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Papers by Shraman Banerjee
Social Science Research Network, 2023
Social Science Research Network, 2022
We investigate a …nite-horizon dynamic pricing problem of a seller under limited commitment. Even... more We investigate a …nite-horizon dynamic pricing problem of a seller under limited commitment. Even when the buyers are ex-ante symmetric to the seller, the seller can charge di¤erent prices to di¤erent buyers. We show that under the class of posted-price mechanisms this asymmetric treatment of symmetric buyers strictly revenue-dominates symmetric treatment. The seller implements this by using a priority-based deterministic tie-breaking rule instead of using a random tie-breaking rule. The e¤ect of asymmetric treatment on revenue increment increases monotonically as we increase the time horizon of the game.
ProQuest Dissertations and Theses, 2015
ERN: Stochastic & Dynamic Games (Topic), 2018
We consider a dynamic posted-price mechanism of a seller who must sell a single unit of a good to... more We consider a dynamic posted-price mechanism of a seller who must sell a single unit of a good to a number of buyers before a deadline. The seller cannot pre-commit to any price-path. Even when the buyers are symmetric (though non-anonymous) to the seller, the seller can charge different prices to different buyers. We show that this asymmetric treatment of symmetric buyers revenue-dominates the optimal symmetric mechanism. We change the random tie-breaking allocation rule, used for symmetric mechanisms, to generate higher revenue for the seller. We show that the result holds even in static environment, though the marginal benefit of price discrimination increases with the time horizon of the game.
We consider the dynamic pricing problem of a seller who cannot cannot pre-commit to future price ... more We consider the dynamic pricing problem of a seller who cannot cannot pre-commit to future price path. In the case when the buyers are time-inconsistent, we compare the revenue-maximizing price path of the seller with a benchmark case of time-consistent buyers. We show that under time-inconsistency, the seller has to lower the initial period prices and increase the more later period prices in order to induce the buyers to buy earlier. With large number of buyers, the sellers problem coincides with the time-consistent case. JEL Classi cation: C72, D01, D42, D82
In single object auctions when bidders are asymmetric, the Myersonian optimal auction is di¢ cult... more In single object auctions when bidders are asymmetric, the Myersonian optimal auction is di¢ cult to implement because of its complexity and possible discouragement e¤ect on the bidders. In these cases, Hartline and Roughgarden (2009) proposes a simpleauction that revenue approximates the optimal auction. This paper experimentally studies the performance of the simple auction vis-a-vis the optimal auction in terms of revenue generation. Keywords Optimal Auction, Simple Auction, Asymmetric Bidders JEL Classi cation D44, C90 O. P. Jindal Global University. Sonipat Narela Road, Near Jagdishpur Village, Sonipat, Haryana 131001. Email: shraman.banerjee14@gmail.com. yAshoka University. Plot No. 2, Rajiv Gandhi Education City, Sonipat, Haryana, 131029. Email: swagata.bhattacharjee@ashoka.edu.in zWe would like to thank Bhaskar Dutta, Yoram Halevy, Debasis Mishra, Noam Nisan, Tim Salmon, and Dale Stahl for helpful comments and feedback. This is a preliminary version. Do not cite.
This paper presents a nite-horizon bargaining model where each player has private valuation over... more This paper presents a nite-horizon bargaining model where each player has private valuation over the good for sale. The seller posts a price in each period, which the buyer has to accept, or reject. If he rejects, a new price is posted in the next period. Bargaining ine¢ ciencies arise due to incomplete information. We show that the probability of trade over all periods decreases when we increase the horizon of the game. JEL Classi cation: C70, D42, D82
SSRN Electronic Journal
We consider a dynamic posted-price mechanism of a seller who must sell a single unit of a good to... more We consider a dynamic posted-price mechanism of a seller who must sell a single unit of a good to a number of buyers before a deadline. The seller cannot pre-commit to any price-path. Even when the buyers are symmetric (though non-anonymous) to the seller, the seller can charge di¤ erent prices to di¤erent buyers. We show that this asymmetric treatment of symmetric buyers revenue-dominates the optimal symmetric mechanism. We change the random tie-breaking allocation rule, used for symmetric mechanisms, to generate higher revenue for the seller. We show that the result holds even in static environment, though the marginal bene…t of price discrimination increases with the time horizon of the game.
Social Science Research Network, 2023
Social Science Research Network, 2022
We investigate a …nite-horizon dynamic pricing problem of a seller under limited commitment. Even... more We investigate a …nite-horizon dynamic pricing problem of a seller under limited commitment. Even when the buyers are ex-ante symmetric to the seller, the seller can charge di¤erent prices to di¤erent buyers. We show that under the class of posted-price mechanisms this asymmetric treatment of symmetric buyers strictly revenue-dominates symmetric treatment. The seller implements this by using a priority-based deterministic tie-breaking rule instead of using a random tie-breaking rule. The e¤ect of asymmetric treatment on revenue increment increases monotonically as we increase the time horizon of the game.
ProQuest Dissertations and Theses, 2015
ERN: Stochastic & Dynamic Games (Topic), 2018
We consider a dynamic posted-price mechanism of a seller who must sell a single unit of a good to... more We consider a dynamic posted-price mechanism of a seller who must sell a single unit of a good to a number of buyers before a deadline. The seller cannot pre-commit to any price-path. Even when the buyers are symmetric (though non-anonymous) to the seller, the seller can charge different prices to different buyers. We show that this asymmetric treatment of symmetric buyers revenue-dominates the optimal symmetric mechanism. We change the random tie-breaking allocation rule, used for symmetric mechanisms, to generate higher revenue for the seller. We show that the result holds even in static environment, though the marginal benefit of price discrimination increases with the time horizon of the game.
We consider the dynamic pricing problem of a seller who cannot cannot pre-commit to future price ... more We consider the dynamic pricing problem of a seller who cannot cannot pre-commit to future price path. In the case when the buyers are time-inconsistent, we compare the revenue-maximizing price path of the seller with a benchmark case of time-consistent buyers. We show that under time-inconsistency, the seller has to lower the initial period prices and increase the more later period prices in order to induce the buyers to buy earlier. With large number of buyers, the sellers problem coincides with the time-consistent case. JEL Classi cation: C72, D01, D42, D82
In single object auctions when bidders are asymmetric, the Myersonian optimal auction is di¢ cult... more In single object auctions when bidders are asymmetric, the Myersonian optimal auction is di¢ cult to implement because of its complexity and possible discouragement e¤ect on the bidders. In these cases, Hartline and Roughgarden (2009) proposes a simpleauction that revenue approximates the optimal auction. This paper experimentally studies the performance of the simple auction vis-a-vis the optimal auction in terms of revenue generation. Keywords Optimal Auction, Simple Auction, Asymmetric Bidders JEL Classi cation D44, C90 O. P. Jindal Global University. Sonipat Narela Road, Near Jagdishpur Village, Sonipat, Haryana 131001. Email: shraman.banerjee14@gmail.com. yAshoka University. Plot No. 2, Rajiv Gandhi Education City, Sonipat, Haryana, 131029. Email: swagata.bhattacharjee@ashoka.edu.in zWe would like to thank Bhaskar Dutta, Yoram Halevy, Debasis Mishra, Noam Nisan, Tim Salmon, and Dale Stahl for helpful comments and feedback. This is a preliminary version. Do not cite.
This paper presents a nite-horizon bargaining model where each player has private valuation over... more This paper presents a nite-horizon bargaining model where each player has private valuation over the good for sale. The seller posts a price in each period, which the buyer has to accept, or reject. If he rejects, a new price is posted in the next period. Bargaining ine¢ ciencies arise due to incomplete information. We show that the probability of trade over all periods decreases when we increase the horizon of the game. JEL Classi cation: C70, D42, D82
SSRN Electronic Journal
We consider a dynamic posted-price mechanism of a seller who must sell a single unit of a good to... more We consider a dynamic posted-price mechanism of a seller who must sell a single unit of a good to a number of buyers before a deadline. The seller cannot pre-commit to any price-path. Even when the buyers are symmetric (though non-anonymous) to the seller, the seller can charge di¤ erent prices to di¤erent buyers. We show that this asymmetric treatment of symmetric buyers revenue-dominates the optimal symmetric mechanism. We change the random tie-breaking allocation rule, used for symmetric mechanisms, to generate higher revenue for the seller. We show that the result holds even in static environment, though the marginal bene…t of price discrimination increases with the time horizon of the game.