Shane Mulligan - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Papers by Shane Mulligan

The past few years of rapidly rising energy costs, coupled with concerns over the long term stabi... more The past few years of rapidly rising energy costs, coupled with concerns over the long term stability of oil and gas supplies, have helped bring the notion of “energy security” to the forefront of the international scene. Especially since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the “resource war” thesis has had an unremitting “fossil fuels case” to support it. Russia and the EU continue tense discussions over natural gas supplies, while the head of Russia’s state-led gas monopoly, Gazprom, was recently elected (installed, some say) as President of that energy-rich state. Ongoing tensions over Iran’s pursuit of nuclear technologies, China’s seemingly relentless search for coal and oil, Canada’s tar-sands, and the global obsession with biofuels, all highlight the importance of energy concerns in relations among the world’s states today. Indeed, one might be tempted to see energy security emerging as a dominant discourse in the field of security in the 21 century. The concept of energy security is ...

Canadian Journal of Sociology, Sep 22, 2003

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, 161 pp. It is over a decade since Rodney Barker, alo... more Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, 161 pp. It is over a decade since Rodney Barker, along with a few other authors, helped revive debates over political legitimacy, its proper conceptualization, and its role in political life. (1) Legitimacy is a central concept in political discourse, and there are perhaps too many ways to speak of it. Yet the corollary (some would say cause) of legitimacy, legitimation, has virtually escaped direct analysis. What is legitimation? What happens where we find this term? The fact that Legitimating Identities tackles such rare questions directly should be of interest to virtually all social and political thinkers. The book offers a thought provoking and genuinely enjoyable, if not entirely satisfactory approach to a theory of legitimation. Without a doubt its ideas warrant further examination. Barker introduces his thesis by enjoining us to recognize that the practice of politics is replete with non-utilitarian behaviours--symbolic rituals, ostentatious building projects, elite parties, "pomp and ceremony," of which he offers no shortage of historical examples--that are difficult to account for from a rationalist perspective. Moreover, much of this expenditure is evidently not for general consumption, but for a select audience of elites, and often mainly for rulers themselves. Barker refers to these characteristic activities of government as instances of "endogenous or self-legitimation." "What are governments doing," he asks, "when they spend time, resources and energy legitimating themselves?" (2). The broad answer is simple enough: "When rulers legitimate themselves, they claim that particular species of prestige which attaches to government" (4). The remainder of the book describes and explains how this claiming--which Barker sees as "a dimension of politics"--occurs. The central point of Barker's argument is that this complex of claims is constitutive of the ruler's identity as a special person, and that rulers themselves are thus the primary target of their own claims. Legitimation, that is, is first and foremost an activity undertaken by rulers to assure themselves of their special status, and hence (it seems) of their right to rule. It is a process by which they justify their privileges, powers, and decisions to themselves; only secondarily is it directed at underlings and subjects, for the ruler's self-conception is, in this view, the most important factor of successful governance. "When subjects lose faith in rulers, government becomes difficult. When rulers lose confidence in themselves, it becomes impossible" (68). Moreover, "since it is the difference from ordinary people that is being celebrated, cultivated, and confirmed, the participation, presence, or even awareness of ordinary people is not a central or even necessary part of the process" (76). Barker devotes a chapter to each of three levels of political relations in which legitimation can be seen to occur: rulers legitimate themselves to themselves; they legitimate themselves to their peers and close subordinates; and they legitimate themselves to their subjects. "At each stage out from the centre [legitimation] is likely to be carried out with less time, attention, energy and intensity, though at any stage the investment can be greater than a narrow utilitarian view would lead one to expect ... And, at each stage, the legitimation is reciprocal" (71). That is, successful legitimation requires the mutual confirmation of identity among rulers, peers, servants, and subjects; in confirming the special identity of the ruler, others confirm their own non-special status. It is thus not merely identity that is confirmed, but relationships among identities. And in terms of relevance, the ruler is invariably at the top. Clearly, Barker's argument does not fit neatly with contemporary "political theory"; his statements seem to offer a radical alternative to our traditional concerns over "popular" or "democratic" legitimacy. …

Digital Cultures and the Politics of Emotion, 2012

Political Studies, 2003

In a recent article in this journal, David Howarth raises important questions regarding the use o... more In a recent article in this journal, David Howarth raises important questions regarding the use of Michel Foucault's thought in the study of political discourse. He proposes to 'evaluate ... the strengths and weaknesses of Foucault's archaeological approach ... by considering its application to the case of Black Consciousness (BC) ideology in South Africa' (Howarth, 2002, p. 118). Though Foucault had reservations about the notion of ideology, I agree that his work does seem to offer a promising avenue into the study of political discourse. I am less comfortable, however, with the way Howarth 'applies' archaeology to that realm of discourse. His approach, I argue, contravenes a number of archaeology's key tenets, and thus cannot be taken as an evaluation at all. In highlighting his oversights, this reply aims to clarify the demands of a Foucaultian approach to political discourse(s). To be sure, this critique is not directed at Howarth's article as a whole. His dissolution of the 'myths' governing previous analyses of the BC movement seems quite valid, and there is much to commend the Gramsci-inspired approach of Laclau and Mouffe as a means of explaining social histories. Nor do I aim to defend the archaeological approach; rather, I further questions archaeology's potential for application in this realm. Beyond the critical points highlighted by Howarth, there are a number of specific requirements of archaeology that put in question the very possibility of its use in the analysis of 'ideologies' or 'political discourse'. My main point, though, is simply this: if we are going to 'evaluate' Foucault's archaeological approach, then we at least need to try using it. This reply discusses three related aspects of Howarth's approach that preclude an archaeological analysis: the first, and most critical, is the predetermination of the discourse, 'BC ideology'; second is the problem of 'translating' archaeology's categories; and third is Howarth's treatment of 'the subject'. An Archaeology of Black Consciousness? The first chapter of The Archaeology of Knowledge (Foucault, 1972; hereafter AK) describes its central theme: the question of the 'unities' of human knowledge, unities that are accepted in history and tradition, but which 'may not ... be what they seem at first sight' (AK, p. 26). Foucault insisted we 'must question these ready-made syntheses, these groupings that we normally accept before any examination ... [W]e must oust these forms and obscure forces by which we usually link

Millennium - Journal of International Studies, 2001

Millennium - Journal of International Studies, 2000

547 The more one advances in the book, the more one has the feeling that the problem was not the ... more 547 The more one advances in the book, the more one has the feeling that the problem was not the credibility of Turkey, or the EU for the matter, but rather of the kind of contract between the two. Ugur proves quite brilliantly, for instance, that his thesis is also applicable to the 1995 Customs Union agreement between the EU and Turkey. So the question the author of this book review would like Ugur to answer is, whether this time around the announcement made in Helsinki in December 1999 by the EU, whereby Turkey became a candidate for entry into the EU, will work differently and not permit either of the two sides to walk away when the chips are down. If we go by the experience of past enlargement processes, one would say yes. And the current process of negotiations, initiated with twelve other European countries for their admission in the EU, has not signalled for the moment to any of the candidate countries that the rules of membership will be rewritten for them. But one never knows and this is a risk they must be prepared to take.