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Papers by S. Parlane

Research paper thumbnail of Decentralized licensing of complementary patents: Comparing the royalty, fixed-fee and two-part tariff regimes

Information Economics and Policy, 2010

Research paper thumbnail of Optimal Initial Public O¤ering design with aftermarket trading

We characterize the optimal pricing and allocation of shares in the presence of distinct adverse ... more We characterize the optimal pricing and allocation of shares in the presence of distinct adverse selection problems. Some investors have private information at the time of the IPO and sell their shares in the after-market upon facing liquidity needs. Others learn their private interest in the after-market, and sell their shares strategically. The optimal mechanism trades-o¤ informational rents and rents to strategic traders. Flipping facilitates truthful information revelation. When liquidity needs are likely, it is optimal to allocate all shares to investors informed at the IPO stage. Otherwise, some shares are allocated to those who trade strategically in the after-market.

Research paper thumbnail of Procurement contracts under limited liability

Economic and Social Review, 2003

Research paper thumbnail of Contracting with capacity constrained suppliers

Research paper thumbnail of Innovation in the Shadow of Patent Litigation

Review of Industrial Organization, 2008

Research paper thumbnail of Optimal Initial Public O¤ering design with aftermarket trading

We characterize the optimal pricing and allocation of shares in the presence of distinct adverse ... more We characterize the optimal pricing and allocation of shares in the presence of distinct adverse selection problems. Some investors have private information at the time of the IPO and sell their shares in the after-market upon facing liquidity needs. Others learn their private interest in the after-market, and sell their shares strategically. The optimal mechanism trades-o¤ informational rents and rents to strategic traders. Flipping facilitates truthful information revelation. When liquidity needs are likely, it is optimal to allocate all shares to investors informed at the IPO stage. Otherwise, some shares are allocated to those who trade strategically in the after-market.

Research paper thumbnail of Decentralized licensing of complementary patents: Comparing the royalty, fixed-fee and two-part tariff regimes

Information Economics and Policy, 2010

Research paper thumbnail of Optimal Initial Public O¤ering design with aftermarket trading

We characterize the optimal pricing and allocation of shares in the presence of distinct adverse ... more We characterize the optimal pricing and allocation of shares in the presence of distinct adverse selection problems. Some investors have private information at the time of the IPO and sell their shares in the after-market upon facing liquidity needs. Others learn their private interest in the after-market, and sell their shares strategically. The optimal mechanism trades-o¤ informational rents and rents to strategic traders. Flipping facilitates truthful information revelation. When liquidity needs are likely, it is optimal to allocate all shares to investors informed at the IPO stage. Otherwise, some shares are allocated to those who trade strategically in the after-market.

Research paper thumbnail of Procurement contracts under limited liability

Economic and Social Review, 2003

Research paper thumbnail of Contracting with capacity constrained suppliers

Research paper thumbnail of Innovation in the Shadow of Patent Litigation

Review of Industrial Organization, 2008

Research paper thumbnail of Optimal Initial Public O¤ering design with aftermarket trading

We characterize the optimal pricing and allocation of shares in the presence of distinct adverse ... more We characterize the optimal pricing and allocation of shares in the presence of distinct adverse selection problems. Some investors have private information at the time of the IPO and sell their shares in the after-market upon facing liquidity needs. Others learn their private interest in the after-market, and sell their shares strategically. The optimal mechanism trades-o¤ informational rents and rents to strategic traders. Flipping facilitates truthful information revelation. When liquidity needs are likely, it is optimal to allocate all shares to investors informed at the IPO stage. Otherwise, some shares are allocated to those who trade strategically in the after-market.

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