Samuel Albert - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Papers by Samuel Albert
Journal of Austrian-American history, Sep 30, 2023
Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians, Jun 1, 1998
Nineteenth-century art worldwide, Mar 15, 2022
Cultures of International Exhibitions 1840–1940
Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians, 2007
Austrian History Yearbook, 2012
direction. He follows this with a comprehensive explanation of the forces, plans, and preparation... more direction. He follows this with a comprehensive explanation of the forces, plans, and preparations, which orients the reader to what the high command thought to achieve. He then thoroughly describes the initial conduct of the campaign—the recapture of Przemysl and the liberation of Lemberg, with a lucid narrative directly based on archival materials. DiNardo’s approach makes this book an ideal vehicle to view how operational designs achieve strategic purposes, in this case the recovery of the Austro-Hungarian province of Galicia. At this point, the successful Gorlitz-Tarnow campaign set the conditions for the Austrians and the Germans to consider the conquest of Russian Poland. DiNardo masterfully presents the decisions, with particular emphasis on the infighting between the Austrian and German chiefs of the general staff, Generals Conrad von Hötzendorf and Erich von Falkenhayn, respectively, and the preparations that led to the six-week conquest of Poland. It is of interest that these were campaigns of maneuver and fluidity of command and control and, as such, defy our conventional received wisdom about the static trench warfare conditions of World War I. Professor DiNardo’s assessments are fascinating and dispel the notion that the chiefs of staff were the “front men” for commanders within the Austrian and German military systems. This is a pervasive myth in the historiography of the war, and DiNardo clearly identifies these campaigns as campaigns conceived and executed by commanders, with the support of their staffs. He argues this point well and also clearly explains who made which decision at what level. In this regard, DiNardo is something of a cheerleader for the talented but underappreciated August von Mackensen and his brilliant chief, Hans von Seeckt. This is a good read as DiNardo’s fine sense of humor and wit paint vivid characterizations of the principal players. His portrait of Conrad, for example, presents “a man of serial obsessions” who is distracted by his professional fixation with Serbia and his personal fixation with Gina von Reininghaus (85). He presents a memorable cast of characters, many of whom his readers will find, in DiNardo’s words, to be “fairly unknown.” These include General Otto von Emmich, General Hermann von François, General Alexander von Linsingen, and many others. Overall, Professor DiNardo achieves his intended purposes. A previous reviewer of this book commented that his treatment of the Russians lacked depth. However, this reviewer finds the analysis of the subject very balanced in the sense that this work is, by design, a campaign study from the Austro-Hungarian and German perspectives. Of note, DiNardo’s work is useful as a valuable counterpoint to illustrate the success of German offensive methods of command and control against a well-prepared and capable enemy in comparison to operations of similar scale conducted by the British and French in 1915. Breakthrough: The Gorlice-Tarnow Campaign, 1915 is strongly recommended, not only for readers interested in World War I, but also as a standalone campaign study of the Operational Art as it was practiced in the pre-mechanized era.
Austrian History Yearbook, 1999
Architecture and Urbanism in the British Empire, 2016
Studies in the Decorative Arts
Studies in the Decorative Arts, 1999
Children's Literature, Culture, and Cognition, 2015
Journal of Austrian-American history, Sep 30, 2023
Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians, Jun 1, 1998
Nineteenth-century art worldwide, Mar 15, 2022
Cultures of International Exhibitions 1840–1940
Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians, 2007
Austrian History Yearbook, 2012
direction. He follows this with a comprehensive explanation of the forces, plans, and preparation... more direction. He follows this with a comprehensive explanation of the forces, plans, and preparations, which orients the reader to what the high command thought to achieve. He then thoroughly describes the initial conduct of the campaign—the recapture of Przemysl and the liberation of Lemberg, with a lucid narrative directly based on archival materials. DiNardo’s approach makes this book an ideal vehicle to view how operational designs achieve strategic purposes, in this case the recovery of the Austro-Hungarian province of Galicia. At this point, the successful Gorlitz-Tarnow campaign set the conditions for the Austrians and the Germans to consider the conquest of Russian Poland. DiNardo masterfully presents the decisions, with particular emphasis on the infighting between the Austrian and German chiefs of the general staff, Generals Conrad von Hötzendorf and Erich von Falkenhayn, respectively, and the preparations that led to the six-week conquest of Poland. It is of interest that these were campaigns of maneuver and fluidity of command and control and, as such, defy our conventional received wisdom about the static trench warfare conditions of World War I. Professor DiNardo’s assessments are fascinating and dispel the notion that the chiefs of staff were the “front men” for commanders within the Austrian and German military systems. This is a pervasive myth in the historiography of the war, and DiNardo clearly identifies these campaigns as campaigns conceived and executed by commanders, with the support of their staffs. He argues this point well and also clearly explains who made which decision at what level. In this regard, DiNardo is something of a cheerleader for the talented but underappreciated August von Mackensen and his brilliant chief, Hans von Seeckt. This is a good read as DiNardo’s fine sense of humor and wit paint vivid characterizations of the principal players. His portrait of Conrad, for example, presents “a man of serial obsessions” who is distracted by his professional fixation with Serbia and his personal fixation with Gina von Reininghaus (85). He presents a memorable cast of characters, many of whom his readers will find, in DiNardo’s words, to be “fairly unknown.” These include General Otto von Emmich, General Hermann von François, General Alexander von Linsingen, and many others. Overall, Professor DiNardo achieves his intended purposes. A previous reviewer of this book commented that his treatment of the Russians lacked depth. However, this reviewer finds the analysis of the subject very balanced in the sense that this work is, by design, a campaign study from the Austro-Hungarian and German perspectives. Of note, DiNardo’s work is useful as a valuable counterpoint to illustrate the success of German offensive methods of command and control against a well-prepared and capable enemy in comparison to operations of similar scale conducted by the British and French in 1915. Breakthrough: The Gorlice-Tarnow Campaign, 1915 is strongly recommended, not only for readers interested in World War I, but also as a standalone campaign study of the Operational Art as it was practiced in the pre-mechanized era.
Austrian History Yearbook, 1999
Architecture and Urbanism in the British Empire, 2016
Studies in the Decorative Arts
Studies in the Decorative Arts, 1999
Children's Literature, Culture, and Cognition, 2015