S. Parlane - Profile on Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Papers by S. Parlane

Information Economics and Policy, 2010

This paper explores the decentralized licensing of complementary patents reading on a technology ... more This paper explores the decentralized licensing of complementary patents reading on a technology standard. We develop a model in which manufacturers must buy licenses from di¤erent patent owners in order to enter the market for di¤erentiated standard-compliant products. We consider three di¤erent types of licensing, namely, the …xed-fee, per-unit royalty and two-part tari¤ regimes, and compare their performances in terms of licensing revenue, price, product variety and welfare. We show that each regime entails di¤erent types of coordination failures. We establish that each of them may maximize the licensing revenue depending on the number of licensors, number of potential entrants and product di¤erentiation.

We characterize the optimal pricing and allocation of shares in the presence of distinct adverse ... more We characterize the optimal pricing and allocation of shares in the presence of distinct adverse selection problems. Some investors have private information at the time of the IPO and sell their shares in the after-market upon facing liquidity needs. Others learn their private interest in the after-market, and sell their shares strategically. The optimal mechanism trades-o¤ informational rents and rents to strategic traders. Flipping facilitates truthful information revelation. When liquidity needs are likely, it is optimal to allocate all shares to investors informed at the IPO stage. Otherwise, some shares are allocated to those who trade strategically in the after-market.

Economic and Social Review, 2003

This paper analyses procurement when contractors have limited liability and when the sponsor cann... more This paper analyses procurement when contractors have limited liability and when the sponsor cannot commit to any specific form of future negotiation. It shows that introducing limited liability enhances competition and thus the likelihood of bankruptcy. Among efficient auctions in which only the winner gets paid, the commonly used first price auction is shown to give the lowest probability of bankruptcy. Finally, it shows that the characterisation of a mechanism minimising the project's cost results from trading-off bankruptcy costs with informational rents.

Economic Theory, 2001

This paper characterizes the optimal and efficient mechanisms to allocate simultaneously two subs... more This paper characterizes the optimal and efficient mechanisms to allocate simultaneously two substitute tasks to two suppliers. Two main results emerge from this analysis. First, even under some regularity conditions efficiency and optimality do not systematically coincide. Efficiency can always be achieved using some second price auctions which are optimal when both suppliers compete for the same task. When there is competition for different tasks the optimal production is distorted from efficiency over a nondegenerate interval of types so as to extract the full surplus over that interval. Second, full extraction of the surplus may still guarantee incentive compatibility.

Review of Industrial Organization, 2008

We analyze non-cooperative R&D investment by two …rms that already hold patents that they can ass... more We analyze non-cooperative R&D investment by two …rms that already hold patents that they can assert against each other with probabilistic success. The market structure results from stochastic innovation and patent litigation. Depending on the level of infringement fees, we highlight positive and negative e¤ects of litigation threats on innovation. We de…ne an appropriate regulatory structure of infringement fees that will implement socially e¢ cient R&D investments in the case of symmetric and asymmetric patent portfolios.

We characterize the optimal pricing and allocation of shares in the presence of distinct adverse ... more We characterize the optimal pricing and allocation of shares in the presence of distinct adverse selection problems. Some investors have private information at the time of the IPO and sell their shares in the after-market upon facing liquidity needs. Others learn their private interest in the after-market, and sell their shares strategically. The optimal mechanism trades-o¤ informational rents and rents to strategic traders. Flipping facilitates truthful information revelation. When liquidity needs are likely, it is optimal to allocate all shares to investors informed at the IPO stage. Otherwise, some shares are allocated to those who trade strategically in the after-market.

Information Economics and Policy, 2010

This paper explores the decentralized licensing of complementary patents reading on a technology ... more This paper explores the decentralized licensing of complementary patents reading on a technology standard. We develop a model in which manufacturers must buy licenses from di¤erent patent owners in order to enter the market for di¤erentiated standard-compliant products. We consider three di¤erent types of licensing, namely, the …xed-fee, per-unit royalty and two-part tari¤ regimes, and compare their performances in terms of licensing revenue, price, product variety and welfare. We show that each regime entails di¤erent types of coordination failures. We establish that each of them may maximize the licensing revenue depending on the number of licensors, number of potential entrants and product di¤erentiation.

We characterize the optimal pricing and allocation of shares in the presence of distinct adverse ... more We characterize the optimal pricing and allocation of shares in the presence of distinct adverse selection problems. Some investors have private information at the time of the IPO and sell their shares in the after-market upon facing liquidity needs. Others learn their private interest in the after-market, and sell their shares strategically. The optimal mechanism trades-o¤ informational rents and rents to strategic traders. Flipping facilitates truthful information revelation. When liquidity needs are likely, it is optimal to allocate all shares to investors informed at the IPO stage. Otherwise, some shares are allocated to those who trade strategically in the after-market.

Economic and Social Review, 2003

This paper analyses procurement when contractors have limited liability and when the sponsor cann... more This paper analyses procurement when contractors have limited liability and when the sponsor cannot commit to any specific form of future negotiation. It shows that introducing limited liability enhances competition and thus the likelihood of bankruptcy. Among efficient auctions in which only the winner gets paid, the commonly used first price auction is shown to give the lowest probability of bankruptcy. Finally, it shows that the characterisation of a mechanism minimising the project's cost results from trading-off bankruptcy costs with informational rents.

Economic Theory, 2001

This paper characterizes the optimal and efficient mechanisms to allocate simultaneously two subs... more This paper characterizes the optimal and efficient mechanisms to allocate simultaneously two substitute tasks to two suppliers. Two main results emerge from this analysis. First, even under some regularity conditions efficiency and optimality do not systematically coincide. Efficiency can always be achieved using some second price auctions which are optimal when both suppliers compete for the same task. When there is competition for different tasks the optimal production is distorted from efficiency over a nondegenerate interval of types so as to extract the full surplus over that interval. Second, full extraction of the surplus may still guarantee incentive compatibility.

Review of Industrial Organization, 2008

We analyze non-cooperative R&D investment by two …rms that already hold patents that they can ass... more We analyze non-cooperative R&D investment by two …rms that already hold patents that they can assert against each other with probabilistic success. The market structure results from stochastic innovation and patent litigation. Depending on the level of infringement fees, we highlight positive and negative e¤ects of litigation threats on innovation. We de…ne an appropriate regulatory structure of infringement fees that will implement socially e¢ cient R&D investments in the case of symmetric and asymmetric patent portfolios.

We characterize the optimal pricing and allocation of shares in the presence of distinct adverse ... more We characterize the optimal pricing and allocation of shares in the presence of distinct adverse selection problems. Some investors have private information at the time of the IPO and sell their shares in the after-market upon facing liquidity needs. Others learn their private interest in the after-market, and sell their shares strategically. The optimal mechanism trades-o¤ informational rents and rents to strategic traders. Flipping facilitates truthful information revelation. When liquidity needs are likely, it is optimal to allocate all shares to investors informed at the IPO stage. Otherwise, some shares are allocated to those who trade strategically in the after-market.