morality and ethics and its universalist foundation of morality, it is argued that the priority of moral objectives results constitutively out of the normative reflection structure of the thinking subject, on which depend both the life objectives and corresponding social order in the specific contexts, as well as the personal ones; expanding, thus, the frame of the structurally constitutive in practical reflection. Additionally, the persistence of the Kantian moral thinking in the foundational architecture of ED is reconsidered.
E-LOGOS, 2018
This paper attempts to be a contribution to the epistemological project of explaining complex con... more This paper attempts to be a contribution to the epistemological project of explaining complex conceptual structures departing from more basic ones. The central thesis of the paper is that there are what I call “functionally structured concepts”, these are non-harmonic concepts in Dummett’s sense that might be legitimized if there is a function that justifies the tie between the inferential connection the concept allows us to trace. Proving this requires enhancing the russellian existential analysis of definite descriptions to apply to functions and using this in proving the legitimacy of such concepts. The utility of the proposal is shown for the case of thick ethical terms and an attempt is made to use it in explaining the development of natural numbers. This last move could allow us to go one step lower in explaining the genesis of natural numbers while maintaining the notion of abstract numbers as higher order entities.
Las Torres De Lucca Revista Internacional De Filosofia Politica, 2012
In this paper Jane Mansbridge reflects upon the role of resistance in democracy. Resistance "can ... more In this paper Jane Mansbridge reflects upon the role of resistance in democracy. Resistance "can cause inaction by focusing on stopping, rather than using, coercion."' Instead we should increase the legitimacy of democratic action and in that manner further the possibility of sanction through coercion. An improvement of democratic institutions and of the procedures of deliberation, which makes room for citizen input, would also make for a more efficacious and organized resistance, when necessary.
Prolegomena Casopis Za Filozofiju, May 30, 2011
The aim of the paper is to propose an alternative model to realist and non-cognitive explanations... more The aim of the paper is to propose an alternative model to realist and non-cognitive explanations of the rule-guided use of thick ethical concepts and to examine the implications that may be drawn from this and similar cases for our general understanding of rule-following and the relation between criteria of application, truth and correctness. It addresses McDowell's non-cognitivism critique and challenges his defence of the entanglement thesis for thick ethical concepts. Contrary to non-cognitivists, however, I propose to view the relation between the two terms of the entanglement as resulting from the satisfaction of a previously applied moral function. This is what I call a "Three-Fold Model".
Prolegomena Casopis Za Filozofiju, May 30, 2011
The aim of the paper is to propose an alternative model to realist and non-cognitive explanations... more The aim of the paper is to propose an alternative model to realist and non-cognitive explanations of the rule-guided use of thick ethical concepts and to examine the implications that may be drawn from this and similar cases for our general understanding of rule-following and the relation between criteria of application, truth and correctness. It addresses McDowell's non-cognitivism critique and challenges his defence of the entanglement thesis for thick ethical concepts. Contrary to non-cognitivists, however, I propose to view the relation between the two terms of the entanglement as resulting from the satisfaction of a previously applied moral function. This is what I call a "Three-Fold Model".
E-LOGOS
This paper aspires to meet a philosophical challenge posed to the author to give treatment to wha... more This paper aspires to meet a philosophical challenge posed to the author to give treatment to what was seen as a particularly nice Meinongian case 2 ; namely the case of Galician Meigas. However, through the playful footpaths of enchanted Galician Meigas, I rehabilitate some relevant discussion on the justification of belief formation and come to some poignant philosophical insights regarding the understanding of possibilities. I hope both the leading promoter of the challenge and, of course, other philosophical readers are satisfied with the outcome.
Logos & Episteme
The present paper deals with the ontological status of numbers and considers Frege´s proposal in ... more The present paper deals with the ontological status of numbers and considers Frege´s proposal in Grundlagen upon the background of the Post-Kantian semantic turn in analytical philosophy. Through a more systematic study of his philosophical premises, it comes to unearth a first level paradox that would unset earlier still than it was exposed by Russell. It then studies an alternative path that, departing from Frege’s initial premises, drives to a conception of numbers as synthetic a priori in a more Kantian sense. On this basis, it tentatively explores a possible derivation of basic logical rules on their behalf, suggesting a more rudimentary basis to inferential thinking, which supports reconsidering the difference between logical thinking and AI. Finally, it reflects upon the contributions of this approach to the problem of the a priori.
ETHICS IN PROGRESS
Boghossian’s (2003) proposal to conditionalize concepts as a way to secure their legitimacy in di... more Boghossian’s (2003) proposal to conditionalize concepts as a way to secure their legitimacy in disputable cases applies well, not just to pejoratives – on whose account Boghossian first proposed it – but also to thick ethical concepts. It actually has important advantages when dealing with some worries raised by the application of thick ethical terms, and the truth and facticity of corresponding statements. In this paper, I will try to show, however, that thick ethical concepts present a specific case, whose analysis requires a somewhat different reconstruction from that which Boghossian offers. A proper account of thick ethical concepts should be able to explain how ‘evaluated’ and ‘evaluation’ are connected.
Logos & Episteme, 2017
The paper offers an integrative interpretation of the different lines of thought Wittgenstein was... more The paper offers an integrative interpretation of the different lines of thought Wittgenstein was inspecting in On Certainty and what he might have been looking for through them. It suggests that we may have been focusing our attention too strongly in the wrong place and comes to a new conclusion about where the real import of these reflections lies. This leads to an answer to the initially posed question of foundationalism that revises the way in which there can be said to be a grounding intention in On Certainty.
Episteme Ns, Jul 11, 2013
Episteme, Jun 1, 2008
Resumen: La pregunta por una fundamentación realista de la moral no tardará en ser enfocada hacía... more Resumen: La pregunta por una fundamentación realista de la moral no tardará en ser enfocada hacía la pregunta por la justificación y verdad de los juicios morales. Considerándose, a veces, que una respuesta a esta última pregunta serviría a los propósitos de la primera. En esta línea los defensores del realismo moral contemporáneo asumen que sus propuestas con respecto a la verdad de los enunciados morales sirven a los propósitos de la fundamentación. Desde una perspectiva realista de este corte, precisamente, algunos han cuestionado recientemente la plausibilidad de tentativas de fundamentación de la moral de corte kantiano, mientras otros defienden la necesidad de complementarlas con base realista si éstas no han de devenir meros formalismos vacíos. El objetivo más inmediato de este trabajo es considerar en qué medida las críticas que desde tales posiciones realistas se han hecho a la Ética del Discurso son acertadas. A este fin, me centraré, de un lado, en los trabajos de H. Putnam, y, de otro, en la propuesta de C. Lafont; concluyendo que la Ética del Discurso puede resistir la demanda de hacer concesiones, o convertirse a un realismo moral, en ambos frentes. Para terminar, no obstante, y como meta última de estas consideraciones, abordaré en términos generales el tema inicial-hasta que punto planteamientos de este tipo, en torno a la verdad de los enunciados, sirven al problema de la fundamentación-. Palabras clave: fundamentación, realismo moral, ética del discurso. 1 Este trabajo fue presentado en las VI Jornadas sobre Teorías de la Verdad que tuvieron lugar en Granada del 19-20 de abril del 2007. Una anterior versión, algo más corta, fue el tema de una ponencia presentada bajo el título 'La crítica del Realismo Moral a la Ética del Discurso' en Frankfurt/M el 28.06.2006 en una serie de conferencias sobre Realismo Moral.
Theoria, Mar 24, 2020
This article aims to defend the need to recognize the independent role of those cognitive abiliti... more This article aims to defend the need to recognize the independent role of those cognitive abilities on whose behalf linguistic meaning is introduced from the proper institution of language. I call this capacity "private pattern recognition" (PPR) and argue that it plays an essential part not just in the instauration of linguistic meaning but also in other relevant cognitive phenomena such as artistic creation and understanding. Moreover, it is precisely the failure to separate both aspects that gives rise to important perplexities associated with the underdetermination of meaning. The first part of the article makes a case for this thesis and addresses its compatibility with Wittgenstein's private language argument. It then focuses on the example of art to illustrate the differing roles of private pattern recognition and shared linguistic meaning. The second part of the article focuses on the paradox of resemblance (RP). It (i) considers the difficulties of Williamson's response, (ii) illustrates how they instead support the current thesis, (iii) attempts to delineate how the role of meaning should be understood, and (iv) briefly revisits the rule-following paradox (RFP).
Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 2020
E-LOGOS, Mar 30, 2018
This paper attempts to be a contribution to the epistemological project of explaining complex con... more This paper attempts to be a contribution to the epistemological project of explaining complex conceptual structures departing from more basic ones. The central thesis of the paper is that there are what I call "functionally structured concepts", these are non-harmonic concepts in Dummett's sense that might be legitimized if there is a function that justifies the tie between the inferential connection the concept allows us to trace. Proving this requires enhancing the russellian existential analysis of definite descriptions to apply to functions and using this in proving the legitimacy of such concepts. The utility of the proposal is shown for the case of thick ethical terms and an attempt is made to use it in explaining the development of natural numbers. This last move could allow us to go one step lower in explaining the genesis of natural numbers while maintaining the notion of abstract numbers as higher order entities.
The paper attempts to conciliate the important distinction between what-is, or exists, and what-i... more The paper attempts to conciliate the important distinction between what-is, or exists, and what-is-not, thereby supporting Russell’s existential analysis, with some Meinongian insights. For this purpose, it surveys the varied inhabitants of the realm of ‘non-being’ and tries to clarify their diverse statuses. The position that results makes it possible to rescue them back in surprising but non-threatening form, leaving our ontology safe from contradiction.
E-Logos Electronic Journal for Philosophy, 2020
This paper aspires to meet a philosophical challenge posed to the author to give treatment to wha... more This paper aspires to meet a philosophical challenge posed to the author to give treatment to what was seen as a particularly nice Meinongian case 2 ; namely the case of Galician Meigas. However, through the playful footpaths of enchanted Galician Meigas, I rehabilitate some relevant discussion on the justification of belief formation and come to some poignant philosophical insights regarding the understanding of possibilities. I hope both the leading promoter of the challenge and, of course, other philosophical readers are satisfied with the outcome.
Analiza i Egzystencja, 2020
Theoria, 2020
This article aims to defend the need to recognize the independent role of those cognitive abiliti... more This article aims to defend the need to recognize the independent role of those cognitive abilities on whose behalf linguistic meaning is introduced from the proper institution of language. I call this capacity "private pattern recognition" (PPR) and argue that it plays an essential part not just in the instauration of linguistic meaning but also in other relevant cognitive phenomena such as artistic creation and understanding. Moreover, it is precisely the failure to separate both aspects that gives rise to important perplexities associated with the underdetermination of meaning. The first part of the article makes a case for this thesis and addresses its compatibility with Wittgenstein's private language argument. It then focuses on the example of art to illustrate the differing roles of private pattern recognition and shared linguistic meaning. The second part of the article focuses on the paradox of resemblance (RP). It (i) considers the difficulties of Williamson's response, (ii) illustrates how they instead support the current thesis, (iii) attempts to delineate how the role of meaning should be understood, and (iv) briefly revisits the rule-following paradox (RFP).
Revista de Filosofía Laguna
In the face of the criticism raised against Habermas distinction between morality and ethics and ... more In the face of the criticism raised against Habermas distinction between morality and ethics and its universalist foundation of morality, it is argued that the priority of moral objectives results constitutively out of the normative reflection structure of the thinking subject, on which depend both the life objectives and corresponding social order in the specific contexts, as well as the personal ones; expanding, thus, the frame of the structurally constitutive in practical reflection. Additionally, the persistence of the Kantian moral thinking in the foundational architecture of ED is reconsidered.
E-LOGOS, 2018
This paper attempts to be a contribution to the epistemological project of explaining complex con... more This paper attempts to be a contribution to the epistemological project of explaining complex conceptual structures departing from more basic ones. The central thesis of the paper is that there are what I call “functionally structured concepts”, these are non-harmonic concepts in Dummett’s sense that might be legitimized if there is a function that justifies the tie between the inferential connection the concept allows us to trace. Proving this requires enhancing the russellian existential analysis of definite descriptions to apply to functions and using this in proving the legitimacy of such concepts. The utility of the proposal is shown for the case of thick ethical terms and an attempt is made to use it in explaining the development of natural numbers. This last move could allow us to go one step lower in explaining the genesis of natural numbers while maintaining the notion of abstract numbers as higher order entities.
Las Torres De Lucca Revista Internacional De Filosofia Politica, 2012
In this paper Jane Mansbridge reflects upon the role of resistance in democracy. Resistance "can ... more In this paper Jane Mansbridge reflects upon the role of resistance in democracy. Resistance "can cause inaction by focusing on stopping, rather than using, coercion."' Instead we should increase the legitimacy of democratic action and in that manner further the possibility of sanction through coercion. An improvement of democratic institutions and of the procedures of deliberation, which makes room for citizen input, would also make for a more efficacious and organized resistance, when necessary.
Prolegomena Casopis Za Filozofiju, May 30, 2011
The aim of the paper is to propose an alternative model to realist and non-cognitive explanations... more The aim of the paper is to propose an alternative model to realist and non-cognitive explanations of the rule-guided use of thick ethical concepts and to examine the implications that may be drawn from this and similar cases for our general understanding of rule-following and the relation between criteria of application, truth and correctness. It addresses McDowell's non-cognitivism critique and challenges his defence of the entanglement thesis for thick ethical concepts. Contrary to non-cognitivists, however, I propose to view the relation between the two terms of the entanglement as resulting from the satisfaction of a previously applied moral function. This is what I call a "Three-Fold Model".
Prolegomena Casopis Za Filozofiju, May 30, 2011
The aim of the paper is to propose an alternative model to realist and non-cognitive explanations... more The aim of the paper is to propose an alternative model to realist and non-cognitive explanations of the rule-guided use of thick ethical concepts and to examine the implications that may be drawn from this and similar cases for our general understanding of rule-following and the relation between criteria of application, truth and correctness. It addresses McDowell's non-cognitivism critique and challenges his defence of the entanglement thesis for thick ethical concepts. Contrary to non-cognitivists, however, I propose to view the relation between the two terms of the entanglement as resulting from the satisfaction of a previously applied moral function. This is what I call a "Three-Fold Model".
E-LOGOS
This paper aspires to meet a philosophical challenge posed to the author to give treatment to wha... more This paper aspires to meet a philosophical challenge posed to the author to give treatment to what was seen as a particularly nice Meinongian case 2 ; namely the case of Galician Meigas. However, through the playful footpaths of enchanted Galician Meigas, I rehabilitate some relevant discussion on the justification of belief formation and come to some poignant philosophical insights regarding the understanding of possibilities. I hope both the leading promoter of the challenge and, of course, other philosophical readers are satisfied with the outcome.
Logos & Episteme
The present paper deals with the ontological status of numbers and considers Frege´s proposal in ... more The present paper deals with the ontological status of numbers and considers Frege´s proposal in Grundlagen upon the background of the Post-Kantian semantic turn in analytical philosophy. Through a more systematic study of his philosophical premises, it comes to unearth a first level paradox that would unset earlier still than it was exposed by Russell. It then studies an alternative path that, departing from Frege’s initial premises, drives to a conception of numbers as synthetic a priori in a more Kantian sense. On this basis, it tentatively explores a possible derivation of basic logical rules on their behalf, suggesting a more rudimentary basis to inferential thinking, which supports reconsidering the difference between logical thinking and AI. Finally, it reflects upon the contributions of this approach to the problem of the a priori.
ETHICS IN PROGRESS
Boghossian’s (2003) proposal to conditionalize concepts as a way to secure their legitimacy in di... more Boghossian’s (2003) proposal to conditionalize concepts as a way to secure their legitimacy in disputable cases applies well, not just to pejoratives – on whose account Boghossian first proposed it – but also to thick ethical concepts. It actually has important advantages when dealing with some worries raised by the application of thick ethical terms, and the truth and facticity of corresponding statements. In this paper, I will try to show, however, that thick ethical concepts present a specific case, whose analysis requires a somewhat different reconstruction from that which Boghossian offers. A proper account of thick ethical concepts should be able to explain how ‘evaluated’ and ‘evaluation’ are connected.
Logos & Episteme, 2017
The paper offers an integrative interpretation of the different lines of thought Wittgenstein was... more The paper offers an integrative interpretation of the different lines of thought Wittgenstein was inspecting in On Certainty and what he might have been looking for through them. It suggests that we may have been focusing our attention too strongly in the wrong place and comes to a new conclusion about where the real import of these reflections lies. This leads to an answer to the initially posed question of foundationalism that revises the way in which there can be said to be a grounding intention in On Certainty.
Episteme Ns, Jul 11, 2013