Raymond Boisvert - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Papers by Raymond Boisvert

Teaching Philosophy, 1984

Dewey’s Metaphysics

This chapter looks at how the beginning of John Dewey’s experimental phase is marked by his first... more This chapter looks at how the beginning of John Dewey’s experimental phase is marked by his first public presentation of a new logical position in Studies in Logical Theory, published in 1903. This is a logic based on the experimental methodology of the sciences, and as such is fully in line with the emphasis on change which dominates this period of his development. The chapter analyzes the impact of Darwin’s theory of evolution on Dewey, for it was this theory which most influenced his view of change. The latter part of the chapter describes the kind of ontology Dewey developed, in which it seems that he never really altered his original Kantian outlook. Critics of Dewey maintain that he remained an idealist, and explicitly compare him to Immanuel Kant.

The Pluralist, 2019

begin Philosophers at Table with a simile. Following Mary Midgley, they suggest that philosophy i... more begin Philosophers at Table with a simile. Following Mary Midgley, they suggest that philosophy is like plumbing. We post-industrial urbanites and suburbanites rely on plumbing to bring us water and dispose of our waste. We rely on it daily, but we rarely think reflectively about it. In like fashion, we all rely on philosophy; ideas, concepts, values, and guiding principles structure and organize the way we perceive and experience the world. Philosophy lies undetected, out of sight, tucked neatly in the walls and under the floorboards. We typically suffer its dripping faucets, its low water pressure, its slow drain as long as we can because these almost always involve unwieldy, labor-intensive repairs. Like plumbers, philosophers-the good kind-roll up their sleeves and work to ameliorate problematic situations. Boisvert and Heldke, in this book, are unclogging conceptual toilets and cleaning up philosophical messes in the philosophy of food. Boisvert and Heldke write: "[T]o live (and thus to eat) in the contemporary world is to negotiate a treacherous set of conceptual sinkholes, some of which threaten to drown you, others risk only damp feet" (20). They prod us to confront and reconsider particular conceptual presuppositions and commitments that hinder us from taking food as a proper object of philosophical inquiry and reflection. For example, Boisvert and Heldke suggest that philosophers need to recognize the self-inflicted wound that is the mindbody problem. In this case, philosophers are prodded to recognize (1) that we are "stomach-endowed creatures," and (2) that being explicit about the necessities of human persistence does influence how we approach philosophy (41). Some philosophers approach philosophy like the geometer; that is, they model philosophical method on the type of abstract inference-by-inference logical proof one finds in Euclid (45). Boisvert and Heldke argue that the stark distinctions between mind and body (postulated by geometer-styled philosophers) are problematized once we recognize that filling our stomachs is an undeniable feature of human life. We are not mere spectators, cogitating from a God's-eye-perspective. Human values, human knowing, and human well-being are, in many respects, influenced by our bodily pursuits of tasty, hygienic, or nutritious sustenance within the natural environment. And this, in turn, supports the idea that food/eating is a legitimate topic for philosophy. In contrast, they suggest that we approach philosophy like the

The Philosophers' Magazine, 2013

Encyclopedia of Food and Agricultural Ethics, 2014

John Dewey's early exposure to Hegel left a "permanent deposit" on his thinking. Dewey's Hegelian... more John Dewey's early exposure to Hegel left a "permanent deposit" on his thinking. Dewey's Hegelian side does not emerge in the usual sense of someone predicting the march of Spirit through history. Rather it is as the complete philosopher seeking, above all else, to leave nothing out. Such a philosopher criticized reifi ed abstractions, reinstated the centrality of relations, emphasized the importance of thinking ideas together with their history, and insisted on the interpenetration of individual and social. Th is Hegelian inheritance, when passed through the fi lter of praxis, identifi es, for some interpreters (I plead guilty) the strength of Dewey's philosophy. Coexisting with this dimension was another nineteenth-century strand, more consistent with theoria, the fascination with scientifi c method. Th is manifests itself as the attempt to articulate a philosophy which would match scientifi c achievements. For some pragmatists (once again, I plead guilty), moving forward means highlighting the Hegelian dimension and jettisoning the single methodology fascination. Most committed Deweyans, though, resist jettisoning anything. Th ey seek, instead, a way to keep both dimensions smoothly interwoven. Such a seamless web approach is manifested in David Hildebrand's helpful book Dewey: A Beginner's Guide. Th e volume, from Oneworld Publications, makes up part of a series, Oneworld Beginner's Guides, joining other texts on the likes of Nietzsche, Aquinas, Wittgenstein, Hume, and Rawls. General introductions to Dewey are important. Readers of Education and Culture will realize that Dewey was an all-around philosopher. In the wider com

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 1989

Studies in Philosophy and Education, 1995

When John Dewey entered the Burlington, Vermont school system he found himself in a class that wa... more When John Dewey entered the Burlington, Vermont school system he found himself in a class that was large, there were 54 students, and heterogeneous, their ages ranged from 7 to 19. This was in 1867, a time when efforts to improve American schools were already under way. The following year, thanks to the efforts of reformers, Dewey found himself in a more centralized system. The newer system aimed at city-wide standards of conformity, a centerpiece of which was the sorting out of students into classes consistent with age levels. Nonetheless, studies prepared at this time indicate the limitations still inherent in educational practice. One such report revealed that, for most students, learning was identified with exercises of repetition and memorization, a “lifeless, monotonous droning of syllables.”1 A widely repeated slogan of the time claimed that “it makes no difference what you teach a boy so long as he doesn’t like it” ([Dewey, 1980], p. 141).

The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 2008

As the 1970s were ending, two books were published that drew extensively on classical American ph... more As the 1970s were ending, two books were published that drew extensively on classical American philosophy. Both were by eclectic thinkers who sought to build bridges among American, Continental, and Analytic philosophical traditions. Each book celebrated three exemplary thinkers. Wittgenstein and Heidegger were the common choices. The different American philosopher sent a significant signal about contrasting emphases. Published in 1979, Richard Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature supplemented Wittgenstein and Heidegger with John Dewey. William Barrett's The Illusion of Technique, one year earlier, had chosen William James. Rorty's book, because of its subsequent influence, pointed toward the future. Barrett's book, whose thirtieth anniversary we celebrate this year, was quite different. It was sort of backward looking. Pulling together themes from his career, Barrett interwove Heidegger's emphasis on Being, Wittgenstein's flirtations with mysticism, and the centrality of hopeful commitment that marked James's appreciation of reli gion. The existentialism and liberal religious thought that had dominated through the sixties and early seventies were here being given one final summation. This year, to celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of Barrett's work, I wish to take a new look at his text. Several reasons conspire to make such an effort worth while. First, in remembering Barrett we recall someone well versed in American Pragmatism who took that influence in a syncretic rather than a school-follower direction. Second, there is the simple piety accorded to an important bridge figure, Barrett himself, who helped bring philosophy to a wider audience.1 Third, there is also his unique amalgam of Heidegger and James, an amalgam that provides fruitful hints for a twenty-first-century Pragmatist-inspired philosophy. This amalgam culminates in an alternative to Rorty's extension of Pragmatism in the

Journal of Philosophy of Education, 2002

Naoko Saito has made a good case for emphasising the 'tragic' dimension within Dewey's pragmatism... more Naoko Saito has made a good case for emphasising the 'tragic' dimension within Dewey's pragmatism. My response suggests ways in which Saito has not gone far enough. She does not adequately move beyond 'procedural pragmatism' to a 'programmatic pragmatism' which offers substantive articulations about the human good. In addition, her emphasis on 'Emersonian perfectionism' is misguided. Both the language of 'perfectionism' and the figure of Emerson are unsuitable for the project she intends. Speaking more concretely of a 'tragic-comic meliorism' allied to the novelist Hawthorne, it is suggested, provides a more fruitful path.

International Studies in Philosophy, 2003

Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, Jul 1, 2004

Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy, 1994

Given the proliferating literature on postmodernism, one might think that all the changes on the ... more Given the proliferating literature on postmodernism, one might think that all the changes on the subject had been runge Such an assumption would underestimate the creative capacity of French philosophers. Bruno Latour's Nous n~vons jamais~t~modemes: Essai d~nthropoJogiesymetrique(Paris: Editions la Decouverte, 1991) manages to turns the discussion inside out by challenging a central assumption shared by friend and foe of postmodernism alike.

Man and World, 1996

Identifying the traits of "modemity" has been a popular sport for some time. Jean Wahl's 1932 Ver... more Identifying the traits of "modemity" has been a popular sport for some time. Jean Wahl's 1932 Vers le Concret highlighted the turn from modernity's fascination with abstractions (pure reason, ideal languages, formal systems), to a more comprehensive emphasis on the concreteness of human experience. Santayana, one year earlier, had fastened onto contrasting images: city and country, stable subject and wayfarer: "The mind of the Renaissance was not a pilgrim mind, but a sedentary city mind .... "(Santayana, p. 130). Combining Wahl and Santayana results in an emphasis on the concrete accompanied by the revival of a pre-Renaissance anthropology (exemplified, for example in the Hebrew scriptures, in the Odyssey, in Chaucer). Such an anthropology would consider the human not only as a being-in-time, but also, in the expression of Gabriel Marcel, as homo viator, the being who is a wanderer. On the contemporary scene, there is an important philosopher, too little known in English speaking countries, whose writings blend a turn to the concrete with a pre-modem sense of the human being as homo viator. He is Michel Serres, the latest philosopher named to the Academie Franfaise. Accessibility to this thinker is made difficult by a carefully crafted, yet demanding, writing style. This difficulty is compounded by his penchant for producing texts that are evocative rather than logically rigorous, and by his rejection of scholarly apparati. Very rarely will one find a reference or a footnote in his books. What one does find are constant allusions which require from his readers a prodigious acquaintance with the history of philosophy, with literature, science, mythology, and religion. The book under review is even more exacting than most. This results, in part, from Serres's rejection of Cartesian-influenced methods in favor of an approach which, repudiating any absolute starting points, combines material from various fields. Atlas discusses, for example, chaos theory, commercials, virtual reality, the Belgian comic book Tintin, mythology, the political creation