Roland Vaubel - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Papers by Roland Vaubel
Cato Journal, 1986
Currency competition for the established national central banks can come from foreign central ban... more Currency competition for the established national central banks can come from foreign central banks or from private money suppliers (at home or abroad). At present, currency competition from both sources is severely restricted in many countries. Currency competition from foreign central banks can be restricted in several ways: • The currency issued by the national central bank can be prescribed as a private unit of account;’ • Contracts in foreign currencies can be prohibited by law or discouraged through discriminatory contract enforcement in the courts ;2 • Governments can restrict or discourage the holding of foreign currencies by residents (or the holding of the domestic currency by foreigners) and thereby interfere with the choice ofmeans of payments; • Governments can refuse to accept any other currency than the one issued by their central bank. Currency competition from private money suppliers is not admitted in any industrial country, but there have been many instances of
Recht, Ordnung und Wettbewerb, 2011
Der Aufsatz zeigt anhand zahlreicher Beispiele und quantitativer Analysen, dass internationale Or... more Der Aufsatz zeigt anhand zahlreicher Beispiele und quantitativer Analysen, dass internationale Organisationen - mehr als alle anderen staatlichen Institutionen - ein extremes Kontrolldefizit aufweisen. Umfragen belegen, dass sie andere Interessen als die Bürger haben. Sie können diese Interessen auch durchsetzen, weil die Informationskosten der Bürger hoch, ihre Kontrollanreize gering und ihre Ausweichmöglichkeiten eingeschränkt sind. Die Parlamente können ihrer Kontrollfunktion nicht gerecht werden, weil sie von den nationalen und internationalen Exekutivorganen entmachtet werden. Von den nationalen Regierungen werden die internationalen Organisationen nur sehr unvollkommen kontrolliert, weil sie Agenda- Setting Macht besitzen und weil die Kontrollkosten der zuständigen Minister und ihre Kontrollanreize zu gering sind. Die von den Regierungen eingesetzten Kontrollgremien (Exekutivdirektoren, Rechnungshöfe, internationale Gerichtshöfe) können diese Probleme nicht wesentlich entschär...
L'opinió de les institucions de la UE que Catalunya i Escòcia, un cop independitzades, haurien de... more L'opinió de les institucions de la UE que Catalunya i Escòcia, un cop independitzades, haurien de tornar a ser estats candidats a formar part de la UE no té cap base als tractats europeus » 84 • EINES 19 HIVERN 2014
Routledge Explorations in Economic History, 2007
Wirtschaftsdienst, 2008
General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public port... more General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ? Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch ge... more Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes. You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.
Econ Journal Watch, 2010
Why They Thought It Couldn't Happen American (and European!) economists did not understand the po... more Why They Thought It Couldn't Happen American (and European!) economists did not understand the politics behind EMU at the time. The political causes of EMU were revealed by Jacques Attali, adviser to French president Francois Mitterand, as late as 1998. In a television interview he said (my translation),
Financial and Monetary Policy Studies, 2014
Routledge Explorations in Economic History, 2007
The creation of EMU and the ECB has triggered a discussion of the future of EMU. Independent obse... more The creation of EMU and the ECB has triggered a discussion of the future of EMU. Independent observers have pointed to a number of shortcomings or "hazard areas" in the construction of EMU, such as the absence of a central lender of last resort function for EMU, the lack of a central authority supervising the financial systems of EMU, unclear and inconsistent policy guidelines for the ECB, the absence of central coordination of fiscal policies within EMU, unduly strict criteria for domestic debt and deficits, as set out in the Maastricht rules, in the face of asymmetric shocks, and Euroland as not an "optimal" currency area. Do these "flaws" represent major threats to the future of EMU? Or will they be successfully resolved by the European policy authorities, leading to a lasting and prosperous EMU? We provide answers to these questions by examining the historical record of monetary unions. We try to extract the key conditions for establishing and for maintaining monetary unions intact. Our main lesson from the history of monetary unions is that political factors will be the central determinants of the future of EMU. The "economic" shortcomings of EMU will likely be overcome as long as political unity prevails within EMU.
The institutions of the European Union are gaining more and more power at the expense of national... more The institutions of the European Union are gaining more and more power at the expense of national and local governments, as well as individuals and private businesses. There would appear to be no reverse gear in this process, while objections from the general public, as expressed in periodic referenda, tend to be brushed aside. This groundbreaking study explains increasing centralisation by analysing the economic incentives at work. The structure of European institutions means they have a vested interest in ever-closer union because this enhances their influence and prestige. Moreover, the bureaucrats themselves are self-selecting. Those that are pro-EU are more likely to seek positions in these organisations and therefore tend to favour policies which give the institutions more responsibilities. The author sets out a series of reforms designed to counteract the centralising tendency and to ensure that the role of EU bodies is more closely aligned with the preferences of citizens.
The Encyclopedia of Public Choice
The dynamics of European political integration is frequently explained by the strategy of Jean Mo... more The dynamics of European political integration is frequently explained by the strategy of Jean Monnet: market integration in selected branches (coal, steel, manufactures, agriculture, nuclear energy etc.) and common economic policies in these areas “spill over” into more and more sectors of the economy and finally necessitate full-fledged political integration. However, there are also public choice explanations. Whenever an increase in market integration (e.g., the internal market program of 1987) is considered or new members join the club, some countries claim to be net losers and insist on new policies which would redistribute in their favor (e.g., the European Regional Policy in 1975 or the doubling of the Structural Funds in 1987–92). Moreover, market integration undermines the tax and regulatory powers of the national governments because it increases the mobility of resources. The national politicians then try to preserve their power by “harmonizing” or centralizing policies at the European level. In the absence of constitutional or natural barriers to policy collusion, market integration leads to policy cartels or monopolies (Vaubel, 1999).
ABSTRACT Horizontal competition among governments has to be enforced by a higher-level institutio... more ABSTRACT Horizontal competition among governments has to be enforced by a higher-level institution, but this institution must not be the federal or union government, parliament or court, because these have a vested interest in intergovernmental collusion and ultimately in monopolization. The European Union institutions have been interested in removing national protection, regulations and subsidies because, by doing so, they could induce the interest groups, politicians, and bureaucrats of the member-states to demand more European protectionist measures, regulations, and subsidies. The establishment of a directly elected European Senate is proposed which would have no other powers than to enforce competition among governments on the basis of qualified minority decisions.
Cato Journal, 1986
Currency competition for the established national central banks can come from foreign central ban... more Currency competition for the established national central banks can come from foreign central banks or from private money suppliers (at home or abroad). At present, currency competition from both sources is severely restricted in many countries. Currency competition from foreign central banks can be restricted in several ways: • The currency issued by the national central bank can be prescribed as a private unit of account;’ • Contracts in foreign currencies can be prohibited by law or discouraged through discriminatory contract enforcement in the courts ;2 • Governments can restrict or discourage the holding of foreign currencies by residents (or the holding of the domestic currency by foreigners) and thereby interfere with the choice ofmeans of payments; • Governments can refuse to accept any other currency than the one issued by their central bank. Currency competition from private money suppliers is not admitted in any industrial country, but there have been many instances of
Recht, Ordnung und Wettbewerb, 2011
Der Aufsatz zeigt anhand zahlreicher Beispiele und quantitativer Analysen, dass internationale Or... more Der Aufsatz zeigt anhand zahlreicher Beispiele und quantitativer Analysen, dass internationale Organisationen - mehr als alle anderen staatlichen Institutionen - ein extremes Kontrolldefizit aufweisen. Umfragen belegen, dass sie andere Interessen als die Bürger haben. Sie können diese Interessen auch durchsetzen, weil die Informationskosten der Bürger hoch, ihre Kontrollanreize gering und ihre Ausweichmöglichkeiten eingeschränkt sind. Die Parlamente können ihrer Kontrollfunktion nicht gerecht werden, weil sie von den nationalen und internationalen Exekutivorganen entmachtet werden. Von den nationalen Regierungen werden die internationalen Organisationen nur sehr unvollkommen kontrolliert, weil sie Agenda- Setting Macht besitzen und weil die Kontrollkosten der zuständigen Minister und ihre Kontrollanreize zu gering sind. Die von den Regierungen eingesetzten Kontrollgremien (Exekutivdirektoren, Rechnungshöfe, internationale Gerichtshöfe) können diese Probleme nicht wesentlich entschär...
L'opinió de les institucions de la UE que Catalunya i Escòcia, un cop independitzades, haurien de... more L'opinió de les institucions de la UE que Catalunya i Escòcia, un cop independitzades, haurien de tornar a ser estats candidats a formar part de la UE no té cap base als tractats europeus » 84 • EINES 19 HIVERN 2014
Routledge Explorations in Economic History, 2007
Wirtschaftsdienst, 2008
General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public port... more General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ? Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch ge... more Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes. You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.
Econ Journal Watch, 2010
Why They Thought It Couldn't Happen American (and European!) economists did not understand the po... more Why They Thought It Couldn't Happen American (and European!) economists did not understand the politics behind EMU at the time. The political causes of EMU were revealed by Jacques Attali, adviser to French president Francois Mitterand, as late as 1998. In a television interview he said (my translation),
Financial and Monetary Policy Studies, 2014
Routledge Explorations in Economic History, 2007
The creation of EMU and the ECB has triggered a discussion of the future of EMU. Independent obse... more The creation of EMU and the ECB has triggered a discussion of the future of EMU. Independent observers have pointed to a number of shortcomings or "hazard areas" in the construction of EMU, such as the absence of a central lender of last resort function for EMU, the lack of a central authority supervising the financial systems of EMU, unclear and inconsistent policy guidelines for the ECB, the absence of central coordination of fiscal policies within EMU, unduly strict criteria for domestic debt and deficits, as set out in the Maastricht rules, in the face of asymmetric shocks, and Euroland as not an "optimal" currency area. Do these "flaws" represent major threats to the future of EMU? Or will they be successfully resolved by the European policy authorities, leading to a lasting and prosperous EMU? We provide answers to these questions by examining the historical record of monetary unions. We try to extract the key conditions for establishing and for maintaining monetary unions intact. Our main lesson from the history of monetary unions is that political factors will be the central determinants of the future of EMU. The "economic" shortcomings of EMU will likely be overcome as long as political unity prevails within EMU.
The institutions of the European Union are gaining more and more power at the expense of national... more The institutions of the European Union are gaining more and more power at the expense of national and local governments, as well as individuals and private businesses. There would appear to be no reverse gear in this process, while objections from the general public, as expressed in periodic referenda, tend to be brushed aside. This groundbreaking study explains increasing centralisation by analysing the economic incentives at work. The structure of European institutions means they have a vested interest in ever-closer union because this enhances their influence and prestige. Moreover, the bureaucrats themselves are self-selecting. Those that are pro-EU are more likely to seek positions in these organisations and therefore tend to favour policies which give the institutions more responsibilities. The author sets out a series of reforms designed to counteract the centralising tendency and to ensure that the role of EU bodies is more closely aligned with the preferences of citizens.
The Encyclopedia of Public Choice
The dynamics of European political integration is frequently explained by the strategy of Jean Mo... more The dynamics of European political integration is frequently explained by the strategy of Jean Monnet: market integration in selected branches (coal, steel, manufactures, agriculture, nuclear energy etc.) and common economic policies in these areas “spill over” into more and more sectors of the economy and finally necessitate full-fledged political integration. However, there are also public choice explanations. Whenever an increase in market integration (e.g., the internal market program of 1987) is considered or new members join the club, some countries claim to be net losers and insist on new policies which would redistribute in their favor (e.g., the European Regional Policy in 1975 or the doubling of the Structural Funds in 1987–92). Moreover, market integration undermines the tax and regulatory powers of the national governments because it increases the mobility of resources. The national politicians then try to preserve their power by “harmonizing” or centralizing policies at the European level. In the absence of constitutional or natural barriers to policy collusion, market integration leads to policy cartels or monopolies (Vaubel, 1999).
ABSTRACT Horizontal competition among governments has to be enforced by a higher-level institutio... more ABSTRACT Horizontal competition among governments has to be enforced by a higher-level institution, but this institution must not be the federal or union government, parliament or court, because these have a vested interest in intergovernmental collusion and ultimately in monopolization. The European Union institutions have been interested in removing national protection, regulations and subsidies because, by doing so, they could induce the interest groups, politicians, and bureaucrats of the member-states to demand more European protectionist measures, regulations, and subsidies. The establishment of a directly elected European Senate is proposed which would have no other powers than to enforce competition among governments on the basis of qualified minority decisions.