Ronnie de Sousa - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Papers by Ronnie de Sousa

Philosophy in review, 1982

Computational Linguistics, Volume 26, Number 4, December 2000, 2000

BRUTUS is a program that tells stories. The stories are intriguing, they hold a hint of mystery, ... more BRUTUS is a program that tells stories. The stories are intriguing, they hold a hint of mystery, and-not least impressive-they are written in correct English prose. An example (p. 124) is shown in Figure 1. This remarkable feat is grounded in a complex architecture making use of a number of levels, each of which is parameterized so as to become a locus of possible variation. The specific BRUTUS1 implementation that illustrates the program's prowess exploits the theme of betrayal, which receives an elaborate analysis, culminating in a set Betrayal in Self-Deception Dave Striver loved the university. He loved its ivy-covered clocktowers, its ancient and sturdy brick, and its sun-splashed verdant greens and eager youth. He also loved the fact that the university is free of the stark unforgiving trials of the business world-only this isn't a fact: academia has its own tests, and some are as merciless as any in the marketplace. A prime example is the dissertation defense: to earn the Ph.D., to become a doctor, one must pass an oral examination on one's dissertation. This was a test Professor Edward Hart enjoyed giving. Dave wanted desperately to be a doctor. But he needed the signatures of three people on the first page of his dissertation, the priceless inscriptions which, together, would certify that he had passed his defense. One of the signatures had to come from Professor Hart, and Hart had often said-to others and to himself-that he was honored to help Dave secure his well-earned dream. Well before the defense, Striver gave Hart a penultimate copy of his thesis. Hart read it and told Dave that it was absolutely first-rate, and that he would gladly sign it at the defense. They even shook hands in Hart's book-lined office. Dave noticed that Hart's eyes were bright and trustful, and his bearing paternal. At the defense, Dave thought that he eloquently summarized Chapter 3 of his dissertation. There were two questions, one from Professor Rodman and one from Dr. Teer; Dave answered both, apparently to everyone's satisfaction. There were no further objections. Professor Rodman signed. He slid the tome to Teer; she too signed, and then slid it in front of Hart. Hart didn't move. "Ed?" Rodman said. Hart still sat motionless. Dave felt slightly dizzy. "Edward, are you going to sign?" Later, Hart sat alone in his office, in his big leather chair, saddened by Dave's failure. He tried to think of ways he could help Dave achieve his dream.

Du point de vue biologique qui caracterise la science cognitive, la demarche phenomenologique a t... more Du point de vue biologique qui caracterise la science cognitive, la demarche phenomenologique a trois defauts importants. Premierement, elle vise la description et non l'explication. Elle constitue en cela un premier pas legitime dans toute investigation du fonctionnement de l'esprit, mais on ne saurait lui laisser le dernier mot. Deuxiemement, son ambition de decouvrir des essences a priori est irrealisable, en regard du projet scientifique qui veut que les essences soient etablies a posteriori. Enfin, elle est vouee a l'echec par le fait que l'intentionnalite, propriete essentielle des contenus mentaux, decoule en partie de proprietes teleologiques constituees par des faits historiques, c'est-a-dire externes par rapport a la conscience immediate.

The phrase, "Moral Emotions " suggests two questions. First, some emotions, such as com... more The phrase, "Moral Emotions " suggests two questions. First, some emotions, such as compassion or sympathy, are generally approved of; others, such as rage or envy, may be thought "nasty". What is the basis of these judgments? We may also want to ask whether emotions in general can themselves legitimately form the basis of moral judgments. In the following discussion I shall principally be concerned with the second question, but my focus will be on the apparent circularity which arises if emotions are both the object and the basis of moral appraisal. On the relevance of emotions to ethics, the history of philosophy affords three positions. The first, which we can roughly identify with the Stoics, denies that emotions have any moral worth: emotions as a group are better stamped out in the service of the good life. This position influenced Kant, and thereby modern philosophy. Its virtue lies in highlighting the importance to ethics of impartiality, but is now widel...

Philosophy in review, 1991

The name of Descartes has become synonymous with “dualism”. A thesis of dualism would seem to pre... more The name of Descartes has become synonymous with “dualism”. A thesis of dualism would seem to presuppose that each of the things of which there are said to be two, is in itself one. Notoriously, what Descartes says about mind-body unity is puzzling. Equally puzzling is what Descartes says about the unity of the soul and the unity of the human body. The modest aim of the following pages is to shed some light on these puzzles if only perhaps by generating further puzzles. Our contention is that the notion of unity or of an individual in Descartes’s ontology of everyday life is a functional concept. Taking seriously the implications of this point has ramifications both for how the unities of mind and body and their separateness are to be understood.

Philosophy after Darwin, 2010

Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume, 1994

In both biology and psychology, the notion of an individual is indispensable yet puzzling. It has... more In both biology and psychology, the notion of an individual is indispensable yet puzzling. It has played a variety of roles in diverse contexts, ranging from philosophical problems of personal identity to scientific questions about the immunological mechanisms for telling ‘self’ from ‘non-self.’ There are notorious cases in which the question of individuality is difficult to settle — ant hill, slime mold, or beehive, for instance. Yet the notion of an individual organism, both dependent on and independent of other individuals in specific ways, is crucial to our conception of life itself. It is also crucial to our notion of mentality, and hence to other concepts — moral and social — which must be explicated in terms of individual mentality. (Think, for example, of the importance of the quality and nature of individual consciousness to debates about abortion and euthanasia.)

Dual-Process Theories in Moral Psychology, 2016

To moralize is to claim to be entitled to impose normative moral standards on persons who either ... more To moralize is to claim to be entitled to impose normative moral standards on persons who either have not already endorsed them, or having endorsed them, fail to meet them. Antimoralism refers to the view that we should reject the hegemony of morality: contrary to what is assumed by most moral philosophers, we are not required to rank moral considerations above all others when we make decisions. On this view, the legitimate sphere of morality ought to be strictly constrained. The word ‘ought’, in the last sentence, signals a potential incoherence: for is this not itself a normative statement, which although it belongs strictly speaking to metaethics rather than morality, could be charged with the sin of moralizing? The argument of this paper begins by sketching reasons for thinking that existing attempts to find a foundation of morality all fail. In the spirit of Humean skepticism and Nietzschean genealogy, recent work in evolutionary psychology and neuroscience suggests that morality is not all of a piece, but arises from clusters of emotional dispositions that order themselves into relatively distinct domains. The avoidance of harm, justice and liberty are part of the liberal conception of ethics, which excludes three other domains – purity, community-loyalty and hierarchy- authority – that are central to traditional and conservative morality. Liberal ideology therefore seems guilty of just the sort of moralizing it deplores in traditional morality. I conclude by sketching some ways in which it can evade this charge.

Biofutur, 2000

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Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 2002

Taking literally the concept of emotional truth requires breaking the monopoly on truth of belief... more Taking literally the concept of emotional truth requires breaking the monopoly on truth of belief-like states. To this end, I look to perceptions for a model of non-propositional states that might be true or false, and to desires for a model of propositional attitudes the norm of which is other than the semantic satisfaction of their propositional object. Those models inspire a conception of generic truth, which can admit of degrees for analogue representations such as emotions; belief-like states, by contrast, are digital representations. I argue that the gravest problem-objectivity-is not insurmountable.

Philosophies

Contemporary philosophers have paid increasing attention to the empirical research on emotions th... more Contemporary philosophers have paid increasing attention to the empirical research on emotions that has blossomed in many areas of the social sciences. In this paper, I first sketch the common roots of science and philosophy in Ancient Greek thought. I illustrate the way that specific empirical sciences can be regarded as branching out from a central trunk of philosophical speculation. On the basis of seven informal characterizations of what is distinctive about philosophical thinking, I then draw attention to the fact that scientific progress frequently requires one to make adjustments to the way its basic terms are conceptualized, and thus cannot avoid philosophical thought. The character of emotions requires attention from many disciplines, and the links among those disciplines inevitably require a broader philosophical perspective to be understood. Thus, emotion science, and indeed all of science, is inextricably committed to philosophical assumptions that demand scrutiny.

Journal of Philosophical Research, 1997

Emotion Review, 2022

Müller argues that the perceptual or “Axiological Receptivity” (AR) model of emotions is incohere... more Müller argues that the perceptual or “Axiological Receptivity” (AR) model of emotions is incoherent, because it requires an emotion to apprehend and respond to its formal object at the same time. He defends a contrasting view of emotions as “Position-Takings" (PT) towards “formal objects”, aspects of an emotion's target pertinent to the subject's concerns. I first cast doubt on the cogency of Müller's attack on AR as begging questions about the temporal characteristics of perceptual events. I then argue that Müller's version of PT is not radical enough. On my attitudinal view, formal objects are not values but natural properties that justify specific affective or behavioral responses. Values are constituted only by a negotiated social aggregation of individual evaluative attitudes.